Covert relationship: American foreign policy, intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980--1988

214 Pages·2009·3.42 MB·English

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u Ottawa
l.'Universilc cnnnrficnne
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FACULTE DES ETUDES SUPERIEURES l = =l FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND
ET POSTOCTORALES U Ottawa POSDOCTORAL STUDIES
I/Universittf canadienne
Canada's university
Bryan Gibson
"^EUlMIJTHiS^UTHOR'orfHESrs"
M.A. (History)
GRADE/DEGREE
Department of History
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Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence,
and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988
TITRE DE LA THESE / TITLE OF THESIS
Dr. Galen Perras
DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THESE / THESIS SUPERVISOR
„ „ „ „ „ _ _ _ _ __
EXAMINATEURS (EXAMINATRICES) DE LA THESE / THESIS EXAMINERS
Dr. Ryme Seferdjeli
Dr. Lotfi Ben Rejeb
Gary W. Slater
Le Doyen de la Faculte des etudes superieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
COVERT RELATIONSHIP:
American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and
the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988
By
Bryan Gibson
2643170
Submitted to
The School of Graduate Studies
University of Ottawa
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts (History)
August 21, 2007
© Bryan R. Gibson, Ottawa, Canada, 2007
1*1
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Table of Contents
Abstract pg
Acknowledgements pg
Introduction pg
Chapter One: The War of Subversion pg
Chapter Two: The Right Reaction pg
Chapter Three: Strict Neutrality? pg
Chapter Four: The Tilt pg
Chapter Five: The Internationalization of the War pg
Chapter Six: The Iran Imbroglio pg
Chapter Seven: Forcing an End to the War pg
Conclusion pg
Appendix A pg
Appendix B pg
Appendix C pg
List of Works Cited
Abstract
Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iraq invaded Iran resulting in a costly
war from 1980 to 1988, which threatened American interests in the Persian Gulf. From
the outset, the stated official American policy was strict neutrality, but this was not the
case. The war had provided the United States with an opportunity to improve relations
with Iraq, particularly after Iran reversed the Iraqi invasion in the summer of 1982.
Because the Reagan administration could not let Iraq collapse, the United States tilted
heavily towards Iraq in defiance of its stated policy. Interestingly, the tilt towards Iraq did
not stop the Reagan administration from secretly dealing with Iran in 1985.
Consequently, the disclosure of these dealings resulted in the buildup of American naval
forces in the region to protect the shipment of oil, and eventually the use of force to end
the conflict in 1988.
i
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I need to thank my parents Marlene and Glenn Gibson.
Without their never-ending support, I do not believe that I would have been able to
accomplish the quality of work that this work provides. My thanks for their thoughtful
insight and guidance throughout the lengthy process of researching and writing this work
cannot be described properly in words. I also need to thank my thesis supervisor Dr.
Galen Perras, who served as an excellent mentor, providing valuable expertise on the
subject, while helping me improve my writing, grammar, and the clarity of my work. For
that, I am truly thankful.
I must also thank Dr. Brian Loring Villa for giving me the confidence to not only
apply for the Master's program, but also for encouraging me to dig deeper into the Iran-
Iraq War. Had it not been for his early support in my studies, I cannot say with certainty
that I would have written this study. Another source of support came from Dr. Donald
Davis, who I served as a teaching assistant throughout my MA. Working for Dr. Davis
taught me a great deal about writing and about thinking outside of the box. Although we
did not see eye-to-eye on everything, for the last two years he served as an excellent
source of intellectual debate. In the early stages of my writing, a colleague of mine
recommended that I speak with Dr. James Gould, a former DFAIT official who was
stationed in Iraq during the mid-1980s. Dr. Gould provided valuable insight into the
political dynamics of the region, the context of the war, and the role of foreign
intelligence agencies in Iraq. I would also like to thank my fellow MA colleague Jeffery
ii
Brideau. Jeff always made himself available to debate ideas and arguments, providing
excellent insight that might not have become known without his support. Finally, I need
to thank Gary Sick for providing valuable advice on the subject, including an important
refutation of a number of arguments. In the early stages of this work, Mr. Sick pointed
me in the direction of a number of important articles that would have otherwise gone
unnoticed. In the end, one cannot thank these five individuals enough for their support
for my work.
A number of institutions and libraries were also very helpful. Notably, the
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries provided incredible information
on my subject. In particular, I recognize the help of Keith Shuler at the Jimmy Carter
Library, Jennifer Mandel at the Reagan Library, and James Yancy at the National
Archives (NARA). Another incredibly helpful institution was the National Security
Archive at George Washington University, which provided me with an early glimpse at
the formulation of the American policy towards the war. Particularly helpful at the NSA
were Joyce Battle and Malcolm Byrne. I also have to thank the University of Ottawa for
providing me the opportunity to engage this important subject. Without the support of
the University, I do not believe this work would have been accomplished. Finally, I need
to thank Erin Walker at Gale-Thomson for her help locating a number of documents that
I used a number of years before deciding to write my thesis. As such, I am indebted to her
and cannot thank her enough.
- Bryan Gibson, May 4, 2007.
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