Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program

335 Pages·2007·5.72 MB·English

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
February 2007
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
D E PA R T M E N T O F D E F E N S E
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAM
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
April 2007
This report was coordinated and prepared by the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics and the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs in accordance with 50
USC 1523 and related requirements.
Copies of this report may be downloaded from the
World Wide Web through the Special Assistant for
Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical
Demilitarization Programs Web Site at http://www.
acq.osd.mil/cp under the reports section as an Adobe
Acrobat (.pdf) file.
CLeAreD fOr PUBLiC reLeASe.
UNLimiTeD DiSTriBUTiON.
April 2007
It is our responsibility to provide our Warfighters the best capability and support in the world. America
remains a nation at war. The Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a global war on terrorism while
simultaneously deterring further attacks on Americans here at home. In doing so, our military faces many
challenges, but one in particular—the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—is among our
greatest challenges.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat. The purpose
of this strategy is to build readiness for current and future challenges. The Chemical and Biological Defense
Program (CBDP) is a critical component supporting both the national strategies and DoD strategies. The
program exists to provide chemical and biological defense capabilities in support of the goals and objectives
of our national military strategies, ensuring that the Department’s operations are unconstrained by chemical
or biological effects.
To effectively execute this program, the Department is depending upon continued congressional support in
three priority areas:
• Stable funding for the Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative to fully exploit the advanced
science and technology innovation necessary to successfully counter future genetically engineered
biological weapons.
• Adequate long-term investment in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
infrastructure to enhance our RDT&E capabilities, including the modernization and construction of
laboratories and test facilities to ensure we develop advanced countermeasures against current and
emerging chemical and biological threats.
• Consistent resources for the overall program itself to ensure that, year after year, we are able to field
the improved defensive capabilities essential to ensure our military can operate in any environment,
unconstrained by chemical or biological weapons.
With the support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress, we have developed and resourced
an integrated CBDP to best serve the Nation, to build readiness for current and future challenges, and to
sustain our armed forces in time of war.
To continue countering the existing and future threat from hostile WMD and to meet the critical
operational needs of our military, the Department requires the full support of the resources requested
in the program budget.
PurPoSe oF the rePort
The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) This annual report of the Department of Defense
provides U.S. forces the best capability and support in Chemical and Biological Defense Program describes how
the world. The CBDP is a key component of national and the Department is executing the CBDP and provides
defense strategies aimed at defending the nation from the the context for a management framework that seeks to
hostile use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)— identify and balance investment priorities against risks
particularly chemical and biological (CB) weapons— over time. The report provides detailed information and
against U.S. citizens, military forces, friends, and allies. assessments regarding:
The CBDP seeks to ensure that Department of Defense
(1) the overall readiness of the armed forces to fight
(DoD) operations are unconstrained by chemical and/or
in a CB warfare environment, along with efforts
biological effects by providing CB defense capabilities to
undertaken and ongoing plans to improve such
build readiness for current and future challenges. (see
readiness; and
Figure 1.)
(2) the requirements for the CBDP, including
The program depends on support in three priority
requirements for training, detection, protective
areas:
equipment, decontamination equipment, medical
(1) Stable funding for the Transformational Medical prophylaxis, and treatment of casualties resulting
Technolgies Initiative (TMTI); from the use of CB weapons.
(2) Adequate long-term investment in the Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
infrastructure, including laboratories and test
facilities; and
(3) Consistent, predictable, and sustained resource
levels for the CBDP.
CBDP Strategic Context
A Nation at War
Four Challenges: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive
Expanding Risks from a World in Conflict
Vision: Ensure DoD Operations Are
Unconstrained by CB Effects
Mission: Provide CB Defense Capabilities
in Support of the National Military Strategies
Four Overarching Program Goals
Current CB Defense Risk: Adversaries pursuing CB WMD Future CB Defense
Capabilities as asymmetrical weapons to deter Capabilities
& or directly attack the United States and our allies &
Business Processes Business Processes
Conclusion: The CB Defense Program mitigates the risk
from those hostile intentions now and in the future
Figure 1. CBDP Strategic Context
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• Persistent obstruction from rogue states (Iran,
StrategiC Context
North Korea, Cuba, and others) determined to
exercise influence on the international stage by
sowing physical chaos and political turmoil.
