DTIC ADA252787: Military Review: Training the Force.

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* Miitariy Review
Headquartes Departmentr 01 Ie A~iy
Prepared by
Lieutenant General US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Leonard P. Wishart Ill VOLUME LXXI - JANUARY 1991 - NO 1
Professional Bulletin 100-91-1
Commandant, USACGSC
Brigadier Genera! (P) CONTENTS
John E.M illerAryoth
2 Training and the Am of t 99s
Dep"t Commandant, USACGSC
by General Carl E Vuono. US Army
Military Review Staff Training and Educating Leaders for the
10
Lieutenant Colonel (P)S teven F Rausch Future: The New COSOC Curriculum
Editor in Chief
Lieutenant Colonel Donald G Rhodes by Brigadier General (P) John E. Miller. US Army,
Associate Editor RLA L TIE h
Major Chnis J.L eBlanc
Managing Edito 18 EM L TIP Th Calegso
Major Bruce M.K irgaeatHmeo BiaeTraining a Ho eStation
Editor, Latin Amrican Editions
Mr. Phillip R. Davis by Major General Charles H Armstrong. US Army
Production Editor Lieutenant Colonel Larry Saunders. US Army Mator J C
Mr. 0 M Giangreco Allard US Army and Major Joseph S Purser. US Arm)
Design Editor
Patricia L.D unnExadn 29 Epnigthe Role of Fire and
Books &Features
Maneuver Centers
Mr. Charles A. Martinson III
Art and Design b iueatClnlToa omn SAm
Consulting Editors b- iueatClnlToa omn SAm
Colonel Marco A. Feliaio da Silva 36 Centralized Battalion Evaluations
Btazihan Army, Brazilian Edition
Major Eduardo Aldunate by Colonel Robert H Suizen. US Army Reserve, and
Chilean Army Spanish Edition Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C Rasmussen US Army,
44 Structured Annual Training
By OdotheSecretayof the Army:
Cadl E. Vuono yMjrWleEWrgtUSAmRsrv
General. United States ArmTyoyMjrWleE.ngtUSAmRsee
50 Too Important to Ignore: Training Field
ChOffcaf
Grade Officers in Units
Bng onr ra F.teS atsAm
BriaedG malnt e tae Arm Oy Lieutenant Colonel Tno mnas V Morley US Arm),
62 The Master Weapon: The Tactical Thought
The1f 11lon of MILITARY REVIEW ist rvd of .F. C. Fuller Applied to Future War
fou*m top e xcaneof ideas on military al-
farsd ctt int wasdo nacriogctiegt s
at thea cIa and operationalt by Major Anthony M Coroalies. US Army
srarfnltdh ein etedgurceatitoionn mtriasisnioinngs, of eeolnnpd Reiw say ThofM ltr
StaffiCollege 7 eiwEsy h o fMltr
Professional Solletn 100-90 MILITARY REVIEW
ande araaoopnoemnrtsilny i Enbshbimonthly in Spopstaangies hEucto Ov Lieutenant Colonel Harolo R Winton. US Army Retirec
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sionw kiomtion. but the views expressed herein
are thoseo f the authors not the Departmient of De- 77 IsgtsLhA.d oRlo adRvs
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TRAINING
Cornerstone of Readiness and Key to Victory
Over the past several weeks, a few editorial writers have made the astounding discovery
that American soldiers could die during a war with Iraq. Really. At die same time, stories
about soldiers refusing to deploy to Saudi Arabia in favor of conscientious objector status have
received considerably more attention than they are due. Even harder to fathom are stories
about how Army recruiters have duped large numbers of recruits, offering the promise of a
college education while masking the possibilities of potential combat until the contract is
made. Obviously. such stories suggest a naivete qbout the current crisis or the results of a slow
news day. Perhaps both. Thankfully not many remain totally oblivious to the real reason
for the Army. A Kansas Cir Star editorial writer observed that a conscientious objector's
"flashes of revelation" are especially questionable "long after the enlistment and only at the
approach of a clear and present danger."
We are also seeing the testimony of former secretaries of defense and former and serving
commanders recommending caretui consideration ,efore 'exercising the mlihtarN option.
'the scribes suggest that our warrior leaders have feet of clay and are losing their resolve to
wield military force. Nothin,,. repeat nothing. could be ftirther firom reality Ratier the mid -
tary professional, seeing the potential futility and waste in the precipitous use of force, is a
realist who knows the uncertainty of war. To their credit, military leaders are goiiz to extreme
lengths to inform the public concerning the risk of entering a wat. "If war comes," tiex
warn, "it will be intense, high-speed, ferocious, fought night and day. but not quick, easy, or
'surgical.'
