Descartes

180 Pages·1967·18.162 MB·English

by  A. Boyce-Gibson

1 HE PHILOSOPHY OF
DESCARTES ,
BY
A. BOYCE GIBSON M.A.(OxoN)
c..
LEClURER IN PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF BIRMINGHAM
NEW YORK / RUSSELL & RUSSELL
PREFACE
THE object of this book is to present an account of the philo
sophy of Descartes, in itself and for itself. My excuse for pub
lishing it, despite imperfections of which I am only too well
aware, is that, in English, this has not yet been done. With
the best will in the world-indeed, it is part of his special task
-the general historian of philosophy tends to think in terms
of periods or epochs of thought. In so doing, he comes to
emphasize, in the work of any one philosopher, those pregnant
anticipations of his successors which draw attention to the
continuity of history, and thus to distort the stress of the
philosopher himself. It is the special task of the historian of
one man's philosophy to redress the balance; and that is what,
in respect to Descartes, I have here attempted.
It was my first intention to devote considerable space to the
historical setting of Descartes's philosophy, and to eschew
philosophical criticism. As I proceeded, I became more and
more exciterl about the philosophical problems raised by
Descartes, and my original aim receded into the background.
I have tried, however, to conduct my discussion and criticism
without introducing problems and terminologies belonging to
more recent philosophies, and thus to retain the historical
perspective. In one serious instance I am guilty of reading his
tory backwards, and that is in my reference to the Kantian
Criticism in Chapter V. My object here was to give greater
precision to Descartes's own conceptions, and I can only hope
that this betrayal of my principles has not been in vain.
In a work written in the intervals of University lecturing,
and over the space of several years, there is bound to be a cer
tain degree of overlapping, and, what is worse, indications of
divergent interpretations or points of view. I have done my
best to remedy these defects, but it is too much to hope that
none have escaped my notice.
I have two outstanding personal obligations. The first is to
M. Chevalier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Grenoble, who was good enough, at the outset of my venture,
\'ii
vm THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES
to spare me time for valuable discussion on a subject on which
he is well known as an authority, and to encourage me by
approving of my outlines. The second is to Professor L. J.
Russell, of the University of Birmingham, who read the whole
work in manuscript, and by his kindly and judicious criticism,
based on an expert knowledge of the seventeenth century, CONTENTS
saved me from errors both of fact and of inference which, if
undetected, would have made it more imperfect than it actually
is. His constant advice, and his readiness to help in any pos CHAPTER 1
sible way on any possible occasion, I can never hope to repay. PAGE
I am greatly indebted to M. Gilson's magnificent com THE HERITAGE OF DESCARTES 1
mentary on the Discours de la M ethode, with its veritable mine The historical approach to Descartes-The anti-historical
of cross-references, and its penetrating insight into the mind outlook of his times-The Middle Ages and their interpreta-
of Descartes and of his times. I must further acknowledge the tion of nature-The 'how?' and the 'why?'-Formal and
final causes-Plato and the mathematical approach to nature
same author's La liberte chez Descartes et la thiologie, with its
-Scientific observation-The reign of natural law-Philo
mass of historical information concerning the theological
sophical implications in the work of Galileo-The mediaeval
controversies which threw their shadow over the writings of view of the relations between religion and science-The
Descartes. I also owe much valuable historical information, Reformation and secular learning-The revolt against the
and many important references, especially in Chapter II, to philosopher's God-Its repercussions within the Catholic
Church-Salvation or adoration the centre of personal
M. Henri Gouhier's La pensie religieuse de Descartes. To all
religion ?-The Oratory, its regimen and philosophical
students of Descartes's relations with the personalities and tendencies-The new alliance of science and religion
movements of the period, and, above all, to all students of Mersenne-Descartes and French Classicism.
Descartes's day-to-day intentions and manceuvres, this work
is indispensable.
