contributions to the royal air force air power review

118 Pages·2010·13.31 MB·English

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ROYAL
AIR FORCE AIR POWER REVIEW
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the Royal Air Force in pnrlicular with respect to the
development :md "ppJiciltion of <lir power. SN68RF
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FOREWORD
T
his Autumn edition of Air Power Rl'l'il'lll so Ryan Clow's piece pro,'ides .1n interesting
opens with il historical pi(.'C(' from Or Alfred pcr"pccth'e - that of a C.lnadian ob<;('rver looking
Price, 'Mischief Nighl', which describes at the thinking of both the US and UK on the
the .1l1icd radar spoofing operations thallook subject. and then considering the implications for
pl"ee during the hours of darkness of the 5/6 the Canadian armed forces. The conclusion that
June 1944: an essential part of the Operation EBO, if it is to be effective, n..'quires the integration
OVERLORD plan. Although the general outline of all c.lpabilities: kinetic and non-kinetic, military
of the opcr.ltiollS is fairly well known, this article and civil, has considerable alignment with current
describes in considerable detail the range of UK concepts in this area. How('vcr, the trick lie, in
activiti~ taken both to protect friendly surface and the abilit), of pan-governmental bod ie .. to pull such
<lir forces opcrilting in the Normandy area, as well an approach together - and thi.!. is a field where
as del.lying the mo\'('menl of enemy reserve forces much more work will be needed.
by convincing enemy commanders that the main
body of the invasion was in the Pas de Calais ilrea. A little known piece of air force history is covered
In term" of lessons for today it is interesting to by Wg Cdr EHard in hi'> article on the RAF'."
consider whether such opcr.ltional [e\'l:,1d eception Servicing Commando Units (SCUs) from the
could still be achicved, givcn the levd of media Second \,Vorld War. These units, made up of
access and involvement in modern oper.1tions. technicians who had volunteered for'sped"l
duties' and subsequently completed commando
An area for much debate and frequently strong training. were the result of considerable analysis
opinions, is Ihat of ballistic missile defence (BMD), by the RAF regarding its poor maintenance and
and Dr Jeremy Slocker's item on Brit.,in·s policy on logistics performance during the BailIe of France
BMD provides a useful introduction 10 the sub;ect in 19-W. The SCUs' performance across a number
area. It Iraces the development of our policy of theatres n..'Sulted in considerable plaudits
from the 1940s, remembering that Britain was the as well as a number of award .. , although the
fiNI country in Ihe world to come under effective Service's innat(' resistance to 'elite' units together
ballistic missile attack, through to the current and with their limited utility outside the operational
perhaps parado;\:ical situation where although '>C('nario for which they were designed meant that
the UK has no plans to acquire any form of BMD, their lifcspan \\Ia~ fairly ~hort. The author then
il is actively involved with the US in dcveloping examines our current posture with regard to the
American defences and hosts two essential same factors and conc1ud('.!. that there are lesson~
elements of US BMD. The requirement for any regarding the capability, although not necessarily
homeland-defence system to be integrated within the organis.1Iion, that we could usefully use today.
a Europe-wide context is clearly brought out, and
of course applies equally to dealing with non-BMD Wg Cdr Dean Andrew's piece on Ihe culture of
threats - think of 9/11 in a European scenario World War ][ Luftwaffe fighter aces is onc that
- how man)' countries' airspace would the aircraft shou Id generate a considerable degree of thought
have nown through before reaching their eventu.,l - .1nd perhaps some questions - in the minds
targ('ts? The author's conclusion regarding what of those who read it. Ilis analysiS of the 'softer'
it will take to produce a considerable change in aspects of the Luftwaffe' .. personnel management
policy is, whilst somewhat negative, probably true. strategies certainly goes soml' way to e;\:plaining
how their leading fighter pilots were both able
Whilst much has bc<>n written on the subject of and encouraged to rack up such tremendous
Effects Ba.scd Operations (EBO), most of this has scores, although the impact on those who were
focussed on the RAF and USAF perspectives not amongst the 'Experten' perhaps needs
consideration in the interests ofbalancc. It would
also be interesting to consider whether the cultures
of the RAF and USAF resulted in a noticeably
different overall success rate.