The reluctance to use force should not be construed as a lack ot confidence or the inability
to use it. If Saddam Hussein believes that such stories indicate a weakening US resolve re-
garding his naked aggression, then he will have made his second mistake.
What does all this have to do with trainin, our theme for this nonth? Everything. By
the middle of the month, the current generation of soldiers mav ver, well face the first real
test of its war-fighting capability. The results will show how well this Any has trained and
has been equipped for combat against an adversary with a broad range of weaponry, the deni-
onstrated willingness to use it and a combat capability forged and tempered during a grinding
eight-year war with Iran. Already. US logistics, mobilization and support systems are being
validated in the unprecedented troop deployment. Combat. if it isn ecessary, will further vali-
date the resurgence in combined arms trainin, durin, the last 10 year. the management and
personnel systetrs that have grown since the end of the Vietnam War. the Volunteer Army
concept, CAPSTONE and, most of all, the philosophies and the systems of trainingz an-
chored by the combat training centers and fieled 1,v lessons learned in the Mojave Desert.
The importance and the challenee of trainni are punctuated in Anny Chief of Staff Gen-
eral Carl E Vuono's article, 'Trainin2 and the Annv of the 1990s." Other theme articles ad-
dress aspects of this critical topic. Training is much too broad to cover in a single issue, ad
we will return to this theme later. Whar we intend to do isw her your appetite to rmad. study and
write on training. That you ccry even one idea iront dhi i, ue and adapt it to your training,
regimen is our goal.
My grade school teacher used to say. "It is too late to stud-; when you are called upon to
recite." The Army may soon be called upon to recite in Southwest Asia. The outcome will
show how well we have done our homeworz.
SFR
I _
and the
ARMY of the 1990s
General Carl E. Vuono, US Army
In no other profession are the penalties for That message reminds us from across the ages
employing untrained p,.rsomnel so appaling or that training is the decisive factor in the out-
so irrerocablea s in the Ann-%. -Dowula,,,,cArmu, come of battle and the ultimate determinant of
the fate of the nation.
N THE spring of 1950. the United States wa, In this article, I want to discuss the signifi-
*at peace--an exhausted and uneasy peace ui cance of training in the Army of today and the
whichthe world was still reeling from the great "why" and "how" of training in the Army of to-
cataclysm of World \,ar 11. Nobod)v expected morrow. For it ist raining that prepares soldiers,
another war; nobodv wanted one. Yet, on 25 units, and leaders to fight and win in combat-
June, the peace was suddenly and violently shat- the Army's basic mission.
tered as the armies of Kim II Sung swept into The Army Today. As we enter a new dec-
South Korea. A small group of American sol- ade, the US Army bears little resemblance to the
diers was hastily oreanc:ed into an ad hoc task force of 40 years ago. Indeed, as we have wit-
force and was thrust into the breach to try to nessed in a year of great challenge, the Army of
stem the tide of the North Korean onslaught. 1990 is the finest fighting force this nation has
These men fought with courage, but they were ever fielded and the best in the world today. This
ill-prepared, poorly equipped and, most impoxr- is more than rhetorical flourish. It is a reality
tantly, inadequatel" trained for the tasks they that has been repeatedly demonstrated in exer-
were given. As a result, many of them never cises throughout the globe, in the crucible of
came home, and the United States was verv combat in Panama and in Operation Desert
nearly run off the Korean peninsula by the arm\ Shiel-the most complex military undertaking
of a backward and impoverished nation. in more than a generation.
The lessoms of those early days of the Korean This Army did not come about by accident.
War are many and vaned, but they all reinforce It ii the product of a comprehensive and vision-
a powerful message that has 4been pervasive ary plan that has as its foundation the Army's six
throughout the histon of armed conflict and i, fundamental imperatives--principles that are
of .sin,ular relevance t,th,e US Army of todav, the benchmark by which we measure every pro-
2 January 1991 * MILITARY REVIEW
I
- y%
posal and every program. and form the architec-
ture by which we are building the Army of the It is training that enables our
future. Thiese imiperativvs include an effective soldiers to bring to bear the awesome
W.affiomtin'. doctrine: a mix (it annored. light, potential of our modem weapons; it is
andi special operations torces: continuous mtod- training that builds the kinds of sergeants
ernimation: the developmencit of comlpetenit, con- and oflicers that our soldiers deserve.
fident leaders: -and an unbending commitment And it is training that makec quality
to a quality force. At the base ot each of these Americans commit themselves to join our
is the sixth imperative and the top priorityv for ranks and quality soldiers commit themi-
the Araw in the field: tough. demianding., realis- selves to a ljfetime of selfless service.
tic training, relentlessly executed to uncompro-
misingt standards;.
