CYBERWAR AND REVOLUTION This page intentionally left blank Cyberwar and Revolution Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism Nick Dyer- Witheford and Svitlana Matviyenko University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London Copyright 2019 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by the University of Minnesota Press 111 Third Avenue South, Suite 290 Minneapolis, MN 55401- 2520 http://www.upress.umn.edu ISBN 978-1-5179-0410-4 (hc) ISBN 978-1-5179-0411-1 (pb) A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper The University of Minnesota is an equal- opportunity educator and employer. 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents INTRODUCTION: YOU MAY NOT BE INTERESTED IN CYBERWAR . . . 1 1. THE GEOPOLITICAL AND CLASS RELATIONS OF CYBERWAR 33 2. CYBERWAR’S SUBJECTS 73 3. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 117 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 163 NOTES 165 BIBLIOGRAPHY 175 INDEX 211 This page intentionally left blank Introduction: You May Not Be Interested in Cyberwar . . . GRIM EPIGRAM War, already distributed around the world by invasions, terrorist attacks, and drone strikes, insurgency and counterinsurgency, civil strife and foreign intervention, is today widening and intensifying in a new form waged across digital networks: cyberwar. Within capitalist democracies, warnings from national security agencies about Kremlin hackers, Chinese digital espionage, and jihadi virtual recruiters, not to mention networked leakers and whistleblowers, challenging said democracies from within, have been mounting for years; alarm rose to a fever pitch around Rus- sian interference in the 2016 U.S. election, then went yet higher with the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and may ascend even further, exposing new actors or directing public attention, again, toward the usual suspects. So it is that in an era when the maxims of Marxist masters have fallen into deep disrepute, one at least seems to have escaped the oblivion of capitalism’s memory hole. “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you,” an aphorism ascribed to Leon Trotsky— first commander of the Red Army, no less!— is today not only widely cited but often, by emendation or implication, given a new, high-t ech, exhortatory gloss: “You may not be interested in cyberwar, but cyberwar is interested in you” (Hoffman 2013; Schrage 2013; Dunlap 2014; Yong- Soo and Aßmann 2016). Like so much about cyberwar, however, the phrase suffers an “attribution problem” (Rid and Buchanan 2015), that is to say, an uncertainty as to authorship. For Trotsky never actually said or wrote “you may not be interested in 1 2 INTRODUCTION war”; the words were assigned to him in a spy novel, Alan Furst’s (1991) Dark Star.1 Yet despite, or perhaps because of, this grim epigram’s status as a piece of viral misinformation, a digitally circulated non-T rotskyism, this book takes “you may not be interested in cyberwar, but cyberwar is interested in you” as a point of departure. We do so not because there is insufficient interest in cyberwar—t here is now no shortage of com- mentary on the topic— but rather because so little of it is written from a politically critical perspective, committed to contesting the logic of the social system that daily draws the world closer to catastrophe. It is from such a position that we ask three introductory questions derived from non- Trotsky’s cryptic proposition. First, what is “cyberwar”? Second, what could it mean to say that “cyberwar” is “interested in you”? And third— the issue that would surely have informed Trotsky’s original observation, had he actually made it— what is the relation, today, of cyberwar to capital- ism, and to revolution? WHAT IS CYBERWAR? Cyberwar, a neologism that asserts war has left the armored train from which Trotsky directed revolutionary troops far, far behind, is a term that has abruptly risen in prominence in recent years but that possesses more than a quarter century of genealogy (Healey 2013; Rid 2016). As we discuss later, cybernetics originated in the American and British military research of the Second World War, setting a path for the development of computers and networks that continued throughout the Cold War. However, the contemporary use of cyberwar, with specific reference to attacks in and on digital networks, did not emerge until the 1980s. Fred Kaplan (2016) suggests that U.S. military concern about this possibility was sparked by President Reagan’s viewing of the film WarGames (1983), about computer-g aming teenagers breaking into the networks of U.S. Strategic Air Command. This anxiety- inducing event purportedly set in motion the first of what would become a long series of invariably urgent reports about the vulnerabilities of the United States (and its foes) to digital attack, produced by competing defense agencies and departments, only to be shelved, then rediscovered and repeated by successive administrations. The actual conjoining of cyber with war was, however, the work of INTRODUCTION 3 popular culture, reflecting the rapid uptake of science fiction author Wil- liam Gibson’s (1984) cyberspace to designate the increasingly widespread experience of internet use. According to Thomas Rid (2016), cyberwar first appeared in the digital avant- garde magazine Omni in a 1987 article about giant military robots. It was taken up more seriously in a 1992 essay by Eric H. Arnett in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that declared, “The leading military concept of the new era might be called cyberwar” and applied it to a range of computerized “autonomous weapons,” including crewless tanks, cruise missiles, advanced air- defense missiles, and anti- missile satellites. This probably inspired the Chicago Sun- Times news report of the same year, titled “Cyberwar Debate,” about an alleged dispute between “scientists and the military” as to “who should wage war, man or machine,” which the Oxford English Dictionary records as the earliest usage of the phrase. In U.S. policy discourse, an early public salvo on “cyberwar” was the 1993 report by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt for the RAND Corpo- ration, the U.S. Air Force think tank. Dramatically titled “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” it acknowledged the immediate influence of the U.S. forces’ lightning Operation Desert Storm victory over Iraq in the Gulf War, in which Arquilla had been a consultant serving General Schwarzkopf. However, it reached back further into history to Mongol cavalry and Nazi Blitzkrieg to emphasize the importance of communication to gather knowledge crucial to military operations and overwhelm an enemy. From these instances, it extrapolated dramatic consequences from the informa- tion revolution and the growing use of computers and networks, suggest- ing that in the future, various forms of irregular warfare aided by such technologies would outmatch more heavily armed conventional forces. The authors developed this thesis in a series of subsequent publications, seizing on examples from the Zapatista uprising of Mayan peasants to the increasing powers of drug cartels to conduct the “swarming” operations characteristic of what they variously termed netwar or cyberwar (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996, 1997, 2000). At the time, their hypothesis seemed futur- ist provocation riding the coattails of fashionable discussions of digital smart weapons, but over the next decades, events would make “Cyberwar Is Coming!” prophetic (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993). These included, first and foremost, the 9/11 destruction of the World