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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1970
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
JAMIE L. WHIVTEN, Mississippi WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
R. L. 'MICHAELS, RALPH PRESTON, JOHN GARRITY, PETER MURPHY, ROBERT NICHOLAS,
ROBERT FOSTEit, Staff Asistants
PART 7
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SERVICE SECRETARIES AND CHIEFS OF STAFF
STATEMENTS:
Appropriation Language and General Provisions
Overseas Dependents Education
Printed for the use of the Committce on Appropriations
*
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
36-735 WASHINGTON : 19069
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Ohairman
MICHAEL J. KIRWAN, Ohio FRANK T. BOW, Ohio
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi CHARLES R. JONAS, North Carolina
GEORGE W. ANDREWS. Alabama ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
JOHN J. ROONEY, Now York GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida JOHN J. RHODES. Arizona
OTT1O E. PASSMAN, Louisiana WILLIAM .MINSHALL, Ohio
JOE L. EVINS, Tennessee ROBERT H. MICITEL, Illinois
EDWARD P. BOLANI), Massachusetts SILVIO 0. CONTE, Massachusetts
WILLIAM H. NATCIIER, Kentucky ODIN LANGEN, Minnesota
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania BEN REIEL, South Dakota
TOM STEI E), Oklahoma GLENN R. DAVIS, WisConsiL
GEORGEI B. SHIPLEY, Illinois HOWARD W. ROBISON, New York
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia GARNER H. SHRIVER, Kansas
JOHN J. FLYNT, Ja., Georgia JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania
NEAL SMITH, Iowa MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut LOUIS C. WYMAN, New Hampshire
JULIA BUTLER HANSEN, Washington BURT L. TALCOTT, California
JOSEPH I'. ADDABBO, New York CHARLOTTE T. REID, Illinois
JOHN J. McFALL, California DONALD W. RIEGLE, Ja., Michigan
W. It. HULL, Ja., Missouri WENDIELI WYATT, Oregon
JEFFI'RY COHELAN, California JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
EDWARD J. PA'TTEN, New Jersey
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland
JOHN O. MARSH, Ja., Virginia
SIDNEWY It. YATES, Illinois
BOB CASEY, Texas
DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas
FRANK B. EVANS, Colorado
DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
'AuL M. WILSON, Clcrk and Staff Dircctor
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
GEORGE H. MAHION, Texas, Ohairman
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
JAMIE L. WRITTEN, Mississippi WILLIAM B. MINSHALL, Ohio
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama JOIN J. RIIODES, Arizona
DANIEL J. FLOOD Pennsylvania GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
JOSEPII P. ADDABBO, New York
R. L. MICIIAELS, RALPII PIUPSTON, JOmN GARITY, PETER MURPHY, ROBERT NICHIOLAS,
RODERT FOSTER, Staff As8istants
(H)
:1, I'
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1969.
DEPARTMENT OF TIE AIR FORCE
WITNESSES
HON. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
GEN. JOHN D. RYAN, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
LT. GEN. DUWARD L. CROW, COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE
LT. GEN. GEORGE S. BOYLAN, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PRO-
GRAMS AND RESOURCES
MAJ. GEN. THOMAS S. JEFFREY, JR., DIRECTOR OF PRODUCTION
AND PROGRAMING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. PITTS, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, HEADQUAR-
TERS, U.S. AIR FORCE
COL. C. E. BUCKINGHAM, DIRECTORATE OF PRODUCTION AND
PROGRAMING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
Mr. MAMoN. The committee will come to order.
This year we have had, beginning in February, a series of many
weeks and months of hearings in regard to defense programs and
the defense budget. We have heard great numbers of witnesses and
we have had a great deal of testimony as to detail in regard to the
Air Force program and the programs of the other services.
We have had your proposed statements before us and some of us
have read them in detail or we have scanned them.
This is the 10th month of the year, Congress having met in early
January, and we must move toward presentation to the I-Iouse of
the appropriation bill for the Department of Defense.
Mr. Secretary, you have not been before us in this capacity, I believe?
Secretary SEA ZiANS. That is true, Mr. Chairman.
BIO(IAPHIIICAL SKEICII OF SECRETARY OF Tile AIR FORCE
Mr. MAmioN. So I would ask that some of your people place in the
record at this point a biographical sketch, which is customarily
done.
