Desert raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940-43

97 Pages·2007·3.91 MB·English

by  Andrea Molinari

O
SPREY
Battle Orders
PUBLISHING
Desert Raiders:
Axis and Allied
Special Forces 1940–43
el Auda
Mixed
Petrol depot Landing
ground
0430
RM hrsMain Ordnance Naval depot
Prov quay Water towers
Power station Naval fuel installation
Water distilleries Tobruk
Petrol distilleries
0130hrs
S. Marco
HQ
Andrea Molinari
• Consultant editor Dr Duncan Anderson
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Battle Orders • 23
Desert Raiders:
Axis and Allied
Special Forces 1940–43
Andrea Molinari
Consultant Editor Dr Duncan Anderson • Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic
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Contents
Introduction 4
Combat mission 6
Doctrine and training 9
Unit organization 14
British forces • Italian forces • Free French forces • German forces
Tactics 50
The LRDG in the Fezzan, 27 December 1940–9 February 1941 • The Free French at Kufra, February 1941
Reconnaissance in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania • The first campaign in the Fezzan, February–March 1942
The LRDG/SAS partnership, March–May 1942 • The big raids, September 1942
The raids in Egypt, July–August 1942
Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) 76
Command • Control • Communications • Intelligence
Weapons and equipment 82
Weapons • Vehicles and equipment
Lessons learned 88
Interaction with the environment
Chronology 90
Bibliography 92
Glossary 93
Index 95
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Introduction
Between June 1940 and January 1943 Italian, German, British, Commonwealth,
Indian and French troops struggled for control of the Western Desert, their
battles being primarily fought in the Libyan province of Cyrenaica and Western
Egypt. What is known as the ‘Desert War’ was actually fought in a relatively
narrow strip close to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea due to the difficulties
of supply and movement in a desert zone.
But several hundred kilometres to the south, deep in the vast inner desert
area known as the Sahara, one of the driest and most inhospitable regions of
The Italian fort of Bu Ngem, some
the world, another desert war was fought, one that might be called the real
300km north of Hon on the road
to Misurata. Nearly all the Italian ‘desert’ war. This war saw Allied and Axis forces involved in a struggle that bore
garrisons were accommodated in little resemblance to the major conflict unfolding on the coastal strip.
forts, whose structure was very It was a war that, in its own way, marked the coming of a new style of
simple, with rectangular or square warfare; a style defined by skilled men bound to their vehicles, men who
outer walls enclosing quarters for
proved capable of striking well behind enemy lines, men who had to fight
the garrison. As they were mostly
against a hostile environment as well as against their enemies. Many lessons
built in the 1930s, motor vehicles
were learned during the war, some forgotten, others not. What has not been
were not usually catered for. The
trellis structure is a radio antenna forgotten, however, is the valour, courage, skill and ingenuity demonstrated by
mast. (Piero Crociani) these men during their struggle.
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The difficulties of crossing the
desert are amply demonstrated
here. The first attempt by von
Almaszy to reach the Nile was
aborted due to travel difficulties.
(Carlo Pecchi)
The Western Desert
TUNISIA
Tripoli HonsMisurata Barce Derna Gazala MEDITERRANEAN SEA
OGRIREERANGNTDAL TRIPOLIGTaAriaNnIA GSUirLteF ONFofiSlBiaIeRngThEazi MAsJKuEHsBDEALR Bir HacThoebimruk BardiaSiMdia Btraurhrani Alexandria PSoaridt
Jedabia CYRENAICA
Marble Arch Suez
El Agheila Mersa Brega QATTARA Cairo
Hon Zella Marada Jalo Jarabub Siwa DEPRESSION Gulf of Suez
KALANSHO Bahariya Nile
HARUG SAND SEA Ain Dalla Asyut
Sebha
F E Z Z A N Um el Araneb EGYPTIAN
Murzuk Tragen SAND
Taiserbo SEA Dakhla
Zaghen
MURZUK RIBIANA
SAND SEA SAND SEA Kufra Aswan
E G Y P T
ALGERIA EGHEI MOUNTAINS
JEBEL
L I B Y A UWEINAT
Tuhma
TIBESTI
MOUNTAINS
NIGER Zouar
PROVINCE
Tokra
Nile
GRAND
ERG BILHA
S U D A N Khartoum
CHAD PROVINCE
N
Lake Chad
Fort Lamy 5
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Combat mission
The Libyan Desert is a huge area of more than 3,000,000km2stretching for about
1,500km south from the Mediterranean and about 2,000km west from the Nile
Valley to the mountains of Tunisia and Algeria. The environment is absolutely
inhospitable, with temperatures rising to as high as 60 degrees Centigrade during
the day and dropping below zero by night. Water (drawn from artesian wells) can
be found only in few oases, where the only vegetation in the area grows. Roads
are simply non-existent; what can be found are at best tracks and paths marking
the vast plains and depressions. Almost no human being can be found in the
huge sand seas of Murzuk, in the Fezzan (as the desert south of Tripoli is called),
as well as further to the east in the sand seas of Ribiana and Kalansho, which,
along with the Great Sand Sea of Egypt, practically bar the road to eastwards. To
the south the Tibesti Mountains, rising up to 3,000m, bar the road to Niger and
Chad (the lower heights of Jebel Uweinat also bar the road to the Sudan).
