Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

189 Pages·1989·2.34 MB·English

by  Russell W. Glenn

Counterinsurgency
in a Test Tube
Analyzing the Success of the
Regional Assistance Mission
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
Russell W. Glenn
Prepared for the
United States Joint Forces Command
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited
NATIONAL DEFENSE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The research described in this report was prepared for the United States
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Preface
On July 24, 2003, a joint, multinational, interagency force landed
in the Solomon Islands at the request of that nation’s prime minis-
ter. Its intent was to “reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions
and authorities in the Solomon Islands, and to ensure respect for the
country’s constitution and implementation of its laws.”1 The call for
help came after years of turmoil during which the legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of the Solomon Islands government had been undermined by
social strife, corruption, intimidation, and armed groups acting with
no regard for the law. Within weeks, the worst of the problems had
been suppressed and national rebuilding began. This analysis consid-
ers why the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
succeeded in its first weeks, months, and years, and what lessons of
value its operations might offer to counterinsurgency (COIN) and
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
The document will be of interest to individuals in or supporting
the government sector whose responsibilities include planning, policy,
doctrine, training, or execution of insurgency, counterinsurgency, or
other stability operations. It will similarly be of value to students, ana-
lysts, or others with a general interest in such undertakings and in the
Solomon Islands mission in particular.
This research was sponsored by the Joint Urban Operations
Office, J9, Joint Forces Command, and conducted within the Inter-
national Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National
1 Bryant (2005a, p. 9).
iii
iv Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop-
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Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the
Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intel-
ligence Community.
For more information on RAND’s International Security and
Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be
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Contents
Preface............................................................................. iii
Figures............................................................................. ix
Summary.......................................................................... xi
Acknowledgments.............................................................. xxi
Abbreviations.................................................................. xxiii
CHAPTER ONE
Background and Brief History of Operation Helpem Fren, the
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)......... 1
Previous Operations ............................................................... 2
Bougainville...................................................................... 2
East Timor........................................................................ 6
RAMSI: A Concise History.....................................................11
The Backdrop to RAMSI........................................................12
RAMSI: Deployment and Execution.......................................... 22
RAMSI as a Counterinsurgency Operation.................................. 40
CHAPTER TWO
Considering the Nature of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency....... 43
The Nature of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.......................... 43
CHAPTER THREE
July 2003 Solomon Islands as an Insurgency: Participant
Perspectives .................................................................53
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vi Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube
A Solomon Islands Insurgency? No............................................ 54
A Solomon Islands Insurgency? Yes............................................ 54
A Solomon Islands Insurgency? Perhaps .......................................55
A Solomon Islands Insurgency from the Perspective of RAMSI
Participants? Concluding Thoughts........................................57
CHAPTER FOUR
Successful COIN: Three Crucial Conditions...............................59
Orchestrating Interagency Capabilities: The “All of Government”
Approach..................................................................... 60
Law Enforcement Support to RAMSI ...................................... 68
Nga Hoe Tuputupu-mai-tawhiti (The Paddles That Bring Growth
from Afar): Aid Organizations and RAMSI............................71
Intelligence in Support of COIN and Other Stability Operations.......76
Command and Control During the Early Months of RAMSI .......... 77
Civil-Military Coordination of Aid Efforts .................................79
Concluding Thoughts Regarding Interagency Challenges.................81
Avoiding Future Interagency Shortfalls..................................... 94
Building and Maintaining the Multinational Team..........................95
Forming and Seizing the Moral High Ground: Shaping Indigenous
Perspectives ................................................................. 104
CHAPTER FIVE
RAMSI: Was It a Counterinsurgency?..................................... 115
CHAPTER SIX
Fitting the RAMSI Square Peg into the World’s Round Holes ....... 121
Vital Elements: Building on the Foundation of Successful
Interagency, Multinational, and Shaping Operations ................. 125
Intelligence..................................................................... 125
Leadership..................................................................... 126
Control......................................................................... 129
Focus on the People........................................................... 132
Implications for Current and Future Operations ........................... 134
Interagency Operation Considerations..................................... 134
Contents vii
Multinational Operation Considerations.................................. 136
Leadership Considerations................................................... 137
Final Observations on the Implications of RAMSI Operations for
Counterinsurgency Operations........................................... 140
U.S. Counterinsurgency Historical Principles ............................ 144
U.S. Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency.................. 144
British Army Principles of COIN........................................... 144
Bibliography.................................................................... 147

Figures
1.1. Bougainville and the South Pacific Ocean Region............... 3
1.2. East Timor and Its Region........................................... 7
1.3. East Timor............................................................10
1.4. Solomon Islands and Environs.....................................13
1.5. Guadalcanal Island and the Weathercoast Region ..............16
1.6. Initial RAMSI Military Component..............................21
1.7. HMAS Manoora Off the Solomon Islands Coast............... 24
1.8. Australian Federal Police Station Sergeant Jesse Graham
and Tanaghai Village Elder Ben Show Off Two Destroyed
Surrendered Weapons.............................................. 27
1.9. Militia Leader Harold Keke and Australian Federal Police
Officer Ben McDevitt During Negotiations .....................31
1.10. Private Shaun Dwyer, 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian
Regiment, Patrolling Honiara with an RSIP Officer in the
Aftermath of Adam Dunning’s Murder ......................... 38
4.1. Structure of the Australian Federal Police........................69
4.2. Papua New Guinea Soldiers Prepare to Deploy to the
Solomon Islands..................................................... 96
6.1. Celebrating the End of Gun Amnesty on “March for
Peace Day” in the Solomon Islands.............................. 134
ix