(The biographical sketch follows:)
DR. ROBERT CITANNING SEAMANS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Dr. Robert Clmanning Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force since February
15, 19069. Born in Salem, Massachusetts on October 30, 1918. Harvard University,
B.S. 1939; Mass. Inst. Tech., M.S. 1942, Sc. D. 1951 Honorary Doctor of Science,
Rollins College and New York University
l'rofessorilal and laboratory-staff positions at M.I.T., lI)11-1955. Engiiieering
find ianlagerial duties in t ih Airborne Systems Department of the Radlo Corp-
oration of A\merlca, 1955-1958. Chief engineer of Missile Electronics and Controls
Division at RCA, 1958-1960. Joined NASA as associate administrator, 1960;
d(elty administrator, December 1965-January 1906. Appointed visiting profes-
sor at M.I.T.. March 1908; became Jerome Clarke Hmnsaker professor, July 1968.
S, rved on technical committees of NASA's predecessor organization, the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1948-1958. Served as consultant
to ti Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Force, 1957-1959; as niember of the
board. 19159-1912; and As5a ssociate advisor, 192-1967. Ile Is a national delegate,
advisory (roup for Aerospace Research and Development (NATO).
Member of Sigma Xt; the American Association for the Advancement of Scl-
ence; American Astronautical Society; American Society for Public Administra-
tion: American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Boston) ; N-ational Space Club;
Foreign Policy Association: National Academy of Engineering; and Interna-
tional Academy of Astronautics. Married to tie former Eugenia A. ,Merrill; live
children.
S','rrmEMn.'l'r or 'riii SciE,r.T.It or 'riip AIR Foncn
Mr. M\A1ON. We are pleased to have you before us. You may be sure
that, we will cooperate with you in the public interest in your im-
l)ortanlt capacity as Secretary.
Secretary SE',\MAIN8s. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I welcome, the ol)l)ortunity to meet. with this committee and to begin
i (lose, working association. Congress has played an important role in
miaintaining the tyl)e of Air Force needed for tuational security. I look
forward to a (ontInution of the past relationsiiI)s which have served
oir' countryy so well.
NATIONAL PRIORITIES
Before addressing the Air Force. budget request, I would like to
discuss ti problem on national prioriti. Only through a meaning-
ful consideration of our requirements both for socialprogress alid
for national security can we provide the essential measures for the
survival and proper groxfth of our country.
There is a great deal of criticism of the defense budget today. I
would urge, however, that the costs of defense be viewed in perspec-
tive. ks a percentage of gross national product, a measure of the total
wealth of our country, our fiscal year 1970 outlays for defense (mili-
tary functions of DOI) and military assistance) will be less than any
year since 1952 with tie exception of 2 years in tie 1960's, in spite of
the continuing war in Southeast Asia.'
In terms of purchasing power, the Air Force budget remains only
slightly higher than it was in 1964. We estimate tiat inflation ha's
iIlc.eased tie cost of buying a particular level of defense by some 3
to 31/, percent per year between 1964 and 1970. In tie aircraft indus-
try this inflational'y pressure has been especially acute because both
the airlines and tie military have been competing for limited aircraft
production facilities and other resources. In 1967, for the first time
in history, commercial aircraft deliveries in pounds of empty weight
exceeded' military aircraft deliveries.
Assuming a 31/2 l)ercent per year inflation in defense costs, the Air
Force fiscal year 1970 budget is abofit $20.5 billion in 1964 dollars.
Tlie actual 1664 budget was just under $20 billion, Once some further
cuts, which I shall address later, are incorporated, our fiscal year 1970
budget will actually be lower than our fiscal year 1964 budget when
measured in 1964 dollars. Moreover, even though Air FOrce personnel
strengths have remained about the same, efforts to establish more
equitable pay levels have made the relative dollar costs of personnel
considerably higher, thereby further reducing our available buying
power in other areas.
More important, in the past few years a,l arge portion of the defense
budget has been devoted to the Aa r in Vietnam, and needed force
improvements have been deferred. For instance, 50 percent of the
total Air Force budget was spent on the costs of operations, 111ain-
tenatce and munitions in 1964, the last year before the buildup in
Vietnam. In the 1970 budget, these same items account for 60 percent
of the budget. Put another way, in 1964 the Air Force was devoting
roughly half of its budget to (evelopinent and force modernization.
