Cuban Studies

239 Pages·2015·3.643 MB·English

Editor’s Note
This is the fi rst volume of Cuban Studies produced under a new editorial team
based at Harvard University. The journal was dormant for several years, a tran-
sitional period during which it depended on guest editors and occasional sub-
missions. That period of uncertainty is over, and we are pleased to report that
Cuban Studies, now one of the longest-lasting academic journals dealing with
Cuban topics published anywhere in the world, has entered a new period.
We began by appointing a new editorial board, as memberships in the
previous board had all expired or were about to expire. The new board seeks
to refl ect the richness and diversity of the fi eld of Cuban studies in terms of
disciplines, approaches, authorship, and the geographic dispersion of its pro-
duction. Serious scholarship on Cuba is produced today well beyond Cuba and
the United States, the traditional centers of knowledge production about the
island. There are important centers in Canada, Mexico, Spain, and Great Brit-
ain. Several scholars of Cuba, including a growing number of Cuban scholars,
are also working in various academic centers in Latin America, stretching the
geographic reach of the fi eld, and benefi ting from exchanges and perspectives
brewed in other intellectual traditions. The fi eld is no longer the near-exclusive
monopoly of white males, a welcomed change that our editorial board seeks
to refl ect as well. Nor are studies of Cuba mostly confi ned to traditional dis-
ciplines such as history, political science, economics and literature. They now
encompass cultural studies, gender studies, art history and criticism, LGBT
studies, ethnography, anthropology, musicology, racial and ethnic studies, en-
vironmental studies, and more.
We build on a long and distinguished tradition of excellence, collabora-
tion, and intellectual integrity. Even during the times when studies about Cuba,
no matter the subject, were hopelessly politicized, Cuban Studies was always a
rare space of academic integrity, respectful dialogue, and productive exchange.
Even at a time when Cuban culture was produced through what Ambrosio For-
net has called “reciprocal negations,” the journal sought to publish empirically
based, methodologically sound, serious academic research. Some of the fi rst
academic polemics involving scholars based in Cuba and the United States
were published by the journal, with great respect for all involved. We honor
these legacies and benefi t from the wisdom of more than forty years of edito-
rial existence by having the founding editor of Cuban Studies (Carmelo Mesa-
Lago) and the former rotating editors—Jorge Domínguez, Jorge Pérez López,
ix
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x : Editor’s Note
Louis A. Pérez Jr., and Enrico Mario Santí—as “honorary members” of our
board. They have deep, unparalleled knowledge about the evolution of Cuban
studies—both the journal and the fi eld.
Following a sensible initiative introduced by Louis A. Pérez Jr. during his
editorial tenure, we asked two colleagues to serve as book review editors, one
based in Cuba and one based in the United States. They need no introduction.
Lillian Guerra is a renowned historian of twentieth-century Cuba and the Ca-
ribbean, author of several key texts about the history of the island. Reinaldo
Funes Monzote is an expert in the fi eld of environmental studies, the top en-
vironmental historian of Cuba. Through their efforts, we will be publishing
reviews about books on Cuba published all over the world, but we are particu-
larly committed to the inclusion of books published in Cuba and of reviewers
based in the island. We ask our readers and collaborators to bring interesting
books to our attention: tracking today’s global editorial production is no easy
task. Finally, we are lucky to have Cary Aileen García Yero as managing editor
of Cuban Studies. A scholar of Cuban culture, with training in history and mu-
sic, García Yero oversees the peer-review process of manuscripts, participates
in editorial decisions, and helps assemble the volumes.
Thanks to the dedication of this editorial team, and of our multidisciplinary
board, we have produced this issue in record time. In addition to papers in his-
tory, culture and politics, this volume contains a central dossier on demogra-
phy. This dossier charts some of the important changes experienced by the
Cuban population—a concept that of course includes those living abroad—and
some of the challenges posed by those changes (such as aging, or the chang-
ing composition of the expatriate community). A paper in the dossier looks
carefully at infant mortality fi gures and raises poignant questions concerning
methodologies and results.
We seek to publish similar dossiers in every issue, with a variety of impor-
tant themes and disciplinary approaches. Proposals from colleagues working
on Cuba all over the world are welcome.
