Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather: The Case of Lebanon PDF
Preview Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather: The Case of Lebanon
Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather VS RESEARCH Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather The Case of Lebanon With a foreword by Prof. Dr. Theodor Hanf VS RESEARCH Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Dissertation Universität Freiburg,2007 Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes 1st Edition 2009 All rights reserved © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH,Wiesbaden 2009 Editorial Office:Dorothee Koch / Anita Wilke VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is part of the specialist publishing group Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system or transmitted,in any form or by any means,electronic,mechanical,photo- copying,recording,or otherwise,without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names,trade names,trade descriptions etc.cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design:KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung,Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN978-3-531-16529-5 To the memory of Riad Fakhoury Foreword Is democracy possible only in homogeneous societies? Does heterogeneity ex- clude a stable democracy? Throughout history, ethnic, linguistic, or religious homogeneity whether by circumstance, coercion, or choice, has seemingly been conducive to democracy. In France, democracy was established after the imposi- tion of religious uniformity and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The United States pulled in immigrants who renounced their original affiliations to forge a new identity in a newly born state. Still, defying assumptions, democracies have emerged in heterogeneous states such as the Swiss Confederation, the Successor States of the Holy Roman Empire and, later, those carved out of the previous colonial empires. One common feature is the failure of – often violent – attempts to enforce homogeneity, or the lack of any such attempt in the first place. In the course of time, these divided societies have learned to live in diversity, to pacify their differences, and to find a path to- wards peace or at least accommodation. In sum, they went beyond forms of sepa- rating powers to sharing power. Whether defined by ethnicity, language, religion, or even ideology, communities agreed to a pacton participating in a joint govern- ment based on proportional or even equal representation. It is noteworthy that political systems based on power-sharing were long margin- al in mainstream political science which laid an emphasis on democratic transi- tions in homogeneous societies and on socio-economic or cultural prerequisites that facilitate the rise of democracy. However, this changed in the 1960s with the emergence of a new “consociation- alist” school which proposed treating power-sharing systems as a distinct type of democracy capable of overcoming divisive cleavages and of securing coexistence. Since then, the power-sharing model in divided societies has inspired a plethora of writings. Numerous studies elaborated theoretical frameworks that outlined the features of this model and pondered the conditions facilitating or thwarting its applicabili- ty. With time, the model acquired normative and prescriptive functions and was even recommended for pacifying conflict-ridden societies in which forceful at- tempts of homogenization had aggravated dissension. Nowadays, in the wake of the colonial empires’collapse and later the break up of the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of so many non-homogeneous states, modes of governance based on power-sharing seem to become the rule rather than the exception. Still, the relevance of power-sharing systems needs to be analyzed with caution. Cyprus’unstable consociational experience, Lebanon’s power-sharing breakdown 8 Foreword in 1975 and the fragility of its post-war predicament, recent constitutional paralysis in Belgium, doubts pertaining to the effectiveness of the power-sharing model in Switzerland after the country’s largest political party was no longer represented in government prompt daunting questions about the sustainability of power-sharing models as well as about their effectiveness in times of polarization. Hence, it seems of paramount importance to reassess the concept of power-shar- ing, to re-explore its limitations and reexamine its prescriptive value. This book is to be viewed as an eminent contribution to this undertaking. Tamirace Fakhouryproposes to refocus attention on the power-sharing model of governance by identifying its potentialities and its limitations as well as by sub- stantiating suggestions for further theoretical study. She then proceeds to testing the applicability of the model to a major case study which has provided an empiri- cal benchmark to Arend Lijphart’s concept of consociational democracy: Lebanon. After examining Lebanon’s pre-war power-sharing model as well as the factors be- hind its collapse in 1975, the study focuses on Lebanon’s post-war order by depict- ing on the one hand its democratic/autocratic components and its power-sharing traits on the other hand. With the ratification of the Ta’if Treaty in 1991, Lebanon’s consociational democracy turned into an ambiguous system, characterized by a complex mix of democratic, authoritarian, and power-sharing pressures. The emergence of a conso- ciation heavily influenced by external factors impaired power-sharing devices, and disfigured the politics of accommodation. The book proposes a contextual framework for analysing the internal and exoge- nous factors that affect Lebanon’s consociational system. It shows how, beyond the variable of the “self-negating prophecy”, the small republic’s fate remains inter- woven