Monographs IBRKK-PIB Disentangling the philosophy of economy y m o n o c e f o y h p o s o l i h p e h t g n i l g n a t n e s i D Mariusz Maziarz ISBN 978-83-61284-63-5 mono_disentangling_MONT_8mm.indd 1 2018-09-21 11:40:45 Disentangling the philosophy of economy Mariusz Maziarz WARSAW 2018 Review: Tomasz Dołęgowski, Paweł Kawalec Proofreading: Małgorzata Wieteska-Rostek Typesetting: Sławomir Jarząbek © Copyright by Institute for Market, Consumption and Business Cycles Research – National Research Institute Warszawa 2018 Materials contained in the monograph shall be protected by the copy right. Text reprint may have occurred only with the publisher's consent. Institute for Market, Consumption and Business Cycles Research – National Research Institute 02-001 Warszawa, Al. Jerozolimskie 87 phone: (48) 22 628 55 85, 22 813-46-50 fax: (48) 22 628 24 79 e-mail: [email protected] http://www.ibrkk.pl ISBN 978-83-61284-63-5 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENT ..................................................................................................7 PREFACE ..........................................................................................................................8 Economic methodology: a menu of approaches.............................................................9 The book layout ............................................................................................................10 INTRODuCTION: ThE ENTANGLEMENT OF ECONOMIC METhODOLOGy ........................................................................................................12 1. The six schools .........................................................................................................12 2. Why the two dimensions? ........................................................................................14 3. The disentanglement .................................................................................................16 1. LOGICAL POsITIvIsM ........................................................................................18 Various readings ...........................................................................................................18 Economists’ (mis-)understanding .................................................................................19 1.1. The neopositivist views on science .......................................................................20 Regularities, laws, and causality ..................................................................................20 The demarcation criterion ............................................................................................21 Verification and confirmation .......................................................................................22 Scientific explanation ...................................................................................................23 The theory-observation distinction ...............................................................................25 1.2. Logical empiricism and economic methodology ..................................................26 The neopositivist philosophy of economics .................................................................26 Criticism of the mainstream economics .......................................................................27 Positive and normative economics ...............................................................................28 Economists’ interpretations ..........................................................................................29 Is economics a neopositivist science? ..........................................................................30 1.3. Neopositivist economics........................................................................................31 Scientific economics.....................................................................................................31 Explanation, causality, and laws ...................................................................................33 4 DISENTANGLING THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY 2. FALsIFICATION AND ThE METhODOLOGy OF ECONOMICs ............34 2.1. The fallibilist epistemology ...................................................................................35 The problem of demarcation ........................................................................................35 Dismissing induction from science ..............................................................................36 Theory-ladeness of observations ..................................................................................37 The fallibilist method ...................................................................................................38 Getting closer to the truth .............................................................................................39 Testing theories .............................................................................................................41 The (literal) falsity of social sciences ...........................................................................43 Popper’s followers ........................................................................................................45 2.2. The falsificationist methodology in the philosophy of economics ........................48 Blaug’s version of the Popperian methodology ...........................................................49 The naïve and fully-fledged stances .............................................................................51 Boland’s reading ...........................................................................................................52 Caldwell’s falsificationism ...........................................................................................53 Hands’ disentanglement ...............................................................................................54 Research programs in economics .................................................................................55 2.3. The fallibilist methodology ...................................................................................56 Fallibilist science ..........................................................................................................56 Truth of economic theories ...........................................................................................58 3. INsTRuMENTALIsM ............................................................................................61 3.1. The sources of the instrumentalist methodology ...................................................62 Pragmatism ...................................................................................................................63 The aims and methods of science .................................................................................64 3.2. Friedman’s essay and its (mis-)interpretations ......................................................65 Reading F53 .................................................................................................................65 Why so many interpretations? ......................................................................................69 Missed interpretations ..................................................................................................70 Various intstrumentalisms ............................................................................................72 Contradicting your own methodology ..........................................................................75 3.3. The instrumentalist economics ..............................................................................75 Dismissing the unobservables debate ...........................................................................75 Causality .......................................................................................................................76 The purpose of models and theories .............................................................................77 Skepticism ....................................................................................................................78 5 4. sCIENTIFIC REALIsM .........................................................................................80 4.1. Development and main arguments ........................................................................81 The rejection of the received view ...............................................................................81 Why is science successful?...........................................................................................82 Counterarguments ........................................................................................................83 Refined positions ..........................................................................................................85 4.2. The scientific-realist philosophy of economics .....................................................86 Models and reality ........................................................................................................86 Unrealistic but true .......................................................................................................87 The evolution of Mäki’s stance ....................................................................................89 Econometric models .....................................................................................................90 The realism-antirealism debate ....................................................................................91 A skeptical turn? ...........................................................................................................92 4.3. Successful modeling ..............................................................................................93 Truth .............................................................................................................................93 The role of causal explanation......................................................................................94 Theory appraisal ...........................................................................................................95 Fallibilism .....................................................................................................................95 5. CRITICAL REALIsM .............................................................................................97 5.1. Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of science ...................................................................97 Economics without constant regularities ......................................................................98 Criticism .......................................................................................................................99 5.2. The Lawsonian critique of the mainstream economics .........................................99 Social and natural sciences .........................................................................................100 The openness of the social world ...............................................................................101 The Lawsonian criticism ............................................................................................102 5.3. The methodology of critical realism ...................................................................102 Examples of the critical-realist economics .................................................................103 Research guidance ......................................................................................................104 6. ThE CONsTRuCTIvIsT APPROACh ............................................................106 6.1. The constructivist philosophy of science ............................................................106 Scientific revolutions ..................................................................................................107 Feyerabend’s anarchism .............................................................................................108 6.2. The rhetorical approach (and other constructivists in the methodology of economics) .....................................................................................................109 6 The rhetoric of economics ..........................................................................................109 Other constructivists ...................................................................................................111 6.3. Methodological anarchism ..................................................................................112 ‘Anything goes’ in economics ....................................................................................112 7. CONCLuDING REMARKs .................................................................................113 7.1. The normative approaches to ontology ...............................................................113 Logical positivism ......................................................................................................116 Critical realism ...........................................................................................................116 7.2. The normative approaches to epistemology ........................................................117 Logical positivism ......................................................................................................118 Instrumentalism ..........................................................................................................119 Falsificationism ..........................................................................................................120 Critical realism ...........................................................................................................121 Constructivism............................................................................................................122 7.3. The descriptive approaches to ontology ..............................................................123 Scientific realism ........................................................................................................123 Falsificationism ..........................................................................................................124 Instrumentalism ..........................................................................................................124 7.4. The descriptive approaches to epistemology .......................................................125 Scientific realism ........................................................................................................126 Constructivism............................................................................................................126 7.5. The unended inquiry ............................................................................................127 BIBLIOGRAPhy .........................................................................................................130 7 ACKNOWLEDGMENT ACKNOWLEDGMENT Economists face severe difficulties with measuring well-being. Similarly, „thank- fulness‟ is also immeasurable. Nevertheless, I primarily need to voice my gratitude to those who commented on the earlier