Creating citizens in the classroom: Hannah Arendt's political critique of education

24 Pages·2008·0.29 MB·English

1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 259
Creating citizens in the classroom:
Hannah Arendt’s political critique of
education
Anya Topolski
K.U.Leuven
ABSTRACT. In “The Crisis in Education,” her only essay dedicated to the topic
of education, Hannah Arendt presents a position that in many ways runs counter
to her conception of the political based on participation, actions and the poten-
tial for radical change. In so doing, she provides her readers, both political and
pedagogical, with a perspective on education that challenges its instrumentaliza-
tion for the sake of the political. To appreciate the counter-cultural yet common-
sense claim Arendt makes, I will first consider the meaning of the term citizen-
ship and its Arendtian interpretation in a political context. Second, focusing on
Arendt’s 1958 essay, I will explain why education is not first and foremost a
public issue and therefore should not be interpreted as belonging to a political
context. Connected to this, I bring to light Arendt’s well known discourse of the
ensuing dangers of a confusion of the private and public realms. Her somewhat
unwelcomed pedagogical-political contribution confronts us with our assump-
tion that the solution to the crisis in citizenship lies within schools, showing it
as yet another symptom of the political crisis of modernity. Having shown how
and why schools cannot be asked to create citizens, I will – immersed in a par-
adox that Arendt recognizes – consider several means by which education can,
in a secondary role, help us to understand and reflect upon the contemporary
crisis in citizenship.
KEYWORDS. Arendt, education, citizenship, political, crisis, responsibility
T
he United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
marked the birth of the twenty-first century by launching a range of
educational projects aimed at creating active and engaged political citi-
zens.1 This inspired many programmes such as Britain’s ‘Educating for
Citizenship,’ the American Democracy Project’s ‘Educating Citizens’
endeavour launched in many schools throughout the United States, and
Canada’s ‘Citizenship Education’ (to name a few of English-language proj-
ects). According to its Web site, UNESCO’s millennium goal is to teach
ETHICALPERSPECTIVES: JOURNALOFTHEEUROPEANETHICSNETWORK 15, no. 2 (2008): 259-282.
©2008 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.15.2.2032370
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 260
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES–JUNE 2008
“a set of practices and activities aimed at making young people and adults
better equipped to participate actively in democratic life by assuming and
exercising their rights and responsibilities in society.” Is there any endeav-
our more praiseworthy than that of providing children from across the
globe with the skills necessary to become good citizens? Not only does
this project aim to make education universally accessible, a huge endeav-
our in its own right, it also aims to solve our contemporary ‘crisis in
citizenship,’ a crisis characterized by decreasing voter participation, a
general apathy concerning politics (especially among youth), and the rise
of far-right parties in several European nations. According to Kymlicka
and Norman in their “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work
on Citizenship Theory” (1994), this crisis has given rise to so much recent
literature on citizenship, a good part of which focuses on the fundamen-
tal role of education in resolving this crisis.
Yet, rather than focus on the crisis of citizenship itself, I want to
consider a less popular project by asking what the basis is for presuppos-
ing that classrooms are the proper place to create citizens; that is, by
reflecting upon the link between citizenship and education. Based on the
recent literature, it is apparent to all concerned that the only possible
consensus is that there is no consensus on what it means to be a good
citizen. If this is the case, how is it possible to teach others how to be
good citizens? How is it that this lack of consensus is not a stumbling
block … that is, to all except for Hannah Arendt? No stranger to
controversy or dissention, Arendt took the path less travelled, challeng-
ing the claim that education can solve the crisis in citizenship. In her 1958
essay “The Crisis in Education,”2 she argued that for the sake of the
world, a separation must be respected between politicians and professors,
between the parliament and the board of education. Arendt, who
famously argued for “the right to have rights” in The Origins of Totalitari-
anism,rarely wrote about children, or childhood, choosing instead to focus
on the political realm created by adults. Yet, in this essay, which speaks
to an issue that is clearly pressing today even though it was published
—260—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 261
TOPOLSKI–CREATING CITIZENS IN THE CLASSROOM:
HANNAH ARENDT’S POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF EDUCATION
precisely sixty years ago, she dedicates a great deal of attention to the
importance of respecting the right of a child to a childhood and the
responsibility of adults to ensure this right.
