Courage Alone: The Italian Air Force 1940-1943

274 Pages·2006·48.18 MB·English

by  Chris Dunning

COURAGE ALONE
The Italian Air Force 1940-1943
Chris Dunning
PUBLICATIONS
Firstpublished in GreatBritain in 1998 by ALSOAVAILABLE
HikokiPublications Ltd
16 Newport Road,Aldershot,Hants,GU124PB Luftwaffe Emblems 1939-1945
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E.mail [email protected] Barry Ketley & Mark Rolfe
© 1998Hikoki Publications ISBN 09519899 79
LuftwaffeFledglings 1935-1945
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LuftwaffeTraining Units & theirAircraft
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Barry Ketley & Mark Rolfe
Act 1988, no part of this publication may be
ISBN 0951989928
reproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical,
The SecretYears
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FlightTesting at Boscombe Down1939-1945
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ISBN0951899 95
ISBN 1902109 023
ForeverFarnborough
Flying the Limits 1904-1996
Edited byBarry Ketley
by
Artwork by Richard Caruana
Peter1. CooperAMRAeS
Maps bySteve Longland
ISBN0,951899 36
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ISBN0951899 44
Stormbird
Flyingthrough fire as aLuftwaffe ground-attack
pilot and Me262 ace
by
Oberst (i. R.) Hermann Buchner
ISBN 1902109 007
Shadows
Airlift andAirwar in Biafra and Nigeria
Caption to titlepage: The unknownsoldier-an unidentified 1967-1970
TenentePilotaofthe80"Squadriglia,17°Gruppo,jOStormoCT by
posing in front ofhis Macchi MC 202 Series 1Folgore. These Michael1. Draper
earlymodelsweredeliveredwithoutthelaterribbedtropicaldust
ISBN 1902109 63 5
filtertotheairintake,sothelocationisprobablyCampoformido
in October1941,shortlybeforetheunitmovedto Ciampinofor
fitment ofthe dustfilters and arapid transfer to NorthAfrica. Condor
The aircraft is finished in the overall dark green 'continental' The Luftwaffe in Spain 1936-1939
camouflage, which was rarelyseenonthe MC202, and ithasa by
name,'Filippo',paintedunderthecanopy.Notvisible,butcertainly
Patrick Laureau
soon to be applied on the whitefuselage band, is the Stormo's
ISBN 1902109 104
famous octagonalarcheremblem
DEDICATIONS
In honour of the Italian airmen of World War II, whom Allied
propagandahasoftentreatedinan unkindway. I hopeI havedone them
justice
To theperson who laid thefoundation in myformative years thatI may
createsuchasthis-my mother.Asonegrowsolderoneappreciatesmore
the too often unstated,soI also wish to acknowledgemysisters,Adrienne
and Elizabeth
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thank you to thefollowing: ArnoLehtonen,JackGreene,FrankMcMeiken,Prof.Jean
Gaillard, Michael Starmer, Capt. Howard Christie,Andy
Fortheiroriginalhelpfuladviceandencouragement, Stewart,PaoloRossi,AlessandroRagatzu,JimDavilla,Ron
Elizabeth Kirby, now a bookseller in Chipping Norton; Mazurkiewicz, and Paul Brown. Space does not allow a
Ron Murray of ISO Publications in London; Dave furtherlistofparticipants,buttheyknowwhotheyareand
Hatherell ofThe Aviation Bookshop in London; Chris mygratefulthankstoallthosewhohelpedfillinthegapsin
EllisandSimonParryofAirResearch Publicationswho thishistory.
producedtheearliereditionofthiswork.Anextrathank
you toSimon Parryfor introducingme to BarryKetley, Iamconsideringasupplementalvolumedetailingunit
whohelpedmegetoverthehurdleswhichheldupearlier badges and more personal experiences of the aircrew
release of this greatly revised and expanded book, and involved.Ifanyex-aircrewortheirfamilieswouldlike to
withoutwhomthisvolumewouldnothavebeenpossible. contributeinformationandanecdotestowardsthis,fill in
missing information, or provide constructive comments
Myfamily and friends for their warmth, enthusiasm, for future editions, please write to me via Hikoki
and support, with special mention ofJohn Bishop, Phil Publications. Any contributions will, of course, be
Minterand JohnRuffalo. acknowledgedinthenew volumeifused.
