diagnosis of and response to abnormal occurrences at nuclear power plants

522 Pages·2002·11.73 MB·English

IAEA-TECDOC-334
DIAGNOSIS OF AND RESPONSE TO
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
PROCEEDIN AGS FSOE MINAR
ON THE DIAGNOSIS OF AND RESPONSE TO ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
ORGANIZEEHTD YB
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AND HELD IN DRESDEN, 12-15 JUNE 1984
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DIAGNOSD NIASR FO ESPONSEO T ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
IAEA, VIENNA, 1985
IAEA-TECDOC-334
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
May 1985
FOREWORD
The safety of nuclear power plants is a meanb of protection of man
and the environment against undue radiological hazard. It includes a whole
spef catd ocrmntue imaaosnu sres undertaken e sdhiutrtiinn gg, designing,
construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear
facilitiese .hT objectivef o such activitieo t ssai void accidentta sro
least to mitigate the consequences of accidents having the potential of
releasing radioactive material.
Nuclear safe es chtibtoy a nsnceoe fd poit n-depth defence, which
embrae chfetos llowing measud rnaeacs tions:
o tpre v-ent abnormalities duri enhotgp erata i nofoun clear
power plant
- to detect and intercept any deviations from normal operational
conditions
to prevent the uncontrolled escalation of such, deviations
o tmi -tigate hetc onsequence fso abnormal eventn si ordeort
achieve stabd lnsae uitable conditions followinn aga ccident.
A great f daeotat lens tbiieoi nngy o aapntvbaaoni ido drmal events
whiy caomh ccur duri enhotgp eratiof one quipment, systed mncas omponentfos
nuclear power plants. The early diagnosis of deviations from normal
co oente ndahsi vuttoya s riim a coeidaonwefai ns nnbosci edoetre d
abnormal events.
The IAEA Seminar on the Diagnosis of and Response to Abnormal
Occurrences at Nuclear Power Plants, held in Dresden, German Democratic
Republic, 12-15 June 1984, provided opportunities for the discussion of
recent achievementn si this important aref ao nuclear safety.
e hSTemins aadwr ivided int7 o sessi1 o rdnnoas und table
discue ssfhioTolnl .owing safety issues were discussed:
diagnosit so abnormal eventt sa nuclear power plants
computerized operator support
early diagnosf iofs ailurn eics ore pard tnp:ars imary circuit
components
- on-site emergency acti donnraes spon ostae bnormal events
feedback of operating experience
- special issuesf o diagnosis.
A total of 68 participants from 15> countries presented 35 progress
reports covering various toe hpdtii ncaosg nd onras eifoss ponso tae bnormal
occurrencet sa nuclear power plants.
Cooperate iCoehnnt trwai tlh Ir Nnusoctlifteua tre Research,
Rossendorf and the Staatliches Amt fuer Atomsicherheit und Strahlenschutz,
DDR, was an important factor for providing favourable conditions for the
fruitful disce uhostpse idnon naes xchanf goie dd enraaes sulf tors esearch
which took place.
Nuclear safety expertse ra invitedo t reade ht proceedingseht fo
seminar and judge themselves on the value of the information presented at
the seminar.y nA comments woulde b welcome.
V.Osmachkin
Scientific Secretary
of the Seminar
CONTENTS
Some aspects of nuclear power plant surveillance ............................................................ 9
H.-F. Brinckmann, G. Hentschel
Current nuclear safety issues — The IAEA response ....................................................... 25
M. Rosen
Aw ean pproach basedn o fuzzy sets concepo tt fault tree analysid snad iagnosisfo
failure at nuclear power plants .................................................................................... 47
M. Sugeno .T,O nisawa. YN, ishiwaki
e e hhsrTtoa flfoee ty anae hdltye nsvit elopmef noat bnormal incident procedures ..7.6.....
F.K. King, C.W. Gordon, V.M. Raina
e hTvisual illustrationf o complex process information during abnormal incidents ...........97.
H. Heimburger. A, Kautto. ,L Norros,. J Ranta
Review of trends in computerized systems for operator support .................................... 97
D.G. Cain
Development of a computerized operator support system for BWR power plant ............ 109
K. Monta, K. Sekimizu, N. Sato, T. Araki, N. Mori
A decentralized hierarchical computer system for digital reactor control .......................... 119
. / Klebau. A, Lindner. F,B aldeweg
Developme fnoct omputerized operator support syster monfus clear power planntis
the Federal Republic of Germany ................................................................................ 125
W.-E. Buttner
Man-machine communication based on the computerized operator support system ........ 131
Y. Sano, A. Fukumoto, E. Seki, I. Tai, N. Mori, M. Tsuchida, N. Sato
On-line reactor monitoring system for the Borssele power plant (PWR) ............................ 141
E. Turkcan, A. Th.J.M. Overtoom
Trends in early diagnosis of failure in reactor internals and primary circuit components .... 163
D. Wach
Inservice inspecf tpioorin mary circuit componf eVontVs ER 440-type nuclear power
plants ........................................................................................................................7.7.1..
