Cooperation. An Experimental Analysis

213 Pages·1975·3.333 MB·English

by  Gerald Marwell and David R. Schmitt (Auth.)

COOPERATION
An Experimental Analysis
Gerald Marwell
Department of Sociology
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin
David R. Schmitt
Department of Sociology
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
ACADEMIC PRESS New York San Francisco London 1975
A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers
COPYRIGHT © 1975, BY ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Marwell, Gerald, Date
Cooperation: an experimental analysis.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Interpersonal relations. I. Schmitt, David R..
joint author. II. Title.
HM132.M35 301.11 74-10204
ISBN 0-12-476350-2
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
To Bobbie and Fran
for helping to find a way out of
the Prisoner's Dilemma
PREFACE
In most recent social psychology or sociology texts, coopera-
tion is considered one of the "basic social processes." Indeed, a
substantial amount of contemporary research either intention-
ally or unintentionally provides evidence concerning the factors
related to such behavior. Yet no major book explicitly focusing
on cooperation has appeared for more than 30 years (May &
Doob, 1937).
This book represents our attempt to take a hard new look
at cooperation, and contains the fruits of some 6 years of
programmatic research on the topic. More than 30 interrelated
experiments are reported in search of the factors that inhibit,
XJ
xii PREFACE
maintain, or promote cooperation. Two of these factors are
given particular attention—inequity and interpersonal risk be-
tween potential cooperators.
In contrast to the individualistic focus of most experimental
research on cooperation, our approach has been molar. By molar
we mean that we have treated pairs of individuals (groups), not
the individuals themselves, as our units of analysis. This proce-
dure stems both from our bias as sociologists and from seminal
work on cooperation by N. Azrin, O. Lindsley, and D. Cohen.
Their work toward the development of an unambiguously
defined, readily repeatable, cooperative response suggested to us
the feasibility of a programmatic investigation of variables that
promote cooperation.
By taking a molar approach we were able to apply some of
the key methodological and theoretical insights of behavioral
analysis to a group response. Drawing on Cohen's (1962) and
Lindsley's (1966) research with children, we first developed a
simple response which reflects the main conceptual characteris-
tics of cooperation. We were then able to investigate experimen-
tally the extent to which this behavioral response could be
controlled by relevant environmental contingencies. At the
methodological level these experiments constitute the first
systematic application of intrapair replication procedures (ABA
design) to moderate-sized samples of human groups. By studying
each group for a number of hours, involving thousands of
responses, we were able to demonstrate the clear and precise
experimental control that can be exercised over cooperative
behavior.
The level of control we obtained was also a function of the
particular alternative to cooperation that we provided to our
subjects. Unlike the setting in most traditional research on
cooperation, the major alternative for our subjects was neither
competition nor doing nothing. Instead, subjects could choose
to work individually—probably the most common "real-world"
alternative to cooperative behavior. Interestingly, however, the
PREFACE xiii
question of competition reentered the research at a later stage.
Reformulated as interpersonal risk—the potential for an aver-
sive response by either partner—it emerged as one of the key
independent variables for analysis. When group members were
later given the opportunity to take money that the other had
earned through collective effort, the rate of cooperation was
dramatically reduced. Not because group members engaged in
continuous competition, but because they retreated to self-
protective individual work. The central problem of trust and
protectiveness for the maintenance of cooperation thus became
apparent. In everyday life, however, cooperation does emerge,
despite the ubiquity of risk. Thus, we began the systematic
pursuit of those factors which reduce the impact of risk, and
promote cooperation. Our findings both underscored the fragil-
ity of cooperative behavior and suggested some minimal social
conditions under which cooperation will persist.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The cooperative, collective nature of this work is strikingly
