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L O R T N O C D N A D Brian Walsh MAN Cpl M M by D01-9424 CO S Photo I mera Ca mbat Co A P J5 Soldiers of ‘A’Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, get a briefing from their patrol commander at an observation post in Macedonia, September 2001. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING COMMAND AND CONTROL by Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann I t seems ironic that an organization like the mili- Foster has described the state of Command and tary can contribute to a language’s lexicon, and Control theory as bleak, using words like “inchoate”, yet not use this lexicon consistently in its own “diffuse”, “conjectural” and “seemingly random”.5 day-to-day activities. The terms ‘command’, In our opinion, Foster’s description continues to ‘control’, and ‘command & control’ (i.e., C2) are reflect the state of Command, Control and C2 today, a case in point. These terms are recognizably mili- both in Canada and internationally. tary, and are well-entrenched in the military’s doctri- nal and operational vocabulary.1 Yet the manner in Our interest in command and control began in which these terms are used, as well as the circum- 1993 when we were asked to establish a C2 research stances of their usage, varies with confusing com- program at the Defence and Civil Institute of plexity. For example, some branches of the military Environmental Medicine. Being motivated scientists, endorse the concept of mission command, others we immersed ourselves in books and journal articles endorse a philosophy of centralized control and about C2. We then consulted with research col- decentralized execution, while in other services the leagues, both nationally and internationally, and pro- notion of network-centric C2 is prominent.2 NATO ceeded to interview commanders from all services. employs a dizzying array of C2 nomenclature and We attended military conferences,6 participated in authorities: OPCON, TACOM, full command, etc.3 meetings at a number of DND directorates that were And if we look for help from official definitions of involved in the development of C2 systems. At the Command, Control and C2 (e.g., those of NATO), we end of a year of intense study, we realized that find that the definitions themselves are circular and Foster’s assessment was correct. There was little con- redundant. The command definition makes use of the sensus within either the military or the research com- word control, the control definition uses concepts that munities on the actual definitions for Command, are part of the definition of command, and the defini- Control and C2 . tion of C2 is merely a longer restatement of the definition of control.4 Add to this confusion the growing Dr. Ross Pigeau is Head, Human Factors, of the Command Systems and bewildering array of C2 acronyms adopted by mil- Section at the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental itaries around the world (e.g., C2I, C3I2, C4ISRW, Medicine in Toronto. Carol McCann, MASc, is a defence scientist in etc.), and it is no wonder that defence analyst Greg the Command Group at DCIEM. 53 Spring 2002 (cid:2) Canadian Military Journal Exasperated but undaunted, we decided to start view, the latter is a subset of the former. Control in the from scratch and re-conceptualize the whole area. cybernetic sense involves a feedback mechanism by Our intention was to develop an internally consistent which some outcome is compared to some goal: action set of command and control concepts that would form is then taken that minimizes the difference between the the framework for a uniquely Canadian research pro- two.8 Cybernetic control systems ranging from the very gram. In the ensuing years, we have exposed our con- simple (e.g., common household thermostats) to the cepts to military and scientific scrutiny7 and, more very complex (e.g., nuclear power stations) have been recently, have begun collecting data to validate our developed successfully, many by the military. However, work. This paper describes our re-conceptualization control in militaristic terms implies more than simply of command and control and suggests ways in which feedback mechanisms. It implies the personnel, facili- it can be applied. ties and procedures for planning, directing and co-ordi- nating resources in the accomplishment of the mission.9 Our position is based on the following fundamental It implies standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules assumption: only humans command. Only humans of engagement (ROEs), regulations, military law, orga- demonstrate the range of innovative and flexible think- nizational structures, policies, equipment — in short, all ing necessary to solve complicated and unexpected those structures and processes (including cybernetic operational problems. Only humans accept the respon- processes) put in place by the military to facilitate the accomplishment of its mission in a safe and efficient manner. The notions of structure and process are key to understanding military control, and it is worth spending time elaborating them. Structures are frame- Walsh wceoprtkss (oorf pinhtyesrircealla teodb jeccotns-) Brian that define and classify some Cpl larger entity. For example, a M by bridge is a physical structure D01-9606a ogthfira dti enrctsel,ar rscesaliafbitleeesds , aotnbr ujesecsnettssi t,y (e et.fcgo..)r, S Photo I szpatainonni nigs as psatcruesc.t u rAe no fo rignatneri-- mera related departments (e.g., per- Ca sonnel, administration, pro- mbat duction, etc.) that classifies Co an entity for providing some A P J5 product or service. In a uni- verse where there may exist The captain of HMCS Preserver is briefed on damage control during training conducted en route to the an infinite number of ways of Arabian Sea for Operation “Apollo”, October 2001. spanning spaces or providing sibility commensurate with military success or failure. products, the use of the structure “bridge” or “organiza- Only humans possess the dedication, drive and motivation” immediately reduces the space for describing the tion to raise merely satisfactory military performance problem to a smaller, more manageable size and, by to outstanding levels. As self-evident as this assump- doing so, offers a more restricted set of solutions. tion seems (i.e., that only humans command), it is amaz- Similarly, military control encompasses a host of struc- ing how little effort has