Demonstrative Knowledge and Epistemic Continuity In Aristotle's Posterior Analytics

317 Pages·2013·3.54 MB·English

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Demonstrative Knowledge and Epistemic Continuity
In Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the
School of Philosophy
Of The Catholic University of America
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
©
Copyright
All Rights Reserved
By
Jeong Hwan Kim

Washington, D.C.

2013
Demonstrative Knowledge and Epistemic Continuity
In Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
Jeong Hwan Kim, Ph.D.
Director: Jean De Groot, Ph.D.
This dissertation challenges the axiomatic deductive interpretation of demonstrative
knowledge (hê apodeitikê epistêmê) in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, which was dominant in
the last century. According to the interpretation, the treatise is thought to hold to an ideal
structure of scientific knowledge consisting in a system of axiomatic deductive knowledge: this
system has a finite set of basic and necessary propositions as axioms or principles and takes
syllogism as its formal language. The net effect of this interpretation is to cast Aristotle’s
philosophy of science in hypothetico-deductive terms and thus to eclipse Aristotle’s theory of
demonstration in the overall interpretation of his philosophical and scientific method.
This dissertation offers a deflationary account of the axiomatic interpretation by
rediscovering the role of the principles (archê) of demonstrative sciences within the epistemic
process of demonstrative investigation. The dissertation provides a unified vision of
demonstrative knowledge in the two books of the Posterior Analytics taken together. According
to the alternative model offered in the dissertation, the nucleus of demonstrative knowledge
consists in the epistemic processes of mediating between knowledge of facts and knowledge of
causes. Unlike the deduction from axioms, demonstrative knowledge on this view is not a one-
directional procedure from principles to theorems as conclusions. Rather, it consists of both
understanding concrete facts from causes and understanding causes from the concrete without
vicious circularity. Within Aristotle’s framework for science, the contexts of epistêmê and nous
are not sharply separated from each other, a point of contrast to the axiomatic interpretation. For
Aristotle, searching for causes and explaining from them are sometimes concurrent, and not
always linear, processes.
Chapters 1 and 2 treat two principles of demonstrative science, hypothesis and definition.
The Chapters loosen the rigid understanding of principles of Aristotelian science as they are
interpreted by the axiomatic-deductive model, and then recover the role of principles within the
movement of demonstrative reasoning. Chapter 3 explores the dynamism of demonstrative
knowledge, which is a continual epistemic process that brings the reasoner closer to the essences
of entities in the empirical world, even though some fallibility may remain within the process.
Chapter 4 seeks the epistemic ground of demonstrative knowledge itself: in the first and last
chapters of the treatise, Aristotle presents that human cognitions from perception to nous are
continuously conjoined in their signifying essences, a view that contrasts with Plato’s epistemic
discontinuity.
This dissertation by Jeong Hwan Kim fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree
in philosophy approved by Jean De Groot, Ph.D., as Director, and by Timothy Noone, Ph.D., and
Richard Hassing, Ph.D., as Readers.

________________________________________
Jean De Groot, Ph.D., Director

________________________________________
Timothy Noone, Ph.D., Reader

________________________________________
Richard Hassing, Ph.D., Reader

ii
To my parents
with deepest gratitude

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ………………………………………………………………………vi
INTRODUCTIN…………………………………………………………………………………..1

CHAPTER I. HYPOTHESIS AS A PRINCIPLE:
The Problem of Existential Interpretation and A Solution ……………………...13
§1.1. Hypothesis as Existence Statement and the Issue of Being ………………………………16
§1.2. Hypothesis as Postulate and the Problem of Philosophical Approximation ……………...32
§1.3. Hypothesis as Instantiation of Universals ………………………………………………...50
§1.4. Hypothesis as Establishing Facts …………………………………………………………64

CHAPTER II. DEFINITION AS A PRINCIPLE:
A Criticism of the Axiomatic Deductive Reading ………………………………85
§2.1. Definition as Ultimate Premise in the Axiomatic Deductive reading …………………….88
§2.2. Knowledge Simpliciter and Conditions of Principles in an Alternative Reading ……….104
§2.3. Definition, Per Se Predication, and the ‘What it is’ Locution …………………………..130

CHAPTER III. DEMONSTRATIVE KNOWLEDGE:
The Dynamism of Demonstrative Inquiry …………………………………….172
§4.1. Starting points of Demonstrative Inquiry and the Issue of Nominal Definition ………...174
§4.2. Types of Definition, Stages of Inquiry, and Essences …………………………………..192
§4.3. Imperfect Demonstration and Fallibility of Demonstrative Inquiry …………………….212
iv
CHAPTER VI. EPISTEMIC CONTINUITY:
The Ground for Demonstrative Knowledge ………………………………….223
§4.1. Pre-existing Knowledge of Demonstration ……………………………………………..227
§4.2. Simultaneous Knowledge and the Problem of Induction ……………………………….237
§4.3. The Meno Paradox and Aristotle’s Response to it ………………………………………257
§4.4. Epistemic Continuity of Human Cognition: Perception, Experience, and Noūs ………..269

CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………..294
BIBLIOGRAHY ………………………………………………………………………………297

v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This is the end of a very long journey in my life. Compared to other journeys that I made
earlier, it has been tougher and sometimes very painful, testing my perseverance. Nevertheless,
I made it through eventually with joy, now acknowledging that my perseverance is not the only
source of its success. I express my sincere gratitude to two Deans of the School of Philosophy at
CUA, the current Dean, Dr. McCarthy and late Fr. Pritzl, O.P. (1952-2011). Without their
generous consideration and encouragement on my study, the journey would have stopped at
some point. I am incredibly indebted to Dr. De Groot, my Professor and Director. My first class
here at the School of Philosophy was her course on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. And I shall
not forget the joyful moment when she finally approved my dissertation on the same Posterior
Analytics. In between, there were her teachings in the courses, innumerous comments and
corrections on my hazy thoughts and awkward writings. I appreciate the readers of my
committee, Dr. Noone and Dr. Hassing for their meticulous and critical review on my
dissertation. Dr. Park Dong Hwan was a Professor at Yonsei University who initially inspired
me on the significance of logic. Dr. Lee Jaekyung is my dear friend who discussed with me
philosophical as well as mundane issues for a long period of time on international calls. I thank
deeply them. I am so sorry that my grandmother cannot any longer welcome me at the finish
line of my journey. The beloved families of my two brothers are strong supporters to me. My
wife, Yong Joo, has been the only partner of me throughout the actual journey. The love and
support by her are immense. Above all, first, last, and always, it has been the immeasurable love,
prayer and support of my parents that have made this entire journey possible. I dedicate
wholeheartedly this dissertation to them, faithful elders of the church.
vi
Introduction
Posterior Analytics: Status Quaestionis

The subject of the Posterior Analytics (PoAn) is epistêmê, which was rendered in the
medieval period as scientia. The historical value of the treatise lies in the fact that it presents the
first elaborated theory of scientific knowledge itself in the history of Western philosophy.
Moreover, for almost two millenia until the Renaissance era, the treatise maintained the
venerable status of not only presenting what scientia is but also guiding how scientific
knowledge is to be pursued. During that long period of time, it received numerous commentaries
and various interpretations with reference to the emergent sciences and philosophies at any
particular times.1
With the advent of the modern era, however, “All that has changed,” as Barnes puts it.
He says: 2
The modern prosecutors generously allow the Prior Analytics a little merit for cultivating,
with some formality, one small patch of logic; but they do not spare the Posterior
Analytics: its first book, they allege, presents in the theory of ‘demonstration’ a barren
and pernicious essay in scientific methodology; its second book, on definition, offers a
farrago of doctrines about ‘essences’ and ‘real’ definitions which should embarrass even
the most liberally disposed reader.
Truly, no scientists in the modern era would have looked up the treatise seeking guidance for
their scientific undertakings. For modern sciences based on empiricism had already departed

1 Among the numerous commentaries, we note two outstanding ones in the Renaissance period: J. Zabarella, In duos
Aristotelis libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Commentaria (Cologne: Lazarus Zetzner, 1597): Galileo, Galilei,
Galileo’s Logical Treatises: A Translation, with Notes and Commentary, of His Appropriated Questions on
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, by W. Wallace. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 138 (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1992). For the ancient and medieval commentaries, refer the bibliographies of the followings: M.
Tuominen, The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); J.
Longeway, Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2007).
2 J. Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Translation with Commentary, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), xi.
1
from the old Aristotelian-scholastic framework that employs concepts like essence and accident
among others.3 The disparagement of the treatise by the moderns has continued into recent times;
for instance, an eminent philosopher like Anscombe finds Book I of the Posterior Analytics the
worst of Aristotle’s corpus.4
Then, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, about twenty years after the first edition
of his commentary, Barnes heralds the revival of interest on the Posterior Analytics among
scholars, this time with embellishment, “The Posterior Analytics plays Cinderella in the
Aristotelian pantomime…. Some of the interest has been primarily philological or historical; but
much of it has had a philosophical drive—and the ideas of the Posterior Analytics are widely
taken to be as estimable and as sophisticated and as modern as anything in Aristotle’s oeuvre.”5
As a matter of fact, during the twentieth century, there have been numerous articles, monographs
and collections devoted solely to the treatise in addition to the two monumental commentaries by
Ross and Barnes.6
This revived interest among philosophers (though not from scientists) has grown slowly
but steadily from the early years of the last century. The relationship between the two Analytics
was at the center of the debates at that time, which were initiated by German scholars, notably
Solmsen with the backdrop of Jaeger’s groundbreaking work on the development of Aristotle’s

3 Leibniz might be an exceptional case, whose mechanical physics is situated within Aristotelian notions of
metaphysics. On this, see: D. Garber, “Leibniz: Physics and philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz,
ed. N. Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 270-352.
4 G. Anscombe & P. Geach, Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 6.
5 J. Barnes, “Aristotle’s Philosophy of the Sciences,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XI, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 225.
6 The influence of the collection of articles edited by E. Berti is huge on subsequent studies: E. Berti, Aristotle on
Science: The Posterior Analytics, ed. Enrico Berti (Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1977).
2