Dominion and Communion - Patristic Theology and Ethics of Humanity's Relationship with Animal Creation

299 Pages·2016·1.538 MB·English

by  Ian Charles Jones

DOMINION AND COMMUNION: PATRISTIC THEOLOGY AND

THE ETHICS OF HUMANITY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ANIMAL CREATION

BY

Ian Charles Jones

BA, Baylor University, 1999

JD, University of Virginia School of Law, 2002

MA, St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2009

MPhil, Fordham University, 2013

DISSERTATION

SUMBITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY

AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

FEBRUARY, 2016
ProQuest Number: 10013400
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation could not have reached its completion without the attentive guidance of
my supervisor, Dr George E. Demacopoulos, who reviewed successive drafts and provided me
with both encouragement and helpful critique. Dr Demacopoulos agreed to my project of
bridging historical theology with contemporary ethics despite its unconventionality in the field of
historical studies, and what success I have achieved in this endeavor is owed in large part to his
sympathy for the vision of my project.
Another pivotal figure in all stages of this dissertation was Dr Charles C. Camosy, one of
my readers and the professor whose bioethics course launched my interest in the subject of
animal ethics. It was my term paper for the same course, titled “Duties of a Steward: Articulating
an Eastern Orthodox Perspective on Animal Welfare,” that became the seed for this much larger
project. Where Dr Demacopoulos provided me with valuable feedback from a historian’s
perspective, Dr Camosy did the same from an ethicist’s perspective. The active involvement of
both professors in all phases greatly enhanced my efforts to bridge these two fields.
I would also like to thank my reader, Rev. Dr Joseph T. Lienhard, SJ, for his helpful
attention to detail in suggesting revisions, and my examiners, Dr Harry P. Nasuti, and Dr
Christiana Z. Peppard, who graciously agreed to sit on my committee to provide me with
challenging perspectives I doubtless would not have explored otherwise.
Finally, I cannot imagine having completed this project without the loving and generous
support of my parents, Ken and Anastasia Jones, who allowed me to revisit my days as a much
younger student by offering me their home as a place to stay while completing my research and
writing.

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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements i
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Patristic Understandings of the Natures and Capacities of Non-Human Animal
Creatures 11
I. Reading these sources with an eye to animal significance 13
II. The hierarchical ontology of animal creation 19
III. Animals for human use and benefit 28
IV. Design of animals revealing God’s glory, wisdom, and providence 33
V. Animals as moral examples 39
VI. The state of paradise and the present state 54
VII. Conclusion 62
Chapter 2: Patristic Understandings of Human Dominion: the Basis for Responsibilities
toward Creation 64
I. The rational human soul as ruler: humanity made in God’s image 65
II. Human humility and human exceptionalism: patristic exegesis of Genesis 2
and its interplay with Genesis 1 80
III. The composite human with a mediatorial vocation 94
IV. Paradise and its recovery 102
V. Human dominion revisited after the Flood 111
VI. Christ as archetype of human dominion, and the saints as His imitators 114
VII. Conclusion 117
Chapter 3: Christ-Like Dominion in the Lives of the Saints 126

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I. The texts: genre, audience, and purpose 134
II. Asceticism revisited 142
III. Use of animals for skins and food 145
IV. Tenderness and cooperation between saints and animals 154
A. Saintly service to animals: mercy and hospitality 156
B. Animal moral or spiritual agency 159
C. Animal service to saints 167
1. Animals cooperating with saints 167
2. Animals honoring departing or departed saints 168
3. Animals showing mercy toward saints 172
V. Saintly command and animal obedience 173
VI. Saintly hostility to harmful animals 183
VII. Conclusion 192
Chapter 4: Contemporary Animal Ethics in Dialogue with Traditional Sources 197
I. David Clough: critiquing and reappropriating theological sources 199
A. Creation 201
B. Reconciliation 209
C. Redemption 216
II. Andrew Linzey: the radical demands of the perennial gospel 221
A. Christ-like dominion as service to sentient creatures 222
B. Ethical case: meat eating versus vegetarianism 231
C. Ethical cases: animal experimentation and genetic engineering 233
D. Linzey as animal-rights theologian: critique and appreciation 236
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III. Roger Scruton: traditional conclusions through modern methods 240
A. Varying animal capacities and their moral implications 242
B. Rationality, and the bases for duties of rational (moral) beings toward
non-rational (non-moral) beings 247
IV. Conclusion 258
Conclusion 264
Bibliography 285
Abstract
Vita
Introduction

The recent publication of Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato si’ has marked an important
step in the recognition that concern for the earth belongs not exclusively on the left end of the
political spectrum, but to all people, especially Christians by virtue of their rich theology of
creation. The pope has issued a call for all of us to think and act on behalf of care for God’s
world, and we need not hold to any particular ideology or even be in the Roman communion to
see the rightness of this call. Even the most ardent climate change skeptic, for example, can
recognize that the consumerist mentality rampant in modern Western society is at odds with the
ascetic renunciation of worldly concerns that permeates the Christian tradition and the gospel
itself. Disputes over scientific evidence may continue and are indeed important for public policy,
but from a theological perspective, it should not strain the bounds of credulity to believe human
choices can affect creation on a global scale. According to Genesis, it would not be the first time.
Among the issues in the “ecological” family, the ethical treatment of animals stands out
as especially significant, both theologically and practically. Theologically, the Judeo-Christian
foundation for our authority as rulers of the earth is located in Genesis 1:26, but that passage
specifically refers to human dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the
animals of the land, not over “creation” or “the earth” generally. While Genesis 2:15 says God
placed Adam “in the garden of Eden to till and keep it,”1 our authority as beings in God’s image
and likeness (Gen 1:26-27) pertains to animals in a unique way. We need to ask ourselves what
is contemplated in it and what is not. Practically, care for animals implicates questions of care for
the wider environment, as both wild and tame animals depend on the natural world for their

1 This translation is from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), as are all Scripture
quotations unless otherwise indicated.

