Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality: Is there a Natural Equivalent of Categorical Morality?

486 Pages·1981·12.63 MB·English

by  C. W. Maris (auth.)

CRITIQUE OF THE
EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION
OF MORALITY
c.w. MARIS
CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION
OF MORALITY
IS THERE A NATURAL EQUIVALENT OF CATEGORICAL MORALITY?
Springer Science+ Business Media, B.V.
1981
(original title: Een Natuurlijk Equivalent van de Plicht?)
translated by Jane Fenoulhet
University of London
ISBN 978-94-017-4432-4 ISBN 978-94-017-4430-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Maris, C.W.
Critique of the empiricist explanation of morality
Translation of: 'n natuurlijk equivalent van de plicht.
Bibliography: p.
includes index.
1. ethics. 2. empiricism. i. title.
bj41.m3713 171 '.2 81-12373
ISBN 978-94-017-4432-4 AACR2
© 1981 Springer Science+ Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Uitgeverij Kluwer B. v., The Netherlands in 1981
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or
any other means without written permission from the publisher
I should like to thank for their help and support
H. Dalitz, Jane Fenoulhet, G.A. den Hartogh, H.J.R. Kaptein, G.E. Lange
meijer, A. Johanna Maris, J.C. Maris. Marca Schasfoort and Ineke Vonk.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
In translating this book it has been my policy to render all quotations in En
glish. Where a published translation exists, this has been used, otherwise I have
given my own translation from the original text. The italicized title then is the
work to which the reader may refer. I have also used a number of abbrevia
tions of titles. The reader may find the list below useful.
My thanks to Phebe Robinow, Michael Evans and Jeremy Walker for their in
valuable help.
J.F.
CPP : Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1869
CPP+ : Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1968
Div. : Durkheim, Emile Durkheim on the Division of Labor in Society
DN : Ross, Directives and Norms
EH : Guyau, Education and Heredity
EL : Stevenson, Ethics and Language
Enq. : Hume, Enquiries
FP : Spencer, First Principles
FPPP : Comte, Fundamental Principles ofP ositive Philosophy
FR : Hare, Freedom and Reason
L : Hobbes, Leviathan
LaF : Olivecrona, Law as Fact
LM : Hare, The Language ofM orals
ME : Durkheim, Moral Education
MS : Smith, Moral Sentiments
OLaJ : Ross, On Law and Justice
ProE : Spencer, The Principles of Ethics
ProPs: Spencer, The Principles ofP sychology
ProS : Spencer, The Principles of Sociology
SM : Guyau, A Sketch ofM orality Independent of Obligation or Sanction
S&P : Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy
Tr. : Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
TRJ : Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence
VJJR : Durkheim, Value Judgements and Judgements of Reality
VI
CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICIST EXPLANATION
OF MORALITY
Contents
INTRODUCTION:
a The problem of the empiricist explanation of morality.
b Definition of 'empiricist'.
c The relation between epistemology and ethics; the structure of this
work.
CHAPTER I: A TOPOGRAPHY OF THE EMPIRICIST
THEORIES OF LAW 9
a The relation of law and morality; the problem of the empiricist ex
planation of the validity of the law.
b The empiricist explanation of Scandinavian Realism; the relation
ship of this school to the Doctrines of Natural Law and of Legal
Positivism.
c Ross' arguments against the dualism of the Doctrine of Natural
Law and the monism of Legal Positivism.
d The psycho-sociological explanation of legal consciousness: this ex
planation casts doubt on the status of the law's claims to validity.
CHAPTER II: HOBBES'S EMPIRICIST THEOR Y OF
MORALITY 25
a Hobbes's empiricist doctrine; his nominalism.
b Hobbes's nominalist view of moral concepts; the subjective charac
ter of these concepts.
c Hobbes's account of human nature: wolf-man; man's natural condi
tion: a state of war; reason provides deliverance; a society ordered
according to natural laws ruled by coercion; the social contract; the
Leviathan.
d Natural laws are of an instrumental rather than an absolute nature.
e Influence of Galileo: empiricism and the theory of motion; Gali
leo's 'metodo resolutivo-compositivo' in the human sciences; Hob
bes's mechanistic image of man and society.
f The apparent idealism of Hobbes's natural law doctrine is an illusion.
g The hypothetical, fictitious nature of natural law concepts in Hob
bes's work.
h A criticism of the empirical basis of Hobbes's theory.
VII
CHAPTER III: THE EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF
DA VID HUME AND ADAM SMITH 41
A. GENERAL 41
a Hume's and Smith's empiricist doctrine of knowledge under the in
fluence of Newton; Newton's theory of gravity applied to the hu-
man sciences.
b A comparison of Hume, Smith and Hobbes; Hume and Smith reject
Hobbes's egoistic view of man; Hobbes, Cudworth and Hutcheson;
sympathy as the basis of moral feelings; reason as the slave of the
passions; doctrine of the social contract untenable.
c Reason is ruled by human emotions, and therefore cannot form the
seat of morality.
B. HUME 50
a Hume's scepticism and empiricism.
b His empiricist approach to morality.
c The use of the virtues of justice and benevolence; through our
capacity for sympathy, this use gives us pleasure, even though we
derive no direct advantage from it.
d All virtues are useful or pleasant, either for their possessors or for
third parties.
e The objectivization of our sympathetic judgements; sympathy and
the unbiased observer; self-judgement from the latter's point of
view.
f The causes of the special authority of moral sentiments.
C. SMITH 59
