Demons, dreamers, and madmen : the defense of reason in Descartes's Meditations PDF
Preview Demons, dreamers, and madmen : the defense of reason in Descartes's Meditations
Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen This page intentionally left blank Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen The Defense of Reason in Descartes’s Meditations Harry G. Frankfurt Foreword by Rebecca Goldstein Copyright(cid:148)2008byPrincetonUniversityPress PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet, Princeton,NewJersey08540 IntheUnitedKingdom:PrincetonUniversityPress,3MarketPlace, Woodstock,OxfordshireOX201SY AllRightsReserved Originallypublished:IndianapolisandNewYork: Bobbs-MerrillCompany,Inc.,1970 FirstPrincetonEdition,2008 LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Frankfurt,HarryG.,1929– Demons,dreamers,andmadmen:thedefenseofreasonin Descartes’sMeditations/HarryG.Frankfurt;foreword byRebeccaGoldstein.—1stPrincetoned. p. cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-0-691-13415-4(hardcover:alk.paper)— ISBN978-0-691-13416-1(pbk.:alk.paper) 1.Descartes,Rene´,1596–1650.Meditationesdeprima philosophia.2.Reason.3.Firstphilosophy.I.Title. B1854.F72008 194—dc22 2007012069 BritishLibraryCataloging-in-PublicationDataisavailable ThisbookhasbeencomposedinAdobeCaslonPro Printedonacid-freepaper.(cid:102) press.princeton.edu PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Contents ForewordbyRebeccaGoldstein vii PrefacetothePrincetonEdition xiii Preface xvii One THE FIRST MEDITATION 1 3 Introduction 2 19 The General Overthrow of Belief 3 32 The Criterion of Doubt 4 43 The Perception of the Physical World vi Contents 5 60 The Strategy of the First Meditation 6 75 Simple and Universal Things 7 84 Mathematics in the First Meditation 8 93 Mathematics and the Omnipotent Deceiver 9 108 Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen Two REASON AND ITS VALIDATION 10 123 Sum 11 154 Sum res cogitans 12 175 Clear and Distinct Perception 13 200 Objections to Descartes’s Rule of Evidence 14 215 Memory and Doubt 15 235 The Validation of Reason 16 250 Truth and Reality: The Galileo Controversy Index 257 Foreword Rebecca Goldstein Certain philosophers provoke a charitable genius in read- ers, who will labor hard to produce interpretations max- imizingprofunditiesandminimizingfallacies.Descartesis not one of these philosophers. There is something about himthatinvitesfamiliarity,andweknowwhatthatbreeds. Whereas the seeming paralogisms of a Nietzsche, a Hei- degger, a Wittgenstein, or a Quine are not willingly ac- ceptedassuch,atleastnotwithoutsomestruggle,thecon- clusion that Descartes spoke nonsense often arrives with no signs of an inner tussle at all. There are contemporary disciplines—cognitive science, for example, or neuroscience—in which “Cartesianism” and “pineal gland” (a metonym for Cartesian dualism) are snicker terms. There seems little doubt that Descartes’s proffered solution to the mind-body problem contributes to his diminishment, at least in certain circles. Cartesian viii RebeccaGoldstein dualism can feel like a reminder of some of the more em- barrassing episodes from one’s childhood or adolescence. Perhaps this is no accident. The cognitive scientist Paul Bloom argues in Descartes’ Baby that innate structures in humancognitiondetermineustoreasonintwoquitesepa- ratewaysaboutanimateandinanimateobjects.Babiesfind it perfectly natural for a person to begin moving without having been contacted by a physical object, but they will evincesurprise(expressedinlongerstares)ifaballorabox justsuddenlytakesoffasifofitsownvolition.Adoubling ofontology—a` laDescartes—canseemjustababy-step,so to speak, away. If we grant such cognitive scientists as Paul Bloom an ontogenetic disposition toward ontological dualism, per- haps it’s not surprising that the Cartesian conclusion can seemasymptomofphilosophicalimmaturity,onethatour disabusing sciences patiently help us to outgrow. This can encourage a presumptive high-handedness toward the whole Cartesian enterprise, disposing us to dismiss it as akin to those childhood delusions centered on the family, throughwhichwehavealllived,andoutofwhichwehave, it is to be hoped, grown. But there is much else in Descartes, in addition to his dualism,thatinducesasenseofourbeingalmosttooclose and familiar with him to extend him the respectful atten- tionrequiredforinspiredreading.Thissenseofapproach- ability is underscored by the intimately confidential tone theauthorassumesinboththeDiscourseonMethodandthe Meditations on First Philosophy, speaking to us in the first person, letting us creep close enough up to him to eaves- drop on his (staged) thought processes, reenacted confu- sionsandall.Hedispenseswiththedistancingpropsofthe professional thinker:the specialized vocabularyand stilted Foreword ix syntax, that trick of throwing the voice so that it seems to be channeling impersonal truth itself. In entering the Meditations, we find ourselves not in the hush of a cathe- dral-like lecturehall, much lessstanding subspecie aeterni- tatis, exposed to the icy blasts of faceless infinity. Rather wearechezRene´,ensconcedwithacozilycladphilosopher beforeafirewhosewarmthhewilluseintheSecondMedi- tation to perform a homey experiment with a wad of wax. Soperhapsitisnotsurprisingthatwehavecometofeel so relaxed in the presence of Descartes that we abuse all the thoughtful preparations laid out for us by our gracious host,failingtoseetheingeniousnessandmeticulousnessof the arrangements, the care that went into making them appear so spontaneous. ItisincontrasttothisunmindfulingratitudethatHarry Frankfurt’sDemons,Dreamers,andMadmen:TheDefenseof Reason in Descartes’s “Meditations” comes as a revelation. UnderFrankfurt’sreadingthephilosopherwhosefamiliar- ity breeds contempt becomes enchantingly unfamiliar; the philosopherwhoseemssoaccessibleastorequirenointer- pretationisrevealedtobeanythingbut;and,perhapsmost startling of all, the philosopher who had seemed to be crushedbytheviciouscircularityoftryingtovindicaterea- son through the use of reason is carefully extracted from beneaththewheel.Thatphilosopherindishabillehasbeen farmorecautiousthanwehaveincautiouslyconcluded,not only constructing arguments of exquisite complexity while maintaining the charming air of a raconteur, but also cali- brating his objectives so as to avoid the question-begging for which precocious undergraduates delight to despise him. Frankfurt showsus just how Descartes setsout to do it,and,afterFrankfurt’sexposition,itisimpossibleeverto read Descartes the same way as before.
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