STRATEgIC REAlITy
We are a nation at war. For the foreseeable future, the
CBDP anticipates expanding risks (see Figure 2) from PREMISE
a world in conflict, fueled primarily by these global
The United States possesses overwhelming military
drivers:
capabilities. In response, adversaries are pursuing
• Increasing competition for limited resources, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN)
particularly in underdeveloped regions with WMD as a comparatively cheap, easy-to- deploy, and
rapidly growing populations that creates internal disproportionately influential tool to deter U.S. power
displacements, refugee flows and humanitarian asymmetrically or to attack the United States directly.
emergencies. With the support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Congress, we have developed and resourced the CBDP, an
• Expanding reach of often amorphous nonstate actors
integrated program to best serve the nation, to build readiness
(terrorist organizations, criminal gangs, religious
for current and future challenges, and to sustain U.S. forces in
fanatics, ethnic groups, etc.), all increasingly
time of war.
operationalized by global communications and
financial resources, and all actively seeking to exploit
societies weakened by ineffective governance.
Figure 2. DoD Security environment
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ACTIvE PlAyERS complex, more interrelated with often overlapping
areas of responsibility, and more closely linked to
A wide spectrum of opposing and supporting actors
transnational networks and private groups. The
directly affect the CBDP:
global scope of the CB threat necessitates effective
• Antagonists. Rogue states such as North Korea multi-lateral cooperation to present an efficient,
and Iran have WMD programs designed both as an unified response to proliferation and use. However,
asymmetrical counter to the U.S. and as a source the cited complexity of the world stage makes
of illicit revenue. Similarly, intelligence reporting it difficult for the CBDP to maximize needed
consistently documents the interest of terrorist international policy integration, research and
groups such as Al Qaeda in obtaining chemical, development (R&D), or financial burden-sharing,
biological, and radiological materials in order to a situation which is exacerbated by opponents
inflict disproportionate psychological and physical who exploit their membership in international
impact on the United States and our allies. Even organizations to actively undermine multilateral
nominally friendly states, such as India and Pakistan, cooperation.
seek the perceived prestige offered by WMD,
• Different Perspectives. Another constraint is
notably nuclear weapons. While no single antagonist
created by the differing priorities and perspectives
offers an insurmountable obstacle, in aggregate they
of various U.S. government branches and depart–
constitute a daunting and ever-evolving problem set
ments, which may impede effective interagency
for the CBDP to manage.
cooperation and burden-sharing. For example, the
• Protagonists. The United States and its Western military may emphasize preventive medicine in
partners, particularly North Atlantic Treaty support of military operations, while civilian planners
Organization (NATO) countries, are essentially may focus on effective responses to terrorist attacks.
united in opposition to the further spread of WMD As a result of these different perspectives, DoD
technology and resources, despite being in occasional emphasizes pretreatments and vaccines rather than
disagreement about preferred tactics and strategy. therapeutics, and may have different information
International bodies, such as the United Nations architectures to support military operations rather
(UN) and the European Union, are also generally than civilian life.
sympathetic, if often not particularly operationally
• Competing Fiscal Priorities. Through 2025,
effective. Within the executive branch, there is
the United States is forecast to maintain not only
comprehensive presidential and departmental
one of the highest population growth rates among
leadership that provides detailed guidance and
developed countries ranging between 0.7 and
resources to pursue WMD defense in general and the
1.0 percent, but it also has an aging population,
CBDP in particular. DoD’s Total Force approach to
necessitating expanded long-term investment in
the CBRN defense mission creates synergy between
nondefense health care, social services, and R&D.
Active and Reserve components. In sum, the CBDP
Within DoD, the requirement to provide pensions
has significant allies, but generating efficient unity
and medical care for millions of retirees is imposing
of effort among them is a challenge.
similar financial demands. Further, DoD’s need
to simultaneously transform and recapitalize U.S.
forces while prosecuting conventional operations
PASSIvE CONSTRAINTS in Iraq and Afghanistan and unconventional warfare
against global terrorism also strains finite resources.
