Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society

502 Pages·1990·32.029 MB·English

by  Ronald Inglehart

Culture Shift in
Advanced Industrial
Society

RONALD INGLEHART
Culture Shift in
Advanced Industrial
Society
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
Copyright © 1990 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Inglehart, Ronald,
Culture shift in advanced industrial society I Ronald Inglehart.
p. cm.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-691-07786-X (alk. paper)
ISBN 0-691-02296-8 (pbk.)
I. Social values. 2. Social history~ 1970-- I. Title.
HM73.154 1990
303. 3 '72-dc20 89-34207
This book has been composed in Linotron Times Roman
Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper
and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the
Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the
Council on Library Resources
Printed in the United States of America
Portions of chapters 1,2, 3, and 8 of this book appeared in an earlier form in The
American Political Science Review in December 1988, December 1981, March 1985,
and December 1987 respectively. Another portion of chapter 8 appeared in
Government and Opposition in Autumn 1986.
9 8 7 6 5
This book is dedicated to
my wife, Marita, and my children,
Elizabeth, Rachel, and Ronald

CONTENTS
Figures and Tables ix
Preface xvii
Introduction: The Impact of Economic and Sociopolitical Change on
Culture and the Impact of Culture on Economics, Society, and
Politics in Advanced Industrial Society 3
Chapter 1. Culture, Stable Democracy, and Economic Development 15
Chapter 2. The Rise of Postmaterialist Values 66
Chapter 3. Stability and Change in Mass Belief Systems 104
Chapter 4. Structure in Mass Value Systems: The Materialist!
Postmaterialist Dimension 130
Chapter 5. Values, Social Class, and Economic Achievement 162
Chapter 6. Changing Religious Orientations, Gender Roles, and Sexual
Norms 177
Chapter 7. Subjective Well-Being and Value Change: Aspirations
Adapt to Situations 212
Chapter 8. The Diminishing Marginal Utility of Economic
Determinism: The Decline of Marxism 248
Chapter 9. The Impact of Values on Ideology and Political Behavior 289
Chapter 10. From Elite-Directed to Elite-Directing Politics: The Role
of Cognitive Mobilization, Changing Gender Roles, and
Changing Values 335
Chapter 11. New Social Movements: Values, Ideology, and Cognitive
Mobilization 371
Chapter 12. Cultural Change and the Atlantic Alliance 393
Chapter 13. The Role of Culture in Social Change: Conclusion 422
Appendix 435
References 461
Index 477

FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURES
0-1. Overview: The processes of change examined in this book 6
1-1. Cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable 26
1-2. Mean life satisfaction by level of economic development 32
1-3. Interpersonal trust among European publics, 197~1986 35
1-4. Economic development and interpersonal trust 37
1-5. Mean life satisfaction and stable democracy 42
1-6. Economic and cultural prerequisites of stable democracy 43
1-7. Political integration of women at elite level by historically dominant
religious tradition 52
1-8. Long-term economic consequences of rise of Protestant Ethic 54
1-9. Economic development and the decline of Materialist values 58
1-10. Materialist values and economic growth, 1965-1984 59
2-1. Value type by age group, among the combined publics of Britain,
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands in 1970 76
2-2. Cohort effects only 80
2-3. Cohort effects plus period effects 81
2-4. Life cycle effects only 81
2-5. Value priorities of eight age cohorts across six West European publics,
1970-1988 85
2-6. Value priorities of seven age cohorts and mean inflation rates across
six West European countries, 1970-1987 94
2-7. Percentage of Postmaterialists minus percentage of Materialists in
combined sample of six West European publics, 1970-1971 through
1984 100
2-8. Projected percentage of Postmaterialists minus percentage of
Materialists for six West European publics in 1990, 1995, and 2000 102
3-1. Three models of continuity and change in mass attitudes 109
3-2. Value stability in three-nation sample 121
3-3. Value stability in the United States 122
3-4. Value stability in the Netherlands 123
3-5. Value stability in West Germany 124
3-6. Latent attitudes model's expected stability of Materialist/
Postmaterialist values over various time intervals and observed
stability over the same intervals 125
4-1. Items used in the twelve-item battery and needs they were intended to
tap 134
4-2. The MaterialistiPostmaterialist values dimension in 1973 and 1978 140
4-3. Structure of value priorities of nine Western publics, 1973 143
5-1. Job goals by value type 170
x - Figures and Tables
5-2. Value-based differences in respondents' education, occupational
prestige, and income 171
5-3. Economic achievement by value priorities and education among those
born since 1945 172
5-4. Economic achievement by value priorities and respondent's father's
educational level 174
6-1. Attitudes toward homosexuality by value priorities of given publics 207
6-2. Divorce rates by value priorities of given publics 208
6-3. Fertility rates by value priorities of given publics 209
6-4. Illegitimacy rates by value priorities of given publics 210
7-1. The distribution of overall life satisfaction and happiness among West
European publics, 1973-1983 219
8-1. The diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism 249
8-2. Economic development and income equality 251
8-3. Support for the classic economic policies of the Left by level of
economic development, 1979-1983 256
8-4. The trend in social class-based voting in five Western democracies,
1947-1987 260
8-5. Percentage voting for political parties of the Right or Center by value
type among combined publics of Britain, France, Italy, West
Germany, and the Netherlands, 1970--1985 262
8-6. Ideological location of the potential electorates for major political
parties 276
8-7. Percentage planning to vote for Communist party by age cohort,
1973-1987 282
9-1. Correlates of issue positions taken by candidates of sixty-six parties
from nine West European countries 301
9-2. The impact of religion, social class, and values on three types of
political polarization 309
9-3. Impact of formative security and values in 1974 on protest potential in
1980 317
9-4. Balance between Materialist and Postmaterialist value priorities
among West German elites and West German public 324
9-5. Balance between Materialist and Postmaterialist value priorities
among elites and public in the United States, 1987 327
10-1. Political discussion rates by level of economic development 343
10-2. Percentage who "frequently" or "occasionally" discuss politics by
birth cohort, 1973-1987 347
10-3. The shrinking gender gap: political discussion rates among men and
women born in the years indicated 350
10-4. Percentage who discuss politics in eight nations, 1973-1987 354
10-5. Strength of partisan loyalties by age cohort, 1976-1987 356
10-6. Percentage "high" on cognitive mobilization by age cohort, 1973-
1987 360