Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

426 Pages·2006·3.07 MB·English

by  Darren G. Hawkins

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DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international
organizationsratherthanactingunilaterallyorcooperatingdirectly?Further-
more, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has
been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions, including the
WorldTradeOrganization,theUnitedNations,andtheEuropeanCommis-
sion, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure
their interests are being served and identifies the problems involved with
monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not in-
herently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at the
international level than at the domestic level. Drawing on principal-agent
theory,theyexplainthevariationsthatexistintheextenttowhichstatesare
willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all
virtuous,butarebetterunderstoodasbureaucraciesthatcanbecontrolledto
varyingdegreesbytheirpoliticalmasters.
DARREN G. HAWKINS isAssociateProfessorofPoliticalScienceatBrigham
YoungUniversity.
DAVID A. LAKE is Professor of Political Science at the University of
California,SanDiego.
DANIEL L. NIELSON is Associate Professor of Political Science at Brigham
YoungUniversity.
MICHAEL J. TIERNEY isAssistantProfessorofGovernmentatTheCollege
ofWilliam&Mary.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Serieseditors
RandallCalvert,WashingtonUniversity,St.Louis
ThrainnEggertsson,MaxPlanckInstitute,Germany,andUniversityofIceland
Foundingeditors
JamesE.Alt,HarvardUniversity
DouglassC.North,WashingtonUniversity,St.Louis
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andtheEconomy
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LeeJ.AlstonandJosephP.Ferrie,SouthernPaternalismandtheAmerican
WelfareState:Economics,Politics,andInstitutionsintheSouth,1865–1965
JamesE.AltandKennethA.Shepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositivePolitical
Economy
JosephineT.Andrews,WhenMajoritiesFail:TheRussianParliament,
1990–1993
JeffreyS.BanksandEricAllenHanushek,eds.,ModernPoliticalEconomy:Old
Topics,NewDirections
YoramBarzel,EconomicAnalysisofPropertyRights,2ndEdition
YoramBarzel,ATheoryoftheState:EconomicRights,LegalRights,andthe
ScopeoftheState
RobertH.Bates,BeyondtheMiracleoftheMarket:ThePoliticalEconomyof
AgrarianDevelopmentinKenya,2ndEdition
CharlesM.Cameron,VetoBargaining:PresidentsandthePoliticsof
NegativePower
KellyH.Chang,AppointingCentralBankers:ThePoliticsofMonetaryPolicyin
theUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnion
PeterF.CowheyandMathewMcCubbins,eds.,StructureandPolicyinJapan
andtheUnitedStates:AnInstitutionalistApproach
GaryW.Cox,TheEfficientSecret:TheCabinetandtheDevelopmentofPolitical
PartiesinVictorianEngland
GaryW.Cox,MakingVotesCount:StrategicCoordinationintheWorld’s
ElectoralSystems
GaryW.CoxandJonathanN.Katz,ElbridgeGerry’sSalamander:TheElectoral
ConsequencesoftheReapportionmentRevolution
Continuedonpagefollowingindex
DELEGATION AND AGENCY
IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Edited by
DARREN G. HAWKINS
DAVID A. LAKE
DANIEL L. NIELSON
AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY
cambridge university press
Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SãoPaulo
Cambridge University Press
TheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridgecb22ru,UK
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridg e.org /9780521680462
©CambridgeUniversityPress2006
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionof
relevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplace
withoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublishedinprintformat 2006
isbn-13 978-0-511-25981-4eBook(EBL)
isbn-10 0-511-25981-6eBook(EBL)
isbn-13 978-0-521-68046-2paperback
isbn-10 0-521-68046-8paperback