Most of all, my main source of raw material, the Publisher's note: First published in 1988 as a slim
ImperialWar Museum stafffor their patience,courtesy, paperbackvolumeoutliningonlythefirsteighty-twoGruppi,
and help. In particular,Phil Reed and hisstafffrom the thisisanewandgreatlyrevisedandexpandedworkwhich
DepartmentofDocuments,andMaryandTerryfromthe covers all the combat units (almost 400 squadrons) and
DepartmentofBooks. experi-mentalestablishmentsoftheRegiaAeronauticafrom
10June1940untiltheArmisticeof8September1943. This
I would also like to acknowledge the many letters book would not have been possible without the generous
received from the readers of the first edition. Further assistance of the following people who supplied photo
informationwassuppliedandhelpfuladvicereceivedfrom, graphs: Richard Caruana,MalcolmPassingham, Giorgio
tonamejustafew,membersofthe82GruppoAssociation, Apostolo, Giancarlo Garello, Achille Ghizzardi,Giorgio
GregoryAlegi of Gruppo Amici Velvoli Storici,Roberto Giorgi,Achille Vigna, Bruce Robertson, Stato Maggiore
Gentilli,Dott.Ing.TullioMarcon,Dott.Ing. UmbertoUcelli, Aeronautica,Bundesarchiv,BarryKetley.
4
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION RegiaAeronautica at the Armistice
The Regia Aeronautica 6
THE CARRIER AQUILA
CHRONOLOGY The other Eagle, the other Royal Navy 197
10June 1940until 8 September 1943 7
ANTI-SHIPPING OPERATIONS
COMMAND STRUCTURE Aircraft, ships and heroes 199
Area commands and theatres 9
AIRCREW
MAPS Training and ranks 209
Bases and locations 15
Regia Marina Comando Aviazione areas 23 FIGHTERACES
SAS transport routes 24 The top scorers 215
UNIT HISTORIES AIRCRAFT TYPES
The Gruppi: Commands, areas, aircraft, move- Data tables 218
ments and duties 26
AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT
UNIT HISTORIES Weapons,sights,loadsand radios 223
The Independent Squadriglie: Commands, areas,
aircraft, movements and duties 137 RA CAMOUFLAGE
Colours for all seasons-exceptwinter 231
SQUADRIGLIE ALLOCATIONS
1940-1941 167 COLOUR SECTION
Aircraftcoloursandunitemblems 241
SQUADRIGLIE ALLOCATIONS Captions to artwork 257
1942-1943 177
AIRCRAFT MARKINGS
ORDERS OF BATTLE 185 National markings 259
10June 1940
The advance against Sidi Barrani DEFEAT
CAl over the English Channel Why the RegiaAeronautica lost 264
The campaign against Greece
The first offensive against Malta GLOSSARY
CSI in Russia, July 1941 Guideto abbreviations 270
Operation PEDESTAL
Defence at El Alamein BIBLIOGRAPHY
OperationTORCH, November 1942 Sources and further reading 271
Invasion ofSicily
5
INTRODUCTION
The intention behind this book is to provide the • Excellent airframes were handicapped by lack
aviationenthusiastwith comprehensiveand extensive of development of more powerful aircraft engines,
information concerning the Italian RegiaAeronautica which resulted in reduced performance, weapon and
(RoyalAirForce)*from theItaliandeclarationofwar load carryingcapabilities.
on 10 June 1940 until the Armistice of 8 September
1943. It will also provide aready reference source for • The lethargic control and organisation of the
historians,wargamers,andinterested parties who may supply system.
have beeninvolved in the theatres ofwarshown. It is
the only single volume account of all the unit • Misapprehensions and poor communication
movements and equipment to date. betweenall theServicesconcerningeachothersneeds
and capabilities.
Despitebeingperceivedasoneofthemostpowerful
airforces ofthe1930s,the RegiaAeronauticafailed to • A lack of appreciation between higher and
live up to its potential in the 1940s.I believe the main lower ranks.
reasons (not necessarily in this order) were:
• Highly effectiveAllied propaganda.
• A lack ofacohesivefinancialpolicyin Italyfor
limitedindustrial and material resources. Despiteall this,the Italianswere amongthefirst to
experiment with radio-controlled aircraft, and they
• Entry into a war with what were, despite the taught the Germans about torpedo-bombing. They
propaganda, ill-prepared and ill-equipped armed practiced air-to-air bombing, and were quick to learn
forces. The Italians were not alone in suffering from the inadequacies of high level bombing against
the consequences-in the early stages of the war shipping.With engines licence-built and bought from
Britain, also, did not have the quality and quantity of Germany, they produced aircraft equal to their
resources needed to prevent defeats. opponents (butasin mostwars-toofew andtoolate).
