Do Economic Sanctions Work? PDF
Preview Do Economic Sanctions Work?
DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK? Do Economic Sanctions Work? Makio Miyagawa Deputy Director, Russian Division Ministry ofFo reign Affairs, Japan M Palgrave Macmillan © Makio Miyagawa 1992 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1992 978-0-333-55275-9 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WlP 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published in Great Britain 1992 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LT O Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-22402-9 ISBN 978-1-349-22400-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-22400-5 First published in the United States of America 1992 by Scholarly and Reference Division, ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-08544-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Miyagawa, Makio, 1951- Do economic sanctions work? I Makio Miyagawa. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0--312-08544-3 I. Economic sanctions. I. Title. HFI413.5.M59 1992 337-dc20 92-14516 CIP To my Father and Mother Contents List of Tables and Maps IX Preface and Acknowledgements X PART ONE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE Introduction 3 ' 2 What are Economic Sanctions? 6 3 Methods of Applying Economic Sanctions 16 4 The Efficacy of Economic Sanctions 24 5 Factors Limiting the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions 61 6 The Aims of Economic Sanctions 89 PART TWO THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS 7 Background to the Crisis 109 8 Action Taken by the United States 120 9 Effect of the Economic Sanctions Against Iran 153 10 Limitations of the Economic Sanctions Against Iran 162 11 Factors Contributing to the Solution 173 12 The Settlement of the Crisis 196 vii viii Contents PART THREE CONCLUSION 13 Conclusion 203 Notes 216 Bibliography 232 Index 237 List of Tables and Maps Table 4.1 Russia's foreign trade 30 4.2 Destination of Russian exports during the First Five-Year Plan 30 4.3 Distribution of seats in the Finnish Parliament 34 4.4 Distribution of exports and imports by currency area in 1957 and 1958 35 4.5 Exports of strategic raw materials to Italy and its colonies (November 1935-June 1936) 41 4.6 Exports to Italy and its colonies from principal countries 42 4.7 Monthly imports of commodities from Italy and its colonies 43 4.8 Imports from Italy and its colonies by principal countries 43 4.9 Japanese stocks 48 4.10 Changes in the geographical distribution of Yugoslav trade 50 4.11 Major importers of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil 55 5.1 The Soviet grain situation, 1981-3 74 9.1 Sources of Iranian imports, 1976-8 153 9.2 Iranian export markets, 1976-8 154 9.3 Iranian contracted crude oil exports at 1 May 1980 155 9.4 EEC exports to Iran in 1979 158 Map 7.1 Iran and neighbouring countries 108 11.1 Iran-Iraq war zone 179 ix Preface and Acknowledgements Economic sanctions - are they in fact effective diplomatic weapons, or mere attempts at self-satisfaction? This book seeks to answer that question through the investigation of the role of economic sanctions in the inter national community today. First, I identify the general principles and characteristics common to most applications of economic sanctions by analysing more than thirty recent examples of the last half-century or so, the most recent case being that of the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. Second, I evaluate the use of economic sanctions by the United States and its allies against Iran after American Embassy staff were taken hostage in November 1979, by tracing in detail the process of the imposition of sanctions: their impact upon the Iranian economy and upon Iran's political decision-making process, Iran's efforts to reduce that impact, the difficulty the United States had in obtaining the cooperation of its allies and the main factors leading to an eventual settlement. It was towards the end of 1980 when I first came across this subject. Oxford was experiencing a rare blizzard, and the university was almost deserted as dons and students had returned to their home towns and villages for the Christmas holidays. I was left alone then, looking for an appropriate thesis subject. I was casually listening to the radio in the common room, when a news programme happened to report the possible release of the American hostages in Iran, and discussed what contributions economic sanctions might make to a resolution of the crisis. Without that radio news, this book could not have been completed. Since that day I have been fortunate, as a graduate student there, a member of the Japanese embassy in London and then of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, to have had a number of opportunities to discuss and analyse this subject with many members of the diplomatic profession. In the course of my research I have benefited from discussion and even argument with a variety of people who are too numerous to mention. However, I owe a great debt of thanks particularly to the following people for the help they have given me in the writing of this book. I should first like to express my very sincere thanks to Mr Wilfred Knapp of St Catherine's College for his detailed and painstaking guidance and criticism and his X Preface and Acknowledgements XI many extremely stimulating suggestions - also his very kind encourage ment, without which this book must never have reached completion. I also owe a great debt to the late Professor Hedley Bull of Balliol College, whose frequent advice continued until his last illness. He began by pointing me in the right direction as to how best to proceed with such a study, later suggesting many valuable improvements and enabling me to overcome what threatened to be an almost insuperable organizational 'log-jam' when the thesis was in its final stages. I must also thank Professor Margaret P. Doxey, whom I have only once had a chance to interview, for her invalu able early advice on approaches to this subject. I am extremely grateful, in particular, to two of my bosses during my career in the Japanese Government, who showed a most generous under standing towards my continued research and writing on this subject. They are The Hon. Ichiro Ozawa, and Yukio Satoh, without whose tolerance and encouragement this book could have never been completed. I wish here to record my gratitude to the excellent help of Mr James Feagan for 'dethesifying' and streamlining my original text into a book. His help was absolutely essential. I should like to thank Charles and Lynn MacGregor, Steven Smith, James and Caroline Noble, Masatoshi Hirofuji, Kyoichi Sasayama, George Kendall, Fusae Sasahara, Louisa Rubinfien and Susan Hitch for their friendship, encouragement and advice. I am especially indebted to Mary R. Mortimer for her unfailing encourage ment, friendship and devotion, typing almost the whole of my original text and arranging various interview appointments. The staff of the Bodleian Library, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Japanese Diet Library and the Foreign Ministry's Library helped me immeasurably. I also thank Mrs Belinda Holdsworth, Editor at Macmillan, for her extensive advice, and Mrs Anne Rafique who provided me· with valuable editorial suggestions. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to my father (who died before he could see the book in anything even close to completed form) and to my mother, who waited very patiently and supported and encouraged me in my writing throughout the last six years. My wife Yuko has given me many suggestions and shown remarkable cooperation and tolerance with my continued involvement in writing this book after and sometimes before my daily work hours in the diplomatic service. This volume in no way represents the official views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan; the thoughts are my own.
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