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Contents
353258
List of figu res pa ge vii
List of tabl es viii
Note s on contributor s x
Pr eface xv
Pa rt I: Intr oductio n 1
1 Delegation underanarchy: states, international
organizations, and principal-agent theory
DARREN G. HAWKINS, DAVID A. LAKE, DANIEL L. NIELSON,
AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY 3
Pa rt II: Variatio n in princ ipal preferenc es, structure ,
decision rules, an d private be nefits 39
2 Who delegates? Alternativemodels ofprincipals in
development aid
MONA M. LYNE, DANIEL L. NIELSON, AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY 41
3 US domesticpoliticsand InternationalMonetary
Fund policy
J. LAWRENCE BROZ AND MICHAEL BREWSTER HAWES 77
4 Why multilateralism? Foreign aidand domestic
principal-agentproblems
HELEN V. MILNER 107
5 Distribution, information, and delegation tointernational
organizations: the case of IMF conditionality
LISA L. MARTIN 140
v
Contents
6 Delegation and discretionin the European Union
MARK A. POLLACK 165
Part III: Variatio n in agent preferenc es, legitim acy, tasks ,
and perm eability 197
7 How agents matter
DARREN G. HAWKINS AND WADE JACOBY 199
8 Screening power: international organizations as
informative agents
229
ALEXANDER THOMPSON
9 Dutiful agents, rogueactors, or both? Staffing,voting
rules, and slackin the WHO and WTO
ANDREW P. CORTELL AND SUSAN PETERSON 255
10 Delegating IMFconditionality:understanding variations
incontrol and conformity
ERICA R. GOULD 281
11 Delegation tointernational courts and the limits of
re-contracting political power
KAREN J. ALTER 312
Part IV: Direc tions for future research 339
12 The logic ofdelegation to international organizations
DAVID A. LAKE AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS 341
Referen ces 369
Index 394
vi
Figures
1.1 Internationaldelegation decision tree page 11
2.1 Types ofagency relationships 45
2.2 Socialpercentof MDB projects, 1980 –1999
(three-year rolling average) 55
2.3 Socialpreferences forthe InternationalBank for
Reconstruction and Development (WorldBank),
1980 –1999 withalternative models ofthe principal 64
3.1 Chain ofdelegation 79
4.1 Percentage ofmultilateral aidcommitted relative to
total ODA committed 113
4.2 PublicopinionintheEUnetpercentagewithgreater
confidence inmultilateral than bilateral
organizations 121
5.1 Stateandstaffpreferences over stringencyof
conditionality 143
8.1 Implications of variationin institutional neutrality 248
8.2 Preference distributions regarding military
intervention 251
9.1 Institutionaldesignand IO slack 263
10 .1 Change inthe number and type of binding
conditions, 3-year moving average 299
12 .1 Delegation withcommunication 351
12 .2 The knowledge condition 357
12 .3 The conditions forsuccessful delegation 359
12 .4 Delegation withmultiple principals 362
vii
Tables
2 .1 Hypothetical pivotalplayers pa ge 62
2 .2 Hypothetical multiple principal 63
2 .3 Logistic regressionresultswith social loan as
dependent variable using the Social Policy Index to
generate principal preferences 67
2 .4 Logistic regressionresultswith social loan as
dependentvariable using thebilateral social foreign
aidto generate principal preferences 70
3 .1 IMF quota votes in the US Congress 88
3 .2 Probit analyses of IMF quota votes in the 98 th
Congress 90
3 .3 Probit analyses of IMF quota votes in the 98 th
Congress (robustness) 91
3 .4 Probit analyses of IMF quota votes in the 105 th
Congress 92
3 .5 Substantive effectsof campaigncontributions from
money-center banks, districtskilllevels, and House
member “ideology” 93
3 .6 Random effects logit ofIMF decisions tolend 99
3 .7 OLS panel estimates of the size of IMFloans 101
4 .1 Summarystatistics forvariables 127
4. 2A Multilateral commitments as %total ODA
committed and OPINION 1 128
4. 2B Multilateralcommitmentsas%totalaidcommitted
and OPINION 1 130
4. 3A Multilateral commitments as %total ODA
committed and OPINION 3 134
viii