been expended in deducing the tures for bounding the mission space — e.g., order of organizational, psychological and technological impli- battle, data bases for describing terrain, sensor and cations it entails. weapon systems, etc. In order to elucidate the nature of command, it is Structure reduces uncertainty by bounding the perhaps instructive to begin by describing what com- problem space and increasing order (or meaningful- mand is not. Thus, we will first explore the nature of ness).10 Order then offers a rational basis for choosing control — the companion concept to command. As we and optimizing appropriate courses of action. Control will see, control provides the means and context for processes, therefore, are sets of regulated procedures command. It is the indispensable mechanism for com- that allow control structures to perform work.11 They mand expression. are mechanisms for invoking and controlling (in the cybernetic sense) action. Military rules of engagement, WHAT IS CONTROL? for example, are formal processes for regulating the use of power— for specifying the way in which mili- We must be careful to distinguish military control tary structures (e.g., soldiers, battle groups, and from engineering or cybernetic control. In our squadrons) are allowed to achieve their objective. 54 Canadian Military Journal (cid:2) Spring 2002 L O Military plans are formal processes for conducting an tion.14 For example, much has been written about the ‘fog’ R operation. For example, the standardization of control and ‘friction’of war, the ‘chaos’of battle and the complex- processes by instituting SOPs is an efficient means for ity of peacekeeping operations. Common to all of these sit- T increasing the speed of response and reducing risk dur- uations is the need for adaptability, the necessity of solving N ing exercises and operations. a multitude of unanticipated problems — both small and O large — that together can impede mission objectives.15 C Control structures and processes are essential for Solving these unanticipated problems requires creativity. action. Structures provide a bounded problem space D within which workable and efficient processes can then We assert that creativity is the most important N be applied to achieve solutions. We must caution, how- requirement for command.16 Without it, command is A ever, that control comes at a price: control, once adopt- condemned to treating every new problem as an instance ed, restricts flexibility. Any particular structure and of an older one. We must stress, however, that although D process (or any particular set of structures and process- creativity is necessary for command, it is not sufficient. N es) excludes from consideration an infinite set of alter- The will to be creative must also exist. Will involves native structures and processes that may suit the prob- the faculty of arriving at one’s own decision, as well as A lem better. All control structures and processes, espe- the determination to act upon it, in spite of opposition. M cially in organizations as large and as complex as mili- It is an attribute that has been pivotal in many descrip- M taries, have their strengths and their weaknesses, tions and discussions of command.17 Lieutenant depending on the situation in which they are applied. General Raymond Crabbe considered will to be para- O The maxim ‘Choose the right tool for the job’is intend- mount in command, describing it this way:18 C ed to protect us from committing the error of another maxim: ‘When all you have is a hammer, you tend to If there was one characteristic of command that treat everything as a nail.’ And as we will argue, over- I believed must be ever present, it was the will coming control restrictions on flexibility is one of the to get the job done, to see an action through to critical functions of command. its successful conclusion, to be resolute. The ability to overcome obstacles and impediments WHAT IS COMMAND? and get to the objective, to remain focused on the mission … ensuring that impediments do It may appear from our discussion of control that not become showstoppers. everything of military value is implicated in our notions of structure and process. After all, if control We define will as diligent purposefulness, and includes organizational structures, SOPs, ROEs, mili- posit two conditions necessary for its expression. The tary rules and regulations, sensor and weapon systems, first is motivation19 and the second is opportunity. equipment, doctrine, training programs, etc., then what The importance of motivation for creativity can be is left that could possibly qualify as command? This illustrated by an example. Many businesses in question is particularly pertinent if we are implying that Western society are highly ‘proceduralized’— that is, even the military chain-of-command is actually a con- the functions and services performed by their workers trol structure (which we are). The answer lies in two are regulated through the use of policies, guidelines, fundamentally important and uniquely human character- checklists, forms, regulations, algorithms, proce- istics: creativity and will. dures, etc. The classic instance of proceduralization is the automotive assembly line with its extensive All control structures and processes are human structures and processes (i.e., control) for manufac- inventions, either directly or indirectly. Weapons do turing cars.20 Yet as most unions know, an effective not build themselves, doctrine does not write itself, strategy for delaying or obstructing production is plans do not change of their own accord and algorithms work-to-rule — that is, to work only within the do not set their own initial conditions. An individual explicit guidelines and duties stated for the position. (or a group of individuals), somewhere, and at some Work-to-rule is effective as a job action because most point, invested time and effort to create the structures businesses rely on the good will of their work force to and processes that militaries now use. Structure and creatively solve the many minor problems for which process are possible only because of human creativity12 rules and regulations have not been (and may never and human determination. Space does not permit an be) developed. We stress that the potential for human extended discussion of the science of creativity, but we creativity has not disappeared from the work force must emphasize that creativity is not restricted