It is thus both out of concern for the public realm and for the sake
of those who do not yet have a voice in this realm that I contend that we
must carefully consider Arendt’s paradoxical political insight,an argument
that reminds us that the crisis in citizenship is a political crisis that calls
for a political solution rather than a pedagogical resolution. To appreci-
ate the counter-cultural yet common-sense claim Arendt makes, I will first
consider the meaning of the term citizenship, its Arendtian interpreta-
tion, and its political significance. Second, I will explain why education
should not be interpreted as belonging to the political. Connected to this,
she makes us aware of the ensuing dangers of such a confusion of the
private and public realms. Arendt’s unwelcome contribution confronts us
with our assumption that the solution to the crisis in citizenship lies within
schools, showing it as yet another symptom of the political crisis of
modernity. Having shown how and why schools cannot be asked to
create citizens, I will – immersed in a paradox that Arendt recognizes –
consider several means by which education can, in a secondary role, help
us to understand and reflect upon the contemporary crisis in citizenship.
THE NATURE OF THE CRISIS IN CITIZENSHIP
The claim I wish to make in this first section appears at first sight to be
obvious: citizenship is a political issue and therefore a crisis in citizenship,
which many experts suggest we are currently undergoing, is clearly a polit-
ical crisis. While I doubt anyone would challenge this position, it needs
to be reaffirmed since it has clearly been overlooked, or forgotten, by
those political figures in charge of creating a curriculum for the twenty-
first century. If it is so obvious that the crisis in citizenship is a political
crisis, why is there such support for projects, such as UNESCO’s, in
—261—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 262
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES–JUNE 2008
which citizens are to be created in the classrooms? Are classrooms now
considered to be political spaces? If so, why did the European Union
threaten to withhold their financial contributions to the Palestinian
National Authority when it was suggested that they were being used to
support Hamas’ political propaganda? Likewise, do we no longer distin-
guish between children and political subjects based on a distinct set of
rights and responsibilities? Are children now being asked to actively
participate in political debates and to vote? While the answer to these
questions is obvious, many aspects of contemporary society indicate that
we could use a helpful reminder. Yet, before we turn to Arendt for her
insight on the relationship between citizenship and education, we must
first briefly define these terms.
While I recognize that the meaning of citizenship is certainly
contested, a disputation that is political in itself, my purpose is not to
debate the definition itself. Rather, I want to determine that it is a clearly
a political concept and second, to compare a contemporary and widely
accepted definition with Arendt’s understanding. For this purpose, I think
T.H. Marshall’s definition, which has been the standard textbook and
academic definition of citizenship since the 1950s (Anthony 1996), encap-
sulates many of our implicit, albeit vague, shared understandings of this
concept. Writing just after World War II, he explained that “citizenship
requires a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a
civilization which is a common possession … there are no universal prin-
ciples that determine what those rights and duties shall be, but societies
in which citizenship is a developing institution” (1950, 2). This abbrevi-
ated definition already brings to light the central concerns of citizenship
debates: the relation of an individual to a (or their) community (or com-
munities); the centrality of creating a sense of common or shared respon-
sibility or loyalty; and the lack of a higher or transcendental ground for
rights and the need for institutions to protect these rights. Given that
Marshall is cited in almost every discussion on citizenship, his definition
is perfectly suited to frame our question: Is citizenship a political issue?
—262—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 263
TOPOLSKI–CREATING CITIZENS IN THE CLASSROOM:
HANNAH ARENDT’S POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF EDUCATION
Is there any aspect of the above concept – its common, community, and
institutional orientation – that indicates that a discussion of the crisis of
citizenship is not a political debate? While the answer is clear, to be
certain that nothing has changed since 1950, we must also ask whether
the conclusion that citizenship is a strictly political concern, based on
Marshall’s definition, remains applicable today.
To this end, I turn to a recent survey on conceptions of citizenship
by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, the “Return of the Citizen:
A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory” (1994). Their article
provides an in-depth consideration of the range of positions articulated
by both political theorists and philosophers, a range wide enough to
include Arendt’s approach. As their focus lies on the concept of citizen-
ship-as-desirable-activity, that is citizenship as a focus on one’s participa-
tion in the public realm or community, in the context of structures and
institutions, in distinction to citizenship-as-legal-status, it helps to point
towards a contemporary distinction, one that is not yet present in
Marshall’s account, between politics and the political. While many
political theorists, such as Schmitt, Ricoeur, Wolin, Mouffe, Nancy,
Badiou, Lefort, and Ranciere (to name but a few), have interpreted this
distinction differently, its basis is found in Heidegger’s thought. As
Marchart writes, “As difference, this difference presents … a new term (the
political) [which] had to be introduced to point at society’s ‘ontological’
dimension, the dimension of the institution of society, while politics was
kept as the term for the ‘ontic’ practices of conventional politics” (2007,
5). In other words, the distinction creates two distinct approaches to polit-
ical theory, and thus to the concept of citizenship: the first focuses on the
state, government and institutions, while the second is more phenomeno-
logical as it seeks to understand political experience and issues of politi-
cal alienation, and to promote interest and active participation by citizens.
