Death (Central Problems of Philosophy)

184 Pages·2007·0.61 MB·English

by  Geoffrey Scarre

Death
Central Problems of Philosophy
Series Editor: John Shand
This series of books presents concise, clear, and rigorous analy-
ses of the core problems that preoccupy philosophers across all
approaches to the discipline. Each book encapsulates the essen-
tial arguments and debates, providing an authoritative guide to
the subject while also introducing original perspectives. This series
of books by an international team of authors aims to cover those
fundamental topics that, taken together, constitute the full breadth
of philosophy.
Published titles
Action Ontology
Rowland Stout Dale Jacquette
Causation and Explanation Paradox
Stathis Psillos Doris Olin
Death Perception
Geoffrey Scarre Barry Maund
Free Will Relativism
Graham McFee Paul O’Grady
Knowledge Scepticism
Michael Welbourne Neil Gascoigne
Meaning Truth
David E. Cooper Pascal Engel
Mind and Body Universals
Robert Kirk J. P. Moreland
Modality
Joseph Melia
Forthcoming titles
God The Self
Jay Wood Stephen Burwood
Realism and Anti-Realism Value
Stuart Brock & Edwin Mares Derek Matravers
Rights
Duncan Ivison
Death

Geoffrey Scarre
acumen
© Geoffrey Scarre, 2007
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
No reproduction without permission.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2007 by Acumen
Acumen Publishing Limited
Stocksfield Hall
Stocksfield
NE43 7TN
www.acumenpublishing.co.uk
ISBN: 978-1-84465-082-8 (hardcover)
ISBN: 978-1-84465-083-5 (paperback)
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library.
Excerpt from “Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night” in Collected Poems
and The Poems of Dylan Thomas, © 1952 by Dylan Thomas, reprinted
by permission of J. M. Dent and New Directions Publishing Corp.
Designed and typeset by Kate Williams, Swansea.
Printed and bound by Cromwell Press, Trowbridge.
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
1. The nature of death 1
2. Existential perspectives 25
3. Long lives, short lives 47
4. Facing death 65
5. The evil of death 85
6. The interests of the dead 111
7. Dealing with the dead 129
Notes 151
Bibliography 163
Index 171

Acknowledgements
I am particularly grateful to Steven Luper and Anthony Bash
for invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this book, and
to colleagues and students in the Philosophy Department at the
University of Durham with whom I have been discussing the topic
of death (not too depressingly, I hope) for many years. John Shand
gave me g enerous advice and encouragement at the outset of
this project, and Steven Gerrard at Acumen has been a kind and
understanding editor throughout. I am also greatly indebted to the
sharp copy-editing eye of Kate Williams. It is a pleasure to record
my thanks to all without whose help this would have been a much
poorer book.
Geoffrey Scarre, Durham

1 The nature of death
Death may seem to be a rather morbid subject for philosophical
speculation. Why, after all, should the living concern themselves
with a state that, by definition, they do not occupy? Death – the
sickle-wielding reaper, the biblical king of terrors – has not yet
arrived for any reader of these lines. In one of the most famous
reflections on death, the Greek philosopher Epicurus reminds us
that “so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death
comes, then we do not exist”. Epicurus concludes from this that
death is of no concern to either the living or the dead, “since for the
former it is not, and the latter are no more” (Epicurus 1926: 85).
Still, as many philosophers have willingly or unwillingly con-
ceded, it is hard to cultivate a state of genuine indifference to the
fact that we will all eventually die. The thought that the people we
love will die, whether before or after us, is inevitably painful. And
it is hard to reconcile ourselves to the knowledge that we ourselves
will finally shuffle off this mortal coil. Whatever else death may be,
my dying marks the end of all those activities, projects, relationships
and commitments that give sense and distinctiveness to my life.
This termination of what I care about can scarcely be insignificant
to me (or to others, with whose lives my own has interlocked). As
Mary Mothersill succinctly puts it, “death is the deadline for all
my assignments” (1987: 90).1 Any unfinished business I have at
that point will remain unfinished (by me, at least). Even if I should
be fortunate enough to die painlessly, my death will deprive me
of whatever gives value to my life, including the opportunity to
pursue a range of rewarding and hitherto untried possibilities. Of