Defending the Multiple Realization Argument against the Identity Theory

227 Pages·2016·1.09 MB·English

by  David Barrett

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Graduate Theses and Dissertations
8-2012
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David Barrett
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
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DEFENDING THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION ARGUMENT AGAINST THE IDENTITY
THEORY
DEFENDING THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION ARGUMENT AGAINST THE IDENTITY
THEORY

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

By

David Alan Barrett
Hendrix College
Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, 2006
University of Arkansas
Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2008

August 2012
University of Arkansas
Abstract

A classic argument in the philosophy of mind is that the identity theory is false because mental
state types are multiply realized in brain state types. In this dissertation I provide a detailed
elaboration of the argument and a defense of it against a few of its prominent contemporary
critics. Finally I offer empirical evidence from inter-species differences in humans and
monkeys, and also from a case of extensive neural plasticity, which shows that mental state types
are multiply realized in brain state types.
This dissertation is approved for recommendation
to the Graduate Council.

Dissertation Director:

__________________________________
Dr. Jack Lyons

Dissertation Committee:

__________________________________
Dr. Eric Funkhouser

__________________________________
Dr. Thomas Senor
Dissertation Duplication Release

I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this thesis when needed for
research and/or scholarship.

Agreed ______________________________
David Alan Barrett

Refused _____________________________
David Alan Barrett
Acknowledgements

I would especially like to thank my director, Jack Lyons, for his help in completing the present
work. Without his advice and patience in reading countless drafts and rewrites, the end product
would have been much poorer and much longer in coming. I would also like to thank the other
members of my dissertation committee, Eric Funkhouser and Thomas Senor. Whatever I get
right probably owes very much to their help. Whatever I got wrong is certainly my own doing.
Table of Contents

Chapter 1: What are the Identity Theory and Multiple Realization? 1

Section 1.1: Explaining Some of the Key Concepts 2
Section 1.2: Functionalism, Identity Theory, and the Multiple Realization
Argument 8
Section 1.3: Popular Criticisms of the Multiple Realization Argument 12
Section 1.4: An Outline of the Rest of the Dissertation 24

Chapter 2: What is a Mental State Type? 27

Section 2.1: Why Psychological State Types Instead of Mental State Types? 28
Section 2.2: But What do Psychological State Types Look Like? 35
Section 2.3: The Pros and Cons of Computationalism 38
Section 2.4: An Example of a Psychological Process 45

Chapter 3: What is a Brain State Type? 53

Section 3.1: Old and New Style Cartography 56
Section 3.2: Taking Stock of the Options 63
Section 3.3: Why Brodmann’s Areas are the Best Bet 65
Section 3.4: Why do Neural Areas Provide a Good Guide to Brain State Types? 70

Chapter 4: What Count as Multiple Realizations? A Reply to Shapiro 75

Section 4.1: A Short Explanation of Shapiro’s Attack 75
Section 4.2: Arguing for a Different Account of Distinct Realizations 83
Section 4.3: Criticisms of Shapiro’s View 89
Section 4.4: Constraints on Brains 98

Chapter 5: But Doesn’t Current Neuroscientific Research Presume Identity Theory?
A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale 105

Section 5.1: Lower-Level Interventions are not Irrelevant to Psychological
Theories 107
Section 5.2: Why this Lack of Irrelevance is Irrelevant 111
Section 5.3: Why Cross-Species Analyses are Important for Psychology, and
why this Importance is Irrelevant to Multiple Realization 119
Section 5.4: Bechtel and Mundale on Brain State Types 123
Section 5.5: Criticizing the Idea that Brain State Types are Functionally
Individuated 125

Chapter 6: But Don’t Cases of Neural Plasticity Constitute Bad Evidence For Multiple
Realization? A Reply to Polger 136
Section 6.1: Begging the Question against the Identity Theorist 136
Section 6.2: Polger on the Nature of the Evidence Required for Multiple
Realization 147
Section 6.3: Polger’s Attack on Neural Plasticity 150
Section 6.4: On Polger’s Slipperiness about Neural Taxonomy 162

Chapter 7: The Empirical Evidence for Multiple Realization 166

Section 7.1: An Example of Cross-Species Multiple Realization 172
7.1.1: The Case Study: What the Researchers Were Looking for and What
They Found 173
7.1.2: Evaluating the Case Study’s Evidence for Multiple Realization 178
7.1.3: Conclusion 185
Section 7.2: An Example of Multiple Realization from Neural Plasticity 186
7.2.1: A Case Study of the Serial Lesion Effect 188
7.2.2: Evaluating the Case Study’s Evidence for Multiple Realization 190
7.2.3: The GRP More Generally 195
7.2.4: Conclusion 197
Section 7.3: The Famous Cross-Wired Ferrets Case 199
7.3.1: The Experiment on the Ferrets: Why the Researchers Rewired
and What They Found 199
7.3.2: Evaluating the Evidence the Ferrets Provide for Multiple
Realization: What Shapiro and Polger have to Say and
My Response 202

7.3.3: Conclusion 209

Bibliography 212