Democracy in Central Asia : competing perspectives and alternative strategies

232 Pages·2007·1.01 MB·English

by  Omelicheva

Democracy in Central Asia
D
EMOCRACY
IN
C A
ENTRAL SIA
Competing Perspectives
and Alternative Strategies
MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA
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Copyright © 2015 by The University Press of Kentucky
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To Angel and Vladi
Contents
Introduction
1. Political Regimes in Central Asia: Two Decades after Independence
2. A Framing Perspective on Democracy Promotion
3. Western Perspectives on Democracy in Central Asia
4. Models of Governance Promoted by Russia and China
5. Central Asian Democracy Frames
6. Democracy in the Public Eye
7. Assessing the Effectiveness of Democracy Promotion Frames
Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Appendix A: Survey Instrument
Appendix B: Focus Group Methodology
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Introduction
Democracy, first and foremost, means order, but it is understood as anarchy and
all-permissiveness here. . . . One can steal, kill, take things away, and plunder. This
is how democracy is understood here and in the entire post-Soviet space. . . . It is
mayhem.
—Focus group participant from Kazakhstan
Set off by the collapse of communism in Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union,
the global resurgence of democracy has become a pivotal political trend in
contemporary international politics. The wave of democratization that swept across
Eastern and Central Europe and rippled into parts of the crumbling USSR consolidated
the idea of democracy as a “universal human right” that should be supported by the
international community.1 This new conviction rekindled a belief that the
democratization of communist states can be fostered from abroad if domestic forces are
weak or lacking within these states.2 Encouraged by the growing perception of
democracy as the only legitimate form of political rule, scores of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), charities, and foundations, most of them sponsored by advanced
democracies from the West, rushed into the former communist states and offered them
financial resources and know-how for rapid democratization.
Despite the initial optimism that democratic aid would be able to nurture and support
“people power” in transitioning states, it has produced mixed results at best. Although
the European Union (EU), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and
other international actors have scored some notable achievements in Eastern and
Central Europe, especially in terms of electoral assistance and the organizational
capacity of civil society groups,3 democracy assistance has been ineffective in
contributing to the long-term sustainable development of democratic culture,
institutions, and processes in other previously communist states.4 In some instances,
democracy assistance has had regressive consequences by destabilizing regimes and
creating fragile, dependent, and unrepresentative political opposition.5 By pressing for
democratic change in one state, agents for democracy have unwittingly urged
authoritarian leaders in neighboring states to protect themselves by becoming even
more repressive. All in all, many analysts concur that when democratic aid has had a
favorable impact, that positive effect has occurred largely on the margins.6
The USSR’s successor states are clearly representative of these trends in democracy
assistance. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—which benefited greatly
from political backing and various forms of assistance from the EU, the United States,
and individual European states—have succeeded in transforming themselves into
sustainable democracies; however, the rest of the former Soviet Union has not made a
smooth transition to liberal democracy. Admittedly, there have been a few “democratic
breakthroughs” marked by the so-called color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and
Kyrgyzstan. But even in these more politically liberal post-Soviet states, the future of
democratic gains is uncertain.7 Most observers agree that democratic reforms are
shallow and spotty in these states, which must constantly contend with authoritarian
resurgence.8
The focus of this book is democracy and democracy promotion in the three post-
Soviet republics of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.9 Arguably,
Central Asia is the region where Western democracy assistance has yielded the lowest
results. In the early 1990s the new Central Asian governments seemed to be committed,
if only rhetorically, to the idea of democratization. They joined the corpus of
international treaties prescribing recognition of the principles of democracy and
fundamental human rights. They also set up formal democratic institutions consisting of
modern laws and constitutions, elections, parliaments, and parties. Inspired by the
democratic rhetoric of the leadership of Central Asian states, the United States, EU,
United Nations, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in
addition to individual European states, NGOs, and international financial institutions,
