De gustibus : arguing about taste and why we do it PDF
Preview De gustibus : arguing about taste and why we do it
De Gustibus De Gustibus Arguing about Taste and Why We Do It Peter Kivy 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©PeterKivy2015 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2015 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015938776 ISBN 978–0–19–874678–2 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. For Ted Cohen Never To Be Forgotten Contents Preface ix 1. Hume’sDilemma 1 2. AGroundCommontoAll 10 3. TheBeautifulversustheGood(intheEighteenthCentury) 22 4. SimpleEmotivism 27 5. DosoasWell 36 6. TheAestheticShrug 45 7. ImmoralArt 58 8. IsBadTasteImmoral? 67 9. Push-pinandPoetry 73 10. BacktoSquareOne 82 11. TheRightPhenomenology? 93 12. TheTruthofInterpretation 102 13. TheTruthofAnalysis 119 14. TheTruthofEvaluation 137 15. CommonSenseandtheErrorTheory 152 Bibliography 161 Index 165 Preface Theseedfromwhichthismonographsproutedwasplantedsomethirty oddyearsago—1980,tobeprecise—inanessayofminecalled“AFailure of Aesthetic Emotivism,” Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), pp. 351–65, portions of which, now in revised form, are included here in Chapter4 andChapter5withkindpermissionofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia. Idonotatpresentreallyrecallhowtheideaforthisarticlecametome. For at the time, the so-called emotive theory of ethics was dead as the Dodobird,andwhyIshouldhavebeenthinkingaboutitatallIcannot imagine. Be that as it may, the point I made in that essay was that contrary to what might, on first reflection, be thought, the emotive theory of ethics was more plausible in at least one respect than was the emotivetheoryofaesthetics,namely,itprovidedaplausibleexplanation forwhyweengageinethicaldisputes,whereasthelatterprovidednone forwhyweengageinaestheticdisputes,disputesovertaste,whichmani- festlywedo. Furthermore, I was even emboldened, in that essay, to suggest that, again contrary to what one might initially conjecture, aesthetic realism might, in the event, be a more defensible position than ethical realism. But there Iessentially letthe matter drop;and although in 1992 Iwent overmuchofthesamegroundagaininaninvitedessayfortheLibraryof LivingPhilosophersvolumedevotedtoA.J.Ayer,Igotnofurtherwithit, andthewholethingquietlyslippedmymind. But whereas I do not now recall why I became concerned with the emotivetheoryofvalueinthefirstplace,in1980,Iknowquitewellwhat remindedmeofitnotverylongago,andwhatledmetothewritingof thepresentmonograph.Iwasinvited,in2012,tocommentonapaperof JamesHarold’s,atthePacificDivisionmeetingoftheAmericanSociety forAesthetics.Inthatinsightfulpresentation,ProfessorHaroldproposed thehypothesisthatwhatissometimescalledthesedays“expressivism”in ethics, the view that ethical value terms such as “right,” “good,” and “just,”donotrefertofactsabouttheworldbutexpressattitudestowards it, is true of aesthetic value terms such as “beautiful” and “sublime” as
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