Destiny and deliberation : essays in philosophical theology

212 Pages·2011·1.18 MB·English

by  Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Destiny and Deliberation
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Destiny and
Deliberation
Essays in Philosophical Theology
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
1
3
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PREFACE
Introduction The following essays center thematically on the end points of time,
withthedoctrineofcreationatoneendandmatterseschatologicalattheother.
The latter focuses on the doctrines of Heaven and Hell, and the philosophical
issues central to these doctrines. The former issue involves exploration of the
nature of God’s creative activity and the potential for understanding this idea
in terms of the idea of deliberation itself.
The underlying theme of all the essays is the issue of developing a coherent
theistic outlook that includes a high conception of deity together with a concep-
tion of human beings who are morally responsible because many of their choices
are free; free in a sense incompatible with being causally determined. The high
conception inquestion isassociated moststrongly withAnselmian perfectbeing
theology, though my preferred formulation of the view derives such perfection
from worthiness of worship, together with further assumptions. The conception
of deity is thus one that involves omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence,
aseity, immutability, and transcendence.
I do not spend any time in these essays defending the libertarian theory
of freedom assumed here, and won’t pretend to a defense here either. Part of
the reason is that both the philosophical literature and the common wisdom
on the matter makes fairly obvious why libertarian freedom matters to us, but
even given that assumed background, perhaps a hint at my own motivations
for this assumption would be useful. In my view, freedom is essential to moral
responsibility, and alternative conceptions of freedom are, somewhat surpris-
ingly, insufficiently sensitive to the nature of science and a proper respect for
its accomplishments. The story of science is the story of immense success at
prediction, explanation, and control in terms of simpler and more elegant theo-
reticalresourcesthanpreviousattempts,andthestoryoftheprogressofscience
is a story that has not been kind to claims about what is knowable a priori by
philosophical reflection alone. Philosophical arguments that determinism must
be true or that some principle of sufficient reason must be accepted are some
such arguments. In contrast, a deeper respect for science has to acknowledge
that the story of scientific progress involves a recognition that causation might
be merely probabilistic, in a way that never involves hidden variables which,
when controlled for, would reveal some underlying deterministic system.
Moreover, the scope of the scientific enterprise is to accomplish the most
with the least theoretical expense, and even for those who insist on a version
of scientific realism in order to make sense of the success of science, the na-
ture of the project cannot be understood properly without acknowledging the
pragmatic dimension of the project. We need such an empirical approach to the
universe precisely because we have only three-pound brains with limited cogni-
viii Preface
tiveresources,andmodelingsystemsinnatureinwaysthatyieldpositiveresults
in terms of explanation, prediction, and control cannot help but abstract away
from certain features of those systems in order to generate the highest payoff at
the least theoretical cost. Even apart from the variety of sociological evidence
about the human foibles and flaws that, quite predictably, corrupt the history
of science, the nature of the project itself and the capacities of those carrying
out the project calls for circumspection in the face of outlandish expectations of
some grand unified theory of everything that will sustain the human desire to
find a reason for everything.
Thus, a proper respect both for the accomplishments and limitations of the
scientific enterprise nicely dovetails with the more common grounds for declin-
ing the offer to embrace determinism when thinking about human action. When
such a refusal involves commitment to libertarianism, the view is usually por-
trayed as being unscientific, but the justification for this conclusion requires the
libertarianism in question to be coupled with other commitments that place hu-
man behavior and human nature outside the nexus of naturalistic explanation
that is the domain of science. Nothing of the sort is central to libertarianism,
as embraced here, however. There is no assumption here that religious forms of
materialism concerning human nature are false, nor that libertarian freedom is
limitedinnaturetohumanbehavior.Inmyview,ifhumanbehaviorisdistinctive
in the natural order, it is because of moral responsibility, and libertarian free-
dom is necessary but not sufficient for that. If a philosophical theory of human
nature and behavior is thought to be insufficiently scientific, the insufficiency in
question will not be a result of any libertarian aspect to the theory, but rather
to other features of the view. In fact, I offer the following alternative: perhaps
onlyversionsoflibertarianismhavethevirtueofbeingsufficientlyinstepwitha
realisticappraisalofwhatafullscientificunderstandingofouruniverseinvolves.
