Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy

336 Pages·1992·0.84 MB·English

by  Russell D. Buhite

Decisions At Yalta : An Appraisal of
title:
Summit Diplomacy
author: Buhite, Russell D.
publisher: Scholarly Resources, Inc.
isbn10 | asin: 0842022562
print isbn13: 9780842022569
ebook isbn13: 9780585196268
language: English
Yalta Conference--(1945) , World politics-
subject
-1945- , World War, 1939-1945--Peace.
publication date: 1986
lcc: D734.C7 1945eb
ddc: 940.53/4
Yalta Conference--(1945) , World politics-
subject:
-1945- , World War, 1939-1945--Peace.
Page iii
Decisions At Yalta
An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy
Russell D. Buhite
Page iv
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements
of the American National Standard for permanence of paper for
printed library materials, Z39.48, 1984.
(c) 1986 Scholarly Resources Inc.
All rights reserved
First published 1986
Printed and bound in the United States of America
Scholarly Resources Inc.
104 Greenhill Avenue
Wilmington, Delaware 19805-1897
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Buhite, Russell D.
Decisions at Yalta.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Yalta Conference (1945) 2. World politics-
1945- . 3. World War, 1939-1945-Peace. I. Title.
D734.C7 1945zl 940.53'14 86-13779
ISBN 0-8420-2256-2 (alk. paper)
ISBN 0-8420-2268-6 (pbk.: alk. paper)
Page v
Acknowledgments
I am obliged to acknowledge the aid and assistance of a number of
individuals in the completion of this work. My primary debt is to the
nameless freshman in a class of 500 who suggested that I do a book
on Yalta. I hope he earned an "A." Richard Hopper, acquisitions editor
for Scholarly Resources, expressed early interest in the project and
encouraged me to complete the study and submit it for publication. To
Carolyn Travers, the project editor, and to others on the editorial staff,
I am grateful for the elimination of stylistic slips and the various and
sundry errors that exist in any manuscript. My research assistant,
Garth Todd, did yeoman work in gathering both manuscript and
secondary materials for my use. The staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library proved most cooperative and helpful during my stay there in
the summer of 1984, a stay made possible by a grant from the Four
Freedoms Foundation of the Roosevelt Library. Paul Varg provided a
careful reading of the manuscript and gave me the benefit of his ideas,
while my colleague Henry Tobias discussed a number of points of
interpretation with me. As she has done in the past, Martha Penisten,
administrative secretary at the university's History Department,
generously interrupted her busy schedule to type the manuscript.
Finally, my wife Mary-helpmate, companion, and best friend-gave
support that only she could provide, or permit. That the above have
incurred no responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation
existing in the book will not prevent my sharing the blame with them.
Page vii
For Mike
Page ix
Contents
Introduction xi
I Setting and Personalities 1
II Germany 21
III Poland 39
IV The United Nations 71
V The Far East 85
VI Iran, Yugoslavia, and the Declaration on Liberated 105
Europe
VII Yalta and the Palestine Problem 119
VIII An Appraisal 129
Bibliography 139
Index 151
Page xi
Introduction
This book is designed primarily for students in American history
courses as well as for the lay reader who may be interested in an
interpretive account of one of this century's most important and
controversial summit conferences. It is not intended to be an
exhaustive or definitive study of the subject based on new archival
research, although it does include information not previously
available. It places Yalta within the context of détente and emphasizes
that in the two main periods during which the United States and the
Soviet Union pursued a détente relationship such an asymmetry of
views existed that avoiding serious discord became virtually
impossible.
A working definition of the term détente and a brief account of its
meaning to American and Soviet policymakers historically are
essential to an understanding of the divergent approaches and
expectations at Yalta. Without belaboring the issue, it can simply be
said that détente is a method or process that states may use to put
aside differences and improve relations in the interest of avoiding
conflict among them. In the case of the United States and the Soviet
Union, it has involved the construction of a network of agreements,
either to meet a common objective, as during World War II when no
real entente cordiale developed, or, as in the last twenty years, to
avoid nuclear holocaust.
For the Soviet Union, détente arose out of the concept of coexistence,
a foreign policy approach that had its origins in the early
postrevolutionary period. Although Marxist-Leninist ideology
postulated that the transition to socialism would require war or violent
revolution, Soviet leaders in the 1920s, realizing the comparative
weakness of the new Soviet state, decided that they had to avoid war
with the capitalist nations in the short term. The way to do this was to
concentrate on increasing Soviet strength, while downplaying the
promotion of international communism. During the World War II era
the Soviets made
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distinctions among the capitalist nations. There were those virulently
aggressive and expansionist states like Germany, Japan, and Italy that
posed an immediate threat to the Soviet Union and the democracies
that remained dangerous in the long run but with whom they could
ally in addressing the present danger. Thus Premier Joseph Stalin
adapted ideology to the interest of Soviet security, and he
deemphasized its importance in his relations with the Western allies.
At Yalta he pursued a policy of détente with the United States and
Great Britain, but he did so without altering, to any significant degree,
the basic aims and objectives of the Soviet Union.
From the American perspective, Yalta provided the opportunity to
codify the wartime community of interest in a set of agreements that
would satisfy the needs of the major powers, establish a mechanism
within the United Nations for protecting the interests of the smaller
nations, and promote the general peace. Through the Declaration on
Liberated Europe and the emphasis on reorganization of the
government of Poland, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Winston Churchill advanced their expectations that liberal
democratic, as well as basic human, values would be observed.
Roosevelt and other members of the U.S. delegation had high hopes
for the ideals expressed in the Yalta accords, despite their willingness
to concede a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to the Soviet
Union.
American dreams were dashed because the détente Stalin formalized
at Yalta differed substantially from that of his Western allies. The
United Nations meant nothing to him except as a show of cooperation
with his U.S. ally to secure concessions in other areas of negotiation at
the Crimean meeting and to provide an opening wedge for subsequent
loans from the United States. Nor did he envision the Declaration on
Liberated Europe as serving to prevent Soviet freedom of action in
Eastern Europe. Indeed, Stalin firmly believed that the United States
and Great Britain should guarantee Soviet territorial aspirations, an
issue that he raised on numerous occasions during the war, even while
German troops occupied a large sector of Soviet territory. Despite
Stalin's wartime deemphasis of the issue, he did not share Roosevelt's
notion that ideology would play a minimal role in the future Soviet-
American relationship, looking ahead instead to the advancement of
Soviet influence in Western Europe through Communist parties then
under Moscow's control. Finally, détente