Chapter VIII, sect. 7, is based on a paper read before the
Aristotelian Society, in November 1929, on 'The Eternal Veri
ties and the Will of God'. I am grateful to the Society for the CHAPTER II
opportunity of submitting one of my main theses to discussion
and criticism. THE MISSION OF DESCARTES . 30
I am greatly obliged to the Research Grants Committee of
Descartes's early education-His revolt against it-Cum
the University of Birmingham for making me a grant to cover plenus forem enthusiasmo-The first dedication of Descartes
the expenses of typing. -The method of doubt-Scepticism and reconstruction-The
Lastly, I am indebted to my wife, who has watched the ideal of the unity of knowledge-Berulie-The second
dedication of Descartes-The retirement to Holland
progress of this work with fostering care, and has undertaken
Metaphysician or scientist ?-Theocentrism and secular
the tedious task of proof-reading. progress-Descartes's religious protestations-His 'prudence'
-His sincerity-The student and his desire for peace-The
A. BOYCE GIBSON
party leader and his desire for propaganda-The Augustinians
and the Jesuits-The Jansenists and the Jesuits-Descartes
BIRMINGHAM
and the theological controversies of his time-Descartes and
September 24, I93I
the Jesuits-Descartes and Dutch Calvinism-The failure of
Descartes to convert the academic world-Convertam me
ad gentes-Philosophy and practice-Princess Elisabeth and
Queen Christina-The duality of Descartes's temperament,
and its reflexion in his philosophy.
ix
CONTENTS Xl
x THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES
CHAPTER III CHAPTER VI
PAGE PAGE
COGITO, ERGO SUM 74 THE OBJECTS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 186
The two stages of the method of doubt-The deceptiveness of The unity of knowledge-Its mathematical foundation
sense-perception-Its rejection as a guide to truth-Historical Number and space-Intuition and perception in mathematics
antecedents of this rejection-Scientific measurement as the -The groundwork of mathematical physics-Is demonstra
proper corrective-The method of doubt extended to science tion in physics possible ?-Extension and motion-Descartes's
The wicked genius-The limits of scepticism-Cogilo, ergo drift to Occasionalism-A scientific physiology-The problem
sum-Not a syllogism-The nature of the metaphysical of life-The 'animal-machine'-Its apologetic value-The
self-Does it include perception ?-Is it to be taken as a denial of mind in animals-The assertion of their pure
substance ?-The relation of soul and body-Is the self of the mechanism-Its metaphysical basis-Its practical difficulties.
cogito instantaneous or continuous ?-The historical signifi
cance of the cogilo-Descartes and Idealism-Dubilo, ergo sum.
CHAPTER Vil
CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION . '215
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 104 The theory of representative perception-Its relation in
The progress from ideal to real-The proof of God from the Descartes to the theory of intuition-Perception, soul, and
idea of God in us-The distinction of fact and value-God as body-The intimate connexion of soul and body-The human
intellectual nature in general- God as transcendent-'The substance-The theory of perception and the two-substance
more cannot come from the less'-The assumption of the theory-Their inconsistency with one another-Resort to
causal axiom-The importance of the first proof-The proof Occasionalism inevitable unless the two-substance theory
of God from our own existence-Its reciprocity with the is revised-The scope of Descartes's Occasionalism-Are all
previous proof- Efficient and final causes in metaphysics- ideas innate ?-The pragmatic utility of sense-perception
The doctrine of continuous creation-Efficient cause and The veracity of the senses and the veracity of God-The dis
temporal succession-Are God and the self separate entities? junction between life and knowledge.
-The ontological proof-A petitio principii?-The criticism
of Caterus-The ontological proof and religious experience.
CHAPTER Vlll
CHAPTER V
THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 149 The attributes of God-Eternity-Its relation to duration
lnfinity-Its relation to human finitude-Its relation to
The scientific interpretation of nature guaranteed by the spatial limitation-The infinite and the indefinite-The
existence of a veracious God-'Clear and distinct ideas' infinite not a negation of the finite-'Amplitude'-Creation
The immediate character of intuition-'Simple natures' God the cause of Himself-The creation of the self-Its com
Deduction-The scaffolding of memory-The distinctness of munity of nature with God, and its dis_parity of power-The
simple natures-The simple nature discovered through a dis doctrine of immortality-The creation of the physical
junctive judgment-The distinctness of spirit and extension world-The origin of extension-The marks of God in nature
-Distinctness and substantiality-Analytic and synthetic -Descartes and evolution-Descartes and pantheism-The
judgments-The theory of innate ideas-Second-hand things eternal verities and the wil( of God-The nature of His
or first-hand principles ?-Descartes and Kant-Extension supremacy over them-God and final causes in nature-Faith
as a substance-Induction and experiment-Descartes and
and reason.
