DTIC AD1024273: False-Failed Innovation

7 Pages·0.69 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:20 AM Page 51
FALSE-
FAILED
Innovation
By G R E G O R Y C. W I L M O T H
U.S. Air Force History Office
Blimp arriving at
Bolling Field.
H
istory is littered with technologies that States tried to build an intercontinental jet
failed as innovations. Others, such as bomber, the technology proved invaluable. Air re-
gliders and airships, were like desert fueling became a capability that quickly spread
flowers. They flourished briefly and with- throughout the services and to other countries.
ered. Then there is the false-failed innovation—a This article looks at airships, gliders, and air
technology that is examined and discarded but refueling to determine why some promising in-
that gets a second chance under other conditions novations are permanently discarded while oth-
and succeeds. Perhaps the best example is inflight ers are profitably resurrected.
refueling, an idea pioneered in the 1920s to ex-
tend the range of wood and fabric biplanes. The Lighter than Air
Army Air Corps set the technique aside in the At the turn of the century, rigid airships
1930s as aircraft range and endurance improved. emerged as a technology in search of a mission.
Rediscovered in the late 1940s when the United First flown by Count von Zeppelin in 1900, three
years before the Wright brothers airplane, lighter
than air flight captured public imagination. In
Lieutenant Colonel Gregory C. Wilmoth, ANG, is currently assigned to
Germany zeppelins became a national passion
the Joint History Office within the Office of the Chairman of the Joint
akin to the space race in America during the 1960s.
Chiefs of Staff and previously served in the National Guard Bureau.
Autumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ 51
1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:20 AM Page 52
(cid:2)
FALSE-FAILED INNOVATION
Many concluded airships might have military uses.
Blimp school,
H.G. Wells wrote The War in the Airin 1907, which
Pensacola.
featured German drakenshipsthat attacked the U.S.
Navy and pulverized cities from the sky.
By 1912 airships appeared to be an innova-
tion whose time had come. Germany operated a
regularly scheduled airship service. Capable of
carrying dozens of passengers as well as hundreds
of tons of cargo, they proved more useful than
airplanes, fragile toys of the rich which could
carry two people for perhaps an hour.
World War I shattered many illusions, includ-
ing the relative usefulness of airships versus air-
planes. In August 1914 both the German army
and navy employed lighter than air military craft.
Although the army used them for reconnaissance
and close air support, by October 1914 only two
out of the original inventory of seven remained
operational.1 The navy had
airships proved to be cheaper limited success with air-
tsoer bvueidld a sth aa snu cbrsutiisteurtse afnodr sitnhhgiep. srM eusasureildtti mfooefr safcl eoseuttrt sas tcweogeuritec- Historical Center
coastal reconnaissance binlu bnldocekr.a dExe pbeyc tBinrigta ian c, lGoseer-- Naval
many built few cruisers.
When mines and submarines drove the Royal
Navy to establish a distant blockade, the German Gotha and later Giant bombers in early 1917
fleet suddenly found that it needed more light while the navy persisted to the end in flying air-
cruisers for littoral operations, but none were ship raids.