to during a job action, only the motivation to express it. geniuses or to intellectuals.13 Creativity is a common human ability that expresses itself throughout the range The second condition for expressing will is oppor- of human behaviour — from the study of military art tunity. Opportunity is a favourable circumstance or and science, to negotiating passage through check- condition for achieving objectives, and we will discuss points while on operations, to planning alternative it in the next section. routes when driving home from work. RE-DEFINING CONTROL AND COMMAND The invention of military structures and processes requires creativity, but the importance of creativity does not Based on the discussion thus far, we offer the follow- end there. Inevitably these structures and processes must be ing new definitions of control and command. changed, adapted, altered, interpreted and, sometimes, even Notice that command is specifically mentioned in our re-invented to suit the evolving needs of the military situa- definition of control, suggesting a manifest dependency. 55 Spring 2002 (cid:2) Canadian Military Journal (cid:2) control: those structures and processes devised by actions appropriate for each. Essentially, controlling command to enable it and to manage risk. involves monitoring, carrying out and adjusting processes that have already been developed. (cid:2) command: the creative expression of human will Commanding involves creating new structures and necessary to accomplish the mission. processes (i.e., plans, SOPs, etc.), establishing the conditions for initiating and terminating action, and The function of control is to enable the creative making unanticipated changes to plans. Most acts, expression of will and to manage the mission problem in including decision making,22 involve a sophisticated order to minimize the risk of not achieving a satisfacto- amalgam of both commanding and controlling. For ry solution. The function of command is to invent novel example, firing a rifle requires the initial command act solutions to mission problems, to provide conditions for of deciding when to pull the trigger (e.g., Are the con- starting, changing and terminating control, and to be the ditions right? Is it safe? Am I ready to accept the source of diligent purposefulness. If command is inca- responsibility of hitting (or missing) the target?). pable of fulfilling these functions — if it cannot, for Continued firing at the same target then involves the example, identify new patterns of behaviour in the controlling acts of monitoring hits and adjusting aim adversary or take advantage of changes in the environ- accordingly. However, if the person firing the weapon ment — then the mission may fail.21 is instead told by another individual when explicitly to shoot and when explicitly to stop shooting, then the There are important implications following from acts of commanding and controlling are divided these new definitions of command and control. First, between two people. The individual giving the instruc- the definition of command embodies our assumption tions is commanding and the one firing is controlling. that ‘only humans command’. Only humans possess the degree of diligent purposefulness necessary to accom- But we must emphasize that simply ordering a per- plish mission objectives. Only humans possess the son to carry out some action is not necessarily an act of degree of creativity and inventiveness required to solve command. If an order is transmitted, without change or intractable problems. However, our assertion that ‘only embellishment, from a superior to a subordinate (e.g., if humans command’should not be confused with the false the platoon commander relays, unchanged, an order assertion that ‘humans can only command’. As our from the company commander to the section sergeant), example of the job action demonstrates, humans are no creativity is involved. Controlling, not commanding, quite capable of not being creative; instead, they can is happening. Commanding occurs only if a person in choose to function simply as extensions of an existing the chain of command interprets an order and alters it to control system. But unlike the job action example, con- suit the vagaries of the situation before transmitting it trol behaviour in a military situation may be appropri- further down. ate. In many instances, following a procedure is the most appropriate course of action because it would be Another reason that our concept of commanding inefficient to re-invent solutions that already exist. implies more than simply the act of ordering is that it allows an individual, working alone, to command. The A second implication of our definitions is that they pilot in a single-seat fighter aircraft, or the soldier cut allow us to distinguish between the concepts of com- off from the group, can still creatively express his or her mand vs. commanding and control vs. controlling — will to accomplish the mission — i.e., can still com- i.e., using the words as nouns vs. using them as verbs. mand — even though there is no one to order. Military usage is confusing in this matter, particularly concerning command. Often the act of commanding is The third implication arising out of our new defi- equated with ordering — that is, commanding is viewed nitions is arguably the most important and controver- simply as an expression of authority. Although order- sial. Nowhere in our definition of command is it stip- ing does play a role in commanding, it is a subsidiary ulated that only commanders command.23 Our defini- role. We will return to this matter after we have tion explicitly states that human will and human cre- described command and control as actions. ativity are sufficient. Any human, therefore, from the most junior military member to the most senior gener- Commanding is the act of creatively expressing al officer, is capable of command because, we assert, will to accomplish the mission. Controlling is the act all humans are inherently capable of creatively of enabling command and of managing risk using expressing their will (to a greater or lesser extent, existing structures and processes. Table 1 lists the depending on talent) in the service of the mission. The Commanding Controlling To create new structures and processes (when necessary). To monitor structures and processes (once initiated). To initiate and terminate control (this includes establishing the conditions for initiation and