Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century

184 Pages·2016·6.162 MB·English

by  Sumit Ganguly

Deadly Impasse
' '
Kashmir and Inda-Pakistani Relations
at the Dawn of a New Century
SUMIT GANGULY
Indiana University, Bloomington
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CONTENTS
List of maps page viii
Prefacea nd acknowledgments ix
List of abbreviations xi
1 The rivalry revisited 1
2 Kargil and after 3 1
3 The troubled decade in Kashmir 53
4 The road to Operation Parakram 6 3
5 The composite dialogue and beyond 81
6 An extension of the rivalry 105
7 Policy implications 120
In lieu of an epilogue 129
Appendix A The KarachiA greement 134
Appendix B The Tashkent Declaration 140
Appendix C The Shim/a Agreement 143
Appendix D The Lahore Declaration 146
Appendix E The India-Paf?_istNano n-Attack Agreement 150
Appendix F Charts,d ata and calculationsb y Jack Renner 152
Appendix G Maps 158
References 160
Index 171
vii
MAPS
1 Siachen Glacier page 158
2 Contested territories 159
Vlll
PREFACE AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
..
,. I'
This manuscript has had a long gestation period. The original idea
stemmed from a plan to update my previous book, The Crisis in
Kashmir: .Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. However, my imagina
tive and supportive editor at Cambridge University Press, Edward
Parsons, upon reading my proposal suggested that I write a wholly
new book. His generous suggestion led to the genesis of this book.
It does not merely seek to update developments in Kashmir but
instead attempts to probe what ails the ludo-Pakistani relationship
and prevents a resolution of the long-standing dispute. It argues
that the two parties are not on an equal footing; Pakistan is the revi
sionist state in this relationship and India is the status quo power.
This argument is not a normative statement; instead it is merely the
description of an empirical reality.
I am deeply grateful to a number of individuals who have read
and commented on the manuscript. My most able, thoughtful and
generous critics are two former doctoral students, Nicolas Blarel
and Manjeet Pardesi. Both of them read the manuscript with care,
proffered important theoretical and substantive suggestions and
forced me to clarify my arguments in various places. Colonel David
0. Smith, a friend of many years, who served twice as the United
States Defense Attache in Islamabad, Pakistan, also provided timely,
thoughtful and trenchant comments on this manuscript. Professor
Robert Jervis, who has long been a staunch intellectual supporter,
read the manuscript with much care and provided me with exten
sive and perspicacious comments. Finally, I wish to thank an
lX
X Pref ace and acknowledgments
anonymous reviewer for Cambridge University Press who provided
critical, but entirely helpful, suggestions for improving the manu
script. The usual caveats apply.
I also wish to thank the following individuals for their assistance.
My research assistant, Brandon Miliate, proofread this manuscript
with care, pitched in as needed to track down errant endnotes, and
created the bibliography and appendices. Karen Stoll Farrell, the
Librarian for South and Southeast Asia at the Wells Library and
Indiana University, Bloomington helped locate relevant documents
in a most timely fashion. Her colleague, Theresa Quill, the Social
Sciences and GIS Librarian, worked closely and attentively with
me to create the accompanying maps. Jack Renner, an intern at
the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University
Bloomington, carefully constructed the economic data charts:
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not thank my pre\rious editor at
Cambridge University Press, Marigold Acland, and my current edi
tor, Lucy Rhymer for their generous encouragement, extraordinary
1
patience and·unstinted support.
,('
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ABBREVIATIONS
CBM Confidence Building Measure
ccs
Cabinet Committee on Security
CFL Ceasefire Line
HuM Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
IAF Indian Air Force
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISI-D Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC Line of Control
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NIA National Investigation Agency
NLI Northern Light Infantry
PAF Pakistan Air Force
PLA People's Liberation Army
PPP Pakistan People's Party
PRC People's Republic of China
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
X1
I
The rivalry revisited