As Arendt’s concept of the political, and consequently her definition of
citizenship, both fall within the latter, this contemporary appreciation of
citizenship as an activity clearly resonates with her own. These non-legal
—263—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 264
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES–JUNE 2008
approaches seek greater emphasis on either, or both, political responsibil-
ity and virtues to develop an understanding of the requirements for
engaged political citizens, often debating the advantages and disadvan-
tages of thick vs. thin conceptions of citizenship. Even with its contem-
porary corrections, the wide variety of conceptions of citizenship
presented by Kymlicka and Norman clearly all recognize in common that
the concept of a citizen is political, a recognition that reaffirms the crisis
in citizenship as a political crisis.
The question this leads us to ask is whether Arendt’s conception of
citizenship is also clearly limited by the political. While it is worth stating
that Arendt has no precise definition of citizenship, a conscious lacuna in
her thought resulting from her distaste for an epistemic approach to the
political, she cannot be said to lack a critical reflection on its importance
for the world.3 As d’Entrèves writes, “For Arendt, the reactivation of cit-
izenship in the modern world depends upon both the recovery of a com-
mon, shared world and the creation of numerous spaces of appearance
in which individuals can disclose their identities and establish relations”
(2006, 27). Appearance, for Arendt, requires both a space and a plurality
of people within that space. Disclosure, which applies equally to the world
and the individual appearing within it, is only possible among equals, an
artificial equality that is a basic rule of the political realm. Thus, Arendt’s
conception of citizenship, based on the presumption of equality and the
need to appear and relate to others, is only possible in the political. While
this description is not yet sufficient to provide us with an understanding
of Arendt’s unique concept of the political, it does indicate that her con-
ception of citizenship, like that of Marshall and those surveyed by Kym-
licka and Norman, is also a strictly political concept.
Having concluded that citizenship is by all accounts a political issue,
we must briefly clarify what it is that Arendt means by education, to ensure
that her critique of citizenship education programmes is not misunder-
stood (as too much of her thought is). Firstly, although Arendt fails
to mark the distinction between educating children and adult learning
—264—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 265
TOPOLSKI–CREATING CITIZENS IN THE CLASSROOM:
HANNAH ARENDT’S POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF EDUCATION
consistently, it is clear from her analysis they are to be distinguished:
“education, as distinguished from learning, must have a predictable end.
… One cannot educate without at the same time teaching; an education
without learning is empty … but one can easily teach without educating
… [or without] becoming educated” (1961, 195-6). Education is a term she
reserves for the process of teaching children beginning in primary school
and ending, approximately, with graduation from high school. While ide-
ally children learn, as they are bring educated, it is a secondary considera-
tion. Thus while learning can occur both in the private and public realm,
it can only occur between equals and cannot be based on authority. In this
sense, teachers educate but students often learn from each other by being
in a learning environment. Adults are not educated in the polis; they can-
not be forced, or coerced, to learn to respect plurality, to be open to oth-
ers, to judge without prejudice, and to be responsible for creating a decent
world (Gordon 2002, 51). This type of learning, which is based on equal-
ity rather than asymmetry, is founded on the human condition of free-
dom, which can only be fully understood or experienced in the public
realm. It has as its aim to promote reflection, thought, judgement, and
actions in its citizens – with the hope that this will result in a thriving pub-
lic space. For Arendt, it is only as equals that we can inter-act with others
and allow our ideas to be contested by theirs, and yet equally important
for her is that children are not yet prepared for the political, something for
which their education in the private realm prepares them. In this sense,
education is the basis for learning, just as the private realm is necessary –
both as preparation and as a respite – from the public.
The question these definitions help to demarcate is whether educa-
tion, so conceived, can create ‘good’ citizens? Yet, it fails to ask the deeper
question raised by the UNESCO-inspired endeavours that presume citi-
zens can be created in the classroom, which is: should education be a
political activity? If children are not yet citizens, how can their education
be political? These questions point towards the need for a serious
consideration of the relationship between education and the political,
—265—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 266
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES–JUNE 2008
a reflection that has repercussions with regard to the contemporary crisis
in citizenship, a reflection undertaken by Hannah Arendt in the “Crisis of
Education.” These well-intentioned UNESCO programmes overlook
precisely that, to resolve this crisis, we need a healthy polis, which is only
possible if we rediscover what the political is. To do so, according to
Arendt, we need to appreciate its significance and singularity, and the
paradoxical importance of recognizing the distinction between children
and adults, between education and participation, between private and
public, which is precisely what, with the best of intentions, these
programmes fail to do, and as a result aggravate the crisis in citizenship.
IS EDUCATION POLITICAL?