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SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS
Major Problems, Few Solutions:
Cuba’s Demographic Outlook
ABSTRACT
In the next several decades, Cuba will face major demographic challenges. As a result
of persistent low fertility and high emigration rates, the population is contracting and
aging. The aging population trend, as suggested by recent population projections, is
irreversible over the short to medium term, posing considerable social and economic
dilemmas for the future. How to address the needs of the elderly population will be
at the center of the economic policy debate. Many rich countries facing comparable
challenges are considering or implementing various policy options—in line with their
prevailing social welfare policies—to cope with the aging crisis. Cuba, while facing far
more adverse economic circumstances, will have to choose among these policy options
as it implements inevitable social welfare reforms.
RESUMEN
En las próximas décadas, Cuba enfrentará grandes retos demográfi cos. Debido a la
persistencia de la baja fecundidad y altas tasas de emigración, la población se está
contrayendo a medida que gradualmente envejece. La tendencia al envejecimiento po-
blacional, como sugieren varias proyecciones de población recientes, es irreversible al
corto y mediano plazo, lo que plantea futuros dilemas sociales y económicos. Cómo
satisfacer las necesidades de la población envejecida será tema central dentro del debate
sobre políticas económicas a seguir. Muchos países ricos enfrentando retos compara-
bles están considerando o implementando varias opciones de política —en consonancia
con su régimen de bienestar social— para enfrentar la crisis del envejecimiento. Cuba,
aunque confronta circunstancias económicas mucho más adversas, tendrá que elegir
de entre estas opciones a medida que implementa inevitables reformas a su sistema de
bienestar social.
Recent population trends indicate that in the next several decades Cuba will
face major demographic challenges. As a result of a sustained fertility decline
since the late 1960s, the country’s population growth rate has become negative,
and the total population started to contract around 2010. This contraction will
accelerate in years to come, as Cuba’s fertility remains below the replacement
level and as the potential number of mothers, because of low past fertility, con-
tinues to diminish. The population decline will be further accentuated by high
3
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Male Cuba - 2014 Female
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5 - 9
0 - 4
550 440 330 220 110 0 0 110 220 330 440 550
Population (in thousands) Age Group Population (in thousands)
FIGURE 1.1. Cuba’s Population Pyramid, 2014
Source: U.S Census Bureau, “International Database,” International Programs, http://www.census
.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=Results&T=12&A=separate&RT=0&Y=
2014&R=-1&C=CU.
net emigration rates—currently at record levels—although this will be slightly
moderated by continued but limited gains in life expectancy.
The signifi cance of these demographic developments is visible in the rapid
aging of Cuba’s population, more particularly in the rapid growth of the de-
pendent elderly population that in coming years will need to be supported by
ever-smaller cohorts of working-age adults. The demographic scenario is made
more complicated by the irregularity of Cuba’s population pyramid, as shown
in fi gure 1.1. Indentations and protuberances at various age groups refl ect past
fl uctuations in fertility. These oscillations are in turn associated with changes
in student, worker, and potential mother cohorts as members of those cohorts
age over time. Already embedded in the population pyramid, these oscillations
in age cohorts will require considerable sequential accommodations in the pro-
vision of education, employment, and other social services as the relative size
of consecutive cohorts change. Secondary school enrollments in some years,
for example, may contract, only to increase again as a larger age cohort reaches
that same educational level.
Despite being aware of these demographic trends, until quite recently Cuban
authorities largely failed to formulate policies to minimize their most adverse
consequences. The case can be made that the authorities instead decided to pri-
oritize the resolution of other pressing problems at the expense of a ggravating
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Major Problems, Few Solutions : 5
a worrisome demographic outlook. A case in point is Havana’s adoption of
explicit and implicit policies to further emigration. While over the short and
medium term emigration brings benefi ts to the strapped Cuban economy (by
reducing labor-market and housing pressures and capturing foreign exchange
through remittances and return tourist visits), in the long term emigration will
deepen the unfolding demographic crisis as the predominantly working-age mi-
grants not only depart but also give birth and raise children abroad.