THE SOURCES OF DISCORD
What animates the Indo-Pakistani conflict? The question is fa.r
from trivial. This rivalry, which originated almost immediately after
British colonial withdrawal from and the partition of the British
Indian Empire in I947, has p;oven to be remarka~ly durable.1 It
has resulted in four wars (I947-48, I965, I97I and I999) and
multiple crises. 2 The structural origi~s ~f this' G~nflict have been
explored at length elsewhere.3 . .
>
This book, focused on Indo-Pakistani relations between I999
and 2009, will attempt to answer a critical question: does the secur
ity dilemma (the spiral model) or the deterreµce model best describe
this relationship?4 This attempt to squarely place the rivalry..in the
1 For a particularly thoughtful account of the process of partition and the drawing
of the Indo-Pakistani border see Lucy P. Chester, Borders and Conflict in S6uth
Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of the Punjab •
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
2 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: I'ndia-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
3 For an Indian perspective on the British transfer of power see V.P. Menon,
The Transfer of Power in India (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1997); for a
Pakistani perspective see Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan
(Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1983).
4 For a clear discussion of these two models see Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976), p. 8I.
I
The rivalry revisited
2
context of central propositions from the security studies literature
is a fundamentally novel endeavor.
The novelty of this approachis twofold. First, despite the persist
ence of this rivalry over six decades, the literature on the subject is
scant.S What little does exists is either descriptive or historical in
orientation and there have been few attempts to examine the rivalry
through theoretical foci. 6 Second, this lack of scholarly attention to
the sources of discord is puzzling, as the two states have been incipi
ent nuclear-armed rivals for well over two decades and became
overt nuclear weapons states in 1998. Furthermore, one of the two
rivals, India, has long had aspirations to emerge as a great power.
Indeed, according to some scholars, it has already achieved great
power status.7
Some recent literature, mostly focused on Pakistan, while not
explicitly alluding to the concept of the security dilemma, has
neverthele~s suggested that the sheer structural differences between
the two states at the time of their emergence from the, detritus of'tlie
British colonial empire in South Asia, led the weaker state, Pakistan,
to fear its behemoth neighbor. To va~ying degrees, these wo~ks sug
gest that misgivir{gs about 'India precipitated Pakistan's anxietie~
and set the stage for the rivalry.8 Before turning to a discussion of
5, See.for example Jyoti,Bhusarl Das Gupta, Indo-PakistanR elations, z947-z955
(Amsterdam: De Bru~ Djar,nl:>atan,1 958); Sisir Gupta, Kashmir:A Study in
India-Pa~iitanR ei;};oJf (New Delhi: Asia Pubfishing House, 1967); Russell
Brines; The Indo-Pa'kiltaniC onflictl New York: l>a'llM all, 1968)'.
6 For an attempt at theorizing about the conflict see T.V. Paul (ed.), The
Inda-PakistaniC onflict:A n Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2.006); for i,c,rittque thereof see Sumit, Ganm1ly," War, Nuclear Weapom1
and Crisis Stability)n,S,qµth Asia," Security,~(udiesp , no. 1 (2.008): 164-184.
7 Manj~et S. Pardesi, "lll,.Jp.gia,a G waFJ>O,t'{'tfU? ,.nderstanding Great Power Status in
Contemporary International R~lati9ns,".iA,si'1~i.i,S'eIcIu, rnitoy. 1 (2015): 1-3q.
8 See for exal\lple, Ayesbq,Jalal, Th~Jtrugg(e (,orP a~istan,A: Muslim Homeland
and Global Politics (Cambridge, ¥A:.ljarvard University Press, 2.014); also see
Aqil ~hap, Thq Army.qn/1D, 11mqcra<M;Yi:l i41ryP oliticsi n Pakistan (C.ambridge,
MA: rJafVard UniversityJ'rc;s:;,:2.014). It suould be npted that Shah's argument,
in some significantdi:gree, differ5r/1oiµ:that of Jalal. Whereas Jalal suggests that
India's size and initial intransigence si;:to ff.Pakistan's fears, Shah argues that the
Pakistaµi pi{litar;: i;:s,t,ab).isJ1pie4m~ lpedi&toke those fears for its own parochial
interest~.,An impprtapt ~ception to these analyses, and whose argument
comports with mine, is C. Christine Fair, Fightingt o the End: The Pakistan
Army's Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2.014); Fair's argument