At first glance, such an inhospitable region would appear to have little
A group of Italian officers leading a
military value. However, following the surrender of France in June 1940 the
Meharistiunit in the desert. All of
Sahara became an attractive area to control. It offered the Italians a chance to
them are riding barefoot and wear
disrupt the Takouradi air route through which aircraft were flown in to Egypt.
the Sahariana. Their only armament
is the 6.5mm Mannlicher Carcano They could also move from Libya across the desert to reach the lower Nile in
Model 91/24 rifle. (Piero Crociani) the Sudan and try to establish a link with their Eastern Africa colonies.
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An AS37, modified with a 75mm
gun, and an AS42 Sahariana to the
rear. The AS37 and AS42 proved
very effective vehicles, with good
firepower and mobility, and they
gave the Italian forces the ability
to respond quickly. (Filippo
Cappellano –AUSSME)
From the French point of view, as soon as the Free French forces took control
of Cameroon and Chad in August 1941, the Sahara offered them the only
chance to fight a war on their own against Axis forces in North Africa.
For the British, a single officer, Ralph Bagnold, was able to figure out that the
Sahara could provide a useful ‘back door’ to move behind Italian lines in North
Africa and harass their lines of communication. This concept was not entirely
An LRDG patrol leaving the Siwa
new: during World War I another British officer, Thomas Edward Lawrence
Oasis on 25 May 1942. Siwa was the
(‘Lawrence of Arabia’), had successfully waged a war behind the Turkish front main base for British raiding and
line. However, while Lawrence waged a guerrilla war with local tribesmen, scouting forces. (IWM, E 012375)
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Bagnold set out to wage a modern style of warfare reliant upon what would
now be called special forces. These forces relied on the ability to travel vast
distances unsupported throughout the Saharan wastes, not tied (at least not
completely) to the oases, and could therefore operate deep behind enemy lines
to gather intelligence and strike at targets, particularly airfields, that had
appeared completely secure.
A comparison between the combat mission of the Long Range Desert Group
(LRDG) and the other forces operating in the Sahara illustrates the
groundbreaking developments introduced by the British unit. The Free French
forces partly borrowed the LRDG’s means and tactics, but were still bound to
the basic concepts of 19th-century colonial warfare. The same was even truer
for the Italians who for the first two years of the war only sought to defend
their strongpoints. The fact that the Italians, and Germans, belatedly
attempted to develop a special forces presence in the Sahara only illustrates
how effective the LRDG’s tactics had been.
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Doctrine and training
European colonial armies in North Africa mostly settled themselves along the
coasts and in major towns, rarely venturing into the deep desert. A military
presence in the inland regions was established, but only following a defensive
pattern. Key positions were the oases, soon turned into fortified positions,
which represented the bedrock of the European presence in the desert. These
strongholds provided a focal point for garrisons and a shelter for columns and
patrols in a way unchanged since Kitchener’s campaign in the Sudan that
culminated in the battle of Omdurman in 1898. Unlike the local Arab tribes,
European armies were bound to slow-moving supply chains that, coupled with
the lack of adequate movement capabilities, slowed the pace of movement
right down. A suitable solution was found in ‘hopping’ from one fort to
another, a doctrine Kitchener developed by establishing large supply dumps
that moved forward with the bulk of the troops. In this way his forces, though
still ‘hopping’ from one oasis to another, could be grouped together in a
stronger force than the small columns previously used.