Regarding fertility, the situation is just as muddled. As most other coun-
tries experiencing below-replacement fertility began to voice alarm about the
long-term economic and social adjustments that such low fertility regimes will
demand, policy makers in Havana remained largely oblivious to their conse-
quences. As late as 2007, Cuba and Denmark were the only two countries with
total fertility rates (TFRs)—defi ned by the United Nations (2013c, n.p.) as “the
average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the
end of their reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to
the fertility rates of a given period and if they were not subject to mortality. It is
expressed as children per woman”—below 1.4 children per woman to declare in
the biennial UN World Population Policies assessment that “their fertility level
was satisfactory and required no intervention” (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilio-
niene 2009, 685). Only in 2011 did Cuba reverse its position (as did Denmark),
stating that fertility was too low, and announce a policy to raise its level (United
Nations 2013b). What the elements of Havana’s fertility promotion policy are
remain a mystery; until now only obscure references to such an initiative have
been made public (Ofi cina Nacional de Estadísticas [ONE] 2011a, 15; de Armas
Padrino 2013). In the same UN report, Havana declared itself not concerned
about its working-age population, although it did indicate that population aging
was a “major concern.” The report noted that in the previous fi ve years, Cuba
had both raised the statutory retirement age and reformed its pension system.
Severity of the Demographic Contraction
Population projections are useful in assessing the potential short- to long-term
consequences of current demographic trends. As the future is uncertain, their
relevance as reliable predictors of forthcoming developments is limited. How-
ever, when comparing various future scenarios (variants) built on contrasting
assumptions of fertility, mortality, and migration, they have a useful function in
evaluating alternative outcomes. Given the uncertainty, though, the analytical
validity of population projections diminishes the further that they are carried
into the future.
Population forecasts differ from population projections in that the for-
mer assume that predicted outcomes will approximate future developments.
A temporal caveat similar to that for population projections apply: the further
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6 : Sergio Díaz-Briquets
a population forecast reaches into the future, the more likely it will be in er-
ror. Because of their nature, population forecasts are mostly done for planning
purposes and focus only on brief time periods (e.g., a few years in intercensal
periods).
The latest population projections of the United Nations (2013c), updated
in 2012, together with a population forecast issued by the ONE’s (2011a)
Centro de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo, offer an opportunity to assess
Cuba’s demographic prospects in years to come. While the Centro de Estu-
dios de Población y Desarrollo refers to its statistical exercise as a projection,
in most respects it was intended to serve as a forecast.1 It provides only one
variant (median) so that all government and academic entities can rely on a
“uniform number” (ONE 2011a, 2) and truncates the last fi fteen years of the
projection (2035–50) because “the changing demographic dynamic” results
for those years “may yield information of limited utility” (ONE 2011a, 8).
Rather than depend on national fertility, mortality, and net migration as-
sumptions for the projection—as the United Nations customarily does—the
ONE relied on a cascading approach whereby provincial statistics were aggre-
gated to generate national assumptions, a process facilitated by virtually uni-
versal death and birth registration and the availability of a population register
to which citizens must report, among other information, residential changes
(ONE 2011a, 7). Results of the projections and the assumptions of the ONE
and the UN Population Division are presented in the tables that follow. Where
appropriate, additional information is offered to clarify concepts or elaborate
on the projections’ implications.
Mortality and Fertility Assumptions and Total Projected Population
Table 1.1 presents fi ve different population projections, together with related
TFR assumptions for fi ve-year periods. The table also includes the projected
absolute number of births associated with each set of assumptions and the
number of women of reproductive age yielded in each projection. Mortality
assumptions do not require elaboration, as they are generally invariant across
the fi ve projections, starting at 79.2 years at birth for both sexes (females, 81;
males, 77) in 2010–15 and gradually increasing to 82.4 (females, 84; males,
81) by 2030–35.
Variability in TFR is signifi cant, in particular regarding the spread between
the United Nations’ low and high variants; by 2035–40, the latter is almost
twice as high as the former. While initially the ONE and UN medium and con-
stant variant TFRs are nearly identical, the ONE projection is far more optimis-
tic than the UN medium variant projection regarding a future fertility upturn.