.In 1970 this percentage has been reduced to 40 percent,. Consequently,
it has been necessary in recent years to defer expenditures for tiose
portions of the Air Force not involved in Southeast Asia.
Looling to the future, we cannot expect drastic cuts in the budget
requests simply on the basis of an end to our involvement in Vietnm.
It will be necessary to reconstitute inventory levels and catch up the
backlog of long-deferred maintenance and modernization if we are
to continue to meet our security requirements in the face of threats
far more formidable than that posed by North Vietnam.
In our review of the defense budget, we had two basic goals:
1. To strengthen our long-range defense posture.
2. To decrease expenditures, especially on lower priority items.
Before discussing specific adjustments, let me describe 'briefly the
threat to our national security that led us to the decisions to improve
our defense.
~~~SOVIET
M[ISSILE, BUIILDUP~i
The Soviets now have more ICBM lamichers in place or under con-
struction. than the 11054 in the U.S. Strategic Forces. And more than
230 of their missiles are the large SS-9's. With the ICBM[ launchers
now under construction and their existing submarine-launched ballis-
tic missiles, they will have over twice as much total missile payload as
the entire U.S. land and sea-based missile force. This payload ad-
vantage could present a serious threat to the United States.
The U.S.S.R. has already tested SS-9's with three reentry vehicles
each capable of carrying a 5-megaton warhead. If this system is per-
fected and deployed, by the middle 1970's and the Soviets wouldd liave
the capability of destroying most of our land-based missile force.
SOVI I,'x' rIOi ITRs I)EVI"LOPMIENT
The Soviets have also made many improvements in tactical aviation.
In the 1970's they have displayedat feast nine new fighter aircraft.
These range from vertical and short takeoff and landing versions
(V/STOL), to the Foxbat, and advanced high-speed, high-altitude
fighter. Not all of these are operational, but the array of new develop-
ments is impressive and indicative of an aggressive R. & D. program.
Their ability to produce modern aircraft is amply demonstrated by the
MIG-21, which rivals the best U.S. fighter and-is already deployed in
the active forces of 19 nations, in addition to the U.S.S.R.
RECOMMEND) CHANGES IN AIR FORCE PROGRAMS
As a result of the intensive review of our military programs and a
reevalution of the Soviet threat in the next decade, we have recom-
mended a number of changes in our force posture.
Since the safety of our citizens ultimately depends on deterring an
attack, the President has proposed the Safeguard antiballistic missile
system, with an initial deployment around some of our missile fields.
'I his will help us to maintain the capability to retaliate even after
absorbing a surprise nuclear attack.
To further protect. our forces, we plan to accelerate development and
del)loyment, of a satellite early warning system. This system will give
us markedly improved early "warning against such weapons as land-
based ICBM's, sulbmarine-launched missiles, and fractional-orbit-bom-
lardment systems, FOBS. As Soviet forces improve, our alert bombers
will need this improved warning in order to avoid l)eing caught on the
ground.
Both missile and bomber forces are necessary to insure our ability
to retaliate in the event of unexpected Soviet developments affecting
either of the systems. Therefore, we recommend full-scale development
of a new bomber, the advanced manned strategic aircraft, now desig-
nated the B-1. This advanced aircraft would take advantage of the
many improvements that have been made recently in airframe and
enginie design. It would have the short takeoff and landing capability
needed for dispersal, and the payload, structure and speed necessary
for penetration. Compared to current aircraft, fewer would be re-
quired because of increased effectiveness, and as a result the bomber
force would be less expensive to operate and maintain.
Even if promptly funded, the B-1 would not, join the force until
1977. Until the B-i is available, we will maintain a strategic bomber
force of FB-111's, and B-52's. We propose to curtail the procure-
mnent of FB-111's to the four squadrons now in production, some of
which will enter the force in fiscal years 1970. These four squadrons
will make a substantial addition to the bomber portion of our de-
terrent, but the FB-111 has a much smaller payload than the B-1.