Bacon-The necessity of verification.
xii THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES
CHAPTER IX
PAGE
THE VINDICATION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 293
The divine guarantee-The Cartesian circle-The guarantee
and the cogito-The guarantee and Descartes's procedure in
metaphysics-The logic of metaphysics and the logic of
science-The guarantee of our knowledge of extension, and
of its distinctness from spirit-The guarantee and scientific
knowledge-Memory and the wicked genius-The order of
approach and the order of reality-The alleged circularity of
the argument from the self to God-The alleged circularity
of the argument from the clearness and distinctness of our
conception of God to His existence-The alleged circularity
in the use of the causal axiom to prove the existence of God LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Possible ways of escape from the circle-The problem of error.
Disc. Discours de la mtfthode.
Med. M editationes de prima philosophia.
Prine. Principia philosophiae.
CHAPTER X Reg. Regulae de inquirenda veritate.
R.V. Reclzerche de la vtfrittf.
FREE-WILL AND THE MORAL LIFE 329
Tr. Pass. Traittf des passions.
Descartes and ethical theory-The will and the cogito--The I ae. Resp. Primae Responsiones: and so with other replies
constraint of the truth and the liberty of indifference to the objections to the Meditations.
Descartes and the theological problem of free-wii1-His
Jae. Obj. Primae Objectiones: and so with other objections
apparent theological eclecticism based on his individual
to the Meditations.
approach to the problem-The real requirements of his
philosophy and their theological trappings-The psychology
of passion-The control of passion-The defensive theory of
morality-The provisional morality of the Discours-No final
theory of morals-Descartes's exposition of Seneca
Morality and our conceptions of the universe- Descartes and
political theory-The impossibility of a final theory of morals
-Omnis peccans est ignorans-Resignation and aggression-
The aggressive aspect of Descartes's theory of morals-The
contribution of Descartes's theory of morals to his philosophy.
INDEX
xiii
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES
CHAPTER I
THE HERITAGE OF DESCARTES
§r. PHILOSOPHY has been well described as the attempt
we make to interpret the world about us. But the world about
us changes. New elements come into our knowledge; we evolve
new kinds of behaviour; and consequently we are confronted
with new problems. It is these problems that the philosopher
of every age tries to solve. He takes a synoptic view of his
time, and the more he sees in it, the further he sees beyond it.
But even if the final explanation is held to lie in the eternal,
the eternal is not a datum, but a conclusion. Philosophy, we
must remember, is the work of philosophers, and philosophers,
however unwillingly, belong to a given moment in history.
Two influences, apart from his own reflective genius, are
powerful in forming a philosopher's outlook. In the first place,
there is a continuity of thought between different historical
periods which puts the results of the earlier at the disposal of
the later. As no intellectual revolution is ever universal, this
inheritance is always a formative influence of the first impor
tance. Often there is an unresolved disharmony in the inheri
• tance, and the greatest work of many philosophers has been to
discern the underlying unity. In the second place, in the actual
facts of contemporary life, the philosopher will find a re-state
ment of the problems he is called upon to solve. He is therefore
conditioned by history in two senses; he is both the child of a
past age and an expositor of his own. To understand him we
must study both the previous history of thought and the
immediate developments of his own time. .
This view is generally accepted; but it is hard to practise.