termination). To carry out pre-established procedures. To modify control structures and processes when the situation demands it. To adjust procedures according to pre-established plans. Table 1: Command and Control as Actions 56 Canadian Military Journal (cid:2) Spring 2002 L O determining factors for whether will is expressed are — that would trivialize the complexity of military oper- R motivation and opportunity. We have already men- ations. The point is to illustrate the difficulty in finding tioned the importance of motivation (recall the job the correct balance between encouraging creative com- T action example). Militaries must insure that their per- mand and controlling command creativity. N sonnel are properly motivated to achieve mission O objectives by, for example, recruiting quality candi- Historically, a military’s chain of command has C dates, ensuring quality of life, espousing noble mili- been the principal ways both for providing and for con- tary values, offering challenge, etc. straining command opportunity. For example, during an D operation, the position of commander is a military’s pri- N However, motivation alone is insufficient for mary mechanism for harnessing command potential, for A achieving objectives. The expression of command will giving it stability and fiduciary power, for formalizing also requires favourable circumstances and conditions its structure by situating it within a chain of command, D — that is, opportunity. Simply wanting an outcome to and for maximizing the probability of its expression N occur, without the means and opportunity to make it when it is operationally necessary to do so. The com- happen, is not enough. Will requires both motivation mander position is the traditional way that militaries A and opportunity. Militaries need to ensure that their provide and constrain opportunity for command expres- M personnel have both the resources (or power) and the sion. Although all individuals in a military can, in prin- M freedom to act creatively. They need to provide ciple, exhibit command behaviour, the position of com- favourable conditions for command expression. For mander is where such behaviour, by decree, is encour- O militaries to take advantage of the tremendous command aged and ultimately expected. Thus, the chain-of-com- C potential resident in each of its members, they must mand allows prescribed individuals the opportunity to encourage creativity and they must provide the opportu- creatively express their will by giving them the authori- nity for its expression. But these requirements lead to ty to do so. an interesting dilemma. Yet such opportunity comes at a price. Commanders How do militaries assign resources and encourage must be held accountable for their creative actions. freedom of action while at the same time ensuring the Creativity is expected and condoned only within the safe and coordinated use of these resources? Unbridled bounds of legal and moral guidelines. Indeed, some of expression of command creativity can quickly lead to these legal and moral guidelines are applicable to all organizational chaos. Conversely, over-control can military members — precisely because these individuals quickly lead to personnel de-motivation. Finding the may find themselves in the position of having to cre- correct balance is one of the premiere challenges facing atively express their will to accomplish the mission (and modern military organizations, particularly when they hopefully do this in a manner consistent with the intent must satisfy the competing demands of doctrine, tech- of the commander). nology, politics and tradition. How, then, do militaries encourage creative command on the one hand, yet con- We do not wish to imply that rigid organizational trol command creativity on the other? For example, the hierarchies are the only mechanisms that militaries doctrine of mission command espouses the delegation have for providing command opportunity, while at the of authority and the freedom to carry out actions con- same time controlling command expression. There are sistent with the intent of the commander. Mission com- others, including military traditions, professional mand, as a philosophy, attempts to maximize human ethics, self-discipline, the military justice system, etc. creativity, initiative and diligence. New concepts like Our point is that such control mechanisms are neces- ‘battlefield digitization’ and the ‘common operating sary, otherwise creative command may become unfo- picture’, which arise from developments in computer cused, uncoordinated and possibly even dangerous. and communication technologies, are designed to facil- Equally necessary is the requirement to guard against itate the expression of mission command by giving all over-controlling command, otherwise the very cre- members the same picture of the operation, thereby ative energy that control is meant to enable will be encouraging coordinated effort across all levels. But extinguished. history has shown that technology also encourages over-controlling behaviour. An example is found in van THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF COMMAND Creveld’s analysis of the war in Vietnam, which illus- CAPABILITY trates how helicopters and radios were used in micro- managing tactical operations:24 The implication that all military personnel, from the most junior to the most senior, are capable of com- A hapless company commander engaged in a mand has far reaching impact, only part of which has firefight on the ground was subjected to direct been explored. How, for example, is command capabil- observation by the battalion commander cir- ity different for the various members of the military? cling above, who was in turn supervised by the What distinguishes the command capability of general brigade commander circling a thousand or so officers from that of raw recruits? What factors con- feet higher up, who in his turn was monitored tribute to command capability and how should these fac- by the division commander in the next highest tors be weighted? chopper… To address these issues, we propose a model called The point is not to argue that micro-management is ‘CAR’ that incorporates the three factors of always wrong or that mission command is always right Competency, Authority and Responsibility. We will 57 Spring 2002 (cid:2) Canadian Military Journal first describe competency, authority and responsibility training, and subsequently in