available. Airships proved to be cheaper and Moreover, in 1917 the army briefly used a
quicker to build than cruisers and served as a sub- lighter than air craft on a new mission: strategic
stitute for coastal reconnaissance. airlift in support of General von Lettow-Vorbeck,
Some visionaries saw another use for air- who waged guerilla warfare against British forces
ships: strategic bombing. In 1915 Peter Strasser, that invaded German East Africa. An airship
the head of Germany’s naval airship division, got launched from Bulgaria carried food, ammunition,
permission from his superiors to mount strategic and medical provisions on a one-way mission to
raids on England. Kaiser Wilhelm II, however, resupply the German forces. Although the airship
was worried about bombing London and possibly successfully crossed the Mediterranean and Sahara,
injuring members of the royal family which in- before Lettow-Vorbeck could be resupplied his
cluded his cousin, George V. As a result, air strikes forces withdrew into Portuguese East Africa. Near
were limited to military installations. Because the Khartoum in the Sudan the airship was recalled by
technology of the day was not terribly accurate, radio and flew back to Bulgaria. As a result, an-
in a pattern which foreshadowed American other potential use for the technology proved to
bombing of North Vietnam, the list of available be disappointing and it was soon discarded.3
targets expanded cautiously, allowing the British Following World War I the U.S. Navy consid-
time to develop a formidable air defense system.2 ered using airships for fleet scouting, in part be-
Even when the German army joined the cause of the development of cheap helium in
navy bombing campaign its operations remained commercial quantities. The reduced lift of helium
ineffective. Bombing at night for protection made was thought to be offset by the increased safety of
it hard to navigate and nearly impossible to hit non-flammable gas. The Navy commissioned its
anything with accuracy. As British defenses im- first postwar airship from the Zeppelin works and
proved, the only real countermeasure available to then quickly accelerated the construction of sub-
airships was to fly at higher altitudes, which fur- sequent airships in the United States. As the capa-
ther eroded accuracy and navigation. In addition, bilities advanced naval airmen envisioned an-
because German airships used flammable hydro- other possible mission for lighter than air
gen as a lift gas they remained highly vulnerable
to air defense fires. As losses mounted, the Ger-
man army withdrew its airships and switched to
52 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000
1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:21 AM Page 53
Wilmoth
Center
Iants Lidaek evhieuwrs to.f airship Historical
Naval
Center
Historical
Naval
Center
USS Shenandoah. Historical
Naval
R–101, effectively ending its commercial efforts.
The Germans then built an even larger airship,
the Hindenburg. After a successful season on the
North Atlantic run, it went up in flames over
Lakehurst, New Jersey, in 1937. That disaster was
a turning point. The Graf Zeppelin was removed
from commercial service. While German airships
were successful on the Atlantic crossing, airship
disasters and the appearance of fast, long-range
British dirigible. Historical Center AmmeaenrMitc etahanne ifwrly hdinailyges , bwtoheaerte sL nsiuguchmhteb are sr tethdha.en B Aoieri nBgu Crelaipup oerf
Naval tahirec rNafatv cya Drrieepra. rDtmubenbet dw tahs ep ZlaRnCnVin, gth ai st rnuien efl yminilg-
lion cubic foot ship was designed to carry nine
Douglas-Northrop BT–I dive bombers. But it was
technology, the airborne aircraft carrier. USS not to be. President Franklin Roosevelt limited
Akron and USS Macon were able to launch and re- the size of new airships. This decision proved to
trieve a small parasite fighter, the F–9C Spar- be the death of lighter than air carriers. While the
rowhawk. Unfortunately, both airships met disas- weight of any aircraft a ship might carry in-
trous ends in severe weather.4 creased with improved technology, the lifting
Meanwhile in Europe, new airship construc- weight of helium remained constant. Because of
tion began in support of long-range commercial restrictions in size the flying aircraft carrier never
passenger transportation with varying results. became anything more than a blueprint.
Germany built and flew the Graf Zeppelin around
the world while Britain built, flew, and lost the
Autumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ 53
1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:22 AM Page 54
(cid:2)
FALSE-FAILED INNOVATION
C–47 snatching glider
at Asansol,India.
Glider landing in
Lubbock,Texas.
Office
History
Air Force
S.
U.
Office
History
Air Force
S.
U.
Germany built one last ship, the Graf Zeppelin a day when the ban would be lifted, Germany fos-
II, a sister to the Hindenburg. Its designers hoped tered nominally civilian gliding clubs which de-
America would relent and allow the export of he- veloped a cadre of glider pilots who could make
lium. When relations with the United States wors- the transition to powered aircraft.
ened, any possibility of reviving commercial air- By World War II Germany, with a pool of pi-
ships vanished. In the summer of 1939, however, lots skilled in nonpowered flight, integrated glid-
Germany discovered another mission for the tech- ers into its airborne forces, but military doctrine
nology, electronic warfare. Flying along the North generally restricted gliders to commando raids. A
Sea coast of England, the airship searched for emis- notable exception was the invasion of Crete in
sions from British radar home chain stations. But 1941, when heavy losses suffered by German air-
its receivers were tuned to the wrong frequency borne formations did nothing to encourage more
and found nothing. The project was abandoned. extensive use of gliders.5
Despite the possibility of varied missions, the On the other hand, the dramatic success of
leading characteristics of airships—heavy lift and glider troops in operations such as the seizure of
range—were not recognized early enough. They Eban Emael in Belgium caught the attention of
proved most successful at strategic airlift and long- the Allies. British plans for glider use resembled
range passenger transport. By the time they came those of Germany while the Americans focused
into their own with these missions, airplanes were on mass airborne troop transport and resupply.
