Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human

261 Pages·1998·15.664 MB·English

by  Dan Egonsson (auth.)

DIMENSIONSOFDIGNITY
DAN EGONSSON
Lund University,
Sweden
DIMENSIONS OF DIGNITY
0/
The Moral Importance Being Human
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A c.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Librat·y of Congress.
ISBN 978-94-010-6088-2 ISBN 978-94-011-4974-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-4974-7
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1998
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1998
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
inc1uding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
To my son Harry
with much love
Contents
Acknowledgements xi
PART I: PROBLEM AND METHOD
I. INTRODUCTION 3
2. METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 8
2.1 Simplicity 8
2.2 Consistency 10
2.3 The Species Concept 15
2.4 Universalizability and Utilitarianism 17
2.5 Intuitions 23
2.6 Problems ofIntuitionism 25
2.7 Basic and Derived Moral Principles 27
PART II: DIRECT IMPORTANCE
3. A "STANDARD ATTITUDE" (SA) 33
3.1 The Standard Attitude 33
3.2 Is it Importantper se to Belong to a Certain Biological
Species? 36
3.3 William E. May's Position 39
3.4 Humanity as a Gift 40
3.5 A Religious Foundation ofHuman Dignity 42
3.6 When Does a Human Being Get a Soul? 45
3.7 Concluding Remarks 47
4. THE DIRECT VALUE OF BEING HUMAN 49
4.1 Objectivism and SubjectIvism 51
4.2 "Valued by" as an Active Process and "Valuable for" 52
4.3 Valuing as a Disposition 52
4.4 Sophisticated and Primitive Wanting 54
4.5 The Intrinsic Value ofBeing Non-Human 57
4.6 Two Assumptions 59
viii
4.7 On the Existence ofthe Wanter 60
4.8 Dworkin on External Preferences 62
4.9 Is Double Counting Morally Objectionable? 64
4.10 Hare on External Preferences 67
4.II An Argument Against Counting Past Preferences 70
5. SA EXAMINED 73
5.1 Is the Denial ofSA Serious? 74
5.2 A Third Aspect ofa Moral Intuition 76
5.3 Taking into Account People's Moral Attitudes 80
5.4 A BriefSummary 83
5.5 The Rationality ofAttitudes 84
5.6 Irrational Preferences in Preference Utilitarianism 85
5.7 A Serious Objection 86
5.8 Conclusion 89
6. ELEMENTS IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SA 91
6.1 Objectivity 91
6.2 Objective Values and Utilitarianism 93
6.3 Inviolability 94
6.4 Irreplaceability 97
6.5 Dignity 100
6.6 Equality 101
7. TOOLEY'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST SA 104
7.1 Tooley's First Counter-Argument 106
7.2 Tooley's Second Counter-Argument 109
7.3 Tooley's Third Counter-Argument III
7.4 The Intuitive Importance ofBiological Ties Il4
7.5 Are Biological Ties Important in Tooley's Third
Counter-Argument? Il6
7.6 Seeing As Il8
7.7 Half-Believing and Vividness 121
7.8 Summing up this Chapter 124
8. EXAMPLES SUPPORTING SA 127
8.1 Warnock's Example 128
8.2 Warnock's First Claim 129
8.3 Absolute Principles 131
8.4 Does Warnock's Example Really Support SA 133
8.5 Two Cases 134
8.6 Warnock's Second Claim 138
ix
8.7 The Moral Status ofNewly Fertilized Eggs 139
8.8 Summary So Far Plus Some More Examples 142
8.9 "The Compromise View" 145
8.10 "The Additive Assumption" 153
8.11 Summary, Conclusion and Further Reflections 157
8.11.1 SA and Agent-Relativity 159
8.11.2 Objections 161
9. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FOR SA 166
9.1 Gaylin's List 168
9.1.1 Conceptual Thought 169
9.1.2 Capacity for Technology 171
9.1.3 The Range ofHuman Emotions 172
9.104 Lamarckian Genetics 174
9.1.5 Autonomy 175
9.2 Blumenfeld's Moral Collectivism 176
9.2.1 Species versus Other Biological Classes 178
9.2.2 A Counterpart ofBlumenfeld's Principle 180
9.2.3 Positive and Negative Moral Collectivism 181
9.204 An Argument from Genetic Changes 183
9.3 Nozick's Defence ofSpeciesism 184
9.3.1 Nozick's First Suggestion 185
9.3.2 Nozick's Second Suggestion 188
904 A Short Summary ofthe Chapter 189
PART III: INDIRECT IMPORTANCE
10. PETER CARRUTHERS' CONTRACTUALISM 196
10.1 Two Demands 197
10.2 Utilitarianism and Intuitions 198
10.3 Contractualism 200
lOA Practical Implications 203
1004.1 A Slippery-Slope Argument 206
1004.2 Social Stability 209
10.5 Contractualism and Character 211
10.6 Cruelty and Culture 214
10.7 Conclusion 217
11. PETER SINGER ON KILLING PERSONS AND
NON-PERSONS 219
11.1 The Direct wrongness ofKilling 220
11.2 Positive Frustration 223
x
11.3 Comparing the Quality ofDifferent Lives 225
11.4 Irreplaceability 228
11.5 Singer's Argument for Irreplaceability 234
11.6 Life as a Journey 236
11.7 Does the Total View Apply to Persons? 237
11.8 Conclusion 238
Summary and Conclusions 240
References 247
Index 253
Acknowledgements
It took four years to write this book. During these eventful years I have
discussedmyethical ideaswith manypeople. Here, unfortunately, Icanonly
mention those who have affected the content and shape of my book in a
direct fashion. But my gratitude includes also those persons who have con
tributed to the prehistory ofthe book.
Two friends have never failed to show interest in my at one stage fairly
thick manuscript. Toni R0nnow-Rasmussen hasencouragedmea great deal
during the different phases of the work. He has also closely scrutinized
several parts ofit and inspired me to make substantial cuts in the original
manuscript. EdDamronhas read the wholemanuscript, mostlyduring inter
vals behind the scenes of Malmo Municipal Theatre, and then made con
structive suggestions.
Special thanks are due to Ingmar Persson, who has meant a lot for both
my philosophical and my working life and with whom I have had conversa
tions about the book and its topics. Thanks also to Wlodek Rabinowicz,
who read parts ofthe manuscript and made comments and suggestions.
Tom Regan suggested that a chapter on Kant should be published sepa
rately. I have followed his advice, which I think was good.
The following, randomly listed, persons have influenced and helped me
in various ways: Birgitta Forsman, Jonas Josefsson, Bjorn Petersson, Alan
Crozier,JohanLaserna,ShellyKaganand,especiallyhelpful, LenaHalldenius.
Lena read the whole manuscriptand corrected manyerrors that would have
disturbed me. Moreover, I thank the participants at the philosophical semi
nars in Lund and at philosophical conferences in Umea, Odense, Leeds and
Lund.
The publication of this book was supported by a generous grant from
Erik and Gurli HuItengren's Foundation for Philosophy. I am grateful for
this financial help.
Lilla Ry, November 1997
D.E.
PART I
PROBLEM AND METHOD