a Smith's refinement of the concept of sympathy; sympathy with
people's motives; self-judgement.
b Sympathy with the neutral observer; internalization of the latter's
standpoint to produce an 'internal judge'; conscience; regret.
D. THE PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF HUME AND SMITH 65
a The gulf between 'is' and 'ought'; theory detached from moral prac-
tice; Hume's persuasion to a moral stance on the grounds of the
aesthetic value and social function of virtues; the 'interested obliga-
tion' towards virtue.
b Smith's universal harmony; the individual's hedonistic urges are best
served by a moral stance.
CHAPTER IV: COMTE AND POSITIVISM 73
A. POSITIVISM, SOCIOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 73
a The positivist theory of knowledge; purely inductive acquisition of
knowledge is impossible; the evolution of human thought accord-
ing to the law of three stages; the hierarchy of sciences; sociology.
VIII
b Biology focusses attention on the organic development of society.
c The organic view of society: the individual as a subordinate part of
the social whole.
d Comte's anti-individualism; rejection of psychology.
e From a psychological point of view Comte's theory lacks subtlety;
altruism and morality.
B. SOCIOLOGY, EVOLUTION AND MORALITY 81
a Social statics and morality; social order and the individual; physio-
logy of the brain: the regions where egoism, altruism and reason are
situated; social order on a social level and at the level of the family.
b Social dynamics and morality; evolution in the theological stage:
development of a universal morality of a categorical nature.
c The metaphysical stage: abstract entities instead of anthropomor
phic conception; the rise of scientific thinking; a critical phase from
the point of view of morality; emphasis on personal irllerests.
d The positive stage: further development of scientific thinking; so
ciology gives insight into man's social nature; final victory of altru
ism.
CHAPTER V: HERBERT SPENCER AND
EVOLUTIONISM 93
A. EVOLUTION, SOCIOLOGY AND HEDONISM 93
a Differences and correspondences between the evolutionary theories
of Spencer and Comte.
b Spencer's empiricist theory of knowledge.
c The process of dissolution and evolution; the struggle for life; the
survival of the fittest; the notion of progress.
d Spencer's emphasis on material development as opposed to Comte's
emphasis on spiritual evolution.
e Spencer's individualism in contrast to Comte's collectivism; Spen
cer's organic view of society; the differences between social and
biological organisms; society in the service of the individual.
B. EVOLUTION AND ETHICS 103
a Moral relativism; good is what is pleasant.
b Relativity brought about by the various demands of the evolutionary
phases; absolute ethics in the final phase of evolution; during the
evolutionary process morality consists in compromises between
egoism and altruism.
c The duality of human nature; the herd-instinct and the predatory
instinct; evolution from the military to the industrial stage; evolu
tion from agressive egoism to altruism as survival functions; the
genesis of a moral sense.
d The culmination of evolution: industrial society, total adaptation,
general harmony and absolute ethics; absolute ethics is the ethics
of the perfect human, being in perfect circumstances; their sub
stance can already be scientifically determined on the basis of the
natural laws of evolution.
IX
e The modified altruism of absolute ethics.
f Justice: altruism without self-sacrifice; decentralization.
g Private benevolence - the weak must not be artificially kept alive;
the survival of the unfit is not desirable; profit in accordance with
merits.
h Spencer's justification of the claims of absolute ethics; the superi
ority of the highest phases of evolution; a moral stance is also rec
ommendable from a hedonistic point of view; a hypothetical guide
line instead of a categorical one.
CHAPTER VI: GUYA U'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 121
A. THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 121
a An equivalent of moral 'duty'; morality is based neither on a
metaphysical obligation nor on sanctions.
b Philosophy of life; the union of egoism and altruism; evolutionism
as an explanation and justification of morality; rejection of opti
mistic ideas of progress; energistic view of life.
c Dominance of altruism; the moral fertility of life eliminates the
contradiction between egoism and altruism.
B. ETHICS 126
a Kant's description of the sense of duty is correct, but his explana-
tion of it is incorrect; the impulses behind the sense of duty; he
redity and education.
b The coercive force of moral commands is caused by the intensity
of moral impulses; life-energy gives rise to expansion and altruism;
the permanent pressure exerted by moral, altruistic impulses; the
altruistic 'obsession raisonnee' and 'idee-force' are the basis of the
notion of duty.
c A hypothetical, empirical justification of morality; a moral stance
is in agreement with man's deepest personal desire: life.
d An intense life certainly involves altruism, and possibly also total
self-sacrifice as empirical 'equivalents of the notion of absolute
duty'.
CHAPTER VII: DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGICAL
ETHICS 137
A. SOCIAL STATICS AND COLLECTIVE EVOLUTION 137
a Durkheim and Guyau: rejection of the economic view of life; life
as energy-charged development; collective life-energy; restriction of
the development of individual lives by the community.
b Durkheim and Comte: organicist view of society; society has an
order of its own higher than that of the individual; Durkheim and
the individualistic sociology of Tarde; the individual has no influ
ence on social events.
x