emerging as superior. The U.S. Army employed gliders for the invasion
of Sicily, Normandy, and southern France. In ad-
The Glider
dition, they were used in Operation Market Gar-
Although gliders preceded airplanes in devel- den, the strike into Holland in September 1944,
opment, their obvious disadvantages left them be- in Burma in 1944, and Operation Varsity, and the
hind as airplane technology advanced. But when attack over the Rhine in March 1945.
the Versailles Treaty prohibited Germany from Although American glider operations were
having an air force after World War I, nonpowered generally successful, there were problems. The
flight emerged as a substitute. Looking forward to lack of preexisting glider forces resulted in a rush
to produce gliders and train pilots. Predictably,
this compromised the quality of both.Moreover,
54 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000
1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:22 AM Page 55
Wilmoth
the craft faced major tactical limitations. Gliders Alan Cobham established Flight Refueling Lim-
under tow were highly vulnerable to interceptors ited and introduced a new refueling system. He
and ground fire. Adverse weather interfered with conducted experiments with British Imperial Air-
flight operations. Because ways and was planning a joint venture with Air
aircraft made gliders obsolete they were rarely reusable, France when war intervened.
gliders were an expensive World War II offered opportunities to ex-
for delivering troops and
expendable item. Also ploit inflight refueling, but none came to
supplies, as helicopters did there was the problem of fruition. The most regrettable failing was not
what to do with the pilots closing the mid-Atlantic gap in the battle against
for commando raids
on reaching the target area. German submarines. Cobham approached the
Should they be used as in- Air Ministry about using inflight refueling for the
fantry or returned to base? The British trained Short S–25 Sunderland maritime reconnaissance
their pilots in infantry tactics and expected them bomber. Increasing the reach of this four-engine
to fight on the ground. Americans never satisfac- flying boat would have covered the gap with ex-
torily resolved the question. isting aircraft and tipped the scales in favor of
U.S. gliders were transferred to the Air Force the convoys. The government declined to act
when it became a separate service following and the gap was not closed until mid-1943 by
World War II. There was interest in developing unrefueled B–24 Liberators.
larger and more modern gliders, but the Air Force After the war Britain returned to efforts to
made little headway. By 1950 air assault aircraft perfect inflight refueling for commercial aviation.
had replaced gliders. C–123s and other aircraft Some technical obstacles were gradually over-
made gliders obsolete for delivering troops and come with a cumbersome albeit effective looped
Office supplies, as helicopters did for commando raids. hose system, but new American airliners such as
S. Air Force History GsInplaifdnlie gorsfh dotin sRalyep pfau edaeercleiadnd fger.om the inventory after a life tlsaheneem tiLIcenod c w tkhhihetehae dleoadeutd etC f1roo9ernf4 uos0tbesel,ll iilvhnaiogtoiw.no Aen.ve ecrrio,a uiln ldrfel ipcgrlhoetns sri estfhhumee leiAnntgt-
U. The first experiments with refueling in the air got a second chance. As the Cold War began the
took place in the United States, Great Britain, and Air Force lacked bombers that could hit targets
France in the early 1920s. It was a period when deep inside Soviet territory. Its primary bomber
the emphasis was on setting aviation records was the B–29 Superfortress. An upgraded version,
rather than using innovations to solve practical the B–50, was also inadequate for the mission.
problems. For example, on New Year’s Day 1929 a The only bomber able to penetrate far into the
Ford C–2A trimotor named Question Mark began a Soviet Union was the B–36. Although its range
dramatic demonstration of inflight refueling on a was an advantage, this six-engined behemoth was
racetrack course between Van Nuys and San slow and vulnerable. Design work on what would
Diego. Two Douglas C–I single-engine biplanes become the B–52 was begun, but aeronautical en-
acted as tankers and refueled the trimotor through gineers quickly ran into a problem. To get the
hoses 43 times. Question Mark finally landed on necessary range they had to increase the fuel ca-
January 7 after over 150 hours in the air.6This ex- pacity; but that made the aircraft bigger and fur-
periment encouraged others to break the record ther increased fuel requirements.