illustrated by reporting our debts to many colleagues and aides,
although we accept for ourselves alone any deserved blame.
First, however, a heartfelt thanks to our sponsor. The
National Science Foundation provided the bulk of support for
this research with three substantial grants (GS-843, GS-1695,
and GS-28087). At key points in the development of the re-
search program The University of Wisconsin Research Committee
also provided support. The University of Oslo and the Norwegian
Peace Research Institute provided space for our Norwegian
venture.
XV
xvi ACKNOWLDEGMENTS
Three people deserve special mention. Dr. Robert Shotola
collaborated with us at the early stages of the program, and co-
authored the most extensive paper incorporated in this book.
He also provided suggestions and encouragement at subsequent
stages. Bj^rn B^yesen translated our experimental materials into
Norwegian, ran all Norwegian subjects, translated their behavior
into English, and collaborated in the analysis and writing of the
article based on these data. Sandra Adkisson Tausend was an
equal in the development and execution of the study with
children relating cooperative behavior to inequity reported at
the end of Chapter 3.
Six people put in extended tours of duty with the program,
and assumed major responsibilities for its progress: James Besser,
Susan Brandscheid, Ira Kaufman, Cheryl Keeton, Connie Tesch
Kolpin, and Richard Shurman.
The list of experimenters, stooges, and schedulers who have
worked in the program includes many who gave us more than
just their time, but took a serious intellectual interest in the
project: Ruth Ames, Sharon Bartman, Vicki Burton, Peggy
Bushneil, Janet Chorlton, Jeanne Condon, Sara Connor, Sharon
Cornell, Catherine Cummins, Martha Dilts, Kathleen Ehrenberg,
Charlotte Farr, Jane Häuser, Fran Hawkins, Rita Hurbi, Karen
Lee, Nancy Light, Marilyn Muehrer, Marilyn Ratliff, Marya
Roland, Robin Ross, Mary Ann Rundell, Lane Simpson, Joyce
Solochek, Dennis Statz, Carol Stolte, David Tucker, and Sue
Wolfe.
The task of typing and assembling the various manuscript
drafts was handled expertly by Beulah Reddaway and her staff
at the University of Washington. The index was primarily the
work of Deborah McDonald. From a long list of colleagues and
friends, the following deserve particular mention: Robert
Burgess, Herbert L. Costner, Weldon Johnson, H. Andrew
Michener, L. Keith Miller, and Shalom Schwartz.
CREDITS
Some of the materials in this book were presented in articles
we have published in professional journals. The following list
contains the complete reference for each of these previous
papers, in temporal order. We thank the various journals for
their permission to reproduce these materials:
Figure A-l, p. 192. Schmitt, David R. & Marwell, Gerald. Stim-
ulus control in the experimental study of cooperation.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1968, 11,
571-574. Copyright 1968 by the Society for the Experimen-
tal Analysis of Behavior, Inc.
xvii
xviij CREDITS
Marwell, Gerald & Schmitt, David R. Are trivial games the most
interesting psychologically? Behavioral Science, 1968, 13,
123-128.
Marwell, Gerald, Schmitt, David R., & Shotola, Robert. Cooper-
ation and interpersonal risk. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1971, 18, 9-32.
Schmitt, David R. & Marwell, Gerald. Taking and the disruption
of cooperation. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 1971,15, 405-412. Copyright 1971 by the Society
for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Inc.
Marwell, Gerald & Schmitt, David R. Some notes on the con-
cept and experimental study of cooperation. Journal for the
Theory of Social Behavior, 1971, 1, 153-164.
Figures 6-1 & 6-2, pp. 117 & 124; Table 6-7, p. 125. Schmitt,
David R. & Marwell, Gerald. Avoidance of risk as a deter-
minant of cooperation. Journal of the Experimental Analy-
sis of Behavior, 1971, 16, 367-374. Copyright 1971 by the
Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Inc.
Table 3-1, p. 38. Schmitt, David R. & Marwell, Gerald. With-
drawal and reward allocation as responses to inequity.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 8, 207-
221.
Marwell, Gerald & Schmitt, David R. Cooperation and inter-
personal risk: cross-cultural and cross-procedural generaliza-
tions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 8,
9-32.
Figures 5-2 & 5-3, p. 97. Marwell, Gerald, Schmitt, David R., &
B^yesen, Bj^rn. Pacifist strategy and cooperation under
interpersonal risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 1973,28,12-20.