constitutional law of afghanistan

264 Pages·2016·3.01 MB·English

Chapter 1 1
2 N D E D I T I O N
A N I N T R O D U C T I O N T O T H E
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L
L A W O F A F G H A N I S T A N

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AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AFGHANISTAN
SECOND EDITION · PUBLISHED 2015
AFGHANISTAN LEGAL EDUCATION PROJECT (ALEP) AT STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
alep.stanford.edu
[email protected]

Crown Quadrangle
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
law.stanford.edu
Protected by Creative Commons License (No Derivative Works)
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ALEP – STANFORD LAW SCHOOL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF AFGHANISTAN
AUTHORS CONTRIBUTING
Rose Leda Ehler (Student Co-Director, 2011-12) FACULTY EDITORS
Daniel Lewis (Student Co-Director, 2011-12) Ghizaal Haress
Elizabeth Espinosa Jenn Round
Jane Farrington Mohammad Isaqzadeh
Gabe Ledeen Nafay Choudhury
CHAIR OF THE
EDITORS
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
Stephanie Ahmad (Rule of Law Fellow, 2011-12)
Taylor Strickling, 2012-13
Ingrid Price (Student Co-Director, 2012-13)
Hadley Rose, 2013-14
Sam Jacobson (Student Co-Director, 2013-14)
Mehdi Hakimi, 2014-
Catherine Baylin
Jane Farrington
Jay Minga
Jason Fischbein
FACULTY DIRECTOR
Erik Jensen
RULE OF LAW
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Megan Karsh
ADVISORS
Rolando Garcia Miron
Rohullah Azizi
VISUAL DESIGNERS
Daniel McLaughlin
Paula Airth
Table of Contents 5
PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Stanford Law School’s Afghanistan Legal Education Project (ALEP) began in the fall of 2007 as a student-
initiated program dedicated to helping Afghan universities train the next generation of Afghan lawyers.
ALEP’s mandate is to research, write, and publish high-quality legal textbooks, and to develop a degree-
granting law program at the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). The AUAF Law Department fac-
ulty and Stanford Law School students develop curriculum under the guidance of ALEP’s Faculty Director
and Executive Director with significant input from Afghan scholars and practitioners.
In addition to An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition), ALEP has published in-
troductory textbooks about: The Law of Afghanistan (3rd Edition); Commercial Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition);
Criminal Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition); International Law for Afghanistan (1st Edition); Law of Obligations of
Afghanistan (1st Edition), Property Law of Afghanistan (1st Edition), Legal Ethics in Afghanistan (1st Edition). Text-
books addressing Legal Methods: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Legal Methods: Legal Practice, and a new version
of Public International Law are forthcoming. Many of the ALEP textbooks have been translated into the na-
tive Dari and Pashto languages and are available for free at alep.stanford.edu. Additionally, ALEP has pub-
lished professional translations of the Afghan Civil Code and Afghan Commercial Code, and business guides
authored by Afghan students in the business law clinic. All are available on ALEP’s website.
ALEP would like to acknowledge the individuals and institutions that have made the entire project pos-
sible. ALEP benefits from generous and dynamic support from the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL) at the U.S. Department of State. Current Stanford Law School Dean Elizabeth Magill,
former Dean Larry Kramer, and Deborah Zumwalt, General Counsel of Stanford University and member of
AUAF’s Board of Trustees, have provided important continuing support to ALEP. ALEP’s partnership has
deepened over the last six years with AUAF’s leadership: Dr. Sharif Fayez (Founder), Dr. Mark A. English
(Acting President), Dr. Michael Smith (former President), and Dr. Timor Saffary (Chief Academic Office).
This second edition of the Constitutional Law textbook represents a new step in ALEP curriculum develop-
ment. We enhanced the visual aspects of the textbook to create a more professional and effective teach-
ing tool. We thank design consultants, Daniel McLaughlin and Paula Airth for their superb work and Me-
gan Karsh (Rule of Law Program Executive Director), Rolando Garcia Miron (ALEP Program Advisor), Chris
Jones, Mansi Kothari, and Adeeb Sahar for their directive and facilitative roles.