for inflight refueling. In 1935 it rose to 27 days, a A committee of the Air Force Aircraft and
record that has never been broken. Weapons Board developed a list of needs which
Such records overshadowed the role of in- included reduced range and inflight refueling. A
flight refueling as a range extender. Experiments team headed by Jimmy Doolittle went to England
continued, but unpredictable weather conditions to meet with Alan Cobham. They returned with
and other factors hindered success. In the 1930s equipment and contracts, and work soon started
technology made inflight refueling less relevant on converting B–29s into KB–29 tankers. In Feb-
for the range of aircraft. The transition from ruary 1949, with KB–29s providing four inflight
wood and fabric biplanes to all-metal mono- fuelings, a B–50 named Lucky Lady II took off
planes led to advances in speed and range. Manu- from Carswell Air Force Base in Texas and flew
facturers in America began building flying boats around the world nonstop in 94 hours.
that carried passengers nonstop across the At- The Air Force soon replaced the cumbersome
lantic. Inflight refueling was more or less forgot- Cobham looped hose system with a Boeing tele-
ten in the United States. scoping boom. KC–97s supplanted KB–29s. In
British interest in aerial refueling persisted. turn the KC–135 Stratotanker, a Boeing 707 deriv-
Designers had difficulty developing a flying boat ative specifically designed for operating with
that could cross the Atlantic without refueling. B–52s, replaced the KC–97. In the meantime, the
British developed the probe and drogue system.
Autumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ 55
1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:23 AM Page 56
(cid:2)
FALSE-FAILED INNOVATION
Air Force
S.
U.
Round-the-world route
of Lucky Lady.
Office
Qreufeusetlieodn, 1M9a2r9k.being Air Force History
S.
U.
Both the boom and the probe and drogue systems technology and prerequisite for another. Such lin-
had advantages. The boom has been most popu- ear advances constitute a technology tree.
lar with the Air Force, but the probe and drogue But technology trees are myths. New devel-
system has often been adopted by the other serv- opments do not follow predetermined paths. The
ices as well as foreign air forces. evolutionary steps taken to obtain a technology
Inflight refueling eventually spread beyond do not constitute the only approach to it. Nor is
strategic bombers. The conflicts in Korea and the most prevalent form of development neces-
Vietnam demonstrated the value in air fueling for sarily even the most efficient.
tactical aircraft. During the Vietnam War tankers Technological choices are often made by ac-
not only extended tactical strike aircraft range but cident or for nontechnological reasons. Today
often saved damaged aircraft returning to base by most people use videos in a VHS format rather
replenishing fuel lost through leaking tanks. than Beta, which is generally regarded as superior.
What was once a stunt and then a niche Business decisions and economic costs gave VHS
technology blossomed into a widespread innova- an early lead that Beta could not overcome as the
tion. Today, inflight refueling is integral to mili- investment in VHS tapes and machines increased.
tary aviation in the United States. Moreover, typewriters and computers utilize the
qwerty keyboard, named after the line of six let-
Myth of Technology Trees
ters on the upper left hand portion of the board.
Enthusiasts of computer games such as Civi- This arrangement was designed to slow typing to
lization are familiar with the technology tree. prevent keys from jamming. The more efficient
Players seek revolutionary technologies to acquire Dvorak keyboard has been around since the
new types of military units, city improvements, 1930s, but familiarity with the qwerty keyboard
and other advantages. However, they must follow has created inertia against change.7
a tree that identifies mandatory technological Likewise the automobile, powered by the in-
prerequisites. For example, a player seeking gun- ternal combustion engine, is the dominant form
powder must first acquire invention and iron work- of personal transportation. But in 1914 steam and
ing. Invention, in turn, depends on engineeringand electricity were serious contenders. Engineers still
literacy. Each advance is a consequence of one claim steam engines offer the most efficient
propulsion for cars. Steam lost because accidents,
56 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1999–2000
1223 Wilmoth.pgs 5/30/00 10:23 AM Page 57
Wilmoth
engineering choices, market decisions, and eco- The myth of the technology tree only looks
nomic factors combined to give internal combus- toward a narrow set of possibilities, building on
tion market domination by 1930. The size of the what is in use today rather than considering alter-
automobile industry and its supporting infrastruc- native paths such as suitable developments of the
ture became a barrier past that were prematurely committed to obliv-
to achieve an innovation, an en- to change. Building a ion. All too frequently discarded technologies are
steam powered car ignored. Yet technologies that are inappropriate
abling technology must be linked
was not enough. One in one age have been resurrected through adap-
to doctrine and organizations needed networks of tive methods and organizations to fill essential re-
dealers, parts suppli- quirements at a later time. This process of inno-
ers, and service stations. Once again, existing in- vation demolishes the notion that the predictive
vestments as sunk costs generated inertia to linear growth of innovations along a single tech-
change. Robert Pool calls these type of barriers nological course is the only road to the future.