The widespread diffusion of motorization during and after World War I
brought a change to the practice of desert warfare. In 1916 British troops had
to face a revolt by the Arab Senussi tribe in Libya, where Italian forces only
garrisoned the coastal towns. Fast-moving and well-armed armoured cars were
used not only to lead the way for regular British forces, but also to perform
‘special missions’ (like the rescue of the crews of two British ships held by
the Senussi), which involved deep penetration into the desert. Most noticeably
these armoured cars served with Duke of Westminster’s No. 2 Armoured Motor
Squadron, whose personnel transferred en bloc from the Navy to the Army and
formed up to six light car patrols. Although these patrols never penetrated too
deeply into the desert, it is they who are the true antecedents of the LRDG
rather than Lawrence and his guerrilla forces in Arabia.
When the Italian Army undertook the ‘reconquest’ of Libya in the 1930s
(actually its first penetration into the deep desert) they made use of a large
number of motor vehicles, yet still with a tactical doctrine based on 19th-
century colonial principles. Motorized units were still used in the desert in the
same manner as fast-moving camel-mounted troops –hopping from one oasis
to another and from one stronghold to another.
An interesting feature of Italian
defensive organization in the Sahara
was the large number of landing
strips spread throughout the area.
Originally these were intended to
host the aircraft of the Aviazione
Sahariana, which were mainly used
for reconnaissance; they were
laterused to bring in supplies to
remote locations. Here a group
of Libyan soldiers unloads supplies
from a Savoia Marchetti SM82
Marsupiale somewhere in the
desert. (Piero Crociani) 9
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When World War II broke out in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the
European armies faced the problem that this time their opponents would not
be poorly armed tribesmen, but other modern European forces. The French
and Italians stayed true to their 19th-century-style doctrines, which ruled out
any chance of effectively waging war in the deep desert. This was a conscious
decision as in the vastness of Sahara those who controlled the strongpoints in
the oases enjoyed major advantages against any attacker in that they had
plenty of water, food and ammunition. Although weapons issued to such posts
were often old, they were deemed suitable enough to face the unlikely
eventuality of attacks coming from and through the desert. There had been
some motorization but not a substantial amount, and the available vehicles
were largely unsuitable, either because they lacked cross-country capabilities
and reliability, or because their payload was insufficient to carry men, weapons
and all the supplies needed.
Although the Italians now faced very different enemies to the Senussi
tribesmen they had fought in the 1930s, they simply improved their old
doctrines rather than seeking any new solutions. Shortly before Italy’s entry
into war, the staff led by the Governor of Libya elaborated the directives for the
defence of the colony in the case of, particularly, a French attack from Tunisia
that might outflank their border defences. Their strategy relied heavily on static
troops tied to strongpoints, though they were also assigned the role of carrying
out sudden attacks against enemy bases and supply columns; true ‘mobile’
warfare was only left to the five ‘sahariana’ companies, whose task was to take
the war into enemy territory.
Given this tactical situation, Ralph Bagnold’s concepts were inventive and
innovative. Surprisingly, behind them lay a gross overestimation of the
Three Libyans in the most typical capabilities of the Italian forces in the area. Bagnold had encountered the
defensive position in the desert: Italian Auto-Saharan during his travels in the desert, and warned the British
a hole dug in the sand. The one at staff in Egypt that, as soon as it entered war, Italy could start large-scale actions
centre mans a 6.5mm Breda 30 light
using ‘light mobile forces in desert cars’ in the Libyan–Egyptian desert. The aim
machine gun; this weapon was very
of these attacks would be to divert British attention from the main front, as
complex and prone to jam. The
well as to carry out special operations such as the sabotage and harassment of
cradle on the left contained 72
O.T.O. Model 35 hand grenades. the British lines of communications, or even to establish landing grounds in
(Piero Crociani) the desert and bring agents and supplies for the many pro-Fascist Italians then
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