Democracy and the Rule of Law PDF
Preview Democracy and the Rule of Law
CY207-FM 0521825598 May7,2003 12:18 CharCount=0 Democracy and the Rule of Law Edited by Jose´ Marı´a Maravall JuanMarchInstitute Adam Przeworski NewYorkUniversity v CY207-FM 0521825598 May7,2003 12:18 CharCount=0 PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE ThePittBuilding,TrumpingtonStreet,Cambridge,UnitedKingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS TheEdinburghBuilding,CambridgeCB22RU,UK 40West20thStreet,NewYork,NY10011-4211,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia RuizdeAlarco´n13,28014Madrid,Spain DockHouse,TheWaterfront,CapeTown8001,SouthAfrica http://www.cambridge.org (cid:2)C CambridgeUniversityPress2003 Thisbookisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithout thewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2003 PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica TypefaceCentennialLight9.5/12.5pt. SystemLATEX2ε [TB] AcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationdata Democracyandtheruleoflaw/editedbyJose´ Marı´aMaravall,AdamPrzeworski. p. cm.–(Cambridgestudiesinthetheoryofdemocracy) Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0-521-82559-8(hardback)–ISBN0-521-53266-3(pbk.) 1.Ruleoflaw–Congresses. 2.Democracy–Congresses. I.Maravall,Jose´ Marı´a. II.Przeworski,Adam. III.Series. K3171.A6D46 2003 340(cid:3).11–dc21 2002035189 ISBN0521825598hardback ISBN0521532663paperback vi CY207-FM 0521825598 May7,2003 12:18 CharCount=0 Contents ListofContributors pageix Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 jose´ marı´a maravall and adam przeworski PartI 1 LineagesoftheRuleofLaw 19 stephen holmes 2 Power,Rules,andCompliance 62 ignacio sa´nchez-cuenca 3 ObedienceandObligationintheRechtsstaat 94 michel troper 4 APostscriptto“PoliticalFoundationsofDemocracy andtheRuleofLaw” 109 barry r. weingast 5 WhyDoPoliticalPartiesObeyResultsofElections? 114 adam przeworski PartII 6 TheMajoritarianReadingoftheRuleofLaw 147 roberto gargarella 7 HowCantheRuleofLawRule?CostImpositionthrough DecentralizedMechanisms 168 catalina smulovitz vii CY207-FM 0521825598 May7,2003 12:18 CharCount=0 Contents 8 DictatorshipandtheRuleofLaw:RulesandMilitary PowerinPinochet’sChile 188 robert barros PartIII 9 CourtsasanInstrumentofHorizontalAccountability: TheCaseofLatinEurope 223 carlo guarnieri 10 RuleofDemocracyandRuleofLaw 242 john ferejohn and pasquale pasquino 11 TheRuleofLawasaPoliticalWeapon 261 jose´ marı´a maravall 12 TheRuleofLawandtheProblemofLegalReform inMicheldeMontaigne’sEssais 302 biancamaria fontana AuthorIndex 317 SubjectIndex 321 viii CY207-FM 0521825598 May7,2003 12:18 CharCount=0 Contributors RobertBarros, VisitingProfessor,DepartmentofHumanities,Universi- daddeSanAndre´s John Ferejohn, Carolyn S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science and SeniorFellowoftheHooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity Biancamaria Fontana, Professor of the History of Political Thought, Universite´ deLausanne Roberto Gargarella, Professor of Constitutional Theory and Political Philosophy, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and Universidad de Buenos Aires CarloGuarnieri, ProfessorofPoliticalScience,Universita` diBologna Stephen Holmes, Professor of Law and Political Science, New York University Jose´ Marı´aMaravall, ProfessorofSociology,UniversidadComplutense de Madrid, and Academic Director, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en CienciasSociales(InstitutoJuanMarch) Pasquale Pasquino, Director of Research in Political Theory, Centre NationaldesRecherchesScientifiques,Paris,andProfessorinPoliticsand Law,NewYorkUniversity Adam Przeworski, Carroll and Milton Petrie Professor of Politics, New YorkUniversity ix CY207-FM 0521825598 May7,2003 12:18 CharCount=0 ListofContributors Ignacio Sa´nchez-Cuenca, Professor of Political Science, Centro de EstudiosAvanzadosenCienciasSociales(InstitutoJuanMarch) Catalina Smulovitz, Professor, Department of Political Science and Government, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Researcher (Consejo NacionaldeInvestigacionesCientı´ficasyTecnolo´gicas) Michel Troper, Professor, Universite´ de Paris X–Nanterre, Member of theInstitutUniversitairedeFrance,andDirectoroftheCentredeThe´orie duDroit BarryR.Weingast, SeniorFellow,HooverInstitution,andWardC.Krebs Family Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Stanford University x CY207-01 0521825598 May7,2003 8:29 CharCount=0 JOSE´ MARI´A MARAVALL AND ADAM PRZEWORSKI Introduction Ourcentralquestioniswhygovernmentsdoordonotactaccording tolaws. The traditional answer to this question has been that the law has an autonomous causal efficacy. People obey the law because it is the law: actions