Defense Against Bioterror: Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies and Commercial Opportunities--Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Defense against Bioterror held in Madrid, Spain from 8 to 11 April 2004 (NATO Security through

108 Pages·2005·0.88 MB·English

by  Dennis Morrison

Defense against Bioterror
Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies
and Commercial Opportunities
NATO Security through Science Series
A Series presenting the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO
Programme for Security through Science (STS).
The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media,
Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
Sub-Series
A. Chemistry and Biology (Springer Science and Business Media)
B. Physics and Biophysics (Springer Science and Business Media)
C. Environmental Security (Springer Science and Business Media)
D. Information and Communication Security (IOS Press)
E. Human and Societal Dynamics (IOS Press)
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Against Terrorism or Countering Other Threats to Security.The types of meeting supported are
generally “Advanced Study Institutes”and “Advanced Research Workshops”.The NATO STS Series
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Series B Physics and Biophysics – ol.
Defense against Bioterror
Detection Technologies, Implementation
Strategies and Commercial Opportunities
edited by
Dennis Morrison
Institute of Engineering Research & Applications,
New Mexico Tech, Albuquerque, NM, U.S.A.
Fred Milanovich
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, CA, U.S.A.
Dmitri Ivnitski
Institute of Engineering Research & Applications,
New Mexico Tech, Albuquerque, NM, U.S.A.
and
Thomas R.Austin
The Boeing Company, U.S.A.
Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on
Defense against Bioterror:Detection Technologies, Implementation Strategies
and Commercial Opportunities
Madrid, Spain
8- 11 April 2004
A C.I.P.Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 1-4020-3385-0 (PB)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3385-8(PB)
ISBN-10 1-4020-3386-9 (HB)
ISBN-10 1-4020-3384-2 (e-book)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3386-5 (HB)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3384-1(e-book)
Published by Springer,
P.O.Box 17, 3300 AADordrecht, The Netherlands.
www.springeronline.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 2005 Springer
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
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or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any
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Printed in the Netherlands.
Table of Contents
PREFACE 9
LIST OF C ONTRIBUTORS 13
Strategic Actionable Net-Centric Biological Defense System 17
S. KORNGUTH
Natural Toxins: The Past And The Present 29
E. GRISHIN
Biological Weapons Inspections- The Iraq Experience 47
E. B. MYHRE
Integrated, Secure And Sustainable Disease Surveillance System In
Uzbekistan: Aspects Of Laboratory Research Networks 51
F. T. ADILOVA
A Network-Ready, Broad Spectrum, Environmental Pathogen Detection
System 67
F. P. MILANOVICH, J. DZENITIS, B. J. HINDSON, A. J. MAKAREWICZ,
M. T. MCBRIDE,ANDB. W. COLSTON
Concept Design Of Anautonomous Biological Agent Detector System
(Abads) 77
R. BARTON, R. COLLINS,ANDR. STARNES
Role Of Prototype System Demonstrations In The Development Of
Detection-Based WMD Defenses 91
L. BRANDT
Validation Testing For Biological Threat Organisms 105
T. L. HADFIELD
Development Of Bioaerosol Alarming Detector 119
A.V.WUIJCKHUIJSE,C.KIENTZ,B.V.BAAR,O.KIEVIT,
R.BUSKER,M.STOWERS,W.KLEEFSMAN AND J.MARIJNISSEN
Biodetection Using Micro-Physiometry Tools Based On Electrokinetic
Phenomena 129
R. PETHIG
5
6
Electro-optical Technique For Detection And Identification Of Biological
Agents 143
VICTORBUNIN
Detection Of Microbial Cells With Electrooptical Analysis 147
O. V. IGNATOV, O. I. GULIY, V. D. BUNIN,
A. G. VOLOSHIN, D. O’NEIL, ANDD. IVNITSKI
Recent Advances In Electrochemical And Photochemical Transduction
Strategies For Immunosensors Based On Electropolymerized Films165
S. COSNIER
Technological Platforms Based On Micro/Nanobiosensors As Early Warning
Systems For Biological Warfare 175
L.M. LECHUGA, J.TAMAYO, A.CALLE, M. CALLEJA
ANDC. DOMINQUEZ
Catalytic Beacons For The Detection Of DNA And Telomerase Activity199
Y. XIAO, V. PAVLOV, T. NIAZOV, A. DISHON, M. KOTLER
AND I. WILLNER
Critical Elements Of Biological Sensor Technology For Deployment
InAnEnvironmentalNetworkS ystem 207
D. IVNITSKI, D. MORRISONANDD. J. O'NEIL
Electrochemical Immunosensor For Detection Of Francisella
tularensis 221
P. SKLADAL, Y. SYMERSKA, M. POHANKA, B.SAFAR,ANDA. MACEL
Biosensors And Nanotechnological Immunochips For The Detection And
Monitoring Of Chemical And Biological Agents
S. VARFOLOMEYEV, I. KUROCHKIN, A. EREMENKO, E. RAININA
ANDI. GACHOK 233
Biosensor For Defence Against Terrorism 245
M. MASCINI AND I. PALCHETTI
Biosensors And Biomimetic Sensors For The Detection Of Drugs, Toxins
And Biological Agents 261
A.P.F.TURNERANDS. PILETSKY
Chemical Multi-Sensor Arrays For Liquids Monolithic Integration Using
Microelectronic Technology 273
A.BRATOV AND C. DOMINGUEZ
7
Immunochemical Approaches For Rapid Detection Of Biologically Active
Compounds 291
B. B. DZANTIEV, A.V ZHERDEV,ANDN.A. BYZOVA
Multifunctional Liquid-Crystalline DNA Based Biosensing Units Capable
Of Detecting Biologically Relevant Compounds 303
YU. M. YEVDOKIMOV
Subject Index 335
PREFACE
Instability in warfare arises when offense significantly outstrips defense.
After a half century of vaccine and antibiotic successes in the war against
infectious diseases, the advantage has shifted back to the pathogen.
Infectious diseases are again the leading cause of human mortality
worldwide. To compound matters, the possible intentional spread of disease
is not only possible but also it is reality. For instance, in the past two
decades, the United States alone has had three biological attacks or incidents
against civilians: 1984 salmonella, 1999 West Nile-like Virus, and 2001
anthracis. In addition, several foreign natural epidemics (the recent United
Kingdom foot and mouth virus pandemic and the mad cow disease outbreak)
have shown the potential for both serious economic and political harm.