Other less-obvious factors exert more indirect yet also
The resultant national economic competition affects
significant influence:
funding for the CBDP and potentially dilutes its long-
• International Complexity. Treaties registered
term ability to promptly counter threats emerging
with the UN more than tripled between 1970 and
from the accelerating explosion of global scientific
1997, and the number of international institutions
competency and technological innovation.
increased by two-thirds from 1985 thru 1999.
At the same time, those entities became more
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- N­ational Budget. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller, projects 2007
Defense spending will be 3.9
percent of gross Domestic
Product (gDP), continuing
a downward trend. Defense
resources have not kept pace
with the growth in gDP.
Between 1968 and 2005, gDP
increased over 300 percent
(from $3.7 to $11 trillion), while
defense spending increased only
62 percent, (from $358 to $523
billion). (See Figure 3.)
- Defense Budget. The buying
Figure 3. DoD outlay as a Percentage of u.S. gDP
power of DoD will decline by
approximately $92 billion over
the next ten years, according to a U.S. defense
industry consensus forecast. After adjusting for
inflation, DoD’s raw spending power is expected
to decline by about $80 billion over the next
five years alone. Additionally, much of national
defense funding is committed to sustaining
people, maintaining vital infrastructure, and
preparing equipment for combat
deployment. As a result, annual
funding for investment accounts
must compete with these other
equally pressing priorities. (See
Figure 4.) Also, according to
projections in its 2007 budget
proposal, DoD plans to reduce
its spending for R&D from $72.5
billion this year to $71.2 billion
in 2011. After inflation is taken
into account, this is a cut of 11.6
percent from 2006.
Figure 4. investment Dollars
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- CBDP Budget. The CBDP received $1.5 billion in
fiscal year 2007 (Fy07), an increase of $84 million
above the initial budget request. Although this is
encouraging recognition of the importance of CBD
to national security, future program funding must
be similarly stable and insulated from the broadly
negative funding trends cited above. Continued
support for the Fy08 President’s Budget Request
for the CBDP will be a key part of the national
strategies to counter the threats from CB weapons.
(See Figure 5.)
Figure 5. CBDP Budget
• In particular, units that have been designated to be
the Challenge
available for employment need CBD equipment
Today’s environment of global conflict is not unique. The
and training to be ready for immediate deployment
human struggle for power and influence remains much
from the U.S.’s power projection infrastructure.
the same as it has been throughout history. What has
Therefore, the CBDP must provide improved
changed, and changed dramatically for the worse, is the
defensive capabilities in support of the national
expanding roster of antagonists who have access to, or
military strategies and force generating base.
who are actively seeking, WMD with the capacity to inflict
catastrophic damage. It is this increasingly dangerous • Building capabilities to manage risk and ensure
strategic context that gives the CBDP its particular U.S. forces are ready to meet current and future
urgency to our nation. Of all the forms of WMD, CB WMD challenges remain paramount, requiring
weapons are among the cheapest and easiest to produce stable funding for the TMTI; adequate long-
quickly and to deploy with the greatest likelihood for term investment in the RDT&E infrastructure,
catastrophic effect. The challenge is compounded by the including laboratories and test facilities; and
ease of disseminating knowledge related to developing consistent, predictable, and sustained resource
WMD, increasing the dual-use nature of technologies, levels for the CBDP.
and the rapid technological advancements that continue to
• Failure to invest in the right CBDP capabilities—
lower the threshold for acquiring WMD, and developing
by improving doctrine, training, material, leaders,
novel threats through various techniques, including
people, facilities, and infrastructure—will increase
genetic engineering. Thus, relevant implications for the
risk for our nation. The ability of the CBDP to
CBDP are as follows:
respond to new and emerging threats is critically
• The nation will continue to be engaged in a long dependent on continued support of integration and
struggle of continuous, evolving conflict against awareness of revolutionary advances in in science
adversaries employing irregular, catastrophic, and and technology (S&T) such as genetic engineering
disruptive strategies, including terror, asymmetric and nanotechnology.
attacks, and WMD to challenge, marginalize, erode,
These implications combine to underscore a strategic
and paralyze U.S. power.
national security imperative to place the highest priority
• As a result, military forces must be prepared on sustaining and further improving DoD’s CBDP.
to deal with the full spectrum of threats. More
specifically, they must be able to operate in all WMD
environments, unconstrained by CB effects.
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