These points are not intended to be an argument for the libertarianism I
assume here, but are rather a confession of the stance from which that assump-
tion is made. The essays here arise out of that stance rather than defending it,
in large part because the case for libertarianism, whatever its defects, is widely
known. The same cannot be said, however, of the other member of the twin
engines driving these essays, which involves a conception to the high concep-
tion of deity characteristic of mature versions of the religions of the Abrahamic
tradition. These essays assume the wisdom of this tradition without defending
it, which explains why the focus here tends to be more on resisting approaches
that tend toward abandoning the high conception of deity than on defending
thatconception.Moreover,theseessaysfocusmoreonresistingthosewhoseein
libertarianism a reason to abandon the high conception of deity, revealing per-
hapsmyownpredilectiontoseethecommitmenttolibertarianismasthedeeper
intellectual commitment of the two. The essays thus tend to address those with
a similar strong commitment to libertarianism but who do not have as strong a
commitment to a high conception of deity.
HighconceptionsofdeityrepresentGodasthemostexalted,perfectpossible
Preface ix
being. God is thus portrayed as omnipotent, omniscience, omnibenevolent, and
incapableofcomingintobeingorpassingaway.Besidestheseintrinsiccharacter-
istics, the idea of a most exalted, perfect being has implications also for God’s
relational characteristics. First and foremost is that of being the sole creator
of everything distinct from himself, in need of no cooperation from anything
outside himself to accomplish his purposes in creation. This central aspect of
Godinvitesinferencesthatthreatenmuchofourordinaryconceptionoftheuni-
verseandtruthsaboutit.First,itmightappeartomakethenecessarytruthsof
mathematicsandlogicdependentonGodinawaythatthreatenstheirnecessity.
Second, to the extent that God’s purposes are within his sole control, one might
wonderwhatroomisleftfornatureitselftoplayanycausalroleinexplanations
of how and why things happen as they do. This point extends to the causal
contribution of human beings as well, but there is a further worry for those who
think of human behavior as involving choices. If God’s purposes are within his
sole control, the appearance is quite strong that choices can only be conceived
in a way that eliminates the plural: choice itself might be possible, but choices
seem to put things in our hands to some extent rather than solely within God’s
control.
These essays are dedicated to the project of finding a logical interstice be-
tweenthehighconceptionand thesedisturbingconsequences.The pointofview
defended here agrees on the first point, that there is no future in a philosophical
theology that undermines the necessity of mathematics and logic, but there is
nothinginahighconceptionofGodthatneedworryushere.Forthemostpart,
however,thispointofviewwillbepresupposedbackground,inordertofocuson
thelattertwoconcernsabove.Thefirstiswhetherthereisanyroomforcausation
and causal powers outside of God’s power, and some of the essays touch briefly
on this largely ignored issue in contemporary philosophical theology. Standard
occasionalism embraces the concern in question, maintaining that all power is
God’spowerandthatnothingbutGodevermakesanythinghappen.Suchnews
is hard to take: the sun surely seems to warm the air, and I seem to be able to
raise my arm at will. Moreover, it is hard to see why God can’t still exert sole
control by distributing causal powers in nature as he wills. His sole control will
therebybeindirect,ratherthandirectasitwouldbeonstandardoccasionalism,
but indirect control can still be sole control, it would seem.
But this point does not reach all the way to choices themselves. Granting
such powers risks loss of control, since what is done must obviously be up to the
individuals in question. Hence, the fundamental difficulty behind these essays:
how is it possible for a philosophical theology to combine a high conception of
God with libertarian freedom?
Asnotedalready,theseessaysdonotaddressthequestionofwhyoneshould
find this high view of deity attractive, and given that the case for such a theol-
ogy is considerably more opaque than that for libertarianism, it is appropriate
inthisintroductiontoindicatebrieflywhatmightattractonetosuchaposition.
A good way to focus this issue is by considering the feature of this conception