The final article considers air-land co-operation
in Normandy, and was produced by Commodore
Moncricff, a recent HCSC student. Whilst the fact
that personality can have a tremendous impact on
the conduct of military operations is not new, there
can be no doubt that this particular case is an abject
example of the effects that can result from poor C2
arrangements combined with persollality clashes.
The inability to apply lessons hard-won in other
theatres of war should be a s.llutary reminder to us
all of the need for robust internal communications,
together with a healthy joint debate on how air
land co-operation can best be taken forwards. [t
is clear that Project CONINGHAM-KEYES will be
instrumental in this regard, although the business
of building trust between commanders will of
course always be a very person,,1 affair.
One last point - if you are a regular Air Power
Review reader but have not filled in and returned
the quC!>tionnaire thilt was contained in the lasl
edition, it is not too [ate for you to do so. The
journal is likely to be undergoing considerable
chilnge in the near future, and your feedback is
essential if the Editorial Board is to continue to
produce a product that meets the needs of both the
Service ;:Jnd wider audiences. Please do take the
time to 1(>1 us know your thoughts.
DDefS

AIR POWER
Re V l e w
Editor Contents
Jay Myers
Production and Design Editor
Harvey Grainger 1 Mischief Night: Allied Radar Spoofing Operations
5-6 June 1944, D-Day
Studio
Dr Alfred price
John Griffiths
Dave Mitchinson
15 Britain's Policy on Ballistic Missile Defence
Dr Jeremy Stocker
35
Effects Based Operations: A Case for
the Primary of Effects
Ryan Clow
47
Are the Experiences of Servicing Commandos
Relevant Today?
Wg Cdr S D EJlard
73 The Culture of the World War 11
Luftwaffe Fighter Ace
Wg Cdr Dean Andrew
Defence Storage and Distribution Centre
(DSDC) Llangennech with their
93 Air-Land Co-operation in Normandy:
High-level Petulance and Intransigence
with the
Coloured Campaign Execution
Commodore I Moncrieff
1 10
Book Reviews/Notices
Wales
SA148YP
Other general enquires on magazine
distribution may be made to the London
Editorial board:
Gp Capt N Parton. 0 Def S (RAF). Chairman; Mr J Myers, Editor, Head of RAF Information
Media Training and Technical Publlcallons (MoD); Gp Copl D 6IQre, MoD; Gp Cop'
M Doel DRAFJD. JSCSC Wolchlield: Mr S Cox. Heod of AHB (RAF): Dr C J M GouHer.
JSCSC Wafchfield; Mr C Hobson, Chief Librarian; Sqn Ldr J Horvey, Defs (RAf) 1rg OH.

'A landing against organised and highly trained preclude a further attempt for at least
opposition is probably the most difficult undertaking a year. Relieved of the need to withhold
which military forces are called upon to face.' substantial forces in the west, the German
(General George C Marshall) High Command could deliver a powerful
reinforcement to the Eastern Front and perhaps
W hatever its outcome, the Allied invasion secure a decisive victory there. If, on the other
of northern Europe in 1944 was to mark hand, the landings succeeded, the German Army
an important turning point in World would face a hard fight both on the Eastern
War H. Should the landings fail, Allied losses in and Western Fronts. That was the recurring
men and materials were likely to be so high as to nightmare of its leaders.
Giant Wuenburg Gennan defence radar
By picking up and decoding the German radio reports of the aircraft
tracks, and back-plotting the distances and bearings given by the
radar stations, Allied intelligence officers located several stations
Detailed planning for the invasion, Operation By the late spring of 1944 the Luftwaffe fighter
OVERLORD, began late in 1943. Soon afterwards force had been so depleted during the hard
tentative discussions began on the possible fought battles over Germany itself that Allied air
use of radio countermeasures to support superiority over the landing area was assured.
the operation. The first expert in this field to Nevertheless, it was vitally important that the
become involved was Dr (later Sir Robert) remaining German land, sea and air forces be
Cockburn, head of the countermeasures permitted few opportunities to engage the troops
section at the Telecommunications Research as they waded ashore during the initial stage of
Establishment at Malvern. Together with the the landings. The plan for the countermeasures
US ABL-15 countermeasures team co-located operation, supporting OVERLORD, had the
with it at Malvern, he began work to prepare the following aims:2
countermeasures plan to support the invasion. As
with most aspects of OVERLORD, there was close • To prevent the enemy obtaining early warning
integration between the British and the American of, and accurate plots on, approaching surface
efforts at all levels. 1 forces.