launched multiple development and democracy promotion projects in the region.
The United States has been one of the largest donors of democracy assistance and
development aid in Central Asia. It disbursed more than $1.8 billion to Central Asian
republics from 1992 to 2006, based on the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act, passed by Congress in 1992 (see chapter
3 for more information). The US democracy assistance programs in the region have
been matched, if not surpassed, by aid from the EU. By some estimates, the EU and its
member states spend US$3 billion on democracy, governance, and related activities
annually, exceeding US expenditures.10 Despite the sheer size and volume of
democracy assistance programs in Central Asia, there has been little meaningful and
sustainable political change in these states.11 In fact, as US and EU regional
engagement intensified in the early 2000s, the quality of democracy in the region
declined.12 There has been a regression of democracy in recent years across the region
and growing resistance to Western democratization efforts by these Central Asian
governments.
Why has democracy promotion been ineffective in Central Asia? Why, despite
considerable efforts by the West, have democracy promotion programs in Central Asia
resulted in little improvement in governance or complete failure? It has long been
assumed that the main sources of resistance to democracy are the Central Asian
governments themselves. Democratic progress has been hindered by the lack of genuine
commitment to democratization by Central Asian leaders who perceive democracy as a
grave threat.13 Some authors stress that because the Central Asian states lack historical
experience with democracy, they have been slow to change.14 Others emphasize the
lingering Soviet legacy of authoritarianism and a weak and deferential civil society that
has been unable to push for reforms.15 It has also been argued that these countries’
traditional power institutions and the mentality of their populations have served as
democratic roadblocks.16 Eugene Huskey, for example, argues that “amid the strains for
the transition from communism, civil traditions have shown little evidence of taking
root in a society dominated by a mixture of family, clan, regional, and ethnic
loyalties.”17 Other scholars note that the prevalence of patronage and clan networks has
crowded out the fledgling civil and political societies in these states.18
Although there are clearly significant constraints on international democratization in
the region, including the difficult and multifaceted transition process itself, it would be
both inaccurate and unhelpful to conclude that the Central Asian governments, culture,
or people are solely responsible for the stalemate of democracy promotion in their
states. The producers of democracy assistance must share responsibility for the region’s
presumed inability to embrace democratic transformation. The literature on democracy
assistance has spawned a variety of criticisms of the political development efforts
funded by the West, but these analyses focus largely on the types of democracy
promotion projects and the methods and strategies of assisting democratization from
abroad. In contrast, this book gives prominence to the content of democracy promotion
policies and how the ideas promoted by agents of democratization resonate with the
target societies and states.
In a nutshell, an important reason for the ineffectiveness of Western democratization
efforts in Central Asia is that their content fails to resonate with Central Asian societies
and states. As demonstrated in the chapters of this book, the ideas, values, and practices
promoted by the United States and the EU in Central Asia lack cultural compatibility,
salience, consistency, and credibility for the targets of democratization.19 Western
policy makers and academics have developed sophisticated conceptualizations of
democratization processes, zeroing in on political pluralism, elections, and civic
engagement, among other things. Yet these conceptualizations are largely divorced from
how democracy and democratization are perceived and understood in Central Asia.20
Here is a Kyrgyz anecdote told in the streets of Bishkek that illustrates the problem:
One day, President Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, President Karimov of Uzbekistan, and
President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan are sitting around, boasting about their
possessions and accomplishments. Nazarbayev tells the others, “In my country we’ve
got a glut of oil and don’t know how to spend all the petrodollars. We build new cities,
raise salaries. Our people drive Bentleys and Rolls Royces. All in all, we are blissed
out.”
Karimov responds, “And we, we’ve got a surfeit of gas and I’ve got plenty of dough
to strengthen the army.”
Bakiyev scratches his head, trying to think of a bragging point, when he suddenly
remembers, “And we, we’ve got democracy and glasnost!”
Nazarbayev and Karimov ask, “What’s that?”
Bakiyev tries to explain: “Democracy is when anyone can shout out ‘Bakiyev is a
fool’ in public and get away with it.”