Contemplation and the Human Animal in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas

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Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
2011
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Edyta M. Imai
Loyola University Chicago
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Copyright © 2011 Edyta M. Imai
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

CONTEMPLATION AND THE HUMAN ANIMAL

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

BY
EDYTA M. IMAI
CHICAGO IL
DECEMBER 2011
Copyright by Edyta M. Imai, 2011
All rights reserved
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: CONTEMPLATION AND NATURAL APPETITES 30

CHAPTER TWO: SENSATION AND CONTEMPLATION 104

CHAPTER THREE: DESIRE AND CONTEMPLATION 166

CHAPTER FOUR: DELIGHT AND CONTEMPLATION 230

BIBLIOGRAPHY 291

VITA 303

iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ST Summa theologiae
SCG Summa contra gentiles
QDV Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
QDA Quaestiones disputatae de anima
In Boetii de Trin. In Librum Boetii de Trinitate Expositio
In DA Sententia libri De anima
In NE Sententia libri Ethicorum
In Met Commentarium in XII libros Metaphysicorum
In Ph Commentarium in VIII libros Physicorum
SENT Commentarium in quatuor libros Sententiarum

iv
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation I examine the manner in which – according to Thomas
Aquinas - the operations of the sensitive soul contribute to contemplation. Aquinas
scholars writing about contemplation have traditionally focused their attention on the role
of the intellect in contemplation. That is understandable, because contemplation is
primarily an intellectual activity. However, contemplation also involves the operations of
the sensitive soul, albeit in a secondary way. The act of contemplation is accompanied by
phantasms1 and the passions of love and delight. The acquisition of knowledge - which
ordinarily precedes contemplation - requires the involvement of the outer and inner
senses and of the sensitive appetite. This is so because a human being is an integrated and
a composite being, made of body and soul, and all our faculties participate in
contemplation, not to mention in the acquisition of knowledge, which typically precedes
contemplation.
The sensitive soul is the soul characteristic of us qua animals. Examining how the
operations of the sensitive soul contribute to contemplation shows us what difference
being animal makes to contemplation; how the contemplation of a rational animal differs
from contemplation of a being who is rational, but not animal. Since, according to
Aquinas, human happiness consists of contemplation, I argue that the operations of the

1 In Aquinas’s terminology phantasms represent a given thing as sensed and perceived.
1
2
sensitive soul are necessary for the attainment and the enjoyment of human happiness
qua contemplation.
Contemplation Is a Neglected Topic
No other commentator on Aquinas has approached the question in the way I
approach it. There is hardly anything in the literature written about the role played by our
animality in human contemplation. There is very little written about our animality in
connection with any problems of Thomas’s philosophy. Thomas Hibbs notes that
contemplation is one of the topics neglected by Aquinas scholars. He says: “Given
Thomas’s emphasis on the crucial role of contemplation in the good life, it is surprising
how little attention has been devoted to the topic or to the role of the intellectual virtues. I
might list the topic of contemplation and intellectual virtues among those features of
Aquinas’s moral thought that remain neglected in the literature.”2 It is interesting to note
that Hibbs mentions contemplation along with intellectual virtues, apparently not even
considering the possibility that one would discuss it in connection with animality. Even in
connection with the intellectual virtues, which belong to the rational part of the soul, the
topic of contemplation has been neglected; discussion of contemplation in connection
with the sensitive soul is non-existent in the literature today.
Hibbs mentions Josef Pieper’s book Happiness and Contemplation3 as a
conspicuous exception to the dearth of books on the topic of contemplation. Pieper writes
about contemplation and happiness in Happiness and Contemplation and in Leisure the

2 Hibbs, Thomas, S. “Interpretations of Aquinas’s Ethics Since Vatican II” in Ethics of Aquinas, ed.
Stephen J. Pope, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002, pp. 412-425.

