Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and the Limits of State Authority

241 Pages·2014·1.64 MB·English

by  Carmen Pavel

Divided Sovereignty

Divided
Sovereignty
International Institutions and the
Limits of State Authority
z
CARMEN E. PAVEL
1
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pavel, Carmen E.
Divided sovereignty : international institutions and the limits of state authority / Carmen E. Pavel.
pages cm
ISBN 978–0–19–937634–6 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. International agencies. 2. International
cooperation. 3. Humanitarian intervention. 4. Sovereignty. I. Title.
JZ4850.P39 2014
341.2—dc23
2014008952
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction ix
1. Sovereignty, the Social Contract, and the Incompleteness
of the State System 1
1. The Institutions of the Social Contract 3
2. On Sovereignty and Delegation of Authority 12
3. Problems of Institutional Design 14
4. Conceptual and Practical Hurdles to Divided Sovereignty 20
5. Conclusion 23
2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal–Agent Model 25
1. Sovereignty-Limiting Norms and Their Current Effects 27
2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal–Agent Model 33
2.1 The Origins of the Model 33
2.2. The Principle–Agent Model for International Institutions 35
2.3. Delegation 36
2.4. The Role of Consent 37
3. Agency Costs at the International Level 44
4. Why Use Principal–Agent Theory? 52
5. Conclusion 55
3. Domestic and International Implications: Slavery, Genocide,
and Civil War 57
1. The Scope and Limits of International Authority 58
2. Constitutional Interpretation and Change 61
vi Contents
3. Slavery 66
4. Genocide 73
5. Civil Wars and Failed States 77
6. Conclusion 86
4. Theories and Institutional Facts 88
1. One-Step Theorizing: Cosmopolitan Justice 91
2. Two-Step Theorizing: The Case of Humanitarian
Intervention 98
3. Objections 105
4. Conclusion 111
5. Romanticizing Institutions 113
1. Cosmopolitan Global Democracy 115
2. Rule of Law Experiments 123
3. Rule of Law for Global Democracy 128
4. Institutional Assumptions and Bureaucratic Pathologies 132
5. Conclusion 138
6. Institutional Pluralism 141
1. Institutions in International Criminal Law 142
2. Fragmentation and Conflict 146
3. The Benefits of a Pluralist System 155
4. Complex Social Orders 159
5. A Hobbesian Challenge 164
6. Conclusion 168
7. The Possibility of Rule-Governed Behavior in International Politics 171
1. Cooperation Under Anarchy 173
2. Assumptions and Implications of International Relations
Theorizing 183
3. Self-Preservation as the Dominant State Preference 188
4. The Possibility of a Rule-Governed Order 191
Conclusion 196
Index 205
Acknowledgments
I have many people to thank for their support and encouragement. John
Tomasi is the kind of graduate school mentor who gives one room to grow
and resources to succeed. He is the best example of an open-minded teacher
and a disciplined, thoughtful, and engaging scholar. Together with Sharon
Krause, Charles Larmore, and William Galston, John guided my dissertation
with a critical and constructive eye. This book grew out of that dissertation,
but it is today much different from it. In their unique ways, each of my disser-
tation advisers has shaped the way I think about political philosophy. Since
taking my first class with Sharon Krause on theories of rights at Harvard,
I have learned much about the history of political philosophy, and about how
to be a professional academic. I thank her for doing philosophy with gen-
erosity, and for inspiring women in academia to reach high and do it with
integrity. David Estlund and Corey Brettschneider have read versions of this
project when it was in its infancy, and I am in their debt for helping to shape
it early on.
Loren Lomasky gave me a home in the Politics, Philosophy, and Law pro-
gram at the University of Virginia for almost three years. Loren gives one
reasons to believe philosophy can be as entertaining as it is inspiring. As a
postdoc there, I taught and learned from great undergraduate students and
had the privilege to interact with world-class scholars. Colin Bird, Jennifer
Rubestein, Lawrie Balfour, Stephen White, George Klosko are just some of
those who, at Virginia, read the manuscript and helped to make it better.
I have presented parts of this manuscript to different groups. Audiences at
the University of Virginia Political Science Department, American Political
Science Association, the Canadian Congress of the Humanities and Social
