Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes PDF
Preview Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
CONSTRAINING DICTATORSHIP How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the emergenceofconstitutionaltermlimitsandsuccessionprocedures,aswellas elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that institutionscrediblyconstrainleadersonlywhentheychangetheunderlying distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who institutionalizearelesslikelytofacecoupattemptsandareabletoremainin office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an originaltime-seriesdatasetof46countriesinSub-SaharanAfricafrom1960 to2010,formaltheory,andcasestudies,thisbookultimatelyillustrateshow somedictatorshipsevolvefrompersonaliststrongmanruletoinstitutionalized regimes. AnneMengisAssistantProfessorintheDepartmentofPolitics,Universityof Virginia. Her research centers on authoritarian politics and institutions. ProfessorMeng’sworkhasbeenpublishedintheBritishJournalofPolitical Science, The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Columbia Law Review, and Studies in Comparative International Development, and has won the “Best PaperAward”fromtheDemocracyandAutocracysectionatAPSA. Published online by Cambridge University Press Published online by Cambridge University Press political economy of institutions and decisions SeriesEditors JeffryFrieden,HarvardUniversity JohnPatty,EmoryUniversity ElizabethMaggiePenn,EmoryUniversity FoundingEditors JamesE.Alt,HarvardUniversity DouglassC.North,WashingtonUniversityofSt.Louis Otherbooksintheseries AlbertoAlesinaandHowardRosenthal,PartisanPolitics,DividedGovernment andtheEconomy LeeJ.AlstonandJosephP.Ferrie,SouthernPaternalismandtheRiseofthe AmericanWelfareState:Economics,Politics,andInstitutions,1865–1965 LeeJ.Alston,ThrainnEggertssonandDouglassC.North,eds.,EmpiricalStudies inInstitutionalChange JamesE.AltandKennethShepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositivePolitical Economy JosephineT.Andrews,WhenMajoritiesFail:TheRussianParliament,1990–1993 JeffreyS.BanksandEricA.Hanushek,eds.,ModernPoliticalEconomy:Old Topics,NewDirections YoramBarzel,EconomicAnalysisofPropertyRights,2ndedition YoramBarzel,ATheoryoftheState:EconomicRights,LegalRights,andthe ScopeoftheState RobertBates,BeyondtheMiracleoftheMarket:ThePoliticalEconomyof AgrarianDevelopmentinKenya JennaBednar,TheRobustFederation:PrinciplesofDesign CharlesM.Cameron,VetoBargaining:PresidentsandthePoliticsofNegative Power KellyH.Chang,AppointingCentralBankers:ThePoliticsofMonetaryPolicyin theUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnion TomS.ClarkTheSupremeCourt:AnAnalyticalHistoryofConstitutional DecisionMaking PeterCowheyandMathewMcCubbins,eds.,StructureandPolicyinJapanand theUnitedStates:AnInstitutionalistApproach Published online by Cambridge University Press GaryW.Cox,TheEfficientSecret:TheCabinetandtheDevelopmentofPolitical PartiesinVictorianEngland GaryW.Cox,MakingVotesCount:StrategicCoordinationintheWorld’s ElectoralSystem GaryW.Cox,MarketingSovereignPromises:MonopolyBrokerageandthe GrowthoftheEnglishState GaryW.CoxandJonathanN.Katz,ElbridgeGerry’sSalamander:TheElectoral ConsequencesoftheReapportionmentRevolution TineDeMoore,TheDilemmaoftheCommoners:UnderstandingtheUseof Common-PoolResourcesinLong-TermPerspective AdamDean,FromConflicttoCoalition:Profit-SharingInstitutionsandthe PoliticalEconomyofTrade MarkDincecco,PoliticalTransformationsandPublicFinances:Europe, 1650–1913 MarkDinceccoandMassimilianoGaetanoOnorato,FromWarfaretoWealth: TheMilitaryOriginsofUrbanProsperityinEurope RaymondM.DuchandRandolphT.Stevenson,TheEconomicVote:How PoliticalandEconomicInstitutionsConditionElectionResults JeanEnsminger,MakingaMarket:TheInstitutionalTransformationofan