Indeed, the events of 2001 exposed civilization’s vulnerability to the
covert introduction of harmful biological agents. Bioterroism and biological
warfare employs living agents or toxins that can be disseminated/delivered
by infected individuals, insects, aerosols, and by the contamination of water
and food supplies. Most biological agents can be thousands of times more
lethal per unit than the most lethal chemical warfare agents. Unlike chemical
agents, biological agents attack people stealthily with no observable reaction
until after an incubation period (days to weeks). Current disease surveillance
and response systems rely on post-symptomatic reporting. However, many
infectious agents such as smallpox have a long latency to clinical symptoms,
thereby eluding early detection potentially resulting in widespread,
uncontrolled contagion.
Consequently, the threat of deliberate dissemination of biological
agents is the most complicated and problematic of the weapons of mass
destruction facing mankind today.
9
10
This volume contains papers presented at the NATO Advanced
Research Workshop “Defence against Bioterror: Detection Technologies,
Implementation, Strategies and Commercial Opportunities” held at the Hotel
Wellington, Madrid Spain from 26 May to 29 May 2004. The objective of
the workshop was to contribute to the critical assessment of state-of-the-art
of emerging (“breakthrough”) biosensor technologies that will allow for the
rapid identification of biological threat agents in the environment and human
population; to identify directions for future research, and to promote close
working relationships between scientists from different countries and with
different professional experience. The volume is devoted to a comprehensive
overview of the current state of biological weapons threat; challenges
confronting biodetection technologies and systems; ongoing research and
development; and, future requirements. Following the structure of the NATO
Advanced Research Workshops, the special section starts from the threat
overview and current art, then followed detection platforms, networked
alarm-type biodetector systems, implementation strategies, electro-optical
and electrochemical biosensors.
A strategy and commensurate technology to detect a bioagent
release at the earliest moment is an essential element of a defense against
bioterrorism. The strategy should include: (1) systems of networked
biodetectors that provide wide area monitoring for the early warning of a
bioagent release; (2) a medical surveillance system that provides early
(detection of the presence of disease in the population at large; and, (3) a
concept for integrating these technologies into the public sector. In (1) the
development of networked alarm-type biodetection systems is extremely
important for detecting, tracking and responding to threats. By fielding a
network of alarm-type biodetectors, civilian and military defense officials
can obtain early warning in the event of a biological attack. The networked
alarm-type biodetectors will provide generic discrimination, i.e., pathogenic
vs. non-pathogenic bacteria and may be used as a “trigger” for a more
sophisticated detector/identifier system. A desired performance requirement
of networked alarm-type biodetectors is real-time, pre-exposure detection,
discrimination, and identification of biological threats. The sensing element
should be able to detect the presence of biological agents at below threshold
concentrations in 5-10 min and be sensitive to a broad range of bioagents
(multiplex capable). Obviously the incorporation of all these features within
one biodetector based on current technology is a very complicated task.
Most commercially available biodetectors are inherently bulky, utilize
complex instrumentation, multistep assays and other time consuming
procedures. The solution may be based on application of new emerging
sensor technologies such as array-based biochips, liquid arrays, artificial
olfaction and microfluidic systems, ion-channel switches and
magnetoresistance technology. In (2) a science base that will provide for
11
biomarkers in human body fluids that indicate the presence of disease must
be established. These markers must be able to distinguish pathogen type and
be present at the very onset of disease (presymptomatic). Once established,
detection technologies and application strategies need to be developed to
bring presymptomatic detection to practical application. (3) strategies need
to be developed to bring these advances to the public. Indeed, all levels of
government are seeking to improve their capability for dealing with the
effects and consequences of a biological incident or attack. In particular,
cities recognize that their personnel will play a major part in a bioterrorist
attack. Each small community is faced with the daunting problem of
developing a bio-terrorism response plan with limited resources and limited
local expertise.
Transportation bioterror security presents an extremely complex
problem (alarms, indications, situational awareness, level of response, large
probability of false positive detection, effectiveness/performance, cost,
politics, limited protection). No accurate and rapid “silver bullet” technology
or system in existence can meet this challenge., We recommend the
continued development of sensing technologies and the approach of
employing multiple, layered detection systems with orthogonal technologies.
Biological Warfare Agent (BWA) sensor for defense purposes may also be
designed to offer “dual use” capability in the civil sector, including public
health environmental air and water monitoring as well as drug discovery.
Approach and preparation for biological terrorism can be compared to
existing civilian methods for earthquake protection – very low probability of
occurrence but with very high consequence. Continued collaboration among
NATO members is recommended due to risk of BWA attack against both
existing member countries (USA, UK and others) as well as emerging
member countries (Russia). We would like to acknowledge the NATO
Science Committee for their contributions. Special acknowledgement goes
out to Cynthia Hernandez for providing technical document production and
preparing the camera-ready version of the text.
T
he editors: Dennis Morrison, Fred P Milanovich, Dmitri Ivnitski, and Tom
R Austin