Our own problems distract us, and we are apt to go to an
earlier philosophy simply to get answers to them, or to explain
how they arose. This procedure is of course useful and even
2
:2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES THE HERITAGE OF DESCARTES 3
necessary to students of these problems, but it prejudices our knowledge. 'Book-knowledge,' he wrote, 'which has grown fat
understanding of the past. We must make a real imaginative little by little through the composition of various pe?ple's
t?e
effort to get behind our preoccupations; when we relax, we are opinions, is not nearly so close to trut~ as the plan:~ r~:
in danger of falling into the abstract and interested criticism flexions of a sensible man on the ob1ects which confront him._
which is always the line of least resistance. But interested In 1640, on his own confession, he h3:d not touched :;i. scholastic
criticism in the long run must always fail to interest. It does classic for twenty years,2 and at no time wash~ .a wide or sym
not bring the author to life again; it merely arrays a corpse in pathetic reader. He seldom referred to authonhes, whether .to
new clothes, and the clothes alone are alive. It is not entirely criticize or to borrow· his criticism of his great contemporaries
unhistorical, for without history there can be no reference to was severe, and his 'appreciation niggardly. m~ saw, as .little
the past at all. But history has been banished from its proper reason for a gentleman to know Greek and Lahn as Swiss or
function, and has returned, as exiles do, illegally and sub Low-Breton'.3 He had apparently no interest in history, and
versively. The interested critic who does not trouble to read it certainly no respect for the past. Malebranc~e may n~t have
forwards has no alternative, and probably no desire, but to been an orthodox disciple, but he was certainly speaking the
read it backwards; and hence the 'rationalist' and 'Idealist' mind of his master when he remarked that 'Adam in the
versions of Descartes in the respective mythologies of the earthly paradise knew no history', and quaintly inquired 'why
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. we should aspire to know more'.4 . . . .
Indeed, Descartes has suffered more than most philosophers But we cannot for this reason set history aside in our study
from the habit of treating one philosopher merely as a means of Descartes. No man can be a complete intellectual hermit;
to another. There are several reasons for this. One is the con least of all the pupil of the Jesuits, the protege of the Oratory,
centration of interest on modern German Idealism, the roots the lay spiritual adviser of the Princess Elisabeth, and ~he
of which have been sedulously traced to Descartes. That they intimate friend of that most indefatigable of learned gossips,
can be found there, no one doubts; but Descartes was far more the good Father Mersenne. Descartes, it is true, had no inten
than a mere precursor of Kant, and this is a fact which the tion of synthesizing historical tendencies. He set out to search
direction-or misdirection-of our attention has helped to for truth in his own way from rock bottom. But the pro?le~s.
obscure. Another is the superstitious depreciation-at least in of the age reappeared in him, as in a n;iicrocosm;. and _in his
England-of mediaeval philosophy, which has tended to con formulation of his own philosophy for his own satisfaction he
ceal Descartes's continuity with the past. A third, based in the found the solution which the age demanded. This is the true
long run on the other two, is the pedagogical necessity of synthesis; not an adroit external manipulation of elements,
beginning the study of modern philosophy somewhere, and if but their embodiment in a living unity of concrete thought.
it has been decided to eliminate the Middle Ages and to con In fact, though Descartes's antipathy to histo~y is .part. of
centrate on German Idealism, Descartes is a convenient his philosophy, his philosophy in its turn has its histoncal
springboard, however much he may suffer in the process. 1' setting. The two principal preoccupations of Descartes w~re
fourth is the tendency of the professional philosophers towards his mathematical method and his personal approach to philo
a narrow craft-unionism, which ignores the debt of Descartes's sophy. In both there lurks a hostility to the historical out
philosophy to the Renaissance and the Reformation because look. The necessary truths of mathematics are independent of
the main inspiration of these movements was not strictly
Disc., Adam et Tannery, CEuvres de Descartes, VI. 12. All references
philosophical. to 1 the text of Descartes are to this magnificent edition. The Roman
There are, however, less discreditable arguments for the numerals refer to the volume, and the Arabic numerals to the page.
prevalent assumption that Descartes was simply a bolt from The care and erudition of the editors, together with the beauty of the
the blue. He was rather of that opinion himself. At least in the type and the noble texture of the pages, makes it a joy to handle.
opening and closing phases of his career he mocked at acca •z QTou oMteedr sebnyn eM, aIrIiIt.a i1n8,5 .T rois Rejormateurs: t>· 933, Rn. oVt.e, ..X I . _h5a0v2~- 5~0o3t.
mulated learning, and he always held that method alone, ·and succeeded in locating it, but it is too characteristic of the anb-h1stor_1c1sm
his method at that, was the one prerequisite for universal of certain currents of thought in the seventeenth century to be omitted.
