Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations PDF
Preview Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations
Diplomacy Games · Rudolf Avenhaus I. William Zartman (Editors) Diplomacy Games Formal Models and International Negotiations With37Figuresand42Tables 123 ProfessorDr.RudolfAvenhaus UniversityoftheFederalArmedForcesMunich Werner-Heisenberg-Weg39 85577Neubiberg Germany [email protected] ProfessorI.WilliamZartman SchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies TheJohnHopkinsUniversity 1740MassachusettsAve., Washington,D.C.20036 USA [email protected] LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2007925685 ISBN978-3-540-68303-2SpringerBerlinHeidelbergNewYork Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.Allrightsarereserved,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialis concerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broad- casting,reproductiononmicrofilmorinanyotherway,andstorageindatabanks.Duplicationof thispublicationorpartsthereofispermittedonlyundertheprovisionsoftheGermanCopyright LawofSeptember9,1965,initscurrentversion,andpermissionforusemustalwaysbeobtained fromInternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis.Violationsareliabletoprosecutionunder theGermanCopyrightLaw. SpringerisapartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia springer.com PublishedbySpringer-VerlagBerlinHeidelberg2007 ©InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis2007 Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,etc.inthispublicationdoes notimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Production:LE-TEXJelonek,Schmidt&V¨ocklerGbR,Leipzig Cover-design:WMXDesignGmbH,Heidelberg SPIN11948902 42/3180YL-543210 Printedonacid-freepaper ToHowardRaiffa The formalmodelerofPIN Preface Whydoesalltheresearchoninternationalnegotiationsoverthepast20yearsmake verylittleuseofformaltheory,despitestatementslikethatofPeytonYoungthatthe principaltoolforanalyzingnegotiationsisthetheoryofgames?Formalanalysisof negotiationscentersonparadigmaticmodelslikeNash’sbargainingschemeorStahl andRubinstein’ssequentialmodels,yetcasestudiesofimportantinternationalnego- tiationsuseonlythemostelementaryconcepts.Thestateoftheartwascharacterized some years ago by a controversy surroundingthe role of formal models—notably rationalchoice models—inpoliticalscience. Some politicalscientistsclaimed that formalmodelshavecontributedlittletotheprogressofpoliticaltheoryas awhole. Othersvigorouslydefendedformaltheory.Herewedealonlywiththeinternational negotiationspartofthedispute. Fromtheverybeginninganduntiltodayformalmodelswerepartoftheresearch of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program of the International InstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis(IIASA)inLaxenburgnearVienna,Austria. In fact, there was a continuingemphasis on the importance of research on formal models for internationalnegotiationsby Howard Raiffa, IIASA’s first director and oneofthefoundersofthePINprogram,towhomthisbookisdedicated.Butitwas notuntil2002that the ideawas put intoeffect by initiatinga PIN project devoted exclusively to the purpose of analyzing the role of formal models of, for, and in internationalnegotiationsandansweringsuchquestionsas:Howcanrationalchoice theorists be induced to make greater efforts to render their abstract concepts and resultsmoreunderstandabletopoliticaland social scientists?What can bedoneto encouragesocial scientiststouseformalapproaches intheiranalysisof real-world problems?Howcanpractitionersofinternationalnegotiationsbeinducedtodevelop interestinandbetaughttoapplyformalmodelstotheirmoreimportantproblems? Thisbookcontainscontributionsfromleadingexpertsinthefieldofformalmod- elingandinternationalnegotiations.Thesecontributionswerefirstpresentedattwo workshopsat IIASA in June 2003 and June 2004, where they were intensely dis- cussedandrevisedbyworkshopparticipants.Theirclassificationintoformalmodels of, for, and in internationalnegotiationsgrew out of these discussions (theeditors werereluctanttoproposetheirgeneralcharacterizationas“formalmodelsfromAto VIII Preface Z”).Eventhoughnotallapproachesandtoolscouldbetakenintoaccountinalim- itednumberofpages,wefeelthatthisbookrepresentsthestateoftheartofformal modelsininternationalnegotiationsandgivessomeadviceintheformoflessonsfor