follow prior norms. This view is now being contested by arguments that law cannot be treated as an exogenous constraint on actions.Insomesituations,theactionsthatindividualswanttoanddo undertakearestableandpredictableeveniftheydonotimplementany antecedentlaws. Thenormativeconceptionoftheruleoflawisafigmentoftheimagi- nationofjurists.Itisimplausibleasadescription.Moreover,itisincom- pleteasanexplanation.Whydopeopleobeylaws?Whydotheyobeya particularlaw?Wouldtheyobeyanynormjustbecauseitisalaw? By a normative conception, we mean only the following. First, a set ofrulesconstituteslawifandonlyifitsatisfiessomeformalconditions. Second,therulesthatsatisfytheseformalconditionsareobeyed.Hence, lawruleswhenactionsfollowanteriornorms.Thequestionwhetherthe lawrulesisthusoneofobligation,obedience,orcompliance. Lists of the formal requirements for a set of rules to qualify as law converge.Accordingtoastandardformulation(Fuller1964:ch.2),laws arenormsthatare(1)general,(2)publiclypromulgated,(3)notretroac- tive, (4) clear and understandable, (5) logically consistent, (6) feasible, and(7)stableovertime.Moreover,thesenormsmusthaveahierarchi- cal structure (Raz 1979: 210–29), so that particular norms conform to generalones. Lawrulesif“thosepeoplewhohavetheauthoritytomake,adminis- ter,andapplytherulesinanofficialcapacity...doactuallyadminister the law consistently and in accordance with its tenor” (Finnis 1980: 270). This implies that they also abstain from undertaking actions not 1 CY207-01 0521825598 May7,2003 8:29 CharCount=0 Jose´ Marı´aMaravallandAdamPrzeworski empowered by rules. As Solum (1994: 122) observes, when law rules, noextralegalcommandsaretreatedasobligatory. Inthestronglynormativeconception,thelawisthesourceofitsown normativity. The relation between laws and actions is seen as one of obligation.Ifnormsqualifyaslaws,thenitisthedutyofpublicofficialsto followthemanditisthedutyofeveryonetoobeyordersofpublicofficials justified by these norms. But even if the motivation to act according to the law is not moral, a conception is normative as long as actions are distinguishedbytheirconsistencywithpreexistingnorms. Regardlessofthemotivationforcompliance,themostvaluableeffect of the rule of law is that it enables individual autonomy. Rule of law makesitpossibleforpeopletopredicttheconsequencesoftheiractions and,hence,toplantheirlives.TociteRaz,“Incurtailingarbitrarypower, andinsecuringawell-orderedsociety,subjecttoaccountable,principled governmentliesthevalueoftheruleoflaw”(1994:361). Inourview,thisconceptionconfusesadescriptionforanexplanation. Situationsinwhichactionscanbedescribedintermsofthenormative conception may transpire even when these actions do not implement any anterior norms. Regularity need not be an effect of rules; it is the regularity of actions that makes them appear as if they implemented priornorms.Moreover,actionsofgovernmentthatarepredictable,sta- bleovertime,andlimitedgeneratetheconditionsforindividualauton- omyattributedtotheruleoflawbythenormativeconception,whether ornottheseactionsfollowanteriornorms. To develop a positive conception of the rule of law, one must start withpoliticalforces,theirgoals,theirorganization,andtheirconflicts. To advance their goals, actors use the instruments they can muster. These instruments may be economic, military, or ideological. But they alsoincludespecificallystatepowers.TheinstrumentsavailabletoSilvio Berlusconi as an owner of mass media are distinct from those at his disposal as the president of AC Milan. And both are different from the instrumentsavailabletoanItalianprimeminister. The state is a system of institutions, each with somewhat specific prerogatives.Theseprerogativesareinstruments,ratherthanprescrip- tions(Gregg1999:366–7).Assuch,theyareasourceofspecificallyin- stitutionalpower.Citizenscanvote;thelegislaturecanpasslaws;courts can issue orders to put people in jail; in almost all countries the exec- utivecanproposethebudget.Aprivatefirmcanbuyvotes,legislators, orjudges,butitcannotissuelaws.Neithercanthecourts. Stateinstitutionsarepopulated,whichmeansthatsomepeoplehave specifically institutional powers. The state as a whole may use this 2 CY207-01 0521825598 May7,2003 8:29 CharCount=0 Introduction powerwithregardtoprivateactors–forexample,whenthelegislature imposes taxes, the bureaucracy collects them, and the courts sanction thosewhoevadethem.Buttheparticularstateinstitutionsmayconfront oneanother,aswhenthelegislaturevotesagainsttheexecutiveorwhen courtssentenceaministertojail.Moreover,becausetheseinstitutional powers are valuable to private actors, they may try to utilize them in conflicts in the private sphere or in their relation to a particular state