Drug War Crimes The Consequences of Prohibition Drug War Crimes The Consequences of Prohibition Jeffrey A. Miron The E INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE Oakland, California Copyright ©2004 by The Independent Institute All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by electronic or mechanical means now known or to be Invented, including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review. Nothing herein should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. 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Telephone: 510-632-1366 facsimile: 510*568-6040 Email: info^independent.org Website: www.independent.org Contents Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 The Economic Analysis of Drug Prohibition 7 Chapter 3 The Effect of Drug Prohibition 25 on Drug Consumption: Evidence from Alcohol Prohibition Chapter 4 Prohibitions and Violence 43 Chapter 5 Is Prohibition Good Policy? 59 Chapter 6 Alternatives to Prohibition 75 and Other Policies Toward Drugs Chapter 7 Conclusion 87 References 89 Index 103 About the Author 109 List of Illustrations Tables Table 3.1 States passing state-level prohibitions 29 before federal prohibition Table 3.2 Percentage of population age 15 and over 40 using illicit drugs, late 1990s-2003 Table 4.1 Homicide rates, 1993-1996 52 Table 5.1 Illicit drug use in lifetime, past year, and past mondi 67 among persons age 12 or older: Percentages, 2002 Figures Figure 3.1 U.S. cirrhosis death rates, 1900-1997 27 Figure 3.2 U.S. cirrhosis death rates, 1910-1940 28 Figure 3.3 U.S. cirrhosis death rates in 31 states without prohibition before 1919 Figure 3.4 U.S. cirrhosis death rates in 31 states adopting prohibition before 1919 Figure 3.5 U.S. cirrhosis death rate 32 and alcohol consumption, 1916-1917 Figure 3.6 Pounds of opium entered for consumption 38 annually 1885-1926, per capita Figure 4.1 U.S. homicide rate 47 Figure 4.2 Expenditure for enforcement of alcohol 49 and drug prohibition, dollars per capita To my father, who is a libertarian, and my mother, who is not. 1 Introduction Drug prohibition in the United States is now almost eighty years old. Federal law first prohibited cocaine, heroin, and related drugs in 1914, and marijuana in 1937. In recent years gov ernment expenditure for prohibition enforcement has exceeded $33 billion annually', with law enforcement authorities making more than 1.5 million arrests per year on drug-related charges (Miron 2003b). In the United States, there are now more than 318,000 persons behind bars for violations of drug prohibition, more than the number of persons incarcerated for all crimes in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain combined.1 What does the United States gain from this incredible invest ment of resources? Prohibitionists believe drug use would soar if drugs were legal, and they regard any increase as undesirable per se. Prohibitionists also assert that drug use causes crime, diminishes health and productivity for drug users, encourages driving and in dustrial accidents, exacerbates poverty, supports terrorism, and contributes generally to societal decay. Thus, advocates claim, pro hibition benefits drug users and society alike. I argue here that drug prohibition, rather than drug use, causes most ills typically attributed to drugs. I show that prohibition’s abil ity to reduce drug use is modest rather than dramatic, so any ben efits of reduced consumption are moderate at best. I demonstrate that prohibition has a range of negative consequences, including increased violence, reduced health for drug users, transfers to crim inals, and diminished civil liberties; thus, prohibition exacerbates 2 | Drug War Crimes many of the problems it allegedly solves. I explain that reduced drug use is not, in general, an appropriate goal for government pol icy. And I demonstrate that, even if a policy-induced reduction in drug consumption is desirable, prohibition is a terrible choice for achieving this goal. I base these conclusions on an economic analysis of drug pro hibition. This analysis uses economic reasoning to determine the likely effects of prohibition on drug use, crime, health, productiv ity, product quality, and other outcomes. The analysis also exam ines evidence on how drugs and drug policy influence each of these outcomes. There is room for scientific disagreement about some of this evidence. But dispassionate examination supports the argu ments for drug legalization rather than those for prohibition. The remainder of the book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the standard economic analysis of prohibi tion. The discussion is “positive” rather than “normative,” mean ing it identifies the effects of prohibition without taking a stand on 'whether prohibition is good or bad. The usual defense of prohibi tion assumes it substantially reduces drug use and, by so doing, .lowers crime and improves the health and productivity of drug users. The analysis here shows, however, that prohibition-induced reductions in drug consumption are not necessarily large or even in the “desired” direction. Moreover, prohibition can increase rather than decrease crime and diminish rather than enhance health and productivity. In addition, prohibition can generate numerous un desirable consequences such as corruption, infringements on civil -liberties, wealth transfers to criminals, unwarranted restrictions on medicinal uses of drugs, and insurrection in drug-producing coun tries. And these unintended consequences are possible even if pro hibition has a substantial impact on drug use. This positive analysis of prohibition therefore suggests two issues are central to the normative analysis of prohibition. The first is whether prohibition’s effect on drug consumption is “ small” or “large,” and the second is whether prohibition in Introduction | 3 creases or decreases crime. If the prohibition-induced change in drug consumption is small, any benefits that might result from re duced consumption are also small, implying the costs of prohibi tion almost certainly exceed the benefits. If prohibition increases rather than decreases crime, then it causes one of the main prob lems it attempts to alleviate, raising questions about prohibition even if it substantially reduces drug use. Thus, these two issues deserve special attention. Chapter 3 addresses the effect of prohibition on drug con sumption by examining cirrhosis death rates during the Prohibition period. Although not identical to current drug prohibition in structure or enforcement, alcohol prohibition is a natural labora tory for studying the effects of drug prohibition on drug con sumption. Debates over prohibition routinely cite this episode as supporting one side or the other, but previous analyses have not controlled adequately for factors other than prohibition that might have influenced cirrhosis. The analysis here indicates alcohol prohi bition had a modest effect on alcohol consumption, which implies drug prohibition has a modest effect on drug use. Auxiliary evi dence from a variety of sources suggests the same conclusion. Chapter 4 examines the effect of drug prohibition on violence. Prohibition advocates claim drug use causes violent behavior, while prohibition critics claim prohibition generates violence by forcing drug markets underground. These claims are not mutually exclu sive, but it is important to determine if one or the other predomi nates in practice. The chapter addresses these competing claims by first examining homicide rates over the past century in the Unitec States. The evidence that alcohol prohibition had a modest impact on alcohol consumption suggests drug prohibition has a modest impact in reducing violence, but this evidence is not by itself deci sive. The chapter shows that both drug and alcohol prohibition co incided with increases in the homicide rate, consistent with the view that under prohibition, market participants substitute guns for lawyers in the resolution of disputes. The chapter then discusses the