theoryandpractice. ThebookispartofaseriesbeingproducedbythePINProgramofIIASA,whose publicationsarelistedinthefrontofthisvolume.Wewishtoexpressourgratitude forthecollectiveparticipationofthesteeringcommitteemembers,allofwhompro- videdaconstructiveatmosphereandhelpfulcommentsatmanystagesoftheproject. Wealsoappreciatetheflexibleandresponsiveparticipationoftheauthorsofthein- dividualchapters who have joinedthe projectfrom a number ofcountries. Special thanks are owed to Dan Druckman who encouraged us to initiatethis project. We are also grateful for the ongoingsupport for theproject by IIASA’s director, Leen Hordijk, who made PIN’s productivitypossible, and also to IIASA’s publications team.Basicsupportforallouractivitiesandcarefulandpleasantattentiontoallthe details of our workhave been provided by Tanja Huber, our project administrator. Combiningthesystems analysis of IIASA withthediplomaticatmosphere of Em- pressMariaTheresa’spalatialhuntinglodgeinLaxenburg,whereIIASAcarriesout itsstate-of-the-artworkwithinbaroquewalls,hasbeenaninspirationforourefforts. Laxenburg, February2007 Theeditors Foreword Negotiationisthecentralactivityofdiplomatsandforeignpolicyleaders.Conflicts areavoidedandendedthroughtheartandscienceofnegotiation.Every day,issues inforeignpolicyareresolvedthroughnegotiation.Waterrights,environmentalcon- cerns,tradeagreements,thebirthofnewinternationalorganizations,effortsatpeace- keeping,andindeedeveryaspectofforeigninteractioninvolvesnegotiation.Thatthe subjectandpracticesofinternationalbargaininghave,untilrelativelyrecently,been mostlystudiedwithinthelimitsofdescriptive,after-the-factassessmentsofspecific negotiationsisdisappointing.Suchstudieshavebeenuseful,ofcourse,butournego- tiationknowledgeandskillsarelikelytobefurtherenhancedbycomplementingsuch researchwithinvestigationsintothefundamentalprinciples,processes,andpractices ofnegotiation.Asthisvolumemakesabundantlyclear,muchabouthowtoimprove negotiationscanbelearnedfromandthroughthejudicioususeofformalmodels. Inthenaturalcourseofanynegotiation,partieswithdifferinginterestsordiffer- ent informationabout how best to advance common interests must find themeans to persuade their counterparts of a way forward. Such persuasion often involves a measureoftheartfuluseofrhetoric,butintheendeverynegotiationisaboutstrate- gic interaction [3]. Participants select courses of action with an eye on what it is thattheircounterpartssaytheyneedandwhatarebelievedtobetheiractualneeds, as well as being equally focused on what the participants themselves need or the principalson whose behalf they are acting need. Thus, understandingand shaping negotiationoutcomes dependsonstrategiccalculationsofexactly thesortcaptured by game-theoretic models of decision making under uncertainty. In this important publication,theeditors,AvenhausandZartman,haveassembledanexceptionalcast of contributorsand have significantly advanced the understanding and prospective useofformalmodels—including,butnotlimitedto,gametheorymodels—astools usedinthedevelopment,understanding,andconclusionofnegotiations. This volume usefully distinguishes between models of negotiations, for ne- gotiations, and in negotiations. The distinction among these three types of ana- lytic/modelingexercisesneatlycapturestheideaofexamininganegotiationtodraw outprinciplesofunderstanding,usingtheseprinciplestoevaluatealternativecourses ofaction,andtheapplicationoftheseprinciplestofacilitatetheresolutionofspecific X Foreword negotiations.Assomeonewhohas beenengagedinthesethreeactivitiesfromboth anacademicandcommercialformalmodelingperspectivefor25years,Iampartic- ularlyexcitedbythepotentialthisvolumehas forunleashinggreater entrepreneur- ship,especiallyamongpoliticalscientists,economists,andpsychologistsengagedin themodelingofcomplex bargainingproblems.Thatthereisgreatdemandforsuch services from government agencies and the private sector there can be no doubt. Thattheknowledgeistheretoimproveupontheperformanceofcountryorproblem specialists alone there is also no doubt[1], [2]. Whileeconomists have been quite activeandsuccessfulindesigningandadvisingongame-theoreticactionsforpracti- caluse,othersocialscientistshavetendedtolagbehind.Iknowofonlyahandfulof companies,forinstance,formedbyoroperatedbypoliticalscientistswhoareusing formal models to advise government and privatesector clients on how to improve