Sciences, and University of Arizona Department of Philosophy have pro-
vided thought-provoking challenges to the views I advance here.
viii Acknowledgments
My greatest debt in writing this book goes to David Schmidtz. Dave and
his wife Cate Johnson have been wonderful friends, and I cannot thank them
enough for making me feel so welcome in Tucson and at the University of
Arizona. The Arizona philosophy department offers amazing opportunities
in political philosophy and Dave has increased these opportunities manifold
with the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom. I am grateful to work with
and to learn from him.
Dave organized a workshop on my book manuscript and invited Allen
Buchanan, Steve Wall, and James Bohman to serve as commentators. Their
tough and fair-minded criticisms have prompted me to think deeply about the
content and contours of the book. John Thrasher, Keith Hankins, Chad von
Schoelandt, Justin Tosi, Kevin Vallier, Bill Oberdick, Michael Bukoski, Danny
Shahar, Jeremy Reid, Brian Kogelmann, Greg Robson, Hannah Tierney, Jerry
Gaus, Sarah Raskoff, Matt Mortellaro, Stephen Stich, Guido Pincione, David
Owen, Fabian Wendt, and David Wiens have all read the manuscript in part
or in full and their suggestions have made the book better.
To David McBride at Oxford, I owe thanks for taking on the project,
sending it to two thoughtful reviewers, and guiding it to publication. To
Robert Keohane and Annie Stilz, my reviewers at Oxford University Press,
I am indebted for kindly taking the time to read the manuscript several times
and for writing detailed comments that have educated me as well as made me
understand more deeply some of the philosophical and empirical issues the
book confronts. I have not been able to address all of their concerns, but have
done my best to engage them in a conversation and keep all of their concerns
alive as I made revisions.
Pamela Phillips and Robert Anthony Peters have provided invaluable
copyediting assistance. I owe thanks to Gayle Siegel and Rosie Johnson for
making it a pleasure to go to work every day. Danny Mannheim’s coffee shop,
Espresso Art, has been a place of respite and inspiration.
Parts of Chapter 6 have appeared before in a different form, in an article
entitled “Normative Conflict in International Law” in the San Diego Law
Review, issue 46, 2009, copyright 2009 San Diego Law Review, reprinted
with the permission of the San Diego Law Review.
Finally to my children Luca and Carla, and to Ioan for unconditional love.
Carmen E. Pavel
Tucson, Arizona
5.9.2014
Introduction
Alex Bizimungu was stuck for twenty-one days crouched in a small
space behind an open door, as the terror of the Tutsi killings by the Hutu
unfolded outside his house in Kigali. He did not move much, for fear of
tipping off the relentless attackers who meticulously ensured that everyone
was dead or dying. Unable to move or rest, the pain of his swollen legs keep-
ing him awake, he witnessed through the crack in the door the killings in
the street by the militant wing of the ruling party. The Hutu were ferocious,
organized, armed, and thorough. Alex heard the killers go into his neigh-
bor’s house and the father cry while his children were shot. The interaha-
mwe (meaning “those who attack together”) proceeded to kill the father,
then shoved his wife and sister into a hole, and killed them both with a
grenade.
This was no spontaneous, unorganized enterprise taking hold overnight.
Mass killings require extensive advanced planning: carefully shaping a politi-
cal system that requires total obedience, gathering resources and weapons,
disseminating hateful propaganda, and coordinating thousands, perhaps
tens of thousands of people, who are single-mindedly motivated by a will
to kill and destroy. Escaping this sort of organized massacre is a lucky and
rare occurrence. During a lull in the killings, Alex emerged from his house
and fled to another house in the neighborhood, where he stayed for another
three weeks, incredulous that he could still be alive when most people
around him were dead. In that place and time, Rwanda of April 1994, death
was near-certain and the chance of staying alive was slim. Death was the fate
awaiting all Tutsis and the Hutu moderates who were not wholeheartedly
committed to the killings. Despite losing all hope, Alex was just as shocked
to discover that his wife, a Tutsi who had earlier secured fake Hutu docu-
ments, was also alive.