version of the book. The colleagues from the Faculty of Metaeconomics, Institute for Market, Consumption, and Business Cycle Research – Polish Research Institute, i.e., Tomasz Kwarciński, Robert Mróz, Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy, and Agnieszka Wincewicz-Price (listed alphabetically) commented on the draft version of the book and helped in improving the manuscript. Also, the encouragement and comments voiced by the two reviewers helped in pol- ishing my book project. My colleagues from the Polish Philosophy of Economics Network actively supported and encouraged my research. Most notably, I am grateful to Jarosław Boruszewski, Marcin Gorazda, Łukasz Hardt, and Mateusz Kucz (listed alphabetically) who commented on my PPEN-seminar presentations. The partial re- sults were presented at several conferences1 whose participants indicated (hopefully fulfilled in the current version) gaps in my reasoning. I am especially indebted to Julian Reiss for his comments. Many thanks go to Gabriela Staroń, without whom this book would have been written much earlier. I am also grateful to my parents. For everything. Last but not least, I would like to thank my Ph.D. thesis advisors from the Wroclaw University of Economics: Stanisław Czaja and Bartosz Scheuer with whom I have spent long hours discussing economics and philosophy. 1 The International Network for Economic Method Biannual Conference (San Sebastian), The Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science 2017 Conference (Copenhagen), The Sixth Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of Social Sciences (Kraków), and the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics 20th Anniversary Conference (Rotterdam). 8 DISENTANGLING THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY PREFACE The philosophy of economics is a branch of the philosophy of science that fo- cuses on studying research practice of economists and the results of their work (the philosophy of science about economics). It is a subdiscipline of ‘metaeconom- ics’1 that covers (1) the study of economics as a science (philosophy of economics), (2) ethical considerations, and (3) sociology of knowledge. The book focuses on the former topic that is also synonymously labeled ‘methodology of economics’. Certainly, the metascientific investigation of economics cannot proceed without ethi- cal and anthropological considerations. Considering that economics is ultimately the science that studies human behavior, the ethical and anthropological issues are at hand. The research conducted at the intersections of ethics and economics seems to be usually labeled ‘economics and philosophy’ (EAP, in short). Other topics usually included in the economic sciences are studies by psychologists and anthropologists. However, the scope of the book is limited to the philosophy of science about econom- ics (aka philosophy/methodology of economics). The methodology of economics has been fiercely debated for the last decades (Mireles-Flores 2018) raising the interest of not only philosophers but also economists what boosts the demand for the systemati- zation of the discipline. The purpose of the book is to enlighten the differences and similarities between the six schools of the philosophy of economics and analyze the connections between the approaches to the philosophy of science and the schools of economic methodol- ogy. This book is intended for economists (as a textbook introducing into the philoso- phy of economics and systematizing their familiarity with it) and the philosophers of economics as a reference book. Furthermore, it can serve as a handbook of economic methodology for graduate-level economics students. The book offers the introduction into six main philosophical schools within the methodology of economics and dis- cusses their relation to the general philosophy of science. These schools often deliver differing views on particular topics. The entanglement or, to put it differently, mistak- ing various purposes for which philosophizing about economics is conducted produce a mistaken view that philosophers of economics contradict each other. The book de- velops the philosophy-of-economics discussion by putting forth the two-dimensional topology of the repertoire of views. The disentanglement between (1) the purpose of philosophizing (normative and descriptive approach) and (2) the scope (ontology and epistemology) proves useful in understanding the similarities and differences between the six schools and shows that some of the inconsistencies present in the literature re- 1 The term was coined by Karl Menger (1954 [1936]. 9 PREFACE sulted from different goals and interests of philosophers. There are a few introductory textbooks into the philosophy of economics on the bookshelves (cf. Boumans and Davis 2015; Caldwell 1994; Hands 2001; Maas 2014), but Disentangling explicitly focuses on discussing and analyzing various schools of thought instead of employing the usual problem-related layout. Even though the philosophy of science sensu stricto is a young branch of philoso- phy that dates back to the beginnings of the twentieth century when the Vienna- and Berlin Circles started to meet regularly (Schnikus 2010; McGrew, Alspector-Kelly and Allhoff 2009), philosophical considerations over science are as old as science itself. The current debates can often be traced back to the ancient-Greek philosophy. For example, realism about abstract entities put forth by Plato is a protoplast of the current scientific-realist position (Hamilton et al. 1961). John Stewart Mill was prob- ably the first economist and philosopher who practiced the philosophy of econom- ics in the contemporary sense. Some ideas become forgotten and, reinvented, win new followers. Others are believed to be novel due to being employed in new fields. Contrary to the general field, philosophy of economics has not yet developed progres- sively over time. In the analytic tradition of the philosophy of economics, six schools coexist and support divergent and often inconsistent viewpoints what resembles the situation in economics that is a heterodox science. The following six main approach- es in the methodology of economics are discussed in the following chapters: logi- cal positivism, falsificationism, instrumentalism, scientific realism, critical realism, and constructivism. For the purpose of the analysis, these approaches to economic methodology are labeled ‘schools’ instead of paradigms with a view not to raise the problem of incommensurability. Economists (e.g., Gerrard 1996; Snowdon and Vane 2005) seem to prefer discussing schools instead of employing the Kuhnian perspec- tive when discussing various approaches to economics. Economic methodology: a menu of approaches In contrast to the natural sciences2, economics is divided regarding research meth- ods and theories. There is a dominance of mainstream economics that characterizes the focus on theoretical modeling. Other, heterodox schools of economics reject cer- tain premises on which the mainstream is based such as the assumption of equilibrium or nonexistent transaction costs or employ different research methods such as experi- ments, simulation, and various quantitative, empirical methods (Lo et al. 2017). Dani Rodrick (2015, p. 8) recently compared economics to a library of models: various models have different scope and the area of applicability. Various approaches to re- search are (rarely explicitly) grounded in different philosophy-of-science stances. For 2 However, even the natural sciences experience the presence of inconsistent theoretical approaches in certain areas such as string theory or cosmology.