P. Kauppinen, L. Poikonen
Load and acoustic emission analyses for monitoring pressurized components .................... 185
M. Leistne. rDA, lbrecht
In-core neutron spectrometry at reactors of WWER types ................................................ 197
U. Hagemann, H.-C. Mehner
Monito erht srsofu rveillanP cPcNe foo mponents ..........................................................5.02.
H.-D. Giera, A. Grabner, G. Hessel, H.-E. Koppen, P. Liewers, P. Schumann,
F.-P. Weiss,. U Kunze,. G Pfeiffer
Ïðèìåíåíèå ñèñòåì øóìîâîé äèàãíîñè òâèíêóè òðèðåàêòîðíîãî êîíòà ðàòîíîëìÿ íûõ
ýëåêòðîñòàíöèÿõ â ÃÄÐ ......................................................................................... 213
È. Õåéå. ðÐß, í. XêË- å.Êî, ò. Ð,Ð èõòåð
(The application of noise-diagnostic-systems and in-core-control-systems in the NPPs
of the GDR: J. Hey er, R. Janke, K.-H. Loth, R. Richter)
Research reaca t tosor aodor fel velopmef noct ore surveillance system ......................7.2..2...
A. T. Mikulski
Applications of neutron noise analysis for surveillance of PWRs WER ............................ 233
.RBar. tMKheely ,er
Instrumentation for identification and diagnosis of unusual events in Indian PHWRs ........ 255
S.P. Mittal
The utilisation of in-core thermic detectors to the feedback effects identification ............ 261
. KDach,. V Krett,. P Jirsa, .J Kott
Acoustic monitorf iLonMg FBR components .........................................................1...7..2..... .
E. Prid hl, H. Mauersberger, K.-J. Fr hlich, D. Hamann
Evaluatif ooren cent upS grUersap dnoeins se capability througa fhe deral fiel1d8 e2xer c.i.s.e
E.L. Jordan
e heTmergency response guidee Whlitn reoesfs tinghouse pressurized water reactor .1..9.2....
J.P. . PRDr. BoeR kka.eosnSp tsi oe,vn i,ch
Automatic analysis of malfunctions consequences — a method developed on a nuclear
reactor simulator ................................................................................................5..0.3.....
. RBi PDruo. srRP.ctPoah ,li l,ottelli
Ê ïîâåäåíèþ ÿäåðíîé ýëåêòðîñòàíöèèñ ð åàêòîðîì òèïà ÂÂÝÐâ íåíîìèíàëüíûõ ýêñïëóàòàöèîííûõ
ðåæèìàõ ...................................................................................................9..1..3....
Ã. Àêêåðìàí, Ï. Äðåãåð, Õ.-Ì. Ïðàññåð, Ä. Ðàéõåíáàõ
(The behaviour of WWER nuclear power stations under abnormal operational
condit. AiGocnkse: rman. DPnr ,eger, H.-M. Pras. sDRere ,ichenbach)
Emergency plannd ipnnrage parednet sans uclear power plane tIhse At rh— ofETol Ae5 3 3....
B. W. Emmerson
Operator information displays for normal operation and fault management of an
advanced gas-cooled reactor ........................................................................................ 353
. /Jenkinson
Le retour d'exp rience ..............................................................................................1..8..3..
B. Fourest
(Revief owe xperience)
Experience and lessons learned from the operation of the Czechoslovak incident
reporting system ............................................................................................................ 397
J. Suchomel
A computerized operation guidance method for post-trip transient control of BWRs ........ 407
K. Fukunushi, Y. Ohga, J. Tanji, S. Kishi, F. Murata, S. Hashimoto
Use fosp robabilistic safety assessment (PSAn )ie valuatiof noa bnormal evenrtosf
supporting decision making ........................................................................................ 417
M.C. Cullingford, V. Osmachkin
wmeentAh f oso dtddr neaasms age diagnosis ................................ .....................9..3..4......
. ASturm. ,D Kinsky. ,R Forster. M,B ode
Computerized operation manual (COM) of nuclear power plants .................................... 449
.SzZegi
Identificf astoyiosnt em's dynaf mpoiocw ser reactor p yalaubntot sregressive signal
analysis ........................................................................................................................ 463
L Mesko, G. For, I. Lux
Analysis of thermophysical feedback effects on neutron noise of nuclear power reactors... 479
R. Kozma
Stochastic aspef ctowts o-dimensional vibration diagnostics .................................3..9...4..... .