A different perspective regarding what these rates imply for future population
growth is provided by the number of births anticipated under each set of as-
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Major Problems, Few Solutions : 7
TABLE 1.1. Total Population Projections and Fertility
Related Indicators, Cuba, 2010–2035
United Nations
ONE Low Medium High Constant
Projected population (in thousands)
2010 a 11,232 11,282 11,282 11,282 11,282
2015 11,199 11,156 11,249 11,341 11,266
2020 11,124 10,929 11,162 11,395 11,195
2025 11,029 10,623 11,019 11,416 11,055
2030 10,905 10,299 10,847 11,399 10,875
2035 10,754 9,899 10,579 11,311 10,609
2050 — 8,186 9,392 10,770 9,329
Fertility: TFRs
2010–2015a 1.52 1.20 1.45 1.70 1.50
2015–2020 1.56 1.05 1.45 1.85 1.50
2020–2025 1.59 0.99 1.49 1.99 1.50
2025–2030 1.62 1.03 1.53 2.03 1.50
2030–2035 1.64 1.07 1.57 2.07 1.50
2035–2040 1.66 1.10 1.60 2.10 1.50
2050–2055 — 1.19 1.69 2.19 1.50
Births per year (in thousands)
2010–2015a — 89 108 127 111
2015–2020 — 74 103 131 106
2020–2025 — 65 98 131 99
2025–2030 — 61 91 122 90
2030–2035 — 54 84 117 81
2035–2040 — 46 78 116 74
2050–2055 — 29 66 119 58
Women 15–49 (in thousands)
2010 a 2,941 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988
2015 2,752 2,758 2,758 2,758 2,758
2020 2,496 2,503 2,503 2,503 2,503
2025 2,256 2,236 2,236 2,236 2,236
2030 2,176 2,078 2,122 2,167 2,131
2035 2,114 1,889 2,002 2,115 2,018
2050 — 1,180 1,518 1,864 1,524
a The starting year for the ONE projection is 2011.
Source: ONE 2011a; United Nations 2013b (esa.un.org.wpp/unpp).
sumptions (ONE estimates are not available). The number is almost 2.5 times
higher with the UN high variant as opposed to the low one, falling somewhere
in between the medium and constant variants. The difference is more marked if
the projections are carried fi fteen more years into the future, as shown for the
UN projections in the last row of the third panel of table 1.1. By 2050–55, the
number of births projected by the UN high variant exceeds those under the low
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8 : Sergio Díaz-Briquets
variant by a factor of four. The implications for future population growth are
evident.
That uncertainty surrounds the future behavior of the Cuban TFR and the
number of live births is validated by recent past trends, as shown in table 1.2.
The TFR fell from 1.63 in 2003 to 1.39 in 2006, only to rise above the 2003
level again after 2009. In terms of live births, the pattern deviates from that ob-
served with the TFR, as the variability is more pronounced, with the live births
being 8 percent fewer in 2012 than in 2003 even though TFR remained about
the same. What accounts for these divergent trends can be found in fi gure 1.1,
which depicts marked indentations in fi ve-year age-group female cohort size,
itself the result of past fertility fl uctuations. The signifi cance of these changes
in cohort size is that even though Cuban age-specifi c fertility rates vary sub-
stantially as women age, at the various age groups they have been rather invari-
ant over time. They are much higher at age 20–24 and 25–29 than at younger or
older age groups.2 In the early 2010s, the largest age cohorts were procreating
at their peak fertility rates. Over the next two decades, as aging proceeds, the
relative size of women of reproductive age (age 15–49) will decline by close
to 30 percent (see table 1.1), with the number of women age 20–24 and 25–29
declining even more (almost by half). So even if fertility rates remain constant,
there will be fewer births.
The ONE statisticians correctly anticipated Cuba’s actual fertility behavior
between 2010 and 2012, the years immediately following the initial projection
year. Rising fertility rates were assumed on the basis of the observed increase
in TFR (and in total number of births) between 2006 and 2009 (see table 1.2).
Whether or not projected TFRs materialize in years to come remains to be
seen. A 2009 fertility survey revealed that whereas at all ages women d esired
TABLE 1.2. Annual Total Fertility Rates and Number
of Live Births: Cuba, 2003–2012
Year TFR Live Births
2003 1.63 136,795
2004 1.54 127,192
2005 1.49 120,716
2006 1.39 111,323
2007 1.43 112,472
2008 1.59 122,569
2009 1.70 130,036
2010 1.69 127,746
2011 1.77 133,067
2012 1.69 125,674
Source: ONE 2013, tables II.4 and II.1.
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Major Problems, Few Solutions : 9
more children (up to a completed family size of two children), most had not
reached that target (ONE 2010, 68). Even if they do reach that target family
size, as noted, fewer births should be anticipated given the much smaller co-
horts of women entering childbearing age in the coming decades. Under the
United Nations’ less favorable low and medium variant projections, the decline
in births would be even more substantial, as shown in table 1.1.
