Deceased Organ Donation and AAllllooccaattiioonn:: 3 Experiments in Market Design Judd Kessler (Wharton) Al Roth (Stanford ) DDeecceeaasseedd oorrggaann aallllooccaattiioonn iiss iinn tthhee nneewwss • In Sept. 2012 the NY Times carried two stories – OOrrggaannss aarreenn’tt uusseedd eeffffiicciieennttllyy ((aanndd ssoommee aarree wwaasstteedd)) – A new (compromise) proposal about how to allocate deceased‐donor kidneys has been put out for ddiiscussiion • The issue of course is that there aren’t enough ttrraannssppllaannttaabbllee ddoonnoorr oorrggaannss.. • There are lots of interesting and important questions about how to most efficiently allocate thhe scarce supplly ((see e.g. ZZeniios et all.)) • But organ allocation has an unusual aspect: how oorrggaannss aarree aallllooccaatteedd mmaayy aallssoo iinnfflluueennccee tthhee supply, by changing donation behavior. 2 PPllaann ooff tthhiiss lleeccttuurree • ddeessccrriibbee 33 eexxppeerriimmeennttss rreellaatteedd ttoo tthhee ddeessiiggnn of deceased donor organ allocation and ssoolliicciittaattiioonn – Describe relevant background on organ donation aanndd ttrraannssppllaannttaattiioonn ((eennoouugghh ttoo iinnddiiccaattee wwhhyy wwee consider the options we consider, and not others) – Dissccuussss whaat eexppeerimeentss— ssoo faar 2 aabbsstraacct,, 1 involving actual organ donor decisions—can contribute to the design/policy debate. 3 OOrrggaann WWaaiittiinngg LLiisstt DDaattaa Waaittingg lisstt ccaanddiddaatteess:: 1155,,550088 ((99//199//12)) Active waiting list candidates: 73,532 TTrraannssppllaannttss ((22001111)):: 2288,,553377 • 22,518 from deceased donors • 66,001199 ffrroomm lliivviinngg ddoonnoorrss Donors (2011): 14,145 • 88,112266 ddeecceeaasseedd ddoonnoorrss • 6,019 living donors (almost all kidneys) Downloaded 9/19/12 from httpp://opptn.transpplant.hrsa.ggov/data/ and http://unos.org/ 4 Kidney transplants are a big part • Last Wednesday whhen I llectured to you about kidney exchange there were xx,xxx ppaattiieennttss oonn tthhee wwaaiittiinngg lliisstt ffoorr ddeecceeaasseedd donor kidneys. • TThhiis morniing tthhere were yy,yyy 5 Table 1: U.S. Kidney Transplants Deceased Deceased Donor Living All Wait-list New Wait-list Year Donors Transplants Donors Patients Additions 1999 5,386 8,044 4,725 41,176 21,845 2000 5,489 8,126 5,499 44,568 22,356 2001 5,528 8,233 6,042 47,576 22,502 2002 5,638 8,539 6,240 50,301 23,631 2003 5,753 8,667 6,473 53,530 24,683 2004 6,325 9,358 6,647 57,168 27,280 2005 6,700 9,913 6,571 61,562 29,145 2006 7,178 10,661 6,435 66,352 32,361 2007 7,240 10,591 6,043 71,862 32,424 2008 7,188 10,552 5,968 78,366 32,584 22000099 77,224488 1100,444422 66,338899 8844,224444 3333,667711 The data for years 1999–2009 are provided by OPTN as of May 21, 2010. New Wait-list Additions counts patients (rather than registrants) to eliminate the problems of counting mmuullttiippllee ttiimmeess ppeeooppllee wwhhoo rreeggiisstteerr iinn mmuullttiippllee cceenntteerrss. AAllll WWaaiitt-lliisstt PPaattiieennttss aallssoo ccoouunnttss patients rather than registratants. All Wait-list Patients data from 1999-2007 are from the 2008 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report; All Wait-list Patients data from 2008-2009 are extrapolated 6 from Wait-list Additions and Waitlist Removals provided by OPTN as of May 21, 2010. Where do donors come from? • Live donors: – Mostlyy ppersonallyy connected to a ppatient – Growing number of web‐recruited donors – SSmmaallll bbuutt ggrroowwiinngg nnuummbbeerr ooff nnoonn‐ddiirreecctteedd donors – Kidneyy exchangge is the fastest ((but still veryy small) growing source of live donor transplants. – But, despite the growth in live donation, we’re falling behind the need for transplantable kkiiddnneeyyss. 7 Deceased donors • Donor regiistratiion, – Opt in, mostly at Departments of Motor Vehicles (at time of driver’s license) – Donatiions ffrom unregiisteredd ddonors can allso bbe madde bby thhe surviving next‐of‐kin • In New England, about half of the eligible unregistered cadavers bbeeccoommee ddoonnoorrss • Other proposals – Opt out (many countries) – MMaannddaatteedd cchhooiiccee • Organ allocation – by waiting list, by region and organ – DDiifffferentt organs hhave ddiifffferentt waiittiing lliistt rulles ((e.g. lliiver iis bby health status, kidneys are primarily by waiting time) • Other proposals – SSiingapore: ffiirst priioriity to regiisteredd ddonors – Israel: similar proposal adopted, just recently implemented 8 MMoottiivvaattiioonn ffoorr tthhee IIssrraaeellii llaaww • “The consent rate for organ donation in Israel, defined as the proportion of actual donors of total number of medically eligible brain‐dead donors, hhaass ccoonnssiisstteennttllyy bbeeeenn 4455%% dduurriinngg tthhee ppaasstt ddeeccaaddee, mmuucchh lloowweerr tthhaann iinn most western countries… • “In two formal surveys of public attitudes towards organ donation, which were done by the Israel National Transplant Centre in 1999 (n=758) and 2200004444 ((nn=441177)), 5555%% ooff iinnddiivviidduuaallss iinn eeaacchh ssuurrvveeyy iinnddiiccaatteedd tthheeiirr willingness to donate organs in exchange for prioritisation in organ allocation. In both surveys, the proportion of individuals who chose this option was much greater than the proportions choosing the second and tthhiirrdd pprreeffeerrrreedd ooppttiioonnss, wwhhiicchh wweerree ddiirreecctt ((2266%%)) oorr iinnddiirreecctt ffiinnaanncciiaall compensation (25%), respectively, for organ donation. The basis of this public reaction is mainly a perceived need to rectify the unfairness of free riders—people who are willing to accept an organ but refuse to ddoonnaattee oonnee—aass pprraaccttiisseedd bbyy aa ssmmaallll yyeett pprroommiinneenntt pprrooppoorrttiioonn ooff tthhee Israeli public. These individuals are opposed to the idea of brain death and organ donation, yet they do not abstain from becoming candidates for transplantation when they need an organ for themselves.” • LLavee JJ, AAshhkkenazii TT, GGurman GG, SSteiinbberg DD. AA new llaw ffor allllocatiion off donor organs in Israel. Lancet 2010; 375:1131–1133. 9 OObbssttaacclleess ttoo ffiieelldd eexxppeerriimmeennttss • DDeecceeaasseedd oorrggaann ddoonnaattiioonn aanndd aallllooccaattiioonn iiss heavily regulated, and making changes is an eexxttrraaoorrddiinnaarriillyy ccuummbbeerrssoommee regulatory/political process with lots of iinntteerreessttss aatt ssttaakkee. • One of the most important regulations is that mmoonneeyy ccaann’tt bbee uusseedd ttoo aattttrraacctt ddoonnaattiioonnss. 10
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