4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES THE HERITAGE OF DESCARTES 5
temporalchanges. They are always necessary. The order in which Descartes had pitchforked history out of the stables; but
they happen is irrelevant to them; their articulation is not that she returned tenfold and rewarded him, in token of good for
of events of time. On the other hand, the personal approach, evil, with her special favour.
placing as it does the whole onus of the search after truth on
the individual, who must live through each turn of the argu §z. It is often said that it is the function of the school to
ment he discovers, relieves him of the study of precedent and teach people how to think, so that they will be able in after
imposes simply the duty of reflecting methodically on the years to reflect methodically on the further knowledge they
implications of his own experience. Both tendencies were at may acquire and the fresh experiences they may undergo. If
work in the central and primary conviction of Descartes, as he this is so, the Middle Ages were the schooldays of modern
sat in the first rapture of dedication over his famous Bavarian Europe, and the great expositors of their outlook have been
stove, 'that works of art put together severally, by the hands happily, though perhaps not intentionally, designated School
of different masters, are less perfect than those that have been men. They cultivated and developed for the extended vision of
worked at by one man'.r their successors both the spirit of universality, which is the
But both these preoccupations Descartes shared with his driving force of philosophy, and the art of close and accurate
age, and both trace their descent to that many-sided move thinking with the aid of which it makes its way through the
ment of the spirit conveniently described as the Renaissance, multiplicity of facts. For patience and subtlety and tenacity,
or re-birth of Europe. 'The Renaissance', says J. A. Symonds, for clarity and conciseness of conception and expression, for
at the opening of his great work, 'made two discoveries: the meticulous attention to detail informed by an unerring mastery
discovery of the world and the discovery of man.' The rise of of the total theme, they have never yet been equalled. By the
mathematical physics and the revival of personal religion were sheer prowess of their logic they were intellectually prepared
the outstanding events in the history of thought since the for the birth of modern science. Their habits of rigorous exacti
Schoolmen of the thirteenth century elaborated their rich tude were equal to any strain which might be put upon them.
mosaic of Aristotelian Christianity. It is precisely these ele Nevertheless, it is by their failure to achieve any clear con
)ments which we find stressed in the work of Descartes; mere ception of science, as distinguished from philosophy, that the
·extension, mathematically expressible, on the one hand, and age they lived in is plainly marked off from our own.
the human soul, dependent on an omnipotent God, on the It would be an exaggeration to deny to the Middle Ages all
other. And they are linked together in a single system accord interest in the facts of nature. To say nothing of the mystical
ing to mediaeval precedent. Descartes's conception of philo sympathy of a St. Francis of Assisi with the humbler orders
sophy, as we shall see, is still that of Thomas Aquinas; and the of creation, and of the gradual penetration by naturalism of
role he planned for himself was that of a new Aristotle, who mediaeval art, the intellect of the period was deeply concerned
should found a new Scholasticism on the basis of recent scien with the study of natural phenomena, which indeed it had
tific discovery. inherited from the Greek tradition. It knew and studied the
Thus, in his single system there is a gathering up of 'things medicine of Galen and Hippocrates, and, above all, through its
both new and old'. He surveyed in his own mind, with a sub preoccupation with Aristotle was constantly confronted with
lime unconsciousness, the great movements of the previous 'the Philosopher's' scientific opinions. His physics and astro
three hundred years, and found that they all worked together nomy were part of the education of every man of culture, and
for good. And this, with the necessary distinctions of emphasis, loomed far larger in the university curriculum than those of
was the experience of all the brilliant company of French their successors do to-day. It is true that habitual acceptance
Classicists in this 'century of genius' .i of authority inclined the learned of the times to the study of
traditional views rather than to independent research, but
• Disc., VI. r I.
•This tribute paid by Professor Whitehead (Science and the Modern they were perfectly prepared to accept a properly accredited
W arid, ch. iii) to the seventeenth century is no less than its due. There new fact when it was brought to their notice, and to make the
has never been a period of greater intellectual verve and audacity, or one theoretical changes which its acceptance involved. The whole
which produced a larger number of outstanding minds.