with its regional environment and heavily influenced by various institution- al, communal and elite conditions. The interplay of internal and external factors in the Lebanese case conditions the resilience of the power-sharing model of gover- nance and reveals its dependence on an auspicious configuration without which consociational settlements are prone to instability. A further merit of this study is its attempt to link the theory of consociationalism with the more recent works on transitology and democratic transition, bringing to the fore the necessity of studying the democratic or un-democratic components of the system as a major variable that impacts power-sharing dynamics. Beyond the implications the study has on the Lebanese case, it reveals broader insights that transcend the Lebanese experience as such and tell much about the shortcomings and benefits of consociational settlements in deeply divided so- cieties. Theodor Hanf Acknowledgments The idea of writing a dissertation on Lebanon’s political transition, initially in- spired by a discussion with Lebanese academics in 2001 in Beit Chabab (Mount Lebanon), had several underlying motives. The most important one was an earnest desire to understand the overlapping external and internal mechanisms that contribute to Lebanon’s unstable predicament. Yet, this would not have been possible without the precious help of my advisor, Professor Dr. Theodor Hanf, who helped me evaluate Lebanon’s complex situa- tion with an objective eye. I thank him for his immense assistance and mostly for his confidence in me. I also thank him for offering me the opportunity to conduct research at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in Freiburg. I would also like to thank my co-adviser, Professor Dr. Jürgen Rüland who of- fered valuable guidance. A special thanks goes to Professor Heribert Weiland who provided me with significant intellectual support during my stay at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. I also wish to thank the German Service for Academic Exchange (DAAD) that funded my research project at the Albert-Ludwigs University in Freiburg. Furthermore, I extend many thanks to my friends, especially Coralie Hindawi, and Ulrike Ostertag, for their support during the writing phase, and to my col- leagues at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, especially to Margret Rae, Leslie Tramontini, and Matthias Seifert, who assisted me with the correction. Many thanks go also to my colleagues Martin Adelman, Petra Bauerle, Marcel Bau- mann, Hannelore Fladerer, Angela Hermann, Clemens Juergenmeyer, Beatrice Schlee, Jan Voelkel, and many others who have made my stay at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute pleasant and enriching. I would particularly like to thank my family in Lebanon. I am mostly grateful to my mother Amal and to my sister Tala for their encouragement and valuable advice. I am also thankful to my brothers, Omar and Wael, for their inspirational remarks. A special note of gratitude goes to Jörg Muehlbacher who offered valuable help during the writing and editing phases. Finally, I hope that this study of Lebanon’s power-sharing and democratization since 1943 will shed some light on Lebanon’s conundrum and prospects for sta- bility. Tamirace Fakhoury Contents Introductory Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A general review of the literature on Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Statement of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Hypotheses and study structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Long-term implications and contributions of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The method of research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Further methods of inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 1. Review and Critique of the Literature on Consociational Democracy 35 Theorizing consociationalism: The evolution of the theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Consociational democracy as a prescriptive model in deeply fragmented societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 The other side of the medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A criticism of the consociational model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A criticism of the consociational theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Lijphart’s reaction: A struggle against all odds? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The survivability of consociational democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 The consociational model and its relation to our case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2. Pre-War Lebanon:A Dance into the Abyss of Consociationalism . . . . 77 Consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon: The characteristics of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 The factors conducive to consociational democracy: Why are they problematic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Performance of the pre-war consociational model (1943–1975) . . . . . . . . . . 85 The strengths of the pre-war consociational model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 The defects of the pre-war consociational model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 An inevitable collapse? An inquiry into the reasons behind consociational failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 A zone of turbulences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 The elite factor in the consociational breakdown (1967–1976) . . . . . . . . . . . 126 The economic factor in the consociational breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Synthesis: The status of the favorable factors revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
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