Arendt develops her understanding of education by specifically reflecting
upon the concrete problems facing the American public in the 1950s. In
addition, her approach challenges several mainstream presuppositions,
thereby ruffling the feathers of many educational theorists, an experience
she underwent more than once in her life. Yet, unlike most of her work,
Arendt’s analysis of education is not, at least at first sight, politically moti-
vated. For Arendt, who speaks as an interested citizen rather than as an
expert, the activity of educating children properly belongs to the private
domain or, more precisely, it is a process that mirrors the transition
children must travel between private and public. Thus while it can be,
and needs to be, discussed in public, the activity itself is one that is
neither public nor political. As she wrote in a letter to Glenn Gray on
June 29, 1964:
It seems to me that the word education covers two entirely different
tasks: (a) the responsibility for the development of the child, physical
as well as psychological, and his particular gifts and (b) the child’s
preparation to enter the world where it is supposed to assume certain
responsibilities for it (quoted in Schutz 1991, 87).
—266—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 267
TOPOLSKI–CREATING CITIZENS IN THE CLASSROOM:
HANNAH ARENDT’S POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF EDUCATION
Most of her readers, especially those whose primary focus is pedagogy
(Gordon 2002), focus on the former aspect and accuse Arendt of being
too conservative. Upon this basis, they then justify their choice not to
take her position seriously. This is truly unfortunate as Arendt’s challenge
is fundamental in that it brings to light important insights into the dan-
gers of politicizing education, a danger hundreds of pedagogical projects
worldwide seem to overlook.
By reminding her readers of the relationship between education and
the private realm, Arendt identifies three basic assumptions that arise from
the unquestioned assertion of its public role (Arendt 1961, 184). First, the
assumption that children do not need authority; second, that teachers do
not need to be symbols of authority through their expertise; and third,
that learning can be substituted by doing. These three points, which must
be further explored, help to clarify the pedagogical consequences of allow-
ing the politics of the public realm to enter the schools and bring to light
the dangers of programmes that try to create citizens in the classroom.
Thus, the private realm – which includes the education of children – has
a conservative tone intended to protect and nourish children. Children,
new to the world, need to have a safe space within which to discover
themselves prior to being challenged and tested through polemos. Child-
hood is a sacred time of wonder, dreams, and hopes; it is a miraculous time
and our responsibility, as adults, is to preserve this unique stage of human
life. “Insofar as the child is not yet acquainted with the world, he must be
gradually introduced to it; insofar as he is new, care must be taken that this
new thing comes to fruition in relation to the world as it is” (1961, 189).
While Arendt’s description strikes one as over-protective and conserva-
tive (not to mention a reflection of that age’s sexism), the spirit of her
interpretation is neither. Rather, it is based on the fundamental under-
standing of the difference between the needs of children and adults,
between discovering one’s past and one’s responsibility for the future.
It is also on this basis that Arendt brings together her analyses of
education and totalitarianism. As Masschelein writes, “Hannah Arendt
—267—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2
1388-08_EthPersp_07_Topolski 04-08-2008 10:16 Pagina 268
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES–JUNE 2008
suggests in her famous study on totalitarianism that there is a connection
between totalitarian terror and the destruction of the newness and other-
ness which is contained in birth. The need for terror stems from the fear
that with the birth of every new human being a new beginning makes its
voice heard in the world” (2001, 16). For this reason, she often refers to
the crisis in education as a crisis in the human condition of natality as it
centres upon the unique nature of every new life. She recognizes that
without birth, without the human condition of natality, without these
same children who are to be protected from the world, there would be
no shared world in the future. While this by no means entails that
contemporary education is totalitarianism, Arendt is suggesting that by
denying children the ‘right’ to be educated in the private sphere, we are
denying them the right to experience childhood, the miracle of natality, a
life without the weighty responsibility of the world. We implicitly acknowl-
edge the importance of preserving this distinction when we condemn
childhood labour and children soldiers. As Jacobitti writes, “parents and
teachers [a shared responsibility of parents and teachers] will have no
authority and hence will be unable to educate children, to protect both
child and world [from the unpredictability of the new], if they do not take
responsibility for the world they helped create” (1991, 599-600). Thus,
while Arendt respected, and applauded, the challenge to authority posed
by her peers, whether within the university or within the public sphere,
she feels that this same challenge was detrimental if promoted within the
schools, places of transmission, formation, and conservation. Yet again,
this position reaffirms the paradox that defines Arendt’s argument meant
to challenge educating citizenship programmes. In line with her separa-
tion of the private and public realm, Arendt felt that each required
differing approaches as each served different, yet equally fundamental,
roles. Thus, the status quo needs to be challenged, but only after school,
in the public realm when adults learn from each other. Her appeal to the
fundamental role of authority in education is thus consistent with her call
for its challenge in the polis; it is an appropriate double-standard given the
—268—
Ethical Perspectives15 (2008) 2