D-Day: Operation Overlord from Its Planning to the Liberation of Paris PDF
Preview D-Day: Operation Overlord from Its Planning to the Liberation of Paris
'OPERATION OVERLORD' FROM ITS PLANNING TO THE L'IBERATION OF PARIS FOREWOfo BY Wl Churchill Classic Conflicts Classic Conflicts D-DAY Classic Conflicts < D-DAY 'OPERATION OVERLORD' FROM PLANNING TO THE ITS LIBERATION OF PARIS ^ PUBLISHED BY SALAMANDER BOOKS LIMITED LONDON A SALAMANDER BOOK PublishedbySalamanderBooksLtd 8 BlenheimCourt BreweryRoad LondonN79NT 135798642 ©SalamanderBooksLtd, 1999 ISBN 1 84065095 8 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproduced,stored inaretrievalsystemortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans, electronicmechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise, withoutthepriorpermissionofSalamanderBooksLtd Allcorrespondenceconcerningthecontentofthisbookshouldbe addressedtoSalamanderBooksLtd CREDITS DW Designedby Design,London SetbyD.A.G. PublicationsLtd PrintedandboimdinGreatBritainby MackaysofChathampic,Chatham,Kent Thisbookwasoriginallypublishedasanillustratededition CONTENTS THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE 7 Charles Kirkpatrick PREPARATION FOR OVERLORD 23 Stephen Badsey THE GERMAN DEFENCES 38 DetlefVogel OPERATION NEPTUNE 57 Edward Marolda D-DAY 79 Roger Cirillo and Stephen Badsey THE BUILDUP 101 Charles Kirkpatrick THE AIR BATTLE 116 Alfred Price THE NORMANDY BATTLEGROUND 131 Nigel de Lee THE BREAKOUT 154 Nigel de Lee THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE 168 Bernard Nalty PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 184 RogerCirillo INDEX 203 THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE an address to students at the US Army War College in the mid- In 1920s, Brig. Gen. Fox Conner harshly characterized the business of fightingas partofan alliance.Whileservingin Franceasanoperations officer on Gen. John J. Pershing's staff, he had witnessed the perpetual inability of the Allied and Associated powers to settle on a common strategy against the Germans or even to i^ree on allocation ofresources. The incessant pursuit of purely national interests, in his opinion, prevented the Allies fi-om bringing the fiill weight oftheir military and economicpowerefficientlyto bear gainst their common enemy.Thus, as he pondered the problem for the benefit ofthe Army's future strategists, Conner concluded that, ifhe had to go to war again, he would prefer to go to war against an alliance, rather than against a single power. Connerwas a considerable scholarofthemilitaryart, buthis strictures on the perils ofalliances had already been voiced centuries before by Sun Tzu, theancientChinesephilosopherofwar,whowarnedagainstentering into alliances without being entirely certain ofthe war aims ofthe poten- tial ally. Hastily conceived agreements. Sun Tzu suggested, could easily founder because two powers fighting a common foe might themselves have conflicting intentions. His was sound advice, for whenever two or more nations combined their efforts in war during the succeeding THE SECOND FRONT DEBATE centuries, bitter disagreements, ratiier than concord, were often the rule. In fact, one of the pecuharities of alHances is that successftil ones have always tended to disintegrate in discord as fast as unsuccessful ones. That certainly was the American experience ofWorld War I, the first major occasion since the Revolution when the United States had waged war in concert with allies. As isolationism and the depression jointly spiraled through the 1930s, a residuum ofsuspicion was directed even against the United Kingdom. There were those, both in the Army and out, who believed American naivety had been cold-bloodedly exploited in 1917 in awar to preserve the British Empire. The Anglo-American alliance ofWorld War II stood in contrast to the experience of 1917-18 as perhaps the most successful coalition in the history of modern warfare. From the very beginning, the United States and the United Kingdom adopted the defeat ofGermanyas their common goal. Agreement on ultimate aims nonetheless did not imply agreement in detail, and the progress ofthewarwas marked byperiodic disputes. Among the most famous was the occasionally acrimonious debate between Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Sir Bernard L. Montgomery about the proper strategy to be employed on the Euro- pean continent: the "broad front" or the "knife-like thrust." The springs ofsuch disagreements arose from the gradually evolving leader- ship ofthe coalition. Until 1943, Britain was the dominant partner and consequently more powerfully influenced the course of the alliance. After 1943, however, the United States, by virtue ofits contribution of the greater mass of manpower and economic power, became senior partner. The Second Front debate, more than any other, was emblem- atic ofthat shift in coalition leadership. It was, furthermore, the most significant difference of opinion that arose between the United States and Britain during the war. Both nations agreed that Germany had to be assaulted, but the specific agreement that the assault would be launched from England, across the English Channel, to the coast of France, was reached only after extended discussion. At its root, the Second Front debate was the question of whether the alliance would adhere to a long-term plan for a cross-channel attack, or would retain the flexibility to take advantage ofthe military situation at the time of attack to strike where Germany was weakest. Economic, political, and military differences, as well as differences in national styles ofwaging war, complicated the debate.
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