technological lock-in.8 To maximize the capacity to exploit new ca-
What then are the implications of techno- pabilities, innovators must recognize that past
logical determinism? Clearly some prerequisites technology is malleable and may evolve into
are more important than others. But a given tech- something quite different. And there must be a
nology need not follow the same development clear grasp of future requirements. Needs drive
path as it did in our civilization, nor must it man- how technology is shaped and used. Only by ana-
ifest itself in its present form. lyzing requirements thoroughly and defining
them objectively, unconstrained by narrow think-
False-Failed Innovations
ing about how traditionally military capabilities
History Office banas eendM,a bathlninoyug m gtheic lhintnoarto ylao ligln.y n Tmoo vuaasctth iboieen vlsie n aakrneed ti netocn hodnvoaocttlirooingnye, hfinaalgsv eeo- fbrageialeenndi z uiansteindoo,n vc aaatnnio dan df. aoLicloetodrik nt efeic rhmstn utosolto ngfoeyel lbdoesw.c ,oR mtehveei sna-
Air Force and oTrhgae ntiaznatki oannsd a balierc troa fwt icealdrr nieerw w cearpea sbuilcitcieesss.ful ivdaetniotnifsy,i nfagl saev-afialialbelde oterc ohtnhoelrowgyis. eA, cfhreieqvuienngt liyn nroe--
U.S. innovations which were based on technology. Ef- quires vision but always calls for hard thinking
forts such as the airship never achieved domi- that transcends a didactic, linear conception of
nance. Still others such as gliders succeeded only how technology becomes capability. JFQ
briefly. Then there were innovations such as in-
flight refueling that were discarded but reap- NOTES
peared when needs and circumstances changed.
1John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War in the Air: Mili-
They are false-failed innovations.
tary Aviation from 1909 to 1921 (Washington: Smithson-
To succeed technology must meet a need ian Institution Press, 1993), p. 68.
that involves choices and tradeoffs. Needs shape 2Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A
development. Provided needs are met, technol- History of the German Naval Airship Division, 1912–1918
ogy can be shaped in various ways, even irra- (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980), p. 67.
tional ones. As needs change over time, so do the 3Robinson, The Zeppelin, pp. 284–93, and Peter W.
characteristics of a given technology. Brooks, Zeppelin: Rigid Airships 1893–1940 (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), pp. 103–04.
Air refueling is a classic illustration of how
4Brooks, Rigid Airships, p. 172, and Richard K. Smith,
variables play on technological progress. There
The Airships Akron and Macon: Flying Aircraft Carriers of
was little practical use for refueling in flight dur-
the United States Navy (Washington: U.S. Naval Institute
ing the 1920s or 1930s and the concept lan-
Press, 1965), pp. 70–71.
guished, though British aviation circles kept the 5Jonathan C. Noetzel, To War on Tubing and Canvas
basic notion of the technique alive. Thus when (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press,
an urgent need arose in the Air Force during the 1993), p. 3.
1940s the technology base was ready. Capabilities 6Richard K. Smith, Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refu-
remained about the same during these decades, eling: Highlights, 1923–1998 (Washington: Air Force His-
but it changed rapidly after 1948. Organizations tory and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 3–7.
7Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of
and doctrine were created that turned the tech-
Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp.
nology into an innovation. Air Force commands
239–64.
grouped tanker aircraft into tanker squadrons and
8Robert Pool, Beyond Engineering: How Society Shapes
wings within existing organizations. Doctrine
Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997),
evolved as what began as a range extender for pp. 152–61.
bombers spread to tactical aircraft, transports,
and helicopters.
Autumn/Winter 1999–2000 / JFQ 57