Consequently, we feel it essential to move forward expeditiously with
development of the B-1. This new aircraft, will assume even greater
importance if Soviet defenses against low-level attack continue to
improve, thins making its overall improved performance more critical.
To maintain the missile side of our retaliatory capability, we will
replace Minuteman I with Minuteman IIT. Our entire force will
consist of Minuteman II and III by fiscal year 1974, as previously
plamled, but a lower initial procurement rate for Minuteman III
will reduce the fiscal year 1970 budget by $157 million. Using this ap-
l)roaclh, we will allow more time for testing and may reduce future
costs for any modifications that may be required after production
has begun,
In the area of airlift, we are recommending the procurement of 18
new C-130's to replace the calabilit.y lost by the diversion of C-123
aircraft to the Vietnamese Air Force. These new aircraft will also
help make up for combat losses and operational attrition of assault
transports in our own tactical units.
Finally, I would like-to mention the manned orbiting laboratory
program (MOL), which has been terminated by the Defense Depart-
ment. With MOL we had hoped to enhance the effectiveness of ex-
trenmely complex defense-oriented equipment and accelerate the de-
velopment of future manned and unmanned systems. H. wever, in-
creasingly severe budgetary pressures, which were responsible for
several delays in the MOL schedule over the past 2 years, and the
rapid progress we have made with unmanned space vehicles, have
finally resulted in the conclusion that the cost of a manned system
is too great to be borne at this time.
We have gained useful development experience in MOL and have
made technological progress which can be applied to both NASA -
manned programs and to unmanned-defense programs. All of the
MOL equipment and systems tested thus far have met or exceeded
design specifications. Examples are the astronaut full pressure suit,
the fuel cell, and the waste disposal and crew feeding systems. We
have established a committee which will formally review the results
of the entire MOL program to insure that what we have accomplished
is used to the maximum. extent possible.
NEEDS REaFFIRMED
Our budget reviews have reaffirmed the need for pressing on with
the F-15 and the C-5 programs as well as improved air defenses. A
new air superiority fighter, the F-15, is imperative if we are to insure
ourselves against the threat posed by the Soviet fighter R. & D. pro-
gram. By the time the F-15 enters the inventory, tie basic technology
of the F-4, currently our most advanced air superiority fighter, will
be 15 years old.
The C-5, designed to carry supplies and equipment long distances
and to operate from semi-improved fields, will reduce our dependence
on overseas bases. This is the only aircraft which has large enough
cargo space and weight-carrying capability to transport all the dif-
ferent types of combat equipment used by an Army division. Although
there has been much criticism of C-5 costs, we should not lose sight of
the fact that this aircraft marks a major technological advance in the
movement of air cargo.
In the field of alir defense, we are faced with the gradual phase
out of obsolescent forces even though the necessary replacements are
not being provided. Eventually this trend could leave us unable to
protect our airspace from any sort of military or blackmail threat.
Such a situation would reduce our startegic deterrence, since any
would-be attacker could count on his bomber force to conduct mul-
tiple attacks, freeing more of his missiles for use against time sensi-
tive targets. We need to go ahead with the airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) aircraft and must lay the groundwork for
an improvAed interceptor aircraft.
TIE DEFENSE 31ANAGE31ENT ENVIRONMENT
During the brief time that I have Served as the Secretary of the
Air Force I jave become acutely aware of the criticism being directed
toward defiise management. I am not averse to criticism. President
Nixon has stated that we should be in the vanguard of "those respon-
sible critics who reveal waste and inefficiency in our defense estab-
lishment, who demand clear answers on procurement policies [and]
who want to make sure a new weapons system will truly add to our
defense." However, I would like to point out several problem areas
that haveinot received sufficient attention. ........
For example, the critics of defense spending often forget the great
damage which inflation has done to the value of procurement money.
In the aircraft manufacturing industry, no precise measurement of
the erosion of inflation has been made, but we estimate that since the
beginning of the war in Vietnam it has cost us at least 20 cents out
of every do-llar, and perhaps as much as 25 cents.