specialist courses and at separately, and then we will explain how together they staff colleges. Indeed, militaries expend significant form the axes of an abstract three-dimensional space resources to ensure that their personnel have the requi- within which the command capability of all military site physical and intellectual competencies to accom- members lies. plish their missions. Interestingly, much less effort is expended in developing the two other competencies — Competency emotional and interpersonal — though they are equally important for command. Military members need skills and abilities for accomplishing missions successfully. These abilities or Missions can be ill-defined, operationally uncertain, competencies fall into the following four general class- resource-scarce and involve high risk to humans. es: physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal. Deployment in theatre is often very stressful for those deployed, as well as being disruptive to family life. For most militaries, physical competency is a pre- Military members inevitably suffer a range of taxing requisite, one that is mandatory for any operational task, negative emotions: guilt, anxiety, anger, frustration, boredom, grief, fear and depression.25 Command under these conditions requires significant emotional competency, a competency strongly associated with resilience, hardi- ness and the ability to cope under stress.26 Command demands a degree of emotional Pilote ‘toughness’ to accept the by Sgt Gerry pqdeoucteeinsncitoeinsa sll. yo fT dhoier peae braicltioitonyns etao-l SD02-3016 kboenael taphn eac nes i touavanetdria olnpl eiesrms cporeittciiotcinavalel, mera Photo I atasi ni sa tsheen saeb iolfit yh utmo omura.in- mbat Ca comFpineatellnyc, y initse repsesresnotniaall Co A for interacting effectively P J5 with one’s subordinates, peers, superiors, the 3PPCLI officers conducting a reconnaissance of their area of responsibility at Kandahar airport in Afghanistan, February 2002. media and other govern- from conducting a ground reconnaissance, to loading a ment organizations. Social skills, developed throughout weapon and flying an aircraft. But physical competen- childhood, are the basis for this competency, which cy is not limited to physical strength; it also involves develops to include attributes of trust, respect, percep- sophisticated sensory motor skills, good health, agility tiveness and empathy that promote effective teamwork. and endurance. Although much technological develop- Interpersonal interactions require an ability to articulate ment has been devoted to extending physical competen- one’s thoughts, ideas and vision — especially verbally, cy in humans (e.g., weapons, night-vision goggles, G- but also in writing. suits, etc.), militaries still place great importance on individual physical skills. The physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal are classes of competencies that play a significant The second skill set, intellectual competency, is part in delineating command capability. critical for planning missions, monitoring the situation, using reasoning, making inferences, visualizing the Authority problem space, assessing risks and making judgements. Even more important, since no two missions will ever Authority, the second capability necessary for com- be the same, intellectual competency must include cre- mand, refers to command’s domain of influence. It is ativity, flexibility and a willingness to learn. the degree to which a commander is empowered to act, the scope of this power and the resources available for The importance of physical and intellectual compe- enacting his or her will. We distinguish between the tency for command is well acknowledged. Most mili- command authority that is assigned from external taries establish physical and intellectual aptitude test- sources and that which an individual earns by virtue of ing at recruitment. They follow this with extensive personal credibility — that is, between legal authority physical and intellectual development during basic and personal authority. 58 Canadian Military Journal (cid:2) Spring 2002 L O Legal authority is the power to act as assigned by individual accepts the legal and moral liability com- R a formal agency outside the military, typically a gov- mensurate with command.30 As with authority, there ernment.27 Legal authority, as expressed explicitly in are two components to responsibility, one externally T laws and regulations, formally assigns commanders imposed, and the other internally generated. The first, N resources and personnel for accomplishing the mis- called extrinsic responsibility, involves the obligation O sion. It is noteworthy that the legal authority assigned for public accountability.31 For example, the assign- C to a nation’s military goes well beyond that of any ment of legal authority is usually accompanied by a other private or government organization. Militaries formal expectation by superiors that one will be held D have the authority to enforce obedience among their accountable for resources assigned. Since superiors N members and, more importantly, militaries can know- (by definition) have greater legal authority than the A ingly place these members in harm’s way if the opera- individual being empowered, extrinsic responsibility tional needs of the mission demand it. These unique implies (in this case) accountability up the chain of D powers, and the significant implications that derive command. It implies a behavioural contract between N from them, are key in distinguishing militaries from the individual and his or her superiors. We must other large corporations. emphasize, however, that although legal authority A implies accountability, extrinsic responsibility is not M Personal authority is that authority given informally synonymous with accountability. Rather, extrinsic M to an individual by peers and subordinates. Unlike legal responsibility refers to a person’s willingness to be authority, which is made explicit through legal documen- held accountable for resources — that is, their will- O tation, personal authority is held tacitly. It is earned over ingness to take responsibility for the legal authority C time based on reputation, experience and character, and is that comes with the position. So, although it is possi- often acquired through personal example, as illustrated in ble for superiors to explicitly delineate (e.g., to list in the following quote from