Having located the radar stations, knocking them out was no easy task . ..
The specialised task of destroying these targets was assigned to Spitfire and
Typhoon squadrons of the mainly British 2nd Tactical Air Force
Four underwing rockets aboard an RAF Typhoon
• To prevent enemy coastal batteries from using But this picture had to be updated continually
radar-controlled gunfire against surface forces. since radar sets, pilrticularly the mobile Freya and
Wuerzburg cquipments, could be moved quickly
• To support airborne operations by: to" new 'lite and be operational within a few hours
of their arrival.
I
I. Reducing and confusing the enemy's early
warning system, thus dci"ying both the arrival of To assist in plotting thl! radars, the
fighters amongst and alerting of the threatened Tekcommunication<; Research Establishment
dropping zones. produced a special ground direction finder
code-n"med 'Ping Pong' able to determine the
2. Interfering with enemy fighter control R!f, bearing of" radar transmitter to within a quarter
thus "ffecting both the movement of night fighters of a degree. From widely separated points
into the "rea of oper"tions "nd the vectoring of across the south of England, the three Ping Pong
intercepting fighter<;. equipments took bearings on enemy radars
along the north coast of Fr"nce.' Tri,l11guiation of
3. Producing diversion"ry thre"ts and thereby the bearings g.lV(> ilpproximatl! positions of the
dividing the enemy's "v"ilable fighter effort. stations, which were then refined by photographic
reconnaissance of the are".
• To delay the movement of enemy reserve
ground forces by producing threats of apparent Further help in locating German radars came from
"S5<lults, both airborne and seaborne. dl-'Coding radio reports on Ihe movements of Allied
aircraft, broadcast by the stations. As part of a long
Destruction of the defenders' radar infrastructure running operation code-nilffied OCCULlST, Allied
To reduce the difficulties of jamming and reconnilissance aircraft made carefully planned
spoofing the Gemlan radar network along the Oights over occupied Europe, photographing the
Channel coast, the first priority was to destroy as ground beneath to provide an accurate record
many as possible of the ground installations. The of thl!ir tracks. By picking up and decoding the
target was formidable: as p..1T1 of Hitler's West Wall, German r.ldio reports of the aircraft tracks, and
there were radar ~tations positioned at roughly back-plotting the dist"nces and bearings given
10 mile int('rvaIs along the co.lsl from Ostend to by the radar stations, Allied intelligence officers
Cherbourg, each with an aver.lgeof three radars.J located sev('ral stations,"
Th(.'SC stations were t'quippcd with the menagerie
of Gennan ground radar systems: Frcya, Mammut Having located the r.ldar stations, knocking them
and W"sscrm"nn e"rly w"rning radars, Sectakt out was no easy tilsk. These small pinpoint targets
ship scilrch "nd fire control radars, Giant and small were usually well protected by 20 mm and 37
WlI('rzbu rg rildars for fighler and flak control. mm anti-aircrilft guns. The specialised task of
destroying these ta rgets was assigned to Spitfire
[t was importilnt thil! the softening-up operations and Typhoon squadrons of the mainly British
should give no hint of where the invilsion was 2nd T.lcticill Air Foret.'. The anti-radar operations
to tilkc place. To that end, for eilch radar target began on the morning of 16 March 1944/ when
attacked in the "rea of the intended invasion, at 12 Typhoons of No 198 Squadron set about the
least two were to be attacked in areas outside it. Wassermann early warning radar station near
Ostcnd on the Belgian coast. During the initi.l1
For their success, the air attacks on German attack four Typhoons attacked the radar with
radar targets would depend on the accuracy of rockets ilnd cannon, while the other eight strafed
intelligence information on their locations. By the flak cmp1acements surrounding the main target.
spring of 1944, Or R V Jonl"S's Scientific Intelligence As the fighter-bombers left the target the 130-fool
dep.lrlment at the Air Ministry had assembled high antenna tower remained upright, so that
a detailed picture of the German radar network. afternoon the fighter-bombers returned. More