6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES THE HERITAGE OF DESCARTES 7
fantastic array, as it seems to us, of 'epicycles' and 'eccentrics' measurable unitary basis of quantity, but a hierarchy of
was designed to bring the Aristotelian theory of the spheres created orders, ascending from indeterminate matter to the
into line with a growing knowledge of the complexity of the pure form of God. They thus produced a philosophy of nature,
planetary paths, and even the Antipodes, belief in which had an explanation of its meaning and purpose, which was not
been formally declared heretical, were admitted, with as good science, for it paid little heed to actual processes, but tended to
a grace as possible, once they had had the temerity to be dis usurp the place of science, as it was not so much in the pro
covered. But there was no general expectation of discovery, cesses as in their significance that the times were interested.
and it was inconceivable that it should lead to anything more The question 'Why?' had ousted the question 'How?'. Or, at
than some slight modification of detail. The general principles any rate, whenever the question 'How?' was asked, the answer
and forces of the physical world were settled for good and all; to the question 'Why?' insinuated itself into the reply. This is
and if they were adequately followed out in particular instances the reason why the efforts of the scientific innovators to answer
there would be no need of discovery but only of verification. the 'How?' unequivocally in its own language evoked such
Thus it came about that the organized observation, or experi alarm in the traditionally minded. To them it carried a sub
ment, on which modern science relies for its data, played so ord;_nate connotation of 'Why?'. Physical law was to be the
small a part in the mediaeval study of nature. It was suspect
ground as well as the mechanical explanation.of n.atural even~s.
as an empirical challenge to the supremacy of reason. Amusing
An outstanding example of such apprehens10n is revealed m
instances of this attitude are furnished by the refusal of the
thP. observation of Pope Urban VIII on one of the main themes
professor of philosophy at Padua to look through Galileo's
of Galileo's Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World,
telescope, and by tpe stout determination of his o~posit; n17m that 'the tides cannot be adduced as a necessary proof of the
ber at Pisa to 'charm new planets out of the sky by logical
double motion of the earth without limiting God's omni-
argument'.1 If we can really learn all we want about the stars p )tence'. 1 .
by 'logical argument' it is clear that we have no need of
This outlook on nature, which had the effect, throughout
specially conditioned observation, and if we obstinately per
the Middle Ages, of excluding pure science in the name of a
sist in such an unprofitable pursuit, we shall be suspected of
philosophy of nature, follows inevitably ~rom the prevailing
some hidden motive, such as a clandestine bargain with the
Aristotelian modes of thought. The reduction of nature to an
devil. Thus, too, it happened that such inventions as the age
uniform system of quantitative relations is wholly opposed to
produced, as, for example, the optical lens and the mariner's
the Aristotelian doctrine concerning Form and Matter, and to
compass, sit somewhat loosely to the general scheme. ~f. the the cognate doctrine of the Four Causes. It was held that
scientific knowledge. They are the products of pure empmc1sm,
every creature, animate or inanimate, owes its existence to the
neither issuing from nor leading up to the theory which their
actualization of less determinate matter by its supervening but
discovery implies.
inseparable form. The combination of form and matter is the
But a lack of interest in experiment, and an under-estimate
condition of any specific existence, so that any separate con
of its importance, are not enough to characterize the mediaeval
sideration of the one or the other is philosophically inadmis
attitude to nature. Both are shared to some extent by the
sible. Only in conjunction with its formal aspect can the
mathematical interpreters of nature in the seventeenth cen
material factor be understood.
tury, and not least by Descartes himself. It is not the emphasis Hence arises the conception of an 'essence'; the underlying
on the a priori element, but a peculiar conception of it, which
formal and generic character expressed in a multiplicity of
sharply divides the outlook of the Middle Ages from that
particulars, and affording, in its formal capacity, an expla~a­
which succeeded it. It is not mathematical but philosophical.
tion of their unity in difference. The essential nature of a thmg
Behind the perceived differences of quality, and the empirical
is part of its raison d'etre as a physical existence: it enters
classifications which grow out of them, they discerned, not the
1 Letter from Galileo to Kepler, quoted by Brett, The Metaphysical Re1l aQtiuoontse do fb Syc iDenrc.e Cahnadr lRese lSigiinogne'r, , inin t hhei sc oalrlteicclt.ieo no, nS c'Tiehnece ,H Risetloigriiocna,l
Foundations of Modern Science, p. 67.
and Reality, p. 135.