agency.Thus,privateinterestsmayseektoinfluencethelegislature;cit- izensmayseekrecourseincourtstocounteractanarbitrarydecisionof thebureaucracy. Whenevereveryoneisdoingwhatisbestforhimorher,givenwhat everyoneelsedoes,actionsarepredictableand,unlesssomeexogenous eventoccurs,stable.Henceitisnotstabilitythatdistinguishestherule of law but the distribution of power. When power is monopolized, the lawisatmostaninstrumentoftheruleofsomeone.Onlyifconflicting political actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to law, does lawrule. An autocracy, a situation in which one political force monopolizes powerandrulesunbounded,mayentailwhatbothBarrosandHolmes, followingMontesquieu,refertoas“rulebylaw.”Here,lawistheinstru- mentofthesovereign,who,bydefinitionofsovereignty,isnotboundby it.Moreover,becausethisstateofaffairsisbasedonamonopolyofforce, nothingcompelsthesovereigntorulebylaw.Extralegalcommandsare asforcefulasthosedressedaslaw. AsHolmesputsit,“ruleoflawandrulebylawoccupyasinglecon- tinuum and do not present mutually exclusive options.” What distin- guishes them is not the nature of the law, whether it operates as a tool or as a framework, but the power system to which they respond. In Holmes’s words, “the powerful will cede power only to rival power- ful forces.” Rule of law emerges when, following Machiavelli’s advice, self-interested rulers willingly restrain themselves and make their be- haviorpredictableinordertoobtainasustained,voluntarycooperation ofwell-organizedgroupscommandingvaluableresources.Inexchange forsuchcooperation,rulerswillprotecttheinterestsofthesegroupsby legalmeans.Ruleoflawcanprevailonlywhentherelationofpolitical forcesissuchthatthosewhoaremostpowerfulfindthatthelawison their side or, to put it conversely, when law is the preferred tool of the powerful. To cite Holmes again, “To say that ‘law is a tool of the powerful’ ... isnottoembraceorpromotecynicism.”Ifsuchwell-organizedgroups cannot use laws to their advantage, they will promote their interests 3 CY207-01 0521825598 May7,2003 8:29 CharCount=0 Jose´ Marı´aMaravallandAdamPrzeworski byextralegalmeans.Iftheycan,aninstitutionalequilibriumensuesin which all relevant forces find it useful to channel their public actions throughpoliticalinstitutions,andconflictsareprocessedontheterrain ofinstitutions.Thosewhohavethevotesusethelegislature,thosewho have laws on their side use courts, those who have access use the bu- reaucracy.Thedifferencebetweenrulebylawandruleoflawliesthenin thedistributionofpower,thedispersionofmaterialresources,themul- tiplicationoforganizedinterests;insocietiesthatapproximatetherule oflaw,nogroupbecomessostrongastodominatetheothers,andlaw, ratherthanreflecttheinterestsofasinglegroup,isusedbythemany. Inanyinstitutionalequilibrium,actionsarepredictable,understand- able,stableovertime,andlimited.Hence,individualscananticipatethe consequences of their own behavior; everyone can autonomously plan one’s life. As Troper argues, the “constraints on individual actions are differentfromlegalobligationsandtakingthemintoaccountisdifferent from obedience. Nevertheless, one could claim that the result is simi- lar to that expected of the Rechtsstaat.... citizens are politically free, becausetheycanpredicttheconsequencesoftheiractions.” If citizens are to be able to predict actions of public officials, they must know what to expect of them. What enables citizens to forecast actions of governments is not whether these actions are described by laws.Forexample,toanticipatewhetherthelegislaturewillraisetaxes, privateeconomicagentsneedtoknowthatonlytheexecutivecaniniti- atetaxlegislation,whichmeansthattheprojectmustenjoysupportof therulingpartyorcoalition,thatthebillmustbeapprovedbyaparlia- mentary committee, and that it must be passed by a majority of those votinginthelegislatureasawhole.Notethatsomestepsinthisexample are not described by laws: the approval of the executive committee of the ruling party is not. Indeed, in some countries taxes can be raised onlyiftheinitiativeisapprovedbyaConfederationofIndustry.Toform predictions, economic agents treat the written and unwritten rules in thesameway–specifically,theyconsidertheneedforapprovalbythe rulingpartyorbyinterestgroupsasequallynecessaryastheapproval by the legislature. To be able to say “This will never happen because thelogginginterestsopposeit”isasgoodabaseforpredictingwhatthe governmentwilldoasaconstitutionalprovisionagainsttakings. But if regularities arise endogenously, so that laws are codifications of the actions that political actors choose to pursue given what others do,whydowewritesomeofthesedescriptionsdownas“laws”? First,insomesituationstherearemultiplewaysinwhichthepolitical lifeofasocietycanbestructured.Wecan,forexample,electone,two,or 4
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