Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan - RAND Corporation

177 Pages·2008·1.13 MB·English

by  Seth G. Jones

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RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDY(cid:1)(cid:116)(cid:1)VOLUME 4
Counterinsurgency
in Afghanistan
Seth G. Jones
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND
National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and
development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified
Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine
Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community
under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Jones, Seth G., 1972–
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan / Seth G. Jones.
p. cm. — (Rand counterinsurgency study ; v.4)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4133-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Afghanistan—Politics and government—2001– 2. Counterinsurgency—
Afghanistan. 3. Afghan War, 2001–—Commando operations. 4. Counterinsurgency.
I. Title.
DS371.4.J66 2008
958.104'7—dc22
2008016686
Cover photo by Army Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel
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© Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation
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Preface
This book examines counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan fol-
lowing the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. It is based on
repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, and 2008. It focuses on the early stages of the insurgency—from
2002 until 2008—and examines why and how the insurgency began.
It also draws lessons from the broader literature on counterinsurgency
warfare and provides recommendations to help the United States
develop capabilities and improve performance in future counterinsur-
gency operations. The focus of this research is on the U.S. military.
However, since the actions of other U.S. government agencies, coun-
tries, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are obviously important, they
are discussed where appropriate. The results should be of interest to a
broad audience of policymakers and academics concerned with coun-
terinsurgency and the related issues of state-building, nation-building,
and stability operations.
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense
Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a
federally funded research and development center sponsored by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combat-
ant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the
defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more
information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy
Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by
iii
iv Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
email at [email protected]; by phone at 703-413-1100, exten-
sion 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes
Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050. More information about RAND is
available at www.rand.org.
Contents
Preface ............................................................................. iii
Figures .............................................................................vii
Table ................................................................................ ix
Summary .......................................................................... xi
Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv
Abbreviations ................................................................... xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction ....................................................................... 1
CHAPTER TWO
Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare....................................... 7
CHAPTER THREE
The Age of Insurgency ..........................................................25
CHAPTER FOUR
Insurgents and Their Support Network .....................................37
CHAPTER FIVE
Afghan Government and Security Forces ...................................67
CHAPTER SIX
U.S. and Coalition Forces ..................................................... 87
CHAPTER SEVEN
Recommendations ............................................................. 111
v
vi Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
APPENDIX
Insurgencies Since 1945 ...................................................... 135
References ....................................................................... 139
About the Author .............................................................. 157
Figures
2.1. A Counterinsurgency Framework .................................12
2.2. A Framework for Afghanistan ......................................14
2.3. Competency of Security Forces and Success of
Counterinsurgencies .................................................16
2.4. Government Popularity and Success ............................. 20
2.5. External Support for Insurgents and Success .....................21
2.6. Sanctuary of Insurgents and Success ............................. 23
4.1. The Afghan Insurgent Front ........................................39
4.2. Pakistan Tribal Areas ................................................45
4.3. Insurgent Targets, 2002–2006 .....................................53
5.1. Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1986–2007 ...........................81
5.2. Afghanistan’s Rule of Law, 1996–2006 .......................... 84
6.1. Peak Military Presence per Capita .................................91
7.1. Variation in Indigenous Capacity ................................ 115
7.2. Example of Grid Methodology ................................... 125
vii