As with all ALEP textbooks, the content of An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan (2nd Edition)
is the product of extensive collaboration. In terms of content, we thank AUAF Professors Ghizaal Haress
and Mohammad Isaqzadeh, who provided extensive chapter-by-chapter comments the first edition, and
Professor Naqib Ahmad Khpulwak, Mr. Fahim Barmaki, and Mr. Yama Keshawerz, former visiting scholars
at Stanford Law School, who reviewed the final draft. I would like to thank the many student authors, and
particularly Jane Farrington, who worked tirelessly to finalize the book for publication. ALEP Curriculum
Advisor Rohullah Azizi, Jason Fischbein (SLS, ’16), and Daniel McLaughlin deserve mention for making sub-
stantive revisions to the second edition. Finally, we thank Professor Ghizaal Haress for bringing the mate-
rial to life in the classroom.
ALEP looks forward to continuing the collaboration that made this book possible. Please share your feed-
back with us on our website, alep.stanford.edu.
Erik Jensen, Faculty Advisor, ALEP
Palo Alto, California, December 2015
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Preface 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·9
CHAPTER 2: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·36
CHAPTER 3: THE EXECUTIVE · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 91
CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENT & ADMINISTRATION · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 112
CHAPTER 5: THE LEGISLATURE · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·135
CHAPTER 6: THE JUDICIARY · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 151
CHAPTER 7: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 179
CHAPTER 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 243
GLOSSARY · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 265
8 Introduction to the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan
CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM
1. CONSTITUTIONALISM · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9
1.1. Defining Constitutionalism ...........................................................9
1.1.1. Why Government? ...............................................................9
1.1.2. Why Constitutional Government? .................................................11
2. CONSTITUTIONS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 13
2.1. An Expression of Sovereignty ........................................................13
2.2. Structure and Limits on Power .......................................................13
2.3. Principles and Aspirations ...........................................................14
2.4. A Response to History ...............................................................16
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 17
3.1. The Early Constitutions: 1923 and 1931 ...............................................17
3.2. The Liberal Age: The Constitution of 1964 .............................................19
3.3. Turmoil after 1973 .................................................................23
4. THE CONSTITUTION OF 2004 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 27
4.1. Drafting Process ...................................................................27
5. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 33
5.1. Textualism ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
5.2. Structuralism ......................................................................34
5.3. Originalism .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
5.4. Precedent .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
5.5. Pragmatism .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 38
CONCLUSION · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 40
CHAPTER 1 9
AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM
1. CONSTITUTIONALISM 1.1. DEFINING CONSTITUTIONALISM
We begin this chapter by defining what we mean
“Over the past two centuries, we have moved
from a situation where almost no country had by “constitutionalism.” At the most general lev-
a written constitution to one where almost el, constitutionalism can be defined as “limited
every country has one.”1 government.” Put differently, constitutional-
4
Why does almost every country have a consti- ism is the concept of limiting the arbitrariness
tution? Is it because constitutions guarantee of political power, of having “a government of
5
democracy, peace, and economic prosperity? laws and not men.” This notion of limited gov-
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Surely not. Many unsuccessful nations have con- ernment has evolved over the centuries, and it
stitutions. Indeed, the world is “full of written is useful to consider how scholars have come to
constitutions, many of which do not mean what today’s understanding.
they say, while others do not accomplish what 1.1.1. WHY GOVERNMENT?
they mean.” It seems more accurate to say that
One of the most influential thinkers about the
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constitutions have become a sort of credential
limits of state power and the purpose of govern-
for countries, both domestically and interna-
ment is John Locke, the 17th century English phi-
tionally, that may or may not have effect in prac-
losopher. Locke’s political theory is founded on
tice. This gap between what a constitution says
the idea that there is a “social contract” between
3
and how a country actually operates illustrates
individuals and government. In his famous Sec-
that there is a difference between having a con-
ond Treatise, Locke explains why he believes peo-
stitution and constitutionalism.