A second point that must be mentioned is that frequent changes in
production schedifles-caused by force structure changes, improved
design, or siil)ly budget cuts--have reduced efficiency and added to
our costs. For example, both the F-111 and A-7D production sched-
ules have been chlaged many times both to conform to changes in
the authorized force structure and to introduce improvements. While
we have no precise estimate of the dollar effects of schedule changes,
we think that it has cost us on the order of 10 cents out of every air-
craft procurement dollar since 1964-65, excluding the cost of im-
)roved systems. In the future, however, we plan to reduce the num-
ber of modifications approved after production begins by more in-
tensive testing in the development l)hase and by weighing'more criti-
cally the costs involved against, the expected gain in performance. We
also seek to avoid cancellation of orden. either by our own agencies
or foreign governments as well as later cutbacks resulting from budget
pressure. This we hope to achieve by establishing proper priorities
from the beginning. Of course, some schedule changes will undoubt-
edly remain necessary-with attendant increases in cost-because of
unexpected changes in the enemv threat and the rapid pace of techno-
logical development. However,'I carot stress too strongly the need
for greater program stability.
A third problem area results from the difficulties involved in budget-
ing and contracting. In presenting budget requests to the Congress for
weapons systems, "underfunding" in the budgetary process is often
confused i'itli "overruns" in the actual procurement of the hardware.
Budget requests have been based on the target price of incentive
contracts, even though contracts usually included a higher "ceiling"
figure designed to establish an absolute maximum oii the govern-
ment's obligation. Both the target price and the ceiling figure are
the result of intense negotiations with industry. In a particularly
competitive situation, they can reflect a. contractor's expectation that
he will probably end up'somewhere between the target and ceiling
figures. Thus, what in effect are insufficient re sts in the first in-
stance, later become the undesirable "overruns" attributed to man-
agement deficiencies. We intend to study this whole problem of ap-
piopriations and obligations and will recommend procedures to
minimize this difficulty.
I would also like t'om ention the problem of centralized organiza-
tional structure. The Services have moved from a loose association
with one another following World War II to a highly centralized
Defense system in recent years. It is entirely possible that this process
has gone too far and steals are being taken'in the Deps.rtment of De-
fense to reverse the trend. This is true not only at the OSD level,
but also within the Air Force as well. Overcentralization can affect
both initiative and responsibility at lower levels, sometimes greatly
increasing costs as a result.
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PROCUREMENT POLICIES
Specific improvements are now being made in the areas of contract-
ing and reporting. We must strive for, a balance between granting both
the Air Force and its contractors freedom to innovate where desirable
and at the same time holding them to the discipline necessary for
accountability. To help realize this, we will use a system of significant
milestones in research and development. These milestones wil have to
be reached at mutually agreed cost levels and schedule times.
liere is no simple solution to contracting. Virtually every type of
contract. has been used, with varying degrees of success, and we are
continually refining our procedures and control. The total package
concept, for example, was designed to provide competition for both
development and production contracting and encourage efficiency in
production. The cost growth in the C-5 program does not mean that
these key features of the total package concept should be discarded.
We should, however, use this concept only in appropriate situations,
tailored to the facts of a particular procurement, and made applicable
only to as much of the production quantity as is practicable.
In production as well as development, we will try to improve the
measurement of contract performance. The need for increased "visibil-
ity" of programs, that is, better reporting of costs and performance
by contractors, has gained widespread acceptance. By the use of cost,
schedule, and performance control systems and selected acquisition
reports the performance of defense contractors can be measured fre-
quently against the contract itself. These reports should provide sus-
tained'"visibility," and go far to guarantee contract accomplishment.
Since we plan to use these management systems for the F-15, we should
get an early. evaluation of their effectiveness.
In procuring the F-15 we will use a combination incentive contract,
with the development portion on a. cost basis and the production on a
fixed-price basis. There will be a systems program office with the di-
rector designated as the single manager. We will emphasize rigid
control of design changes and will ascertain the effect on costs in the
entire program before changes are approved. In addition, the Secretary
of the Air Force will review the program periodically comparing
actual performance against milestones designated in the contract.
Contractor performance for subsystems such as the avionics, the
engines and the airframe structures must meet the contract standards
before subsequent work will be authorized, In addition, the F-15 pro-
duction rate will be held at a minimum economic level until flight
testing has demonstrated that the design will satisfy our requirements.
