Currency, Credit and Crisis: Central Banking in Ireland and Europe

393 Pages·2019·3.481 MB·English

by  Patrick Honohan

CURRENCY,CREDITANDCRISIS
The global financial crisis in 2008 brought central banking centre stage,
prompting questions about the role of national central banks and – in
Europe – of the multi-country European Central Bank. What can central
banks do, and what are their limitations? How have they performed?
Currency, Credit and Crisis seeks to provide a coherent perspective on the
functions ofacentral bankinasmallcountry byassessingthewayinwhich
Ireland’s financial crisis from 2010 to 2013 was handled. Drawing on his
experiences as Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland and in research and
policy work at the World Bank, Patrick Honohan offers a detailed analytical
narrative of the origins of the crisis and of policymakers’ conduct during its
mostfraughtmoments.
Patrick Honohan is Honorary Professor of Economics at Trinity College
Dublin,NonresidentSeniorFellowatthePetersonInstituteforInternational
EconomicsandaResearchFellowoftheCentreforEconomicPolicyResearch
(CEPR).
STUDIES IN MACROECONOMIC HISTORY
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ChristopherM.Meissner,UniversityofCalifornia,Davis
KrisJamesMitchener,SantaClaraUniversity
DavidC.Wheelock,FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis
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EricMonnet,ControllingCredit:CentralBankingandthePlannedEconomyin
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Currency, Credit and Crisis
Central Banking in Ireland and Europe
PATRICK HONOHAN
TrinityCollege,Dublin
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Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108481892
DOI:10.1017/9781108680325
©PatrickHonohan2019
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Firstpublished2019
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Contents
ListofFigures,TableandBoxes pagevii
Acknowledgements ix
ListofAbbreviations xiii
BankingDramatisPersonae xvi
Introduction 1
PARTI CURRENCY
1 CurrencyChoices 21
2 TowardstheEuro 49
3 TheEuroAreaCrisis 73
PARTII CREDIT
4 SafeandSoundBanking 99
5 FaultsinFinancialServices 126
6 TheRoleoftheCentralBank 153
PARTIII CRISIS
7 TheGuarantee 179
8 TheRacetoStabilizetheBanks 209
9 TheBailout 232
10 CleaningUp 256
v
vi Contents
PARTIV TAKINGSTOCK
11 TheEuropeanDecadeofBankFailure 289
12 TheIrishEconomyinBoomandBust 312
13 LessonsLearnt 339
References 354
Index 364
Figures, Table and Boxes
Figures
I.1 Totalnumbersatwork,1998–2018 page15
I.2 Distributionofpopulation,1961–2016 16
1.1 ConsumerpricesinIreland,1914–2018 26
1.2 Nominalanchor:Alternativeexchangerateregimes,1970–2018 28
2.1 Relativehourlyearnings,1975–2008 52
2.2 Realinterestrates,1983–2013 53
2.3 Nominaleffectiveexchangerate,1979–2008 63
2.4 IrelandandIceland:Realwages,2000–14 66
3.1 Yieldspreadroughlyequalsexchangerateriskpluscreditrisk,
1990–2013 78
4.1 TotalassetsofsixIrishbanks,1998–2008 111
4.2 Dublinrealhouseprices,1971–2018 112
4.3 Shareofnewmortgagesathighloan-to-valueratios,2004–7 113
5.1 VariablemortgageinterestratesIrelandandtheUK,2003–13 129
5.2 Numberofowner-occupiermortgagesinarrears,2009–18 136
5.3 Repossessionsandsurrendersofowner-occupiedproperties,
2009–18 137
7.1 Ireland:Allocationofbankinglosses 201
8.1 CentralbankfinancingoftheIrishbankingsystem,2003–12 228
10.1 Projectionsandoutcomes,2010–15 281
10.2 Scaleofausteritycomparedtobankcreditorbailout,2008–15 283
12.1 Totalemployment,1970–95and1998–2018 317
12.2 Unemploymentrates:Ireland,theUKandeuroarea,2006–14 319
12.3 Unemploymentintwocycles,1967–92and1993–2017 319
vii
viii ListofFigures,TableandBoxes
12.4 Realpercapitapersonaldisposableincome,1970–90
and1996–2016 320
12.5 Irishlongspreadoverbunds,1971–91and1998–2018 323
12.6 ActualandhypotheticalGDP,2000–10 325
12.7 Fallinnumbersemployedfrom2007peaktotroughandto2017,
Europeancountries 334
12.8 Numbersatwork:SelectedEUcountries,1998–2017 335
Table
7.1 MainbanksinIrelandin2008 199
Boxes
2.1 ForeignExchangeReserves 69
4.1 GlimpsesoftheBanks’RiskCulturefromtheBankingInquiry 118
4.2 TwoCostlyRiskManagementFailures:NeglectingBubbleRisk
andCross-Collateralization 120
7.1 Iceland 203
12.1 TheGDPMeasurementProblem 323
Acknowledgements
My motivation for writing this book came from the more than six years
IspentasGovernoroftheCentralBankofIreland,workingwithanable
and motivated staff to rebuild institutional morale in a constrained and
oftenhostileenvironment.Toprovidehereacomprehensivelistingofall
who have contributed to this effort would be impossible; to be selective
seemsinvidiousthoughunavoidable.
Iwouldliketoemphasizethekeyroleplayedmyformercolleaguesatthe
Central Bank in the 2009–13 crisis management story that is told here.
Bank restructuring and economic stabilization were at the heart of the
matter. The incomparable all-rounder Matthew Elderfield took the posi-
tion of deputy governor for financial regulation and built on the reforms
that had been initiated by Mary O’Dea. He was ably succeeded in this
analytically demanding role by Cyril Roux heading a group in which
JonathanMcMahon,FionaMuldoonandSharonDonneryservedinturn
with great distinction as directors in charge of bank supervision. This
group included Michael Feeney, Pat Brady, Fiona McMahon, Shane
O’Neill, Dwayne Price, Ed Sibley and Adrian Varley as examples of key
experts who stepped into vital roles during the resolution of the crisis.
Complementing the banking specialists were the economists, financial
stability and monetary operations experts. Stefan Gerlach succeeded
TonyGrimesasdeputygovernorinchargeofthisareaandpresidedover
agroupwhichhadtobeinnovativeinunchartedwaters.MauriceMcGuire,
Gabriel Fagan and Lars Frisell were, in turn, directors here, and were
supportedbysuchexpertsasMarkCassidy,RobKelly,ReaLydon,Fergal
McCann,YvonneMcCarthy,Anne-MarieMcKiernan,GillianPhelanand
PeterSinnott,alongwiththelegalteamheadedsuccessivelybyJoeGavin
and Eadaoin Rock. Other areas, such as consumer protection (headed by
BernardSheridan)andthesupervisionofnonbanksalsohadanimportant
ix