ple unite in society and form governments:
This chapter will explore that gap and more. In §4 To properly understand political power and
Part 1 we examine the historical origins of mod- trace its origins, we must consider the state
ern constitutional theory and its reflection in that all people are in naturally.
the Constitution of Afghanistan. Part 2 looks at That is a state of perfect freedom of acting and
the functions that constitutions serve, both gen- disposing of their own possessions and per-
erally and in Afghanistan specifically. In Parts sons as they think fit within the bounds of the
law of nature. People in this state do not have
3 and 4, we review Afghanistan’s constitutional
to ask permission to act or depend on the will
history, up through adoption of the 2004 Con-
of others to arrange matters on their behalf.
stitution. In Part 5, we present several methods
The natural state is also one of equality in
of constitutional interpretation, providing you which all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal
with analytical frameworks to use as you study and no one has more than another… 7
the Constitution. Finally, we review the process
§123 If man in the state of nature is as free
of how to amend the Constitution. as I have said he is—if he is absolute lord of
his own person and possessions, equal to the
greatest and subject to nobody—why will he
part with his freedom? Why will he give up
this lordly status and subject himself to the
control of someone else’s power? The answer
is obvious:
10 Introduction to the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan
Though in the state of nature he has an unre-
Later thinkers, such as the 18th century phi-
stricted right to his possessions, he is far from
losopher Jean-Jaques Rousseau, built on Locke’s
assured that he will be able to get the use of
them, because they are constantly exposed to work to elaborate how government could best
invasion by others… This makes him willing protect individuals’ rights and interests. As
to leave a state in which he is very free, but Rousseau wrote in The Social Contract, “[t]he
which is full of fears and continual dangers;
problem is to find a form of association which
and not unreasonably he looks for others
will defend and protect with the whole common
with whom he can enter into a society for the
force the person and goods of each associate,
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and
estates… 8 and in which each, while uniting himself with
all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as
§131 But though men who enter into society
free as before.” Because people do not intend
give up the equality, liberty, and executive
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power they had in the state of nature… each to surrender all freedom when they enter a so-
of them does this only with the intention of cial contract, the only legitimate form of gov-
better preserving himself, his liberty and prop- ernment is one in which the legislative power
erty (for no rational creature can be thought
belongs to the people alone (not to a monarch or
to change his condition intending to make it
dictator). Finally, while the concept of a social
worse). So the power of the society or legisla-
contract is distinct from that of a constitution,
ture that they create can never be supposed to
extend further than the common good.9 constitutions logically follow from the social
contract. Constitutions are a means of anchor-
Individuals enter into this “social contract”
ing the organization of government and pro-
through mutual consent, agreeing to give up
tecting individuals’ rights and privileges.
sovereignty and abide by certain rules for the
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good of themselves and others.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
You may have heard of another English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, also famous for his ideas about
the “social contract.” Hobbes, who lived from 1588-1679, believed that life in the “state of nature” was
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” As a result, people would enter into a social contract and cede
some of their rights so as to be more secure. In contrast to Locke and Rousseau, however (and earlier
in time than them), Hobbes argued that it was necessary to have a near-absolute ruler to prevent
discord and civil war. Importantly, Hobbes lived and wrote during the brutal English Civil War (1642-
1651), a turbulent and particularly deadly period. The war certainly influenced Hobbes’s theories about
the role of central authority in securing peace. Is this analogous to how the unstable environment in
Afghanistan influenced the form of government articulated in the 2004 Constitution?
Locke’s views, in contrast, were formed after the civil war had ended but during the rule of King James
II, whose efforts to secure absolute power as monarch became a source of new insecurities for the
general populace. It was within this context that Locke questioned the theory of absolute rule and
instead theorized a more limited form of government.
The authors thank Professor Mohammad Isaqzadeh for his comments on this passage.