AfricanSociety DavidEpsteinandSharynO’Halloran,DelegatingPowers:ATransactionCost PoliticsApproachtoPolicyMakingunderSeparatePowers KathrynFirmin-Sellers,TheTransformationofPropertyRightsintheGold Coast:AnEmpiricalStudyApplyingRationalChoiceTheory ClarkC.Gibson,PoliticiansandPoachers:ThePoliticalEconomyofWildlife PolicyinAfrica DanielW.Gingerich,PoliticalInstitutionsandParty-DirectedCorruptionin SouthAmerica AvnerGreif,InstitutionsandthePathtotheModernEconomy:Lessonsfrom MedievalTrade JeffreyD.Grynaviski,PartisanBonds:PoliticalReputationsandLegislative Accountability StephenHaber,ArmandoRazo,andNoelMaurer,ThePoliticsofProperty Rights:PoliticalInstability,CredibleCommitments,andEconomicGrowthin Mexico,1876–1929 RonHarris,IndustrializingEnglishLaw:EntrepreneurshipandBusiness Organization,1720–1844 AnnaL.Harvey,VotesWithoutLeverage:WomeninAmericanElectoralPolitics, 1920–1970 Published online by Cambridge University Press ShigeoHiranoandJamesM.Snyder,Jr.PrimaryElectionsintheUnitedStates MurrayHorn,ThePoliticalEconomyofPublicAdministration:Institutional ChoiceinthePublicSector JohnD.Huber,RationalizingParliament:LegislativeInstitutionsandParty PoliticsinFrance SeanIngham,RuleofMultipleMajorities:ANewTheoryofPopularControl JohnE.Jackson,JacekKlich,andKrystynaPoznanska,ThePoliticalEconomyof Poland’sTransition:NewFirmsandReformGovernments JackKnight,InstitutionsandSocialConflict MichaelLaverandKennethShepsle,eds.,CabinetMinistersandParliamentary Government MichaelLaverandKennethShepsle,eds.,MakingandBreakingGovernments: CabinetsandLegislaturesinParliamentaryDemocracies MargaretLevi,Consent,Dissent,andPatriotism BrianLevyandPabloT.Spiller,eds.,Regulations,Institutions,andCommitment: ComparativeStudiesofTelecommunications LeifLewin,IdeologyandStrategy:ACenturyofSwedishPolitics(Englishedition) GaryLibecap,ContractingforPropertyRights JohnLondregan,LegislativeInstitutionsandIdeologyinChile ArthurLupiaandMathewD.McCubbins,TheDemocraticDilemma:Can CitizensLearnWhatTheyNeedtoKnow? 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ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108834896 doi:10.1017/9781108877497 ©AnneMeng2020 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2020 PrintedintheUnitedKingdombyTJInternationalLtd.PadstowCornwall AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. isbn978-1-108-83489-6Hardback isbn978-1-108-79247-9Paperback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. Published online by Cambridge University Press CONSTRAINING DICTATORSHIP How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the emergenceofconstitutionaltermlimitsandsuccessionprocedures,aswellas elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that institutionscrediblyconstrainleadersonlywhentheychangetheunderlying distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who institutionalizearelesslikelytofacecoupattemptsandareabletoremainin office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an originaltime-seriesdatasetof46countriesinSub-SaharanAfricafrom1960 to2010,formaltheory,andcasestudies,thisbookultimatelyillustrateshow somedictatorshipsevolvefrompersonaliststrongmanruletoinstitutionalized regimes. AnneMengisAssistantProfessorintheDepartmentofPolitics,Universityof Virginia. Her research centers on authoritarian politics and institutions. ProfessorMeng’sworkhasbeenpublishedintheBritishJournalofPolitical Science, The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Columbia Law Review, and Studies in Comparative International Development, and has won the “Best PaperAward”fromtheDemocracyandAutocracysectionatAPSA. Published online by Cambridge University Press Published online by Cambridge University Press
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