Projected Population Growth Rates and Net Migration Assumptions
All projections agree that in decades to come Cuba’s population will contract
in size and at an accelerating pace. The only difference is with regard to the rate
of decline, as depicted in the upper panel of table 1.3. Particularly severe will
TABLE 1.3. Population Projection Growth Rates and International Migration
Related Indicators: Cuba, 2010−2035
United Nations
ONE Low Medium High Constant
Population growth rates (%)
2010−2015a −0.07 −0.22 −0.06 0.11 −0.03
2015−2020 −0.13 −0.41 −0.16 0.09 −0.13
2020−2025 −0.17 −0.57 −0.26 0.04 −0.25
2025−2030 −0.22 −0.62 −0.32 −0.03 −0.33
2030−2035 −0.28 −0.79 −0.47 −0.15 −0.50
2035−2040 — −1.01 −0.63 −0.25 −0.67
Net migration ratesb (%)
2010−2015a — −2.5 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5
2015−2020 — −2.5 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5
2020−2025 — −2.6 −2.5 −2.5 −2.5
2025−2030 — −1.9 −1.8 −1.8 −1.8
2030−2035 — −2.0 −1.9 −1.8 −1.9
2035−2040 — −2.1 −1.9 −1.8 −1.9
Annual net migrationb (thousands)
2010−2015a −35 −28 −28 −28 −28
2015−2020 −35 −28 −28 −28 −28
2020−2025 −26 −28 −28 −28 −28
2025−2030 −17 −20 −20 −20 −28
2030−2035 −9 −20 −20 −20 −20
2035−2040 — −20 −20 −20 −20
a The starting year for the ONE projection is 2011.
b ONE assumed that for the 2010−2015 and 2015−2020 quinquenniums, annual net migration
would remain at the current average level gradually declining by 25 percent for subsequent fi ve-
year periods.
Source: ONE 2011a; United Nations 2013b (esa.un.org.wpp/unpp).
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10 : Sergio Díaz-Briquets
be the population contraction under the UN medium and low variants, with
the ONE projection suggesting a lower rate of decline. As noted previously,
in Cuba’s case the demographic picture is more complicated, as low fertility
is not the sole driver of population decline. Since the mid-1990s net migration
(defi ned by the United Nations [2013c, n.p.] as the “net number of migrants,
that is, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants[,] expressed
in thousands”) has played an important role.3 And with regard to this variable,
the ONE projection assumptions were well off the mark.
Across its four variants, the United Nations used identical assumptions
for net migration rate, minor fl uctuations being dependent on age structure
changes (see table 1.3). The 2010–15 assumptions are lower than the actual
rates, as almost continuously since 1994 annual net migration has averaged
about three per thousand. Furthermore, the United Nations projects declining
net migration rates, a questionable assumption since the current high emigra-
tion rates will generate even higher likely future migration fl ows as today’s
migrants acquire foreign citizenship and start claiming close relatives.
While more realistic in its assumptions, the ONE also underestimated net
migration during the years immediately following 2009. While ONE projected
a net emigration of 35,000 annually between 2011 and 2015, statistics for 2011
and 2012 indicate that the reality considerably surpassed this estimate: the ac-
tual fi gures were 39,263 in 2011 and 46,662 in 2012 (ONE 2013, table VI.2).
Further confounding ONE’s forecast validity was the longer-term net migration
assumption. ONE assumed that the annual net migration level of 35,000 would
remain unchanged for a decade, and then would start declining by 25 percent
each subsequent fi ve-year period until reaching zero by 2035–40 (ONE 2011a,
8). This is unlikely for reasons noted earlier, unless the nature of the Cuban
polity and economy changes radically.
Cuba’s Changing Dependency Ratios and Age Structure
The economic and social implications of these demographic trends can be de-
scribed as alarming and worsening. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 summarize the most
commonly used dependency ratios and age structure components as generated
by the ONE and UN projections.
All projections anticipate an increase in the total dependency ratio (the
population younger than age 15 plus the population age 60 and older) of
close to 50 percent by 2035, or just about two decades into the future. Main
d iscrepancies follow from differential fertility assumptions, the UN high vari-
ant yielding a higher ratio, as shown in the middle panel of table 1.4. A striking
pattern is that regardless of UN variant, by 2050 (see table 1.4), the Cuban total
dependency ratio will double regardless of fertility assumption.
A similar outcome is expected concerning the old-age dependency r atio
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