/. Pazsit, M. Antonopoulos-Domis, 0. Glockler
Panel discussion ................................................................................................................ 525
List of participants and designating Member States and organizations ............................ 527
SOME ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SURVEILLANCE
H.-F. BRINCKMANN, G. HENTSCHEL
Central Institr uoNtfue clear Research Rossendorf,
Academy of Sciences,
Dresden
Nuclear Power Plant "Bruno Leuschner",
Greifswald
Departmentr of Research,
Rheinsberg
German Democratic Republic
Abstract
Continuous research activities and technological developments in the
fif eolnd uclear safety se ihentcare ly daf yors eactor construction have
a oth deilgh safety standar fdo operating nuclear power plantsas tu.B
n iother industrial plants abnormal occurrences canne obet xcludneod
principle. Therefore, safety related measured nsa developments wilelb
the subf jefocu trther invests ibgaeahet ni tounIhs o.wn that diagnostic
methods pln aaiy mportant r roolefae rly detecti foonf airolfu rdneas
r *
condition based maintenance. Microprocessor equipped surveillance systems
have undoubtedly supported the action of the operator considerably in
recent years. Lest but not least scientific investigations ere the basis
for further progress in nuclear safety research. As an example some
results obtained from investigations of experimental fuel assemblies
at an operating nuclear power plant are briefly outlined.
1. Introduction
e hTsubjee hct sftoe minar entitled "Diagnosd niaR fsoe sponsoet
Abnormal Occurrences at Nuclear Power Plants" includes a very broad spec-
trum of tasks and questions and it is impossible to deal with all of them
in a relatively short introductory review. Furthermore, many conferences
and seminars related to nuclear safety problems have taken place recently.
For insto ae dngyn euceaoShreay i,trmnp gon s"ioOu pmerational Saffeot y
Nuclear Power Plants" in Marseilles /!/, the most important aspect were
discussed in detail.
Having in mind these activities and the fact that nuclear energy is
r mlooers e ess huaf btljpos euocb tlicy aadssimksI c: uessnioon s
to hsmea a rrnn eyoe fea dctivit niiets h niios t ,hareroree ahwtor sdis,
operatif oonn uclear power plants really combined wio tsmh any risks that
one hae to deal with problems of abnormal occurrences at such short inter-
vals?
I believe participants of the seminar are convinced that in our days
the generatiof no electricity yb nuclear power plants si basa e nvdo ery
high safety standard. This statement can be made because the two main po-
tential dangers, the high concentration of radioactivity in the reactor core
and the residual heat release after reactor shut-down, have been well-known
already in the early days of reactor operation. As a consequence, investi-
gations end developments on reactor safety have been started during that
time and we are able to look back on more than 30 years of successful
theoreticad nlae xperimental woe htrf nkii el fdo nuclear safety.
It e mebumsp thasized that measures which guae rahhnitgthe ereli-
ability of a nuclear power plant already begin with the development and
testi fonmg aterir aocfles rtain reactor componentA s. thorough materials
testing programme, including for instance the test of all welding seams by
ultrasonic methods, is realized during the production of components and
continued during the assemblage of the power plant. Finally, nuclear power
plant operats iiopn erfa ow reymlbel d trained st faoefn fginedenras
scientists.
One should also menn ttiiho ins col ncltoeauxn tt n nrtwiiihhea i stch
nuclear power plants are in operation there are regulatory bodies respon-
sibler of licensing, dna that last on ttlub easte ht International Atomic
Energy Agency recommends safety standards, coordinates scientific work and
advises member countries on questions, concerning the peaceful use of nuclear
energyl .lA these facts hao vt dreel athern a outstanding positionf o nucle-
ar industrye ht ni fieldf o plant safetyn i comparison with other branches
of industry.
In spite of this fact the occurrence of failures cannot be excluded on
principle. Therefore, measures have been prepared and equipment has been
installer dofp, rovidie nhtpg ossibilia tffoya st responsn ieo rdeotr
restrict failure consequences.
In this cons neiicm tp wtiovoioran tnl auonattb lteph uae txperiences
have been gained from more than 3000 years of power plant operation. But on
the other hand this drar uwaost tentione hfatal ocstto thaa t certain
number of power plants has already been in operation for longer periods.
This requires for instance a renewal of the equipment for data acquisition
and data processing paying regard to increasing safety requirements. Taking
into account quality assurance materials testing programmes should alsoeb
mentioned. But this is another broad field of plant surveillance which is
not a subject of the seminar.
Considering all these activities, one can finally answer the questions
raised befy osbrt eating r aetuhnfo aofe trormraat ls continuatfioo n
successful previous developments for nuclear power plant safety, demonstra-
e hstam teti ane t ghsitcmi eentisd tnesan' gineers' awaren feotsh seir
high responsibility in this field.
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