8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES
THE HERITAGE OF DESCARTES 9
not merely into its philosophical interpretation, but into its
mathematical science, with its quantitative systems of
actual constitution. What makes it behave as it does is not an
measurement, within the philosophy of nature, a~ a method of
universal system of mechanical relations to which it belongs,
abstraction leading to merely abstract conclus10ns. Such a
but some occult quality, which it carries within itself, however
course, however, would have been contrary to the whole intel
freely it may share it with .other instances of the same cl~ss. lectual temper of the Middle Ages, and its adoption was never
This is its 'cause' quite as literally as the brute matter which
suggested even w?en the success. of the mathe!11atical met~od
it organizes \the material cause), ai;id the agency which bri17gs
in the interpretation of nature raised the question of the philo
it immediately into being (the efficient cause). They are all m
sophical status of that met~od in its. most acute form. More
separably and simultaneously the 'reason' why it exists. Indeed,
promising, because more akm. to mediaeval r:iodes of thought,
if there is any one dominant explanation, it is the Form, for
was the mathematical concept10n of Form which was embedded
the material and the agent are, respectively, indeterminate and
in the recognized Platonic tradition. If the 'Why' of the uni
individual, and can be brought into the sphere of philosophy
verse is itself one with the principle of mathematical perfec
only by being taken in relation to the determining universal.
tion, the interpretation of the physical world under mathe
Now if we apply this theory to the general structure of
matical formulae will itself be implicitly teleological. And, as
creation, we shall find a succession of orders, qualitatively
teleology will operate pervasively an~ internally, not o~st~uc­
distinguished by both the kind and the degree of the Form
tively and intrusively, it will be possible to conduct a distmct
which they embody. The quantitative interpretation of matter
and disinterested investigation into the 'How?' without
threatens to reduce all the facts of nature to a dead level.
rejecting the final authority of the 'Why?'.
Taken literally, it might be suspected of abolishing the distinct
As a matter of fact, as we shall see, it was under cover of a
status of man, and thus of striking at the very root of religion.
renascent Platonism that mathematical science eventually
If, however, we make an arbitrary exception of the human
came to its own. But, teleology or no teleology, the assumption
soul, we still have to obliterate the qualitative differences be
of mathematical uniformity in nature is bound to flatten out
tween inanimate and animate, between vegetative and sen
the hierarchy of creation, to abolish celestial privilege, and to
tient, and thus to violate distinctions which are not only
modify the theory of essences beyond recognition; and it could
'essential', but working factors in our everyday experience.
not but meet with uncompromising hostility from entrenched
These are difficulties which the mathematical theory of nature
Aristotelianism, which therefore stood immovably in the way
cannot avoid, so long as it claims to be a metaphysic of nature
of scientific progress.
or even to possess an unqualified metaphysical sanction, and
In discussing the concurrence in the Platonic tradition of
its presentation by Descartes is certainly not exempt from
mathematics and teleology, we have insensibly passed from
them.) Moreover, as applied to astronomy, while we may now
the theory of Forms to the theory of Ends. The Aristotelian
recognize it as more unequivocally beneficial, it was likely to
tradition recognized nothing in nature without a purpose,
be none the less hostile to the Aristotelian tradition. The
whether it be attributed, as by Aristotle himself, to an uncon
heavens, according to 'the Master', were of a different stuff
scious immanent teleology, or, as by his Christian emendators,
from the earth. They are formed from a 'fifth body', to which
to the explicit will of a personal God. And as it is towards its
belongs the essential quality of rotation denied to terrestrial
formal perfection that every cre~ture aspires, th~ final caus~ is
bodies. And as circular motion carries with it the connotation
virtually the formal cause considered as an ob1ect of aspira
of undeviating uniformity, the 'fifth body' is held to be uncom
tion. To know what a thing is we must know what, in the
pounded and immutable, and to stand to the terrestrial as
natural course of its development, it is destined to become.
more perfect to less perfect. For such a theory the mathe
Thus final cause enters as intimately into the explanation
matical interpretation of nature means extinction, for measure
of motion as formal cause into the explanation of existence.
ment is no respecter of celestial privilege, and is not daunted
Everything moves, when it. does move, t?wards. its p~oper
by the sensuous appearance of cosmic immensity.
place, as purposively determmed. Its end 1s to situate itself
It may be said that it would have been possible to admit
in a perfect organization, and it is the immanent pull of this