3 Pieper, Josef, Happiness and Contemplation, 1958, tr.Richard and Clara Winston, South Bend, Indiana:
St. Augustine’s Press, 1998.
3
Basis of Culture. 4 These are classic works. However, his project is to defend the value
of contemplation in the world of work and constant distractions; he does not closely
examine what happens in the human soul when we contemplate, or when we engage in
research leading to contemplation. He certainly is not interested in the role of the
operations of the sensitive soul in contemplation. Furthermore, he does not analyze what
Aquinas said about contemplation, but rather discusses contemplation as an essential
component of a good life from the perspective of Aquinas’s philosophy. More recent
works on the subject of contemplation also focus on the importance of contemplation for
living a good life,5 rather than on the way we engage in the contemplation.
Types of Contemplation
There are two sides to contemplation: the object of contemplation, and the subject
who contemplates. The ultimate object of contemplation is God,6 who cannot be known
in the way material objects are known to us, and who, in fact, cannot be fully known.7 As
far as the object of contemplation is concerned, the animal side of human nature is
irrelevant, since we cannot study God the way we study other objects. Aquinas tells us
that we may also contemplate truth about God’s creation.8 Created things of this world

4 Pieper, Josef, Leisure, the Basis of Culture,1948, tr.Gerald Malsbary, South Bend, Indiana: St.
Augustine’s Press, 1998.

5 For example, Dewan, Lawrence, “Truth and Happiness: Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 67, 1-20, 1993.

6 Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Theologica, II-II 180, 4, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1948. Latin text: Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Theologiae,
Roma: Alba-Editiones Paulinae, 1962. Part One of Part Two, Question 3, article 8. Hereafter refered to as
ST.

7 ST I 12, 7.

8 ST II-II 180, 4.
4
are material objects, but the truths about them are not material. Thus, from the
perspective of the object of contemplation, the operations of the sensitive soul, i.e.,
sensory perceptions or passions, are not relevant.
However, as far as the subject is concerned, namely, a human being, all aspects of
human nature pertain to contemplation, for the subject who contemplates is a rational
animal. A human being is able to engage in contemplation, because a human being is a
rational creature.9 But a human being depends on the operations of the sensitive soul,
namely, sensory perceptions and the passions, for the acquisition of knowledge, because
a human is an animal. Senses and passions guide us in the study which precedes
contemplation. The inner sense of phantasia and passions of love and delight assist the
intellect in the very act of contemplation. Thomas Aquinas also considered the role of the
senses in contemplation in the afterlife. He believed that there will be a resurrection at
which time the souls of the dead will be reunited with their bodies. After the resurrection,
the whole human being is to experience delight in the contemplation of God, and that
experience of delight requires the participation of the sensitive soul and the body, as well
as the intellective soul. From the perspective of the human being who contemplates, the
operations of the sensitive soul are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and for the
enjoyment of contemplation.
A comprehensive work on the subject of contemplation is Garrigou-Langrange’s
Christian Perfection and Contemplation.10 Garrigou-Lagrange distinguishes two kinds of
contemplation: ordinary and mystical. “Ordinary contemplation” is a term used by him to

9 According to Thomas, angels are also able to contemplate God, but angelic contemplation is not the
subject of this work.

10 Garrigous-Lagrance, R., O.P. Christian Perfection and Contemplation B. Herder Book Co. 1951.
5
describe the kind of contemplation to which a person may be led as a result of study of
the world around us. Mystical contemplation is beyond the powers of unaided human
reason, for it requires God’s grace.11 Most of Garrigou-Lagrange’s work is devoted to the
discussion of the mystical type of contemplation. On the other hand, this dissertation
treats of the ordinary contemplation, and specifically, it examines the role of the sensitive
soul in the ordinary contemplation. Aquinas himself does not explicitly stress these
distinctions in his discussion of contemplation, but he mentions them. It is up to Aquinas
scholars to retrieve from his writings all that he has to say about different types of
contemplation.
Aquinas’s discussion of contemplation is two-fold: there is contemplation in this
life on earth and contemplation in heaven. I shall focus on the earthly contemplation, but
I will discuss briefly the heavenly kind of contemplation, because there is continuity
between the two kinds of contemplation. Contemplation of God in heaven is the perfect
kind of contemplation and the final end towards which we all, according to Thomas, tend.
Thus, the ordinary contemplation should be considered against this ultimate standard and
the final end. The other reason to consider it is that, when we do find discussion of
contemplation in the literature, it is generally a discussion of contemplation in relation to
our final end, which is heavenly contemplation. I shall briefly discuss that “standard
view” of contemplation before proceeding to the examination of the role of the sensitive
soul in contemplation. In earthly life, we may engage in an ordinary contemplation, or in
a mystical contemplation. The latter is possible through God’s grace. In this dissertation I
will discuss the ordinary contemplation, not the mystical kind. Furthermore, I will not

11 Garrigous-Lagrance, pp. 221-222.