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DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA 93943-510- DUDLEY KNOXLIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATESCHOOL MONTEREY, CA93943-5101 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS DO SECURITY COMMITMENTS U.S. DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION? by John D. Wilshusen December 1997 Thesis Advisor: Peter R. Lavoy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE FormApprovedOMBNo.0704-0188 Publicreportingburdenforthiscollectionofinformationisestimatedtoaverage 1 hourperresponse,includingthetimeforreviewinginstruction,searchingexistingdata sources,gatheringandmaintainingthedataneeded,andcompletingandreviewingthecollectionofinformation.Sendcommentsregardingthisburdenestimateorany otheraspectofthiscollectionofinformation,includingsuggestionsforreducingthisburden,toWashingtonHeadquartersServices,DirectorateforInformation OperationsandReports, 1215JeffersonDavisHighway,Suite 1204,Arlington,VA22202-4302,andtotheOfficeofManagementandBudget,PaperworkReduction Project(0704-0188)WashingtonDC20503. 1. AGENCYUSEONLY (Leaveblank) 2. REPORTDATE REPORTTYPEANDDATESCOVERED December 1997. Master's Thesis TITLEAND SUBTITLE Do U.S. Security Commitments Discourage 5. FUNDINGNUMBERS NuclearProliferation? AUTHOR(S) John D. Wilshusen PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES) PERFORMING 7. Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION MontereyCA 93943-5000 REPORTNUMBER SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCYREPORTNUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those ofthe author and do not reflectthe official policy or position ofthe Department ofDefense orthe U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTIONCODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum200words) U.S. policy makers claim that nuclear weapons are needed to guarantee security commitments and discourage the international spread ofnuclear weapons. This thesis evaluates the link between security guarantees and efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. It draws three conclusions based on case studies ofthe use ofconventional security commitments and nuclear security guarantees to prevent nuclear weapons development in South Korea and Taiwan. First, nuclear security guarantees alone are not sufficient to prevent proliferation. Second, strong conventional commitments made credible by visible presence offorces are sufficient to prevent nuclear proliferation whenthe direct security threat is conventional. Third, when the security threat being faced includes nuclear weapons, nuclearproliferation prevention requires both a nuclear security guarantee and a physically evident conventional military guarantee. Two implications for security policy follow from these findings. First, nuclear weapons are necessary in the modern security environment. Second, nuclear security guarantees are not credible without the stationing ofconventional forces. 14. SUBJECTTERMSNuclearweapons, proliferation, nonproliferation, South Korea, 15. NUMBEROF Taiwan, security commitment, security guarantee, U.S. nuclearpolicy PAGES 115 16. PRICECODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 18. SECURITYCLASSIFI- 19. SECURITYCLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATIONOF CATIONOFREPORT CATIONOFTHISPAGE TIONOFABSTRACT ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 StandardForm298(Rev. 2-89) PrescribedbyANSIStd.239-18298-102 11 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DO SECURITY COMMITMENTS U.S. DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION? John D. Wilshusen 'i Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., University ofMissouri-Columbia, 1990 Submitted in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 1997 k/feM e t\