negotiatedoutcomes.Icertainlyhopethatthisvolumewillstimulateourcolleagues and students to turn their skills to the translation of insights from formal models intopracticaltoolsforpolicymakersandcorporatedecisionmakers.This,Ibelieve, is themost promisingpath to improvingdecision making, tyingitclosely to logic and evidencerather than continuingreliance onlyon opinion,wisdom, and insider information.The latter are unquestionablyuseful, butthey are fundamentallynon- reproducibleand inadequate as one shifts from one negotiation setting to another. Wisdomcannotbetaught,buttherigorousinterpretationofthelogicalandempirical implicationsofformal modelscan be. Indeed, many ofthechapters inthisvolume pointthewaytohowtodoso. The spread of formal model insights into the real-world, real-time negotiation processrequires,asthisvolumehighlights,adeepappreciationofboththestrengths offormalapproaches andtheirlimitations.Extensiveformgames, forinstance, are avaluableandoftenintuitivewaytodescribethe—sotospeak—essenceofdecision making. They force the analyst and the negotiatorto identifyexactly what critical decisionsmustbemadebyallsidesinanegotiation.Gametreescompeltheanalyst and theuser tothinkhard about whatis endogenous and whatis exogenous to the decisionprocessand,therefore,whatcanbeinfluencedorreshapedandwhatcannot. That trulyis theessence of resolvingdisputes. At thesame time, theanalyst must not overstate the comprehensiveness of the problem encapsulated in a game tree, andthedecisionmakermustnotallowtheanalysisofthegametobetakenonblind faith—reallythereislittledangerofthis—butneithershouldheorsheallowpersonal opinionor personal beliefs to remain comfortablyunchallenged when the model’s implicationsdifferwithintuition. Thestrengthofformalmodelsisintheirabilitytolayoutthelogicofasituation andtomaketransparentwhatisassumedortakenforgranted,whatexpectationslook like,what informationis criticalforworkingthrougha problem,and at whatjunc- turesdifferentchoicesleadirretrievablydownbetterorworsepaths.Buteveryformal model—likeeverysetofgeneralprinciples,howeverderived—isnecessarilyasim- plified, skeletal representation of the true complexity of any situation. Those who negotiatewithouttheaidofmodelsoftenriskblindingthemselvestothebigpicture as they focus on intricate—and often inessential—details. But likewisethose who relymechanically ona formalmodel blindthemselves toinformationnotcaptured Foreword XI adequatelybythemodel—suchasdifferencesintheskillsbroughttothenegotiation bydifferentparticipants—andsoriskthrowingawayusefulinformationthatshould beutilizedtoenrichtheirinterpretationofanalyticimplications.Thepresentvolume doesamasterfuljobofremindingusofthetrade-offbetweenthebigpictureandthe subtledetails. Young [4] produced an earlier volume on a closely related theme about 15 yearsago,andwecantakeheartandencouragementfromtherealizationthatmuch progresshas been made and continues to bemade. Increasingly, governments turn toformal,analytictoolscombinedwithquantitativeanalysistoprovideguidancein makingcriticaldecisions,testinginadvancealternativeapproachestocentralforeign policymattersandusingmodelsasrelativelyobjective,detachedtoolsbywhichan- alysts and policymakers can test theveracity or efficacy of their own judgments.I saythisasonewhoknowsatfirsthandhowtheUnitedStatesgovernmenthasused justsuchtoolstohelpinformaspectsofitspoliciestowardterrorismingeneraland al Qaeda inparticular, as well as in itsapproach to negotiationswithNorthKorea andnumerousothersocietiesandtroublingsituationsaroundtheworld.Thosewho takeseriouslythecoremessages ofthisvolumewillstandattheforefrontoffurther advancingthegoalofimprovingforeignpolicydecisionmakingandthescienceof governmentnegotiationsintheyearstocome. February2007 BruceBuenodeMesquita References 1. FederS(1995)Factionsandpolicon:Newwaystoanalyzepolitics.In:WesterfieldHB (ed)InsidetheCIA’sprivateworld:DeclassifiedarticlesfromtheAgency’sInternalJour- nal,1955–1992.YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,CT,USA 2. FederS(2002)Forecastingforpolicymakinginthepost-coldwarperiod.AnnualReview ofPoliticalScience5:111–25 3. Sartori A (2005) Deterrencebydiplomacy. PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton,NJ, USA 4. YoungHP(1991)Negotiationanalysis.TheUniversityofMichiganPress,AnnArbor, Michigan,USA
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