Gen. Matthew Ridgway:28 written form) subordinate accountabilities, until these accountabilities are accepted, extrinsic responsibility I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped is not in place. the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and sleet and the mud, shar- Extrinsic responsibility is also associated with per- ing the same cold, miserable existence they had sonal authority. Personal authority is earned from supe- to endure. riors, peers and subordinates who, through implicit acts of trust and commitment, empower the individual with The degree of personal authority achieved by an indi- informal authority — an authority often associated with vidual is correlated with professional knowledge and abil- leadership. Personal authority comes with expectations, ity (i.e., competency). However, an individual’s ethics, however. Subordinates and peers (the followers) expect values, courage (both physical and moral) and integrity that the individual (the leader) will behave in a manner form the basis for a more endur- ing personal authority. Although legal authority is an essential component of command for most militaries, in some organizations — for example guerrilla groups, para-militaries, cults — command authority is achieved almost exclusively through personal authority.29 In these cases, command can be flexible, albeit perhaps arbitrary and idiosyncratic. By contrast, when an individual has been given the legal authority to command but has not been able to establish personal authority Figure 1 – The relationship between Authority and Responsibility in the CAR structure, when Competency (by virtue of lack of time, is at a fixed level. opportunity, ability or inclina- tion), command is relatively limited and rigid, because consistent with their trust and not treat their loyalty authority is based solely on formal mechanisms. frivolously. Personal authority, therefore, implies Command authority is most effective with both legal accountability down to those who are the source of the authority to formalize power, and personal authority to empowerment. motivate will in others. Extrinsic responsibility is the degree to which an Responsibility individual feels accountable both up to superiors and down to followers. As such, it should be correlated with The third dimension of command is responsibili- the amount of legal authority assigned and personal ty. This dimension addresses the degree to which an authority achieved, and it should act as a guarantee or 59 Spring 2002 (cid:2) Canadian Military Journal commitment on the part of the individual to dispense understand the implications of this space for command, power responsibly. But history has shown that authori- first imagine a horizontal slice taken at some arbitrary ty and extrinsic responsibility are not always correlated level of competency (see Figure 1). This slice is a pla- — sometimes there is an unwillingness to be held nar surface describing only the responsibility and accountable for authority given. When this happens, the authority dimensions (i.e., for the moment it ignores potential for abusing authority becomes great. the competency dimension). For the discussion that follows, we have arbitrarily divided the surface into Intrinsic responsibility, the second component of quadrants representing high and low values for each responsibility, is the degree of self-generated obliga- axis (see the right-hand side of Figure 1). tion that one feels towards the military mission. It is a function of the resolve and motivation that an individ- When there is high authority (both legal and per- ual brings to a problem — the amount of ownership sonal) and acceptance of responsibility associated with this degree of authority (both extrinsic and intrinsic), the result is maximal (balanced) command. In this situation, the military organization can be assured that the authority assigned and earned will be treat- ed responsibly in accordance with stated intentions, implied military values and general societal expectations. Balanced command is the desired state since responsibility is the only mechanism by which militaries can guarantee that their extreme power will be exercised safely and appropriately. There are cases, however, when there is an acceptance of high levels of responsibility without commensu- rately high levels of authority being given. This condition results in ineffectual command: although responsibility has been taken, power over resources has not been assigned or no clear mandate to act has been author- ized. The experience of a military commander like General Dallaire in Figure 2 – Three slices of the Authority-Responsibility surface for three different levels of Competency. Rwanda32provides an example of the frustration and perceived ineffectual- taken and the amount of commitment expressed. ity of command that can occur in peace support opera- Intrinsic responsibility is associated with the concepts tions, despite the extremely high level of intrinsic of honour, loyalty and duty, those timeless qualities responsibility that he brought to this mission. linked to military ethos. Of all the components in the Ineffectual command undermines the very purpose of a dimensions of command, intrinsic responsibility is the military. Without authority, a commander is powerless to most fundamental. Without it, very little could be properly accomplish the mission, yet can feel responsi- accomplished. It is the source of all motivation, effort ble for not having done so. Without sufficient authority, and commitment. Indeed, it is the driving force a commander is compromised in his mission. Even behind the creativity that our definition asserts is worse, the individual in the position is placed under essential for command. Intrinsic responsibility will tremendous psychological pressure. be affected by such factors as whether military personnel are conscripted or allowed to volunteer, When little authority is assigned to or earned by an whether civilians support the role of military in socie- individual, and he or she has little expectation of being held ty, and whether the military organization itself is per- accountable for actions, minimal (balanced) command ceived to be upholding the values deemed important results. The levels of authority and responsibility are in by its own members. balance, but little scope for initiating change is expected or granted. Therefore, command capability is minimal. THE