• Theambivalent attitude ofmany Italiansto the Essentially,Italianfrontline airmenandgroundcrew
entryofItalyintothewarontheAxisside,thereasons ofWorldWarIIwereno different to theyoungmen of
for which had little relevance to the average Italian, other nations. They suffered from the same in
but had much to do with adventurism and vanity on adequacies (possiblymoreso)in thesystemsmeant to
the partofBenito Mussolini. support them, learned to make do in most situations,
fought, lived and died-but in so doing shared the
• Lackofaclearlythoughtoutstrategicortactical comradeshiponlythoseinvolvedcantrulyunderstand.
doctrine for the air force, exacerbated by equipment
mediocrity.The loss ofItalo Balboin 1940 robbed the ClaimsstatedinthetextarethoseinItalianrecords
Regia Aeronautica of one of the few men within its -not necessarily the real outcome of the combats. It
rankswhomayhavehadthenecessaryvisiontosalvage must be remembered that all Air Forces suffered
thesituation. differences betweenthoseaerialvictoriesclaimedand
enemy aircraft actuallyshot down. One ofthe related
• Reliance on ideas and tactics 'proven' in problems was identification. Such was the reputation
Albania, Ethiopia and Spain, where success against oftheSpitfirethatItalianaircrewwereclaimingtohave
limited oppositiongave an exaggeratedpictureofthe encountered them all over the Mediterranean and
RegiaAeronautica'scapabilities. Balkans,months before they actually arrived!
• Badlystructured aircrew trainingwith an over In thefollowing pagesI hope toshowthe extentof
emphasison technicalflying skills,to the detrimentof the Regia Aeronautica's commitment to the various
strategic and tactical understanding relating to use of theatres they were expected to cover.
the airweapon.
Chris Dunning
• Toomanydifferentaircrafttypesproducedfrom London 1998
limited resources, rather than standardisation on a
select few.
*ItalywasnominallyamonarchyuntilI6June1946whenUmberto,
• Obsolescent equipment, despite some good sonoftheweak-willedVictorEmmanuelIIIwhohadbeenonthe
engineeringideas.Inparticular,theunderdevelopment thronefrom1900unfilSMay1946,abdicatedfollowingareferendum
ofan efficient radio communications system. whichdemandedtheestablishmentofarepublic
6
CHRONOLOGY
The timetable for the Regia Aeronautica's war
In addition to the main events listed below, there 19July
were also constant coastal patrols, convoy escorts, CombattimentodiCapoSpada: attackonHMSSidney
rescue duties, home defence, reconnaissance and and HMS Havock
transportflights.
1September to 18 September
1940 First NorthAfrican Offensive:capture ofSidiBaITani
10June to 25June
Operations againstFrance 27 Septemberto 15April1941
Operations against England in the Battle ofBritain
10June to 10January 1941
Operations against Malta: first stage 28 Octoberto 23April1941
Operations againstGreece
10June to 31August
Conquest ofSomaliland,EastAfrica 9Novemberto 13November
British attack onTaranto
22June
Firstraid onEasternMediterranean:Egypt,Palestine, 27November
Cyprus Battaglia di CapoTeulada: attack on Force H
8July to 15July 9Decemberto 6February 1941
Battaglia di Punta Stilo (Battle of Calabria): convoy Withdrawal from Cirenaica, under British counter
battle offensive
17July
Firstraid on Gibraltar 1941
1Above:Single-finnedCant2.1007bombersofthe261"Squadriglia 9Januaryto 11January
unloadtheirbombs onatargetsomewhereinthe Mediterranean, Attack onForce H
possiblyMalta
7
10January to 22May 13 February to 14February
First offensive against Malta Attacks on convoys in eastern Mediterranean
10January to 27November 10 Marchto 11March
British offensive in EastAfrica Attacks on Royal Navy in eastern Mediterranean
9February 20 March to 10May
British bombard Genova Second offensive on Malta
15 Februaryto 15April 21 Marchto 24March
Axis reconquest ofCirenaica Battaglia della Sirte: attacks on convoys from eastern
Mediterranean
28 March
Battaglia di Gaudo e Matapan (Battle of Matapan): 25 May to 21June
mostly naval Axis captureTobruk
6April to 17April 13 June to 15June
Operations againstYugoslavia Battaglia di Mezzo Giugno: HARPOON and
VIGOROUS convoys to Malta
28April to 1 May