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sustenance. While it is possible to address questions of animal treatment in isolation from larger
ecological questions by focusing only on specific actions we should not take against animals,
such an approach already assumes a certain ideal of our relationship with animals: a negative one
whereby we may do nothing better than to leave them alone, instead of a positive one whereby
we are responsible not only for refraining from abuse, but also for protecting and perhaps even
nurturing their ability to live in accordance with their natures. Although this dissertation deals
with the subject of animal treatment specifically and not with ecological questions more
holistically, it aims to be attentive to the relationship between the two, bearing in mind that the
answers to one set of questions have ramifications for the other set.
Non-human creation is often treated as merely instrumental, a means to the end of human
happiness and flourishing, or at least of meeting human needs. Particularly in the developed
world, these ends are conceived of in consumerist terms, in which desires tend to masquerade as
needs, sometimes actually taking on that character by becoming addictions. While this dynamic
is harmful to the planet and to humans, it is devastating in a direct way to non-human animals as
sentient creatures, capable of feeling the painful effects of their exploitation. The two modern
institutions that most clearly emblematize the large-scale, efficiency-oriented exploitation of the
modern world are the industrial “factory” farm and the research laboratory, both of which treat
the animal in value-neutral terms, as either a unit of production or a source of data. The benefits
to the public are obvious: artificially cheap meat and dairy products in the former case, and
advances in scientific knowledge in the latter.2 Notwithstanding the hidden costs of the

2 Detailed information on these practices may be found in, among other sources: Charles
Camosy, For Love of Animals: Christian Ethics, Consistent Action (Cincinnati: Franciscan
Media, 2013); Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); Matthew
Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (New
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2002); Andrew Linzey, Animal Gospel (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster
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environmental degradation and the adverse impact to public health caused by factory farming,
demand for large quantities of meat and dairy at low shelf prices drives a system that relies on
what may fairly be described as concentration camps for animals. The same may be said for the
demand for medical research in pursuit of new discoveries and treatments.
It is not unfair to characterize public sympathy for animals as sincerely felt but arbitrarily
granted, arising inconsistently due to lack of information and reflection. The recent public outcry
over the Minnesota dentist Walter Palmer’s killing of Cecil the Lion, going so far as to force him
into temporary hiding owing to death threats, is enough to demonstrate that many in the public
do feel sympathy for animals, even at an intense level. It is interesting to speculate, then, as to
how much of the righteous indignation against Palmer came from people who routinely enjoy
low-cost meat and dairy. Considering that this reaction was quite mainstream, I suspect the
answer is that a substantial majority of his critics are consumers of factory-farmed animal
products. There are a couple of possible explanations for the discrepancy. The first is that a lion
naturally commands more sympathy than a cow, pig, or chicken, perhaps because of its majestic
air, or perhaps because of its status as a threatened species. In either scenario, the sympathy runs
to the species and not the individual, so Cecil is valuable as a member of a majestic or threatened
species. This is likely part of the reason for the disgust with Palmer’s action, but it does not
account for concerns like the amount of time it took Cecil to die (forty hours) or for the labeling
of his killing as murder.3 There seems also to be a well-placed sympathy for the suffering and
death of Cecil as an individual animal. And this is just one example that stands apart from the

John Knox Press, 1998); and Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Urbana and Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 1994).
3 See, for example, Rose George, “The hunter who killed Cecil the lion doesn’t deserve our
empathy,” The Guardian (July 29, 2015) [cited 25 September 2015]. Online: http://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/29/hunter-killed-cecil-lion-walter-palmer.
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countless people who have strong emotional attachments to their pets, investing them with value
as individuals with some claim to honorary membership in the human family.
But this sympathy begs the question of the discrepancy: if so many people care about the
needless suffering and killing of individual animals, why are the factory farms in business?
There would not be that kind of supply without a commensurate level of demand. When outrage
over the system is expressed, it is often stereotyped as coming from either those on the cultural
fringes or those with a nearly superhuman ability to go without foods ordinary people cannot go
without. Whether demeaning or flattering, the effect of the stereotype is to marginalize the issue.
When the cost of compassion becomes too high, it can be easier to shift one’s attention
elsewhere. This myopia, I submit, is at the root of the current disparity between our
instrumentalizing of animals on the one hand and our sentimentalizing of them on the other
(which, in the final analysis, is simply another way of instrumentalizing them). If compassion is
to be real rather than arbitrary and convenient, it will be necessary to examine our own practices
with an openness to critique and change. We must confront the ways in which not only Palmer’s
choices, but our own, contribute to the degradation of animals.
One way of countering an instrumentalist attitude, sometimes employed in philosophical
ethics, is to focus inquiry on whether animals have “intrinsic” value, that is, value in themselves
independent of their extrinsic utility. In a Christian setting, this concept may be adjusted to refer
to value vested in them from outside, by their Creator. Although the idea that animals have some
value as God’s creatures may not be particularly controversial among Christians in the abstract,
there nonetheless exists a fear of compromising human uniqueness by virtue of the imago Dei
that can stifle serious reflection on questions of animal ethics. Particularly among conservative
Christians, there is a suspicion that an interest in compassion for animals can only coexist with