COMMAND CAPABILITY SPACE Finally, the fourth quadrant in Figure 1 represents The CAR model allows us to map out the entire the potential for abuse of command, and is thus called space of command capability as well as situate dangerous command. It results when significant author- individual members within this space. As Figure 1 ity has been assigned or earned, but the individual has illustrates, each of the CAR dimensions describes one not been willing to accept responsibility for the proper axis of an abstract 3-dimensional space. To better use of this power. There have been many examples of 60 Canadian Military Journal (cid:2) Spring 2002 L O abuse of command in history,33and it is an outcome that levels of authority and responsibility. A large imbal- R most nations and their militaries try to avoid by invok- ance in any one of the dimensions will lead to coming and enforcing judicial powers of punishment. promised command capability. T N Yet abuse of authority is only one example of dan- Finally, if the ellipses in Figure 2 are plotted suc- O gerous command. This quadrant also represents the cessively for each increasing level of competency, a C potential outcome from automating command capabili- diagonal volume of space emerges that represents the ty. As technology becomes more sophisticated and the ideal (or preferred) combination of competency, author- D need for greater speed and accuracy more pressing, ity and responsibility.35 This Balanced Command N ‘empowering’ automated systems to make very fast Envelope (BCE) is the region of the command capabili- A defensive and offensive actions seems to be an attrac- ty space (see Figure 3) within which military organiza- tive solution. However, two potentially negative out- tions should ensure that all of their members lie D comes for command are possible should this option be throughout their careers. It is the region where compe- N invoked. First, empowering automated systems pushes tency, authority and responsibility are most in balance. command into the dangerous command quadrant It is the region that best protects militaries from danger- A because such systems are incapable of accepting ous or ineffectual command, and it is the region where M responsibility for their actions (i.e., they have the motivation and initiative are maximized while the like- M authority but not the responsibility). Second, since the lihood of poor performance and fear of failure are min- human commander in this situation will still be expect- imized. Although being (slightly) outside the BCE can O ed to accept responsibility for the actions of automated sometimes have positive benefits — e.g., an acting C systems (but now have less authority), they may find position may motivate an individual to acquire greater themselves situated in the ineffectual command quad- levels of competency, thereby re-establishing the CAR rant. According to the CAR structure, militaries must balance — extreme outliers typically induce negative carefully consider the repercussions of empowering command conditions.36 automated systems. In summary, we propose that command capability Having discussed the four quadrants of the — i.e., the potential for creative expression of human authority-responsibility surface, we are now in a posi- will — is captured by the dimensions of competency, tion to reintegrate the competency dimension and to authority and responsibility. The command capability hypothesize the desired relationship among the three dimensions. Figure 2 illustrates three slices of the authority-responsibility surface for three different levels of competency (low, medium and high). The dot-filled ellipses located in each authority- responsibility surface represent the preferred command capability areas. When competency is low, as is usually the case for an entry level military member, the level of authority given to such a member should also be low, as should the expected level of responsibility. Too much authority and responsibility would overwhelm an individual who has not, as yet, attained the level of competency (physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal) necessary for the position. And from the organizational per- spective, it is risky to assign authority to someone who does not have ade- quate competency to wield it. Conversely, if competency is high, too little authority and responsibility will induce boredom, low motivation and Figure 3 – The Balanced Command Envelope. professional dissatisfaction.34 Notice that the ellipses (i.e., the preferred command regions) of all military members can be positioned within this in Figure 2 move diagonally across the authority- three-dimensional space, and it behoves the military to responsibility surface as competency increases. Also ensure that its members stay on the BCE. Furthermore, notice that regardless of the level of competency, the the military should foster command potential in each of off-diagonals of the authority-responsibility surface its members — through training and education to should be avoided (i.e., dangerous command and inef- increase creativity and competency, through opportuni- fectual command). We assert, then, that the level of ties for exercising authority, and through challenging competency should match, or be well-balanced with, leadership to ensure motivation. 61 Spring 2002 (cid:2) Canadian Military Journal CONCLUSIONS military situation, thus making command pre-eminent. Control should always be subordinate to command. O ur re-conceptualization of command and control is grounded first and foremost in new definitions. Only a few of the implications arising from our re- We believe that definitions are crucial: they provide conceptualization of command and control have been the authoritative anchors for deriving new ideas, discussed here. There are many more: for example, the hypotheses and interpretations. We have attempted, difference between management and leadership, the in our definitions, to capture the essence of the con- nature of commandership, selection of appropriate concepts of command and control, giving them signifi- trol structures and processes to enable command, the cance and precise meaning while encapsulating the function of technology, and the role of education in nature and key qualities of each. In our view, the command development. We assert that our re-conceptu- essence of control lies in structure and process, while alization, anchored in our definitions