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Strategic Studies Institute SS1 U.S. Army War Coflege Special Repdrt W4RE DOES CUBA STANDI Etirique A. Baloyrd 1 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE rMOn Ap.povoc .'rIt, ,nf.1A3 a I hp1Vl,IIElf 0! 0 o l H s m nK l, .l ......... ,r ,1 4Ia MII0W ',.I I¶m -" , .... .. L AGENCY USEO JNLY f .st. 2,0I QPORT DATE J. I'Ul4T rIIL %N OATES -COV9;E6 S4.T IIL AND SUBTITLE ¶m UNIA"lmN UMBERS _ __ __ _ _ 7. PERFOMING ORGANIZAT N NAMIk() AN, ADDESb(LSi) d. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College it,- SPNOI4G~M 1 NTRN DGNC ... _________ ieL(cid:127)UL(cid:127)j Qi I - NYA Mk(S) ANIJ AULLSSIESI 10. SPONSORING,'MONITMtRING AGENCY REPORT NUMIER S . SUPPLUMENTARY NOTES -2A, DISTRIBUTIONNA'V AILABILIIY (cid:127)TATFMENT 15b. DISTRIBUTION CODo Approved for public release! distr3,bution 'AMSaR(cid:127)'(cid:127)uCm O(cid:127)00wrds} Given the potential explosiveness of the Cuban crisis and the possibility of U.S. military involvement, the author examines the Cuban situation. Current events raise quoestions about security issues for the United States as well as about the effectiveness and wisdom of the lhrpe-rlprýadj-nld U.S. policy of containment and nunishment. Many observers believe that the Castro regime is in its final hour, and its passing could be accompanied by massive bloodshed, causing a new wave of refugees to southern Florida. The author argues that since Castro's current policy of "re-equilibration" is not likely to succeed, only two options remain openi deepening the process of government-led reforml or continuing the current policy, with growing chances of violence and turmoil. The author suggests that since the former might jeopardize Castro's hegemonic position, the latter is the, more probable option. 14, SUBJECT TERM . 15. NUMBER OF PAGES Castro regimei "re-equilibration"I government-led reformi Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): Revolutionary It.PA ICCOSE ~771-E,U NITV(cid:127):L A3SflI~J~DgIJC~AJ4T1 I f l. S1CURIV CLASSIrnATION 4. "I~, s~ . 3I |CT11ITT.C LAS-4S'~IPN-~T' C,A~T'ION 20.L IMITATION OF ABSTRACT OF RIPORT Of THIS PAGE Of ABSTRACT ;,E a -I-" =A IT4 4 . @4 04 __.,' .4..... ~~ ~ .. '22. - - 'r," -t !s import, -t 1'1Z %.;Nsisksent ite m' rest c: ';;e ororz, otrwertco.~v; r and title page. 'ýR.:ýk:"-,o.:~ r1eý ' or :nq if, e.ai.n block of :r'e iorm tollow moorzi'i 5tr av .-ithin the knes to meet . r~'Ottc3i scanniflq requirementls. Block 1. Aq,?ncy Use Only (Leavehblan~k)- Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Bloc 2. ýep-lio t pbitctioncat Denotes public availability or limitations. 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'. ..it..Mor'iforing Poenc-; 'Jarrefs) accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., n,'ri'trv I INCLASSIFIFD). if form contains classified ,f"I ~''~~'.oir~ i mi iown) C, r' ?triT his block must '.'. - ' 'ov t r. i_:-J'isewnere sucnas: be Completed to assign a limitation to the .'-,ins,-;h. nrP To be ?h *ract. n t er eitiher (J L (tinl im ited) or SAR (same .7.'.... 4 . 4Ut ~uf.~-.'.te~ .~ u~$tr~t , 1) i~ mica.it blank, tne austract or unpI'-.mri~rn(tI ~he oid'er report, is assumed to be unlimited. Best Available COPY WHERE DOES CUBA STAND? Enrique A. Baloyra AccesionF NTIS CRA&I DTICI "1IA/ ' By ............ ......... Di:,l ibul i I January 14,1994 Avdliability (;JUdos Avdil wdldor Dist Special BA 1.. ... ..... The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report Is approved for public release; distribution Is unlimited. Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. ii FOREWORD The crisis of the Cuban revolution has once again raised a number of security issues for the United States, along with important questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of the three- decade-old U.S. policy of containment and punishment. Many observers believe that the Castro regime is in its final hour, and that its passing may be accompanied by massive bloodshed and a new wave of refugees to southern Florida. Given the potential exploslveness of the Cuban crisis and the possibility that It might lead to U.S. military involvement, it would seem appropriate to take a closer look at the Cuban situation. In particular, we need a better understanding of those forces promoting both political stability and Instability. In this report, the distinguished Latin American scholar Enrique Baloyra argues that Castro's current policy of "re-equilibration" is unlikely to succeed and that his options will increasingly boil down to two choices: One, he can deepen the process of government-led reform, or, two, he can continue the current policy, with growing chances of violence and turmoil. Baloyra suggests that since the former might jeopardize his hegemonic position, the latter Is the more probable option. The future, in short, Is likely to be grim. This report Is an expanded and refined version of an earlier paper that was presented at an SSI roundtable on "Cuba and the Future," held at the U.S. Army War College. That session was organized by Dr. Donald E. Schulz and funded by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Outreach Program under the leadership of Colonel John D. Auger. The Strategic Studies Institute Is pleased to publish this report an a contribution to understanding events in this important region. JO N W. MOUNTCASTLE Col nel, U.S. Army I ctor, Strategic Studies Institute iii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA is a Professor of Political Science and former Dean of the Graduate School at the University of Miami. He has published widely on Central America and the Caribbean Basin. His best known book is El Salvador in Transition and his most recent is an edited volume which he organized with James A. Morris, Conflict and Change In Cuba (1993). Iv WHERE DOES CUBA STAND? A Riddle. Is Cuba different? Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall In November 1989, and particularly since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in summer 1991, predictions about the imminent collapse of the Castro regime have been more frequent.' Scholars and qualified analysts agree that the regime confronts its worst crisis ever and that it can not possibly escape it unscathed.2 By this they do not mean that the regime will inevitably fall, only that to avoid more catastrophic alternatives, Including widespread violence or outright civil war, the historic revolutionary leadership must innovate considerably more than It has ever been willing to. Indeed, It appeared that to prevent a complete national collapse that would destroy the regime, the leadership had already Introduced changes that it would normally have refused to even consider. If the Cuban leadership is acting under duress, why have we not witnessed more dramatic developments? If social and economic conditions are so harsh and growing worse, why have people not gone into the street to march and protest? Why are we yet to witness domestic political opposition effectively challenging the regime? Why have the leaders in the so-called left-wing of the Cuban Communist Party refrained from expressing their criticisms and disagreements In public? Why have the armed forces apparently remained loyal? Is Cuba unique?3 Some could argue that the Cuban system of domination Is so perfect, so omnipresent and so omnipotent that, as many of the characters In the plays of Vaclav Havel claimed, "There is no alternative but to submit." Others would claim that the regime still enjoys a fair amount of foundational legitimacy and that the government Is firmly in control of the situation and capable of experimenting with ad hoc strategies of re-equillibration. Which is actually the case? On Cuban Uniqueness. For a long time, specialists have dealt with Cuba as a deviant, almost unique, case. We need to review the factors making Cuba different, not to drive home the point that it will romain so-that is, invulnerable to the changes that broke down other socialist regimes-but to understand how these factors are retarding the process of change. In very schematic fashion, here Is how five of those factors seem to be operating in the early 1990s. First, Cuba's Insularity and proximity to the United States have always militated against regime change for a number of historical and political reasons. These are well-known and do not require additional elaboration except to point out that they have allowed the fidelistas to play politics in terms of North-South (small versus large, Independent versus neocolonial) oppositions and to Isolate the Cuban public from external stimuli. In the Cuban case, North-South contradictions have very profound historical roots and become specific as a test of strength between nationalism and Imperialism. The result has been that the more relevant contradiction of Cuban politics in the last four decades-pitting of an oppressive regime against a dominated soclety-has been overlooked and neglected. Far too frequently, political actors in the United States address Cuba as a domestic U.S. Issue, seek to project power and Influence through American Institutions, advance proposals that Ignore the historical antecedents of U.S.-Cuban relations, or fail to Incorporate the nuances of contemporary Cuban politics. Regardless of the Intent, the result Is the perception in Cuba that outside actors want to dictate solutions which, In many cases, run contrary to the explicit wishes or public positions of their would-be Cuban allies. Second, none of the peaceful processes of regime transition has been determined by external factors. In the 1970s, military defeat abroad contributed to the deterioration of the Salazarist regime in Portugal and to the collapse of the colonels' regime In Greece. Similarly, the defeat In the Falklands unravelled the Argentine military regime, but only 2 after General Galtieri committed his government to a gamble of his and his colleagues own choosing, rather than one that was imposed on them. In Central Europe, where the USSR instigated the removal of Erich Honecker in the GDR, helped plot the overthrow of Nicolas Ceaucescu in Romania, and orchestrated the ouster of Todor Zhikov in Bulgaria, the Soviets had to act through local intermediaries who had their own interests and priorities. The outcome of these Interventions was far from uniform. Such Intermediaries have not been available in the Cuban case, and potential local allies have been unwilling and/or unable to assist in this project. The United States lacks an effective domestic presence in Cuba and, for the reasons adduced before, an American connection would likely be a delegitimizing factor in the eyes of the majority of the Cuban population, rather than a factor that would Increase the prestige and legitimacy of the opposition. In too many cases, opponents of the regime, particularly those operating In the United States, have chosen to highlight their closeness and support for the Cuba policies of the incumbent administration. Third, Cuba was a model ot national communism which, despite a heavy reliance and dependence on the Soviet Union, maintained a degree of Independence and autonomy that could not have been predicted from a cursory inspection of the country's strategic assets and resource potential. Cuban willingness to experiment in the delivery of collective goods at home and aggressive pursuit of proletarian Internationalism abroad-including programs of fraternal economic assistance-preserved the freshnebs of the revolutionary experience for a long time. The boredom and despair of the disaffected coexisted side by side with the optimism and heightened sense of personal efficacy of the committed. That sense of efficacy was probably much more widespread in Cuba than in other socialist countries. To be sure, the Cuban revolutionaries failed the test of creating wealth. Nevertheless, they have evolved a winning competitive ethos yet to be contradicted by military defeat or catastrophic political setbacks. This ethos stands behind the arrogance and self-sufficiency of the leading figures of the 3