Occupation of Cefalonia, Corfu, and Zante-Ionian 22 June to 20July
Islands Axis advance onEI Alamein
8May to 10May 22July to 31July
Attack onForce H and convoy First battle ofEIAlamein
May41 to September1943 11August to 13August
Anti-partisan operations in Albania andYugoslavia Battaglia di Mezzo Agosto: PEDESTAL convoy to
Malta
20 May to 31 May
Assistance to German assault on Crete 30 August to 5September
Second battle ofEIAlamein
1June to 30 November
Second stageofoperations against Malta 10 Octoberto 20 October
Third offensive on Malta
22July to 25July
Attacks on Force H and convoy 20 Octoberto 22January 1943
Third battle ofEIAlamein,and withdrawal toTunisia
29July to 30November1942
Expeditionary force to Russia: advance to the Don 7Novemberto 13 May 1943
river Defence against invasion ofNorthAfrica andTunisia
26 September to 28 September 1Decemberto 15 May 1943
Attacks on Royal Navy in western Mediterranean Unitreplacements,and then withdrawal from Russian
front
18Novemberto 10January 1942
Withdrawal from Cirenaica, under British counter
attack 1943
18 May to 11June
1December to 31December Defence ofPantelleria
Third stage ofoperations against Malta
9July to 17August
Defence against invasion ofSicily
1942
January to April 3Septemberto 7September
Preparation for the invasion ofMalta Defence againstinvasion ofsouthern Italy
18January to April 8September
Axis retake Cirenaica Italysigns theArmistice
8
COMMAND STRUCTURE
Doctrine, Area Commands and Theatres
After the carnage ofWorld War One, most people surrender. Ground forces were considered as purely
regardedanothermassblood-lettingasunthinkable.More defensive. Fighter aircraft were dismissed, as bombers
sober-minded and less optimistic individuals, however, were to be self-defending and as fast or faster than the
were working on theoretical concepts for future armed interceptors. At the time, this was a reasonable
conflicts. Someofthesewouldinfluencemilitarythinkers proposition, as the latest bombertypes entering service
far beyond their national borders, one of the most in the late 1920s-1930s were capable of outflying any
importantinthe aviationworldbeingtheItalian,Giulio interceptors.A caseinpointbeingtheFaireyFox,which
Douhet. wasfaster than anythingelseinRAFservice at the time
ofits debut. In fact, later experience was to prove that
Douhetwasanarmyofficerwhohadcommandedthe thiswas afalse premise.
prewarItalianAirCorps,buthad beencourt-martialled
in 1916 for disagreeing with his superiors on the use of Douhet's ideas were taken up by ChiefofAir Staff,
aircraft.Bytheendofthewarhewasworkinginaviation SirHughTrenchard,fortheRAF,andBrigadierGeneral
administration,andhadbeenreinstatedwiththerankof WilliamMitchellfortheUSAAC.AllagreedthattheAir
General. By 1922 he had determined to concentrate on Force must be an independent serice,not a supplement
writingaboutthetheoriesconcerningtheuseofairpower. tothearmyornavy.Ideasabouttheroleofgroundforces
and fighter aircraftwere modified, but the basicidea of
In1927herevisedandreissuedabookwhichbecame thethebomberastheultimatewar-winnerremained.The
widely read and of seminal influence through-out the fear of this ("the bomber will always get through")
western world-'CommandoftheAir'.The main thrust misguidedmanypoliticiansinthethirtiesandfortiesand
ofhis argument was that future victoryinwarwould go left them vulnerable to the likes of Adolf Hitler who
to the nation which could dominate the skies.Bombing exploitedthisfear to thefull.
of industries and cities would cause panic among the
population who would force their government to During the 1930s another Italian developed and
provedpracticalwhatwastobecomeamajorelementin
2 Above: Fiat 0.50fighters ofan unidentifiedfighter squadron
the forthcoming war-the long range mass aircraft
violating the airspace ofthe Republic ofSan Marino. The basic
formation. Marshal Italo Balbo developed Douhet's
tacticalcombatformationoftheRegiaAeronauticafighterunitsuntil
wellintothe warwasthe'sezione'ofthreeaircraftasseenhereby theories and suggested that "closely formed units of
therighthandwingman bombers could operate over large distances and
9