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'"sLOLDIEMIA. RI-AS SOUTAE4S AS8884-14 JAME C.PLLA 1992 SOLDIER AS POLICEMAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1945 1946 - A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by J -+is t; I + .Q< - .-.. ......... James C. Pollman January 1992 P1 j tr, t o,( A :ilLasL~t' CodeZ jAval! I .30/or'- f Dist Special Statement A per telecon Maj Jill Whiskey Total Army Personnel Command TAPC-OPB-D Alex, VA 22332-0411 NXA 11/14/91 ©James C. Pollman 1992 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945 most of Southeast Asia came under the control of the South East Asia Command (SEAC), commanded by Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. From that time until November 1946 SEAC attempted to perform its military mission of rescuing allied prisoners of war and returning the Japanese to Japan. It initially appeared to be a reasonably easy task, even though it would be new to everyone in SEAC. After the military mission was complete SEAC was to turn the areas over to the legitimate governments, pack their bags, and go home as the war was over. Up until the time that SEAC's troops started arriving at the various countries in Southeast Asia no one had given any serious thought about who were the legitimate governments; everyone assumed that the returning colonial powers would be welcomed with open arms and everything would return to the way it was before the war. This study focuses on what happened when SEAC combat soldiers were forced to act as policemen in the areas of greatest strife: Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies. The basic issue is: when soldiers are forced to act as policemen, i.e. controlling mostly unarmed civilians, a whole host of additional political requirements arise. The failure of the European governments, especially Britain's, to fully realize this caused the soldiers of SEAC, from Mountbatten all the down to the lowest private, to make decisions that had serious political implications. It also calls for a serious change in a soldier's orientation; he is not just killing the enemy any more. In order to clearly understand this situation it is also ne.cessary to understand the sort of handicaps under which SEAC was workig. The vacillatirg position of the United States, the critical shortage of st.; ping, the complete lack of knowledge, both geographically and politically, orn most of the area, and some puor political decisions by the British government greatly constrained SEAC's activities. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH In 1978 James C. Pollman graduated from Gustavus Adolphus College in Saint Peter, Minnesota with a Bachelor of Arts degree. Upon graduating he joined the Peace Corps and served for three years in Malaysia as a Mathematics teacher. After returning from Malaysia he joinnd the Army and became a commissioned officer through the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a Captain in the United States Army and has served in a variety of assignments in Europe, the Continental United States, and Korea. Io~i DEDICATION To the Men and Women of the United States Army and Professional Men of Arms everywhere iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The completion of this thesis was made possible by the unselfish encouragement, guidance and supervision of professors David K. Wyatt and Anthony Kirsch. To both of them, I am very gratcFul. I am indebted for their valuable comments on the manuscript to clarify some of my basic concepts and theories. To Professor Wyatt and the many hours of editing, thank you. Thanks to the long list of scholars whom I listed in the bibliography, and their literature which served as the pedestal of this study. In particular I wish to single out Peter Dennis for his book; Troubled days of peace. I am grateful for the scholarship support from the Foreign Area Officers' Division, Department of Education, U.S. Army, Washington D.C. My special thanks and love to my wife, Mui Wah, whose support was essential to this undertaking. Lastly, I wish to thank Lord Mountbatten: his ability to see beyond the past and present and attempts to make this world a better place serves as a continuing inspiration to me. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ............................. iii DEDICATION............................ .......... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................. v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................. vii LIST OF FIGURES .... ... ................... .. ....... .. viii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................... ix LIST OF TABLES ....................................... x INTRODUCTION . .. . ............ ....................... 1 1. MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON SEAC ..................................... 6 United States Policy ............................. 6 Shipping Constraints ............................................. 15 2. THE PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ................. 25 3. LAW AND ORDER IN INDOCHINA AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES... ................................... 36 French Indo-China .............................. 37 The Netherlands East Indies .................... 54 Conclusion ............................... ................................. 84 Bibliography ...................................... 91 ....................................................................... Index 93 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFNEI Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies ALFFIC Allied Land Forces French Indo China ALFSEA Allied Land Forces South East Asia CAB Cabinet COS Chief of Staff DO Dominion Office FO Foreign Office FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States MECSAC Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College NEI Netherlands East Indies NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration OSS Office of Strategic Services RAPWI Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees SEAC Southeast Asia Command SWPA South West Pacific Area vii