and extended the essence of command lies in creativity and will. through the CAR model, offers a coherent and powerful Most importantly, however, our definition of com- framework for advancing command and control theory mand captures the fundamental assumption to which and application.37 Indeed, it may even provide a com- operational commanders have alluded to time and mon vehicle for aligning command and control concepts again — that humans bear the burden of command. among the three services. So fundamental is this axiom that it seems to have suffered the fate of many axioms: its self-evident Finally, the astute reader will have noticed that nature has concealed its significance. Our re-concep- though command and control have been discussed tualization gives this axiom the prominence and cred- extensively, C2has been neglected. It is an oddity of the it that it deserves. military lexicon that C2 means something different than command and control. Our new framework also Command and control are complementary. includes a re-definition of the concept of C2, but we Command cannot be exercised without control, but con- must await a future opportunity to discuss it. trol is meaningless without command. However, the two are not equal. Command creates and changes the structures and processes of control to suit the uncertain NOTES 1. The term “command” has been used for at and relationships within the NATO Alliance are Kluwer/Academic, 2000). A second Human in least the last 50 years in military writing. Prior discussed by Thomas-Durell Young in Command conference was held in Breda, NLin to that, the concept of command was often sub- Multinational Land Operations and NATO: June 2000. sumed under the concept of “generalship” (e.g., Reforming Practices and Structures (Strategic 7. The framework has been presented in a J.F.C. Fuller, 1936, Generalship: Its Diseases Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, variety of military fora over the last five years, and Cure. A Study of the Personal Factor in Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997). including the DLSC-sponsored Army Futures Command, Harrisburg, PA: Military Service 4. NATO “Glossary of Terms and meetings; the Maritime Warfare Command and Publishing). The term “command and control” Definitions” (STANAG AAP-6(R), 1988). See Staff Course at MWC; and both the Advanced is of relatively recent vintage, appearing, we C. McCann and R. Pigeau “Taking Command of Military Studies Course and the Command and believe, coincident with the rise in information C2” (Proceedings of Second International Staff Course at the Canadian Forces College; as technology (IT) in the 1960s. Alan English, a Command and Control Research & Technology well as to war studies students in the Dept. of Canadian military historian, points out that nei- Symposium, 1995, Washington, DC: Institute Military Leadership and Psychology at RMC. ther the term “command and control” nor, for National Strategic Studies, pp. 531-545) for In February of this year it was briefed at a indeed, the term “control” was used in an a more detailed description of the problem of DCDS Strategic Retreat and, in addition, to the address entitled “Higher Command in War” using the NATO definitions as a basis for a con- Naval Board. Also during its development, the made by General Slim to the US Command and sistent conceptual framework for C2. framework has been regularly presented at both General Staff College on 8 Apr 1952 (reprint- 5. Foster, G. D. (1988), “Contemporary C2 the CCRTS (see footnote 6) and the Human in ed in Military Review, Vol. 70, No. 5 (May theory and research: The failed quest for a phi- Command meetings. 1990), pp. 10-21). In it, Slim speaks exten- losophy of command,” Defense Analysis, 4(3), 8. See N. Weiner, Cybernetics (1961, sively about command, but though he talks p. 213. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) for a fuller treat- about headquarters and their organizations, he 6. The largest scientific conferences on C2 ment. A special type of cybernetic control is doesn’t use the word “control” at all. English are the Command and Control Research and called Perceptual Control Theory (Behaviour – takes this as good evidence that before IT, peo- Technology Symposia (CCRTS) held under the The Control of Perception, W.T. Powers, 1973, ple considered command as the overarching auspices of the Center for Advanced Concepts Chicago: Aldyne) where a psychological per- activity, and that is was only with the advent of and Technology at the National Defense ception, rather than an outcome, is compared to ITthat the term C2appeared. (English, person- University in Washington, DC. A US-based a goal. Regardless, both types are regulated via al communication, 14 Nov 2001.) CCRTS, with about 120 papers, is held in June feedback mechanisms, which may occur in a 2. These command and control philosophies each year. An international CCRTS is held bi- cycle repeatedly until the goal is achieved. are endorsed, respectively, by the Canadian annually in a country other than the US, with 9. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions Army (“Command,” B-GL-300-033/FP-000 the next one planned for Quebec City in (STANAG AAP-6(R), 1988). Land Force, Volume 3), the Canadian Air Force September, 2002. These meetings have 10. W.R. Garner, Uncertainty and Structure (“Out of the Sun – Aerospace Doctrine for the addressed mainly technologies for C2. as Psychological Concepts (1962, New York: Canadian Forces,” B-GA-400-000/AF-000) and Recently, a new series of conferences has been John Wiley and Sons). the US Navy (see P. Forgues “Command in a initiated, focussing exclusively on command. 11. Control structures and processes differ in Network-Centric War,” 2001, Canadian The first of these “Human in Command” meet- their degree of formality and rigidity, ranging Military Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 23-30 for a ings was held in 1998 at Ft. Frontenac, from the high rigidity of equipment and soft- discussion of the network-centric approach to Kingston with the proceedings subsequently ware; through plans and rules of engagement; C2 and its adoption by the U.S. Navy). published in a book of the same title, edited by to organizational structure and doctrine, the lat- 3. The complexities of command authorities C. McCann and R. Pigeau (London: ter having somewhat more flexibility. See R. 62 Canadian Military Journal (cid:2) Spring 2002