FISCAL Y'EAf 1070 BtGOET SUM MARY
I should like to conclude with a summary of our fiscal year 1970
budget. Two groups of reductions have been undertaken. The first
rest e d from our initial review of the fiscal year 1970 budget sub-
mitted to the Congress in January as I have discussed. These cuts are
detailed in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows, by general category, our
initial recommended revisions to requested fiscal year 1970 total obliga-
tional authority. These first stage reductions amount to $1,105.6 muil-
lion of which $1.9 million applied to the fiscal year 1969 supplemental.
Table 2 shows the request for new obligational authority for fiscal year
1970 as originally submitted and initially revised.
The second group of changes, which are now under consideration,
result from two major factors. First, actions to implement the law
lim-iting federal expenditures in fiscal year 1970. Second, these changes
8
are being contemiplated in view of the likelihood of further congres-
sional cuts. Considering that we are already well into fiscal year 1970,
fiscal chaos could result if we took no action until the finaf bill were
passed. The projected Air Force portion of this reduction has not
been finally decided. Some items, however, have been determined: a
cut of flying hours, phasing out a significant number of aircraft., re-
duction i support. functions, and a reduction of approximately 50,000
military and 13,000 civilian personnel.
On l)alance, we feel that the first series of adjustments which we have
made to the budget achieved the basic goals that I mentioned at the
beginning of my statement. The), would also still permit strengthening
our long-range posture with a better missile warning system, a more
meaningful strategic bomber program, more airlift, and1 a better tac-
tical aircraft, prog'amn. While providing for these inlrovellents, they
would still have reduced our budget request by $1,105.6 million, and1
our fiscal year 1970 outlay by approximately half a billion dollars.
Regarding the second grolp of reductions, some could come from or
possibly result in more efficient operations within the Air Force, but
we should be quite clear that opportunities for such savings have
definite limits. In most. cases these reductions will adversely affect our
worldwide military posture. Everything possible will be done to mini-
mize such effects, but they will occur. Taking into account the reduc-
tions already made and those under review, the budget which is before
you will require considerable retrenlchment for the Air Force. How-
ever, we will continue to maintain the maximum operational capability
and do what we can to modernize our forces.
TABLE I.-SUMMARY OF PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1970 BUDGET
ln millions of dollars
Total obligational authority (fiscal year)
1969 1970 1969-70
1. StraFlt.it I forr-c-e-s : ... ---.............. -107.3 -320.9
-428.2
SRAM ........................................................... -129.6 -196.4 -326.0
PBr-o5c2u ..r.e.m...e..n..t. ................................................................... .............. ((--3472..72)) ((--111002..86)) -14105.3 .03)
FB-111 ...................................................... (-49. 7............ W49. 7)
R. .... ................................................ (+7.0)
Minuteman III .......... ...............................- 150.9
Satellite early warning ......................................... +43.0 +I43.0
AWACS ................................................. -15.0 -15.0
AMSA .................................. ........................ +23.0 +23.0
Infrared technology ..................... . . ......................... +7.9 +7.9
2. SEA items:
B-52 sorties ..................................................... +25.1 +27.4 +52.5
OX-I aircraft .................................................... -6.8 ............-6.8
Herbicides ................................................................... -14.0 -14.0
VNAF modernization .......................................................... +20.0 +20.0
Sparrow .............S. ..................r.r.o.-9...6........................... .9. -9.6
Air munitions ................. ..................... -89.5 -316.1 -405.6
Defense communication planning group ............................. -f.1 ............ -19.1
3. Non-SEA general purpose forces:
F-111D .......................................................... +11.5 +155.7 +167.2
Vehicles ..................................................................... -5.0 -5.0
Traffic control radars .......................................................... -10.0 -10.9
Aircraft shelters ......... ............................................ +14.7 +14.7
4. Military personnel and 0. &. M.
Serviceman's group life Insurance .......................... -4.4 -6.2 -10.6
Civilian man-year reductions ............................ .............. -14.0 -14.0
Transportation ............................................ ............... -12.0 -12.0
Supplies. ............................................. ...- 22.1 -22.1
Service engineering ................ ........................... -5.0 -5.0
Electronic data processing equipment ............................... .- 3.6 -3.6
REDCOSTE............................................... +19.0 +19.0
Medical reimbursements. ........ ............................ -1.6 -1.6
Manning level nonflying units..................................... -. 0 -1.0