Does Tomorrow Exist?: A Debate

212 Pages·2023·1.762 MB·English

by  Nikk Effingham, Kristie Miller

Does Tomorrow Exist?
This book takes up the question of whether past and future events exist.
Two very dif erent views are explored. According to one of these views
(presentism), advanced by Nikk Ef ngham, the present is special. Efngham
argues that only present things exist, but which things those are changes as
time passes. Given presentism, although there once existed dinosaurs, they
exist no more, and although you and I exist, at some time in the future we
will come to exist no more. According to the alternative view (eternalism),
advanced by Kristie Miller, our world is a giant four-dimensional block of
spacetime in which all things, past, present, and future, exist. On this view,
dinosaurs exist, it is just that they are not located at the current time.
The book considers arguments for and against presentism and eternalism,
including arguments that appeal to our best science, to the way the world seems
to us to be in our experiences of time, change, and freedom, and to how to make
sense of ordinary claims about the past.
Key Features:
• Of ers an accessible introduction to the philosophy of temporal ontology.
• Captures the process of philosophical debate, giving readers an insight
into the craft of philosophy.
• Engages with and clearly explains state-of-the-art and cutting-edge research.
Nikk Efngham is Professor at the University of Birmingham where he works
on metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. He is the author of Time
Travel: Probability and Impossibility (2020) and An Introduction to Ontol-
ogy (2013).
Kristie Miller is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, and
Joint Director of the interdisciplinary Centre for Time. She works primar-
ily in metaphysics, particularly on the nature of time, persistence, and per-
sonal identity. In addition to her articles, she has co-authored several books,
including Out of Time (2022), Everyday Metaphysical Explanation (2022)
and An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time (2018).
Little Debates About Big Questions
Tyron Goldschmidt
Fellow of the Rutgers Center for Philosophy of Religion, USA
Dustin Crummett
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany
About the series:
Philosophy asks questions about the fundamental nature of reality, our place
in the world, and what we should do. Some of these questions are perennial:
for example, Do we have free will? What is morality? Some are much newer:
for example, How far should free speech on campus extend? Are race, sex
and gender social constructs? But all of these are among the big questions in
philosophy and they remain controversial.
E ach book in the Little Debates About Big Questions series features two
professors on opposite sides of a big question. Each author presents their own
side, and the authors then exchange objections and replies. Short, lively, and
accessible, these debates showcase diverse and deep answers. Pedagogical
features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms
and principles, glossaries, and annotated reading lists.
T he debate format is an ideal way to learn about controversial topics. Whereas
the usual essay or book risks overlooking objections against its own proposition
or misrepresenting the opposite side, in a debate each side can make their case at
equal length, and then present objections the other side must consider. Debates
have a more conversational and fun style too, and we selected particularly
talented philosophers—in substance and style—for these kinds of encounters.
Debates can be combative—sometimes even descending into anger and
animosity. But debates can also be cooperative. While our authors disagree
strongly, they work together to help each other and the reader get clearer on
the ideas, arguments, and objections. This is intellectual progress, and a much-
needed model for civil and constructive disagreement.
The substance and style of the debates will captivate interested readers new
to the questions. But there’s enough to interest experts too. The debates will
be especially useful for courses in philosophy and related subjects—whether as
primary or secondary readings—and a few debates can be combined to make up
the reading for an entire course.
W e thank the authors for their help in constructing this series. We are honored
to showcase their work. They are all preeminent scholars or rising-stars in
their fi elds, and through these debates they share what’s been discovered with
a wider audience. This is a paradigm for public philosophy, and will impress
upon students, scholars, and other interested readers the enduring importance of
debating the big questions.
P ublished Titles:
D oes Tomorrow Exist?
A Debate
Nikk Effi ngham and Kristie Miller
Should Wealth Be Redistributed?
A Debate
S teven McMullen and James R. Otteson
D o We Have Free Will?
A Debate
R obert Kane and Carolina Sartorio
I s There a God?
A Debate
K enneth L. Pearce and Graham Oppy
I s Political Authority an Illusion?
A Debate
M ichael Huemer and Daniel Layman
S elected Forthcoming Titles:
D o Numbers Exist?
A Debate
W illiam Lane Craig and Peter van Inwagen
W hat Do We Owe Other Animals?
A Debate
B ob Fischer and Anja Jauernig
C onsequentialism or Virtue Ethics?
A Debate
J orge L.A. Garcia and Alastair Norcross
A re We Made of Matter?
A Debate
E ric T. Olson and Aaron Segal
F or more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/
Little-Debates-about-Big-Questions/book-series/LDABQ

Does Tomorrow Exist?
A Debate
Nikk Effingham and Kristie Miller
Cover image credit: idizimage / Getty Images
First published 2023
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 Taylor & Francis
The right of Nikk Effingham and Kristie Miller to be identified as authors of this
work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent
to infringe.
ISBN: 978-0-367-61594-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-61596-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-10566-4 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003105664
Typeset in Sa bon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Contents

Foreword x
JONATHAN TALLANT
PART I
Opening Statements 1
1 In Defence of the Block Universe View 3
KRISTIE MILLER
1. Introduction 3
2 . Theories of Time: The Options 5
3 . The Argument From Special Relativity 17
4 . Arguments Against the Block: Change 25
5 . Arguments Against the Block: Temporal
Phenomenology 27
6 . Arguments Against the Block: Free Will 33
7. The Argument From Explanation for the Block 38
2 In Defence of Presentism 54
N IKK EFFINGHAM
1. Introduction 54
2. Making Sense of the Debate 56
3. In Favour of Presentism 59
4. Truthmaking 64
5. Being Explains Truth 73
6. Problems for Presentism 75
7. A Proposed Solution 77
8. Objections 78
9. Comparison to Eternalism 81
10. The Open Future 83
viii Contents
11. Presentism and Special Relativity 86
12. Conclusion 94
PART II
First Round of Replies 97
3 Past and Future Do Not Exist: Reply to Kristie Miller 99
NIKK EFFINGHAM
1. Introduction 99
2. Change 100
3. Direction, Asymmetry, and Explanation 109
4. A Bad Presentist Explanation 114
5. A Better Presentist Explanation 115
6 . Back to the Open Future 119
7 . Conclusion 122
4 The Past and Future Exist: Reply to Nikk Efngham 123
K RISTIE MILLER
1. Introduction 123
2. The Argument From Ontological Parsimony 124
3. Truthmaking and Parsimony 129
4. The Objection From Relativity 140
PART III
Second Round of Replies 147
5 Back to the Block: Reply to Nikk Ef ngham’s Reply 149
KRISTIE MILLER
1. Change 149
2. Direction, Asymmetry, and Explanation 156
6 Presentism Returns: Reply to Kristie Miller’s Reply 165
NIKK EFFINGHAM
1. Introduction 165
2. Ontological Parsimony 166
3. Truthmaking 170
4. Ontological Parsimony Again: Qualitative Parsimony 172
Contents ix
5. Ontological Parsimony Again, Again:
Quantitative Parsimony 174
6. Do Propositions Exist? 176
7. Permissivism 177
8. Conclusion 180
Suggested Readings 182
Glossary 187
References 191
Index 193