For it iszt raining that brings our wvartfighting
doctrine to life. it ist raining that ives u,; the in- WVby We Train. The fundamental impor-
dispensable capacity to I nteUrt'le the variots c- tance of training-a truth that iss elf-evident to
-
mnent.s Of our mix of forces into packag,-es that are military leaders-is not widely understood by
efi~ctive against srecific threat wve filice. It 6~ manyv outside of the profession of arms. In the af-
training, thaIt enables ouri soldiers it, bring, to bear tentiath of the collapse of the Soviet empire,
the awesomne p-otential of our modern wveapons, some have called into question the need to.......
it is training that butilds the kind; tit sergts manain readiness and training within the
and officers that our soldiers deserve. And it i: Army. After all, the argument goes, since the ...
training that makes qualitv Americans commit Soviet threat has receded and since the WVest
themselves to i oin our rank- and q1uality soldiers would have greatly extended w\arning times of-
commit themselves to a lifetime of seltiess; serv-- any renewed Soviet military challenge, wye can
ice. In short. it is traininLe that undergirds the affo~rd to scale back the training and readiness ot
Arnwi ot today. and it k~ training, that we must many of our forces. T1hat is the same argument
ssan; we share the Annv of the future. that welhave facet. afer every -ar in our history,
MILITARY REVIE $ 4 0.
NWW 7/13/92
-,7- -Z-- --
and theend of the Cold War is apparently no historically trail in the wake of the collapsing
different, empires. It is,t herefore, critical that we retain
The events of 2 August 1990 have dampened the high levels of training that we have achieved
the public enthusiasm tr this perspective, but within the US Army, Europe and in those forces
we can expect it to surface again in the years earmarked to reinforce our forward deployed
ahead. So it is important that, within our profes- units there.
sion,.we clearly understand why training will re- But the days are over in which the major chal-
lenges to our national interests rested exclusively
on the continent of Europe. The brutal and un-
As we marvel at the collapse provoked aggression by Iraq against Kuwait is a
of the Soviet empire, we also witness the vivid preview of the nature of the international
birh of a new era of unceflainty and system in the decade of the 1990s and beyond.
pceornifl,r aonnt e arrae i tnhw emhsicehlp tehse i tlhlr--edaetfsi nweed .w..i ll Tenwdou rfienagtu riems poofr ttahnec eIr aoqfi tarattiancikn gu. nFdierrsstc, othree tahte-
we must also p are f or the implications tack came with virtually no warning. Had our
w thes tma prpa frh ims atin forces across the entire Army not been trained
of the instability and chaos that and ready, the credibility of our response would
historically trail in the wake of the have been negligible.
collapsing empires. It is, therefore, Second, we no longer have the luxury of con-
critical that we retain the high levels of sidering the developing world to be militarily in.
aiin thwe he A d significant. Iraq struck its neighbor with a so-
within the US Army phisticated array of weapons and forces, and
with demonstrated capabilities that were once
thought to be reserved to the major powers.
main so vital in the year, ahead, and that we If we were to deter Iraqi aggression against
carefully articulate our training rationale to Saudi Arabia and be prepared to defeat an at-
those whose support Is SO critical to our future. tack if deterrence proved unsuccessful, our
The training imperative isd riven by three-b a- forces had to be trained and ready from the mo-
sic and interrelated resxonsibilities: the Armys ment they arrived in the Arabian desert. More-
strategic obligations in the evolving intemation- over, they had to be trained and ready to fight
al environment, the Army's requirement to and win on a high-intensity battlefield-a
shape the force for tomorrow, and our sacred dut battlefield that included the specter of chem-
to our soldiers. Each of these responsibilities ical warfare.
is ot central importainc itt,he Amy and th. Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf highlights
nation. the perilous nature of the evolving international
The International Environment. Tough, environment and reinforces the undiminished
realistic training ha-,a lways been crucial to our requirement for the Army to be trained and
national success, and In the years ahead, the na- ready. If the wave of the future is the "come as
ture of the international environment will rein - .ou are" war, then we must be ready to go at all
force that importance yet again. As we marvel times.
at the collapse of the Soviet empire, we also wit - Reshaping the Army. The mandate for
ness the birth of a new era of uncertainty and trained and ready forces is reinforced by our plan
peril, an era in which the threats we will confront for reshaping the Army of the future. In response
are themselves ill-detino,. Although we ap- to revolutionary developments abroad and re-
plaud the political trends that are occurrin,- source constraints at home, we have begun to
within the Warsaw Pact. we must also prepare for shape a smaller Army-one with fewer soldiers
the implications of the instability and chaos that and fewer units.
