Detente or Razryadka?

261 Pages·2014·1.38 MB·English

Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CGU Theses & Dissertations CGU Student Scholarship
2013
Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin
Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-
Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977.
Daniel S. Stackhouse Jr.
Claremont Graduate University
Recommended Citation
Stackhouse, Daniel S. Jr.. (2013).Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet
Tensions, 1969-1977.. CGU Theses & Dissertations, 86. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/86. doi: 10.5642/cguetd/86
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Détente or Razryadka?
The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions,
1969-1977

by
Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr.

A final project submitted to the Faculty of Claremont Graduate University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Claremont Graduate University
2013

Copyright Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr., 2013
All rights reserved.
APPROVAL OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE

This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed
below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. as fulfilling
the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Janet Farrell Brodie, Chair
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of History

William Jones
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of History

Joshua Goode
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of History
ABSTRACT
Détente or Razryadka?
The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions,
1969-1977
by
Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr.
Claremont Graduate University: 2013
The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union. After twenty-five years of the Cold War, President Nixon made a historic visit to
Moscow in May, 1972, to sign both the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
SALT I froze the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides at then-current levels for five
years, while the ABM treaty limited defensive nuclear weapons permanently. The
leaders of the two superpowers also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific
and communication technology, as well as cultural exchanges. Several more US-Soviet
summits followed throughout the decade.
The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War.
Meanwhile, the Russians preferred razryadka. While both can be translated as “relaxing
tensions,” the difference in terms was indicative of a difference in understanding of what
“relaxing tensions” actually meant. For the Americans, détente meant peace through
arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.
However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically by
respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining from
interference in nations of the developing world. For the Soviets, razryadka referred
strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of state-to-state relations:
arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as a co-equal superpower.
One of the principle means of conducting US-Soviet detente was through a
private “backchannel” between US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin. This dissertation
argues that transcripts of their telephone conversations from 1969-1977 reveal that the
backchannel enabled Kissinger and Dobrynin to establish a relationship which provided
the empathy needed to bridge many of the ideological differences between their two
countries. Consequently, the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel serves as a case study of
the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy.
To my mother and father,

Sarah Jane Kautter Stackhouse and Daniel Stinger Stackhouse, Sr.
No dissertation is merely the work of its author. The dissertation committee plays
an indispensable role in the project’s development from concept to completion. The
Chair of my committee, Dr. Janet Farrell Brodie, helped me immeasurably with the
manuscript’s organization. Dr. William Jones has introduced me to numerous works over
the years which have contributed tremendously to my knowledge and understanding of
history. Dr. Joshua Goode helped me to realize that my dissertation was not just about
the Cold War or détente, but also a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in
international diplomacy. I thank them all for helping to make the final product much
better than it would have been otherwise.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Détente, Razryadka, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin Special Relationship.....1
Historiography of Detente
Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s Views of Détente
The Backchannel
Sources
Organization and Focus

Chapter 1: Arms Control: A Balance of Power or the Correlation of Forces?............36
Arms Control and Detente
SALT I
ABM
SALT II

Chapter 2: Human Rights: A Diplomatic Issue or an Internal Affair?........................92
Human Rights and Detente
Jewish Emigration
The Helsinki Accords
A Few “Hardship Cases”

Chapter 3: Foreign Interventions: Preserving Stability or National Liberation?.......152
Foreign Interventions and Detente
Vietnam
The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Angola

Conclusion: The Role of Relationships………………………….......……....…...…..222

Bibliography: …………………………………………………………………………..242

vii
INTRODUCTION

Détente, Razryadka, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin Special Relationship

“Now, what it all gets down to is how two great powers, the two major powers in the
world, are going to be able to talk about their differences rather than fight about them?
You’ve got to set up a relationship [italics mine] on a personal basis or in some fashion
whereby the differences can be discussed and the areas of self-interest can be discovered,
worked out, and then increased. And that is what détente is all about.”1
-Richard Nixon

The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, known today as the period of “détente.” One of the most noteworthy events of
this era occurred when US President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Moscow in
May, 1972, to sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) with Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The treaty had two components: the Interim Agreement
which froze offensive nuclear missiles at then-current levels for five years, and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) permanently limiting defensive nuclear weapons. Nixon
and Brezhnev also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific and communication
technology, as well as cultural exchanges. Several more US-Soviet summits followed
throughout the decade.
Originating in the late 1960s, détente was an effort to relax tensions after more
than twenty years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, two
nations with competing social systems – democratic capitalism and communism,
respectively. The overriding concern was that the two superpowers might allow their
differences to spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear war. Several factors precipitated
the change from confrontation to negotiation including the development of nuclear parity
between the United States and Soviet Union, the emergence of powerful economic rivals

1 Frost/Nixon – The Complete Interviews, 400 min., Paradine Television Inc., 1977, DVD.
1
in Western Europe and Japan, as well as the emergence of newly independent former
European colonies in the developing world where both Washington and Moscow
competed for influence.
However, by the end of the 1970s détente – the relaxing of tensions which had
brought so much hope and progress to efforts of avoiding confrontation and even a
potential nuclear war – was dead. While many believed that the immediate cause
stemmed from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal
of a second treaty known as SALT II from Senate consideration, a deeper examination
revealed fissures in the rapprochement almost from the very beginning. Accusations by
both sides of violating agreed upon limits in nuclear weapons plagued the period. In
addition, disagreements on the subjects of human rights and foreign interventions in the
developing world further endangered progress.
The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War, while
the Russians preferred razryadka. While both can be translated as “relaxing tensions,”
the difference in terms indicated a fundamental difference in understanding of what
“relaxing tensions” actually meant. For the Americans, détente meant peace through
arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.
However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically in
terms of respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining
from interference in the affairs of newly formed nations in the developing world. For the
Soviets, razryadka referred strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of
state-to-state relations: arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as
a co-equal superpower.
2