4
January 1991 * MILITARY REVIEW
'V
* Iraqi forceslIn
I
Kuwait City shadty
the 2A ugust
Safer
1990 Invasion.
But even as we shape the future Army, our .
strategic responsibilities will continue to span
the globe. So) every soldier, every unit, and every
leader within our smaller force structure must be X
fully trained to fiazht and win. We cannot afford
to adopt a course which some have proposed-a
course of so-called tiered readiness in which
some of our units are fully trained while others,
are not. Undcr such a propsal., it is hkeh"t hat .t
,
the forces that are fidly trained would be inade- '_ "
."
quate in number to deter or defeat ratq-like ag-
gression throughout the world, while short ,
warning times and sophisticated adversaries
would deny us the time necessary to bring other
forces up to full readiness.
So if we are to be a smaller Army-and we will
be-then we can never relax our efforts to estab- -
lish and achieve the highest standards of training
throughout the Arm. We no longer have the luxuy
Commitment to Soldiers. Finally, we nmust ofc onsideringt he developing world to
train with our eyes firmly fixed on our sacred re- be mi/itariy insggiyfiant. Iraq struck its
sponsibilities to the sons and daughters of this neighbor with a sophisticated array of
nation who are entrusted to our care. Our sol- weapons andforces, and with demons-
diets depend upon their leaders to train them in trated capabilities that were once thought
peacetime so that they can fight, win and survive to be reserved to the major powers...
in battle. General "Light Horse" Harry Lee of Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf
Revolutionary War fame clearly captured our re- highlights the perilous nature of the
sponsibilitv when he cautioned that "a govern- evolving iterational environment and
ment is the murderer of its o\vn citizens when it reinforcest he undiminishedr equirement
sends them to the field untrained and untaught." for the Army to be trined and ready
No leader in America's Army must ever Ift he wave of the future is the "come as
guilty of that most inexcusable lapse of profe:- you are" wa, then we must be
sional responsibiliry. ready to go at all times.
So whenever a serg,eant takes the extra time a i a ins
to plan his training in precise detail, whenever
he spends those extra hours executing his
training to exacting standard-,, whenever he cer-must understand, attain, sustain and en-
devotes that extra effort to scrupulously asses,- force the highest standards of combat readine:-
ing his training, he isi nv'esting in the lives of his through tough, realistic, multiechelon com-
soldiers, bined arms training designed to challenge and
Thus. it isc lear that the nature of the evolving develop soldiers, units and leaders.
international environment, the ArmyIs respon- How Ve Train. That is the "why" of trainin,.
sibilities to shape the force for the future, and our The "how" is embodied in the Amw's compre.
enduring obligations to our soldiers all require hensive training strategy. As we contront an en
that the Army of tomorrow be as trained and vironment of constrained resources, we 11uw;
ready as the Army of today. Accordingly, every move fomard aggressivelv to shape our trainint.
Army leader--every sergeant and every offi- programs at all levels to make the best use of the
5
MILITARY REVIEW * January 1991
assets we are given. Over the past five years, the Training Soldiers. First, we must develop sol-
Army has taken great strides in developing diers who are proficient in battlefield skills, dis-
and articulating the training strategy that is ciplined, physically tough and highly moti-
presented in US Army Field Manual (FM) vated. The training of our individual soldiers is
25-100, Trainingt he Forcea nd its companion FM no; and will continue to be, a primary respon-
sibilitv of our noncommissioned officers-ser-
I geants who. in this first year of a new decade, are
__ _ __
We cannot afford to adopt... the best in our history. Their unparalleled capa-
course of so-caed tiered readiness bilities and unmatched proi'essionalism provide
inl which some of our units aref ulr the Army with a vast reservoir of expertise for
rainwe hdi e oftouruts are fu training our mldicr. Gone are the days in
trained while others are not... which we had to rely on centralized and inflex-
The fores that are fiuly tained would ible training mechanisms to ensure that stand-
be inadequate in number to deter or ards were being met throughout the Army. Our
defeat iraq-ike agghrssion throughout sergeants are now fully capable of assuming
theworld while short wa g tunes ad principal responsibility for the development of
sophisicated adversaries would deny us every soldier.
the time necessary to bring other The training of our soldiers will be focused pri-
forces ap to fiu reaadness. marily at home stations and will concentrate on
the basics that win in battle. For proficiency in
the basics is an unalterable prerequisite for high-
25-101, Ba/e Focused Training. FM 25-IL'L er level training in every MOS (military occupa-
establishes the Army's training doctrine, and tional specialty).
FM 25-101 applies this doctrine and assists lead- Training Units. Well trained soldiers are, of
ers in the development and execution of training course, not enough: they must be molded into
programs. Together, they are mandatory reading cohesive, effective units from squad to corps,
for every leader, sergeant and officer, in the and in combat, combat support and combat ser-
Army- vice support units throughout the Army Col-
The overarching principle that will guide our lective training begins at home stations where
training in the decade of the 1990s will remain basic soldier skills are integrated into small-unit
straightforward: we will train as we will fight, proficiency Unit training then builds warfight-
and we will train to exacting, uncompromising ing capabilities in successively larger organiza-
standards. This is an immutable principle that tions while reinforcing the individual and col-
undergirds the entire Army and applies equally lective skills upon which the entire structure
to combat, combat support and combat service rests.
support units in TOE (table of organization and The centerpiece of collective proficiency at
equipment) organizations and in our general battalion and brigade levels resides in our com-
support forces. bat training centers (CTCs), the National
Although conditions may change, our stand- Training Center (NIC) at Fort Irwin, Califor-
ards will not, for they are the yardstick by which nia. the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
we measure our readiness for combat. This fun- at Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee,
damental principle means, at its most basic Icv- Arkansas, and the Combat Maneuver Training
el, that we will train soldiers, units and leaders in Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. The
combined arms and multiservice joint opera- CT s provide us the indispensable capability to
tions-the kinds of operations that will be re- synchronize all elements of the combined arms
quired by an environment growing increasingly team in an environment that comes as close to
complex. actual combat as our technology permits. The
6 January 1991 * MILITARY REVIEW
US soldiers refueling a Hummer in
the Ad-Dibdibah region of Saudi Arabia.
The requirements to train soldiers, units and leaders are no less prominent
in our Reserve Components. Indeed. as we have seen in Operation Desert Shield.
the Total Force concept is fundamental to the defense of our nation in an era of
increasing uncertainty and challenge. Todaky in the Arabian desert, soldiers from the
Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are serving shoulder-to-shoulder
with their Active Component counterparts.
value of tile cT\, cannot IV, ~ie ritated. and the wvhich hionei.c ritical commtiand and c, ntrolk kIII,
payoffI. icasured in thle perfoinnane (if our at division and corps levels. K-71P represent,
units in battle. In an analv.,is of thle fight in Pan - the top of thle training pyramid that resl. upflon
amna, commianders repeatediv m.id that thle JRxTC thle foundation of individual soldier skills and
wvai the sini-,le motst importaont element in theit fonuis an Arms' that ist rained and ready to filfill
units' success. And a decade ot investmlent In its strategic mnandate worldwide. l3CT1 is.n ow
the NTC has, created aI level ot proficiency in, being, used bv Descrt Shield units to reinforce the
deser operation,, that is thle f'oundation of detcr- ,kills required of commnanders and staiis.
rence-and the basis for victory if battle shiould Training Leaders. Even as we develop thle
becomne necex sarv-on thle Arabian pnnu comibat skillsof our soldien, and units. we nit-
5
toclav continue Ito ensure that our leaders are fully
A cnicial element in achievinu unit proticicin- trained at every echelon as an investment in thle
cv ist ile training of battle staffs. Thie battle .tatt. Anii- of toidav and tonlorrow. For. in the prote-
constitins- (it primary representative' fromn all sion of arms. there is no substitute for thle leader-
st aiff and,.lice clenleni.. 1mu,1IVb trained Ito I nic- ship oftamfpresinlwo rco ett
(Mrite thle seven battlefield operatinte Int heari oit war1N)res; 1 11017etiirtheiroldien.-ins!
sVNTCiII.
Thiese Ina lorfunci in, must bV executed it we.uc Comm1111ite to the defens~e of thle nation
to tielhr and winl in combat.1. Trainiing of leader, is the primary locus o
SPecial mencition 1u1,I .1il'o be 111:1de ot the, thle Arily~. leader development pro,-raii-.i
B.ittic ( oinmand Traininc l'ro--rani (BCTIP